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ABSTRACT
Foreign aid, power and housing are the three key issues covered in this thesis. 
The focus of the thesis is on aid and the relationships that it triggers, and the 
role that power plays in shaping these relationships. This will be examined 
in the context of housing.
The thesis explores the way in which power impacts on inter and intra donor- 
recipient relations. While the economic relation in aid has been often the 
preoccupation of those engaged in this debate, the political relationship has 
been often overlooked. This research shows that an appreciation of the role 
that politics in general, and power in particular plays in aid, is necessary for 
an understanding of the aid process.
In order to form a complete picture of this process, both the planned 
intervention (policy-planning-implementation) and the community side, were 
covered by the research. This included the examination of the interactions 
between and amongst different collective actors as well as the impact of such 
interactions.
The research thus examines the particular relationship between the government 
of Egypt (GOE) and the United State Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which has gone through numerous changes over the last two 
decades, highlighting the way in which it had been predominantly a political 
relationship.
A housing project, co-funded by the GOE and USAID, targeting factory 
workers in Helwan, an industrial suburb of Cairo, was studied. The 
uniqueness of this case is that it was an attempt by USAID to change GOE 
housing policy. On the one hand, the analysis looks into the inter-and intra 
relationship between the different actors involved in the project. On the other 
hand, these various and complex relationships are examined in terms of their 
impact on two communities who were involved in the project.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
I THE PREMISE
There seems to be a general agreement that power is an elusive concept, 
difficult to define and even more difficult to study. However, in trying to 
understand what dominates a relationship such as that of donors and recipients 
of aid, to have veered away from power would have been to veer away from 
the crux of the relationship. This was a realisation that came out of eleven 
months of fieldwork in Egypt. The objective of the research was to reach an 
understanding of the relationship between the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Government of Egypt (GOE). Since it would 
have been difficult to study a relationship out of a particular context, a 
housing project that was under implementation at the time was chosen as a 
case study to provide such a context. This thesis is therefore about aid as a 
political relation, with a particular emphasis on power relations exemplified 
in the context of a housing project. It is also about how the political relations 
at all levels and the dynamics that they trigger, influence the process of a 
development project and how it impacts on the populations it is targeting.
Both the aid and the housing literature tend to have an economic bias. What 
this thesis will be attempting to do is to demonstrate that the political side of 
both aid and housing is as important in our understanding of both processes.
H BACKGROUND
USAID’s presence in Egypt was at its peak in the mid seventies under 
President Sadat’s Regime (1970-81). In 1975, a decision was made by the 
U.S. government to give full support to Sadat’s policies, namely peace with 
Israel and the newly introduced Open Door Policy, by dedicating to Egypt $1 
Billion a year in aid. This amount, which is the largest by far given to any
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country and only equals the amount given to Israel, was the beginning of a 
somewhat unique relationship between USAID in Egypt and the GOE.
One of the largest USAID projects at that time, was the Housing and 
Community Upgrading For Low Income Egyptians Project1, was initiated by 
USAID in 1976. The Project, with a budget of $160 Million, was co-fimded 
by the GOE and USAID. This housing project, which was the first large 
scale ‘non-conventional’ housing initiative in Cairo, is located in Helwan, 
which is an industrial suburb 30 Km south from the centre of Cairo (see 
Appendix 1 for maps). The main goal of the Project was M..to demonstrate 
the viability of a new approach to housing policy in Egypt for low income 
families in a manner that allows the GOE to recover a substantial percentage 
of its investment" (USAID Project Paper, 1978). The main policy changes that 
USAID was seeking were among others: a switch in the GOE’s emphasis on 
middle to low-income families; a reduction in subsidies by reducing standards; 
and to encourage mobilisation of private savings for investment in housing 
(Ibid), (see Appendix 2 for full list of objectives). The GOE had been 
predominantly involved in the construction of public housing or ‘conventional 
housing’, which was, according to the thinking of the time, an inefficient 
housing solution for low income populations.
There were two main components to the Helwan Project: an upgrading and a 
sites-and-service component. The Project was meant to upgrade seven 
‘squatter’ communities with a population of around 200,000 (Project 
Completion Report, 1988, p. 1). What started as the core housing 
component, Helwan New Community (HNC), was located on unoccupied land 
that was subdivided into 10 neighbourhoods, including 7,200 plots with 
infrastructure and services for a population of around 100,000 (Ibid). The 
Helwan Project which was meant to be finalised in 1984, was officially 
finished in 1988, with some of the components still under completion at the
1 Throughout the thesis, it will be called here the Helwan Housing Project, or simply 
the Helwan Project.
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time the fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in 1989. One major 
deviation from the original plan had occurred in 1987, leading to the building 
of public housing in five of the ten HNC neighbourhoods (see Appendix 2, 
table summarising the Project components).
m  HYPOTHESIS
The aid relationship by its very nature creates a dynamic that contributes to 
shaping the processes of donor led development. This dynamic which is 
largely political, is often not acknowledged. This study will be examining a 
particular housing case in Egypt to demonstrate the importance of 
recognising the impact of this relationship, focusing on the following 
hypothesis.
The Helwan Housing Project failed to meet its objectives as a result of the 
inherent contradictions between USAID project formulation and Government 
of Egypt housing policy on the one hand, and between the housing approaches 
of these intervening agencies and the needs of the low income target 
populations on the other. The contradictions originate in the very nature of 
aid relations, the different political and economic interests of the agencies, 
institutions and communities involved in the Project, and the degree to which 
they were able to advance their interests through the exercise of power and 
control. This is manifested throughout the different phases of the Project 
from formulation to implementation.
IV METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach to this study is to follow the different phases of 
the Project process examining the way in which inter and intra relationships 
between and within different institutions, agencies and target populations have 
evolved and the way that these relationships have impacted on the process 
itself. The impact will be examined in terms of the manner that the 
relationships within the project process has shaped the Project and in turn how
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this has impacted on the populations it was meant to reach. In other words, 
the thesis examines both the institutional side of the project as well as the 
populations involved. The thesis will follow the process from its initiation, 
its formulation and its implementation.
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
There are thus two levels of research questions:
1. The policy - implementation level:
What were the different housing policies of the major two 
agencies involved in the project?
What were the elements available that helped/hindered the 
different agencies to implement their policies?
To what degree and in what manner did the power relations 
between the different agencies influence the project process? 
What was the direct and indirect impact that such power 
relations had on the target groups?
2. The communities - target group level:
What were the interests (in relation to the project) of the 
different actors/groups in the upgrading community?
How did the power relations between these different groups in 
the upgrading community affect the process of the project? 
What was the impact of the project on these power relations in 
the upgrading community?
What was the socio-economic impact of the project on the 
different target groups (upgrading community and public 
housing residents)?
B. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION:
Data collection, both secondary and primary, took place over a period of 
eleven months over two stages. The first, was between October and March 
1988-89 and the second was between May and September 1989. This was
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followed by a number of short visits over the following year. The secondary 
data collection included mainly the examination of project documents and 
studies written on the upgrading communities. I was also able to access 
memos and meeting minutes. However, there was little that could be learned 
from them as they were often schematic and included nothing much on 
substantive issues. The primary data collection methods included observation, 
structured and semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and discussions.
At the policy and implementation levels, semi-structured interviews and 
discussions were conducted with employees in the Ministry of Housing 
(MOH), USAID, the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)2 and the 
Executive Agency for Joint Projects (EAJP)3 (the latter to be termed ‘the 
Agency’ throughout the thesis). Many days were spent in the Agency offices 
in Helwan, where observations and long discussions were carried out with 
staff. It was possible to observe how various discussions and decisions were 
taking place as well as interaction with members of the public.
At the community and target group levels, structured and semi-structured 
interviews were carried out as well as in-depth interviews and participant 
observation. Arab Rashed, one of the seven upgrading communities, was 
chosen as a case study4. Research was carried out both with the leadership 
of the community, and with members of the community. Neighbourhood five, 
which was the first to be inhabited at the time of the fieldwork, was the site 
of the research in Helwan New Community (HNC). In both cases, structured
2 The American Technical consultancy office hired to support the Egyptian 
implementation agency EAJP.
3 This is the Egyptian Project implementation agency.
4 The reason for choosing Arab Rashed was primarily because there has already been 
some research carried out there which gave me some basis of knowledge for the place.
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interviews were carried out with an adult male or female member5 of 200 
households6, as well as discussions with other members. Of the 200 in each 
of two places (Arab Rashed and the Helwan New Community) 20 households 
were randomly selected for in-depth interviews. The latter were visited 
periodically over the period of the fieldwork (For more details see Appendices 
3 & 4).
V THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis has nine chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. 
Chapter 2 is the conceptual chapter which covers the main issues and debates 
in the three bodies of literature that this thesis touches, namely: aid, power 
and housing. Chapter 3 is the chapter which lays the basis for the context of 
this thesis. It briefly covers the political economy of Egypt, the history of 
USAID in Egypt, the housing policies of GOE and USAID at the time of the 
Project, and the conditions under which the Helwan housing project was 
implemented. Chapter 4 traces the way in which the Project was initiated and 
the different stages it went through during the pre-implementation phase. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are about the upgrading component of the project, looking 
into the institutional as well as the community processes that occurred during 
implementation. Chapters 7 and 8 are about the Helwan New Community, 
again from the institutional as well as the population viewpoints.
5 I interviewed one of the ‘main adults’, a man or a woman, ie not necessarily the head 
of the household- the latter in my view an elusive and in many cases a meaningless unit of 
analysis.
6 A household is defined here as a unit that includes members living under the same 
roof, and who share the same resources.
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CHAPTER 2
AID, HOUSING AND POWER: A LITERATURE REVIEW
I INTRODUCTION
Aid, housing and power are three areas, each with a vast literature, theory 
and range of debates. The purpose of this chapter is by no means to cover all 
three. It will however raise issues in these three bodies of literature that will 
provide a conceptual framework to analyse the various processes under study 
in this thesis. It will critically examine the way in which both the literature 
on aid and on housing tends to be dominated by an economic rather than a 
political analysis. It will also explore ways in which the power discussion can 
be approached in a manner that makes the use of the concept less elusive. To 
achieve this, the focus of the discussion on power will be largely 
methodological rather than theoretical.
H FOREIGN AID: THE ECONOMIC DEBATE
This section will attempt to summarise, as well as critically examine some of 
the most important points of discussion that the aid literature has covered 
focusing mainly on issues related to the analysis of this thesis.
A. BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN AID:
Foreign aid is defined as "an instrument used by a government to strengthen 
the economy of another country" (Krueger et al, 1989, p. 1). It is money 
transferred on concessional terms by governments of rich countries to the 
governments of poor countries (Mosley, 1991, p .3). Its main goal, as seen 
by most donor countries, is "to promote long-term economic growth in 
recipient nations" (Bergner, 1985, in Bandow, 1985, p.25).
The first major foreign economic assistance programme was the Marshall 
Plan, officially the European Recovery Programme. It was put together in
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1948 to revive the war-torn economies of Western Europe. The Marshall 
Plan was hardly under way when the developed countries turned their attention 
to problems of economic growth and stability in the developing world 
(Krueger et al, 1989, pp. 1-2). During this period assistance was increasingly 
extended to former colonial territories by the U.K., France, the Netherlands 
and Belgium (Ibid, p. 34). This was followed by the emergence of bilateral 
aid agencies such as the American Agency for International Development, the 
German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and the British Overseas 
Development Administration (Cunningham, 1974, p.2). On the multilateral 
side the World Bank was created in 1944, followed by the United Nations in 
1945 (Op.cit, p. 34).
Aid flows may be multilateral or bilateral1. Foreign aid generally includes 
three types of aid, namely military assistance, disaster relief and development 
assistance. While they are sometimes blurred together, they are mainly three 
discrete types of foreign aid (Bergner, in Bandow, 1985, p.25). This thesis 
focuses on bilateral development assistance aid.
B. THE AID DEBATE:
The aid debate consists broadly of two major views held by the supporters of 
foreign aid on the one hand and its critics on another. While the former 
mostly belong to the political ‘right’ the latter is a mixture of the ‘right’ and 
the ‘left’. A middle ground also exists, mostly emerging in the late 1980’s 
and 1990’s.
The following is a brief summary of the main issues raised in the aid 
discussion with a focus on the opposing views held within the debate. The 
major shortcoming of this debate, which the following discussion will stress, 
is the domination of an economic rather than a political analysis of aid.
1 Multilateral aid is from a group of countries or an international organisation while 
bilateral aid is from one country to another.
8
1. The supporters of foreign aid:
The major argument of those who support foreign aid is that the ‘third world’ 
needs the economic contribution from the West in order to achieve growth. 
Foreign aid is based on the rationale that the insertion of aid funds into a 
recipient economy sets in motion a causal chain of positive influences in the 
following broad manner: aid leads to increase in domestic investible resources 
which then give rise to an increase in domestic investment which result in 
more rapid rates of growth (Riddell, 1987, pp. 103-105). This view of 
economic growth originates in the ‘two-gap model’ which identifies a gap 
existing between domestic savings and investment or between foreign 
exchange demand and supply, and thus the role of foreign aid (Chenery and 
Strout, 1966).
Conventional aid theories are traced back to the Keynsian growth model. This 
marks the beginnings of the creation of aid theory which developed in the 
1950s and 1960s. Walt Rostow was the first one to relate Keynsian growth 
theory to the economic purpose of providing aid. He saw the need of ‘poor 
countries’ for a ‘take o ff  stage into self-sustained growth. This ‘take o f f  was 
to be helped through the provision of foreign aid (Riddell, 1987, p .87). 
While using the Keynsian growth model, theorists like Rostow, Chenery and 
Strout (1966), also placed emphasis on the need for structural change to create 
the conditions necessary for growth to occur. Both highlighted the need for 
human capital and infrastructure investment to achieve more rapid 
development (Riddell, 1987, p .86). Aid’s role was seen as allowing
developing countries to improve their standards of living, build up their 
infrastructure, create industrial sectors and establish social services faster than 
otherwise would be possible for them (Arnold, 1985, pp. 159).
Those who support this view are categorised by White as belonging to the 
‘supplement economic theory’ school. This is the school that maintains that 
aid constitutes a supplement to the recipient’s own resources and see a positive
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relationship between aid and the total volume of resources available for 
development (White, 1974, p. 104).
According to Mosley the ‘case for aid’ can be summarised under three 
arguments. The first is the ‘distributive case’ argument. This is the argument 
that sees the conditions of poor people in the ‘third world’ as not acceptable 
and a situation that can be relieved by the transfer of income from those who 
have more in developed countries. The second, the ‘allocative’ argument, is 
based on the existence of multiple imperfections in the market for capital 
investment and loan finance in developing countries which could be alleviated 
by aid. And the third, the ‘stabilising case for aid’, proposes that aid flows 
can augment world aggregate demand and relieve unemployment particularly 
in developing countries (Mosley, 1991, p.5).
As the above brief review shows, the supporters of aid recognise the need for 
‘third world’ economic growth, and believe that this would be achieved with 
Donor support. Very little analysis has been carried out in this discussion 
about whether aid has actually achieved this goal nor what were the 
implications of foreign aid for recipient countries.
2. The critics of aid:
During the 1970s foreign aid was under almost continuous criticism from both 
the radical left and the radical right (Krueger et al, 1989, p. 6).
"Criticism of overseas aid unite the radical left and the radical 
right against the middle. But two groups of radicals arrive at 
the same conclusion -distaste for aid flows- by a different 
process of reasoning" (Mosley, 1991, p. 13).
Most of those who hold this view belong to the ‘displacement economic 
theory’ school. Displacement economic theories, in opposition to ‘supplement 
theories’, see foreign aid as a substitute for, rather than a supplement to the 
recipient’s own resources. The latter is seen to be consequently switched
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from development to non-developmental expenditure. The availability of aid 
is, according to these theories, seen as a soft option which induces the 
relaxation of recipient countries’ investment effort (White, pp. 104-105, 
1974). Those of the political right see aid as a distortion of market forces. 
Those of the ‘left wing’ persuasion have argued that because aid goes to the 
elite, it concentrates benefits of development in the hands of the rich (Ibid, 
p. 122). Savings mobilised through domestic taxation of the rich which would 
have been necessary if aid was not available, would have transferred resources 
to more productive uses (Griffin, 1970, in White, 1974, p. 123).
Influential ‘rightist’ critics of aid in the 1970’s and 1980’s are rooted in neo­
classical economic theory (Friedman, 1966; Bauer & Yamey, 1957). At their 
most extreme, these critics give no place to aid. They argue that its nature, 
as a form of intervention channelled to recipient governments, frustrates the 
free operation of the market, distorts the price system, and impedes private 
sector development (Riddell, 1987, p. 157).
In addition to the negative economic impact of aid, a number of authors also 
raise the negative structural changes that aid brings about. It is seen as 
contributing to the creation of a large public sector and central planning 
institutions, both perceived as obstacles to economic development. "Access 
to external resources obscures the economic inefficiency of public enterprise 
and distortions resulting from planning and control occurs" (Krueger et al, 
1989, p. 6).
Bauer, who seems to be the ‘high priest’ of the ‘right’, responds to the central 
argument of those who support aid by their argument that without it ‘Third 
World countries cannot evolve’, by saying: "..if a country...cannot readily 
develop without external gifts, it is unlikely to develop with them" (Bauer, 
1972, p. 100).
"In fact, external donations have never been necessary for the
development of any society anywhere. Economic achievement
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depends on people’s own faculties, motivations and mores, 
their institutions and the policies of their rulers” (Bauer, 1991, 
p. 7).
As for ‘the left’, their major criticisms focuses on the wider qualitative effect 
of aid on the receivers of aid rather than looking only at its impact at the 
macro-economic level. They are interested in examining the type of growth 
it has achieved and who it has benefited. They mostly look at issues of 
redistribution, and the role of the state and the economic elite in both donor 
and recipient countries. Some of the hard-liners among these critics tend to 
view development assistance as:
"..an imperialist conspiracy - as an instrument designed to 
reward the political, economic and bureaucratic elites of the 
developing countries of acquiescing in the exploitation of their 
resources and people" (Hayter, 1971, p .76).
From a populist perspective, (Griffin and Enos, 1970; Franke and Chasin, 
1980) the costs of modernisation are seen to be borne by the poor, and the 
gains realised by the wealthy. In contrast to critics of ‘the right’, those of 
‘the left’ analyse this as being the result of the weakness of the public sector 
in dealing with both external and internal organised interests (Krueger et al, 
1989, p. 6).
Most of the leftist critics (Baran, 1973; Franke & Chasin, 1980; Jalee, 1982; 
Wallerstein, 1975) have the root of their argument in the dependency school. 
The main focus of dependency theorists is on the external influences that 
distort the process of development (Seers, 1981, p. 15). One of their main 
arguments is that poverty in the ‘third world’ is a consequence of the 
penetration of market forces into the peripheral ‘third world’ from the 
capitalist centre. Self reliance is inhibited by the surplus in the economy 
being siphoned of by foreign capital and its representatives, in alliance with 
the state power in the periphery, which is in the hand of a small elite (Riddell, 
1987, pp. 135-136).
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Some ‘leftist’ authors (Lappe, 1980; Seers, 1981; and Myrdal, 1982) also 
focus their analysis on the role of the state of recipient countries and the way 
they represent the interests of a minority, the economic elite. Aid, as they see 
it, supports this relationship rather than going towards the alleviation of 
poverty. Aid is seen by Hayter and Watson as an attempt to preserve the 
capitalist system in the ‘third world’ by providing the regimes and elite with 
resources which contribute to their already existing power, a power they use 
to continue to exploit the poor (Hayter and Watson, 1985). These views 
follow the ideas of neo-Marxist theorists such as Poulantzas (1975), Althusser 
(1969) and Miliband (1969) for whom the role of the state is central to such 
analysis.
C. THE AID DEBATE AND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AID 
ACHIEVES ECONOMIC GROWTH:
The key relationship between aid and the economic growth performance of the 
‘third world’ has in fact not been appropriately proved or disproved in the 
literature.
Questions that do not seem to have been answered are: why is there still a 
need for aid if it was only meant to facilitate ‘take off’? What has gone 
wrong over the last thirty years of aid? There are those, like Arnold, who are 
of the firm belief that in some cases there seems to have been an actual 
deterioration of the economy despite aid and few developing countries have 
broken free of aid dependence (Arnold, 1985, p. 163-164). However, to what 
extent have such conclusions been substantiated? Most, even from within the 
aid debate, agree that "..unfortunately, a great deal of the discussion on the 
effectiveness of aid and other capital flows to date has been somewhat 
polemical" (Lele and Nabi, 1991, pp.3-4).
Riddell (1987) and Mosley (1991), amongst others have tried to find an 
answer to this question by examining figures coming out of empirical studies 
carried out in the ‘third world’. Most reach the same result, which is that the
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figures are not conclusive. Mosley, for example, argues that empirical results 
show no statistically significant correlation in any post-war period, either 
positive or negative, between inflows of development aid and the growth rate 
of GNP in developing countries when other causal influences on growth are 
taken into account. This, Mosley explains, contradicts development agency 
reports which show that projects are generally successful and that, on balance, 
overseas aid is an efficient instrument for the generation of growth in 
developing countries. These conclusions, he adds, are simply not consistent 
with the bleak macro-level results reported in empirical analysis (Mosley, 
1987, p. 139).
Mosley’s own conclusion summarises the inconclusive effectiveness of aid. 
His view very much reflects the new mid-way position that has emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s among those engaged in the aid debate.
"Stripped of its bare essentials, the case for development aid is 
that it increases growth rates in some developing countries, 
improves the standard of living for some poor people, and 
offers the prospect of doing better in the future for both. That 
is all" (Mosley et al., 1991, p.234).
The above brief discussion can lead one to safely say that the aid debate, both 
at the theoretical and the empirical levels, has failed to reach any conclusive 
results about the economic effect of aid. This raises a number of questions: 
Does this mean that aid is one of those issues that are so elusive and complex 
that analysts cannot really deal with them? Is the incapacity to reach 
conclusive results due simply to inadequacies in the economic analysis of aid? 
Or is it that, without dropping the economic approach to aid, an additional 
type of analysis is needed to give more insight into the problematic of aid?
HI POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN AID: RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DONORS AND RECIPIENTS
When examining the aid literature, one is struck by how little work has been 
done to analyse the actual relationship between donors and recipients,
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especially at the political level. Although the economic relationship is 
undoubtedly vital and will be included in the present analysis, this thesis will 
primarily examine the political aspects of foreign aid. The focus is thus on 
recognising that the aid relationship is primarily a political relationship. It 
also examines the extent to which this relationship plays a role in shaping aid 
and influencing its effectiveness.
Bandow, who is among the few who have protested about the lack of political 
analysis in the literature, puts this point very simply: "The bulk of foreign 
assistance flows from government to government. This form of transfer 
politicises economic decisions" (Bandow, 1985, p.xix). Montgomery argues 
that an understanding of foreign aid operations as a whole cannot be reached 
without a study of the politics of aid. "Its purposes and its achievements, its 
origins and its operations, its giving and its receiving, all involve conflicts of 
ideology and power" (Montgomery, 1962, p. 3).
"Perhaps the greatest objection to aid is that it is provided for 
political reasons rather than to promote development; the end 
results, therefore, are also political" (Arnold, 1985, p. 167).
In his revision of aid theories, White explains that while economic theories 
dominate aid literature, there are a minority who apply political or 
‘transactional’ theories in their analysis. Analysis of aid as transaction leads 
on to the identification of the patterns in this transaction, and to the 
formulation of theories concerning the interests of the users and how their 
interests are pursued. He distinguishes between two kinds of political 
theories. First, there are the ‘donor oriented’ theories, concerned with aid as 
an instrument of foreign policy. In this case the focus is on the interests of 
donor countries. Second, the ‘recipient oriented’ theories, concerned with aid 
as an instrument of domestic politics. These theories are concerned with the 
interests of recipient governments vis-a-vis competition with other groups at 
the national level (White, 1974, pp. 104-108).
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One of the limitations of studies which undergo a political analysis of aid is 
that they often stop at merely identifying recipient and donor interests. 
Donors and recipients are also often seen and studied as separate entities and 
the relationship between them is less often investigated. It is to the 
understanding of this relationship that the thesis will attempt to make a 
contribution.
A. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DONORS AND 
RECIPIENTS
Given that the aid relationship is a relationship between governments, those 
of the donor’s and the recipient’s, it is inevitable that there should be factors 
originating in the very nature of such a relationship which play a role in 
shaping and impacting on its outcome. The outcome in this case is whether 
aid succeeds in reaching its pronounced goal: development. Three factors, 
that play a role in this process, which are critical to this research, will be 
discussed here: the first is the interests of donors and recipients; the second 
is the contradictory goals of aid; the third, and most important, is the manner 
in which aid is administered and its inherently interventionist nature which 
stems from the nature of aid policy itself. These factors will all be analysed 
in the light of how they ultimately lead to a relationship where the exercise of 
power by both actors dominates the process of giving and receiving aid.
1. Interests of donors and recipient in the foreign aid context:
The aid literature discusses the interests that both recipients and donors have 
in foreign aid. However, this discussion often stops at the identification of 
these interests rather than a more in-depth explanation of their implications. 
Interests of donors and recipients are important in so far as they help to 
understand how much they influence decisions around aid. They are also 
helpful in understanding what is at stake and how much is invested in the 
giving and receiving of aid. The importance of such a discussion lies in
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adding to an understanding of the complexity of the aid relationship and 
explains one of the reasons for its politicisation.
a. Donor’s interests:
While donors’ interests might be seen by some as an illegitimate reason for 
giving aid, in fact, short of personal interests, institutional, national and 
international interests are pronounced by most donor governments themselves 
as being part of their rationale for giving aid. Most use a defence rationale, 
an economic rationale, a political rationale, as well a humanitarian motive 
(Black, 1968).
This discussion is often triggered by concern on the part of the public and 
politicians in donor countries about aid policy. There are, on the one hand, 
groups within the donor countries who need persuading that aid needs 
pursuing and there are on the other hand, those who are lobbying for aid to 
be increased. It is the former group to which governments seem to give most 
attention.
Donor governments appeal'to a variety of explanations to legitimise their 
granting or withholding of foreign aid to the ‘third world’. National self- 
interest, commercial considerations, historical links, political goals and the 
straightforward desire simply to accelerate economic growth in less developed 
countries are all motives that have been acknowledged as directly affecting 
policies governing aid flows over the last 25 years or so (Riddell, 1987, p. 3).
The international and national interests are highlighted by most donor 
governments by stressing the political interests abroad and economic interests 
at home. In the U.S., for example, President Nixon’s major policy statement 
on aid was clearly built on the principle that it would correspond to American 
private commercial interests (Hart, 1974, p. 163). Political interests in aid 
are about making and supporting allies through helping in ‘stabilising’ 
(Rossiter, 1985, p. 69).
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"Encouraging development, or at least attempting to do so, is 
good politics: economic as well as military aid can help attract 
allies, and to the extent that it works, increase domestic 
stability in friendly nations, reducing both external and internal 
threats" (Bandow, 1985, p.xvi)
External threats, which in the case of the U.S. was the Soviet Union up until 
the nineties, have lately been replaced by internal threats in different ‘allied’ 
countries. Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East is perceived as one 
such great threat.
Global self-interest may be served by helping developing countries reach the 
point of economic take-off which will help remove potentially explosive 
trouble spots that otherwise could affect an entire region (Arnold, 1985,
p.161).
"..we in rich countries, may have some self-interest in doing 
so in order to reduce social tensions which inevitably will grow 
if the rich parts of the world remain an island of affluence in 
an ocean of poverty" (Norbye, 1983, p .32).
In addition different institutions in donor countries may have different vested 
interests in aid giving. The defence ministers see aid as a means of winning, 
and holding the political and military support of the ‘third world’; trade and 
employment ministers see it as a means of winning a foothold in the markets 
of ‘third world’ countries creating jobs at home; ministers of overseas 
development see it as a means of promoting growth in ‘third world’ countries 
for the benefit of both those countries and the World economy (Mosley, 1991, 
p.5).
Large firms, for example in the housing sector, such as construction material 
factories and contractor firms, also have interests linked to the export of goods 
and expertise in the ‘third world’. Some donor countries insist on tied aid, 
which is the linking of aid disbursements to the procurement of goods and 
services in donor countries. In these cases in particular, the interests of these 
groups are guaranteed. There are institution and individual consultants whose
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careers depend upon the aid process continuing: they are mostly technical 
assistance personnel ‘who go round the world from one assignment to another’ 
(Arnold, 1985, p. 168).
One of the reasons it is important to know about the interests of donors in aid 
is to have an insight into what is behind various donor policies regarding aid. 
For example, Jay and Michalopoulos propose a method of understanding the 
way in which donor interests play a role in aid allocation. They explain that 
there is abundant statistical evidence that donor interests rather than general 
consideration of efficiency of recipient countries’ policies and needs have 
dominated the country allocation of bilateral assistance (Jay and Michalopoulos 
in Krueger et al (ed), 1989, pp. 70-71).
It is knowledge of these interests that can be the most potent tool for 
recipients to use in their negotiations, bargaining and manipulation strategies 
in relation to donors. This, as this thesis will show, can eventually change the 
balance of power in the aid relationship.
b. Recipient interests:
There is much less discussion in the literature about the recipient’s interests 
in aid. This is a serious weakness as understanding the nature of recipient 
interests in aid would obviously give another level of insight into the obstacles 
to the effectiveness of aid. One of the reasons that recipient countries, or 
more accurately recipient governments, do not try to alter the practices of 
foreign aid, is that this might affect their interests. "Powerful vested interests 
on both sides ensure that aid continues, whether or not it promotes sound 
development" (Arnold, 1985, p. 168).
As in the case of donors, there are different groups within recipient countries 
whose interests are served by aid at the national, institutional or personal 
levels. Recipient Government vested interests in aid is often in the support 
it gives them in holding onto their positions. This may again include
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economic and political interests. Bandow explains this by saying ‘fragile, 
non-democratic third world’ governments need aid money for their survival. 
"Despite their rhetoric, recipient governments may not be genuinely devoted 
to development". They use aid money for strengthening their own power 
(Bandow, 1985, p.xx). McNeil also argues that:
"It is ministers who are those most concerned. The minister 
wants to receive as much aid as possible, provided it is not 
accompanied by leverage which unduly constrains his [her] 
freedom of decision" (McNeil, 1981, p.54).
As is the case for donors, not only governments have interests in aid. 
Governments are joined by members of local elite whose careers are often 
fostered by external relationships (Arnold, 1985, p. 168). There are also all 
the counterparts of the donors, such as contracting, consultancy, research and 
other firms who want aid to continue whether or not they believe in its 
effectiveness. Donor policies are rarely ever challenged for this reason. This 
goes back to the discussion raised by neo-Marxists about the possible alliance 
between the state and the elite, and their mutual interest in aid at the expense 
of the poor. Another key alliance which is crucial to the understanding of the 
aid relationship, is the ‘unspoken’ alliance between donor actors, recipient 
governments and local elite. In other words, as the discussion in this thesis 
will demonstrate, alliances can cut across national and international actors. 
These alliances, as will be further discussed below, are not static, they shift 
over time.
2. ‘Confusion’ between development goals and non-development goals:
As shown above, most donors readily admit that their involvement in aid 
comes out of various political and economic interests. The main disagreement 
they may have with critics of aid is not about whether they do or do not have 
interests in aid, but rather to what extent these interests interfere with
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development goals. Some critics of aid maintain that non-developmental goals 
are the main reason for the failure of aid.
"Not only is economic development for the recipient at times 
viewed by donors as secondary to the pursuit of these 
objectives but the two can directly conflict on occasion.
Pursuit of non-developmental objectives-whether political, 
cultural, or commercial- through economic aid can potentially 
have a seriously detrimental impact on aid effectiveness" (Jay 
and Michalopoulos in Krueger, 1989, pp. 68- 69).
In a study of USAID, Rossiter distinguishes between development and 
strategic goals that govern aid administration. He proposes that the confusion 
between the two levels of goals accounts for the failure of economic aid to 
achieve its developmental goals. He explains that development mandates and 
diplomatic policies conflict in U.S. foreign assistance programmes. The U.S. 
foreign assistance mandate started in 1962 by making no distinction between 
diplomatic-strategic and humanitarian-development goals (Rossiter, 1985, 
pp. 15-24). The later Mandate of 1973, while more development oriented still 
did not manage to remove USAID from the control of the State Department, 
which is motivated largely by diplomatic and strategic goals (Ibid, p .221).
It is argued that the confusion in aid goals, is in the first place, due to the real 
confusion of policy makers themselves as to why aid is given. The lack of 
clarity of the goals is in turn transmitted to the civil servants. Consequently, 
two messages about aid are given: one to the electorate and the other to the 
international community - as to why aid is a ‘good thing’. In the U.S. for 
example, at the beginning of the 1970s, the Peterson Report, although in 
favour of increased aid, recommended "to establish a framework of 
principles, procedures and institutions that will assure the effective use of 
assistance funds and the achievement of U.S. national interests". Foreign 
policy in the U.S. has not changed since (McNeil, 1981, p.52).
Not all donors, however, allow strategic goals to dominate or to get confused 
with development goals. For example Scandinavian aid represent an important
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stride away from either the strategic goals or the concerns of post-colonial 
responsibility. Swedish aid laid down several basic principles early on in the 
1950s which help guarantee immunity of aid from political or strategic 
considerations. Examples of such principles include determination of needs 
by recipients, funding mostly goes to project aid and participation of recipients 
in running such projects (Browne, 1990, pp. 126-127). The question of how 
effective their aid efforts are, and how this is changing under new political 
leadership, is of course to be examined.
3. The interventionist nature of foreign aid:
Another factor which plays an important role in the politicisation of aid is its 
interventionist nature. Not all aid is implicitly conditional. However no aid 
is devoid of conditionality. Aid is rarely ever a matter of just a transfer of 
money from donor to recipient. Most aid is conditional on some change in 
policy in the recipient countries. When it comes to policy then one is dealing 
with politics.
Mosley et al. (1991) in their study of concessional loans given by the World 
Bank, provide a good illustration of the discussion of policy interventions. 
Conditions attached to such loans are not just the usual conditions of 
repayment. They include that the recipient government must fulfil changes in 
some of its previously chosen policies (Mosley et al p.xiii, 1991).
"The point at issue is how far pressure of this kind, which is 
quite overt, constitutes ‘political influence’ and how 
successfully it can be imposed on a reluctant government. ...as 
a rule conditionality consists of a requirement that the recipient 
adhere to policy conditions which the Bank, and sometimes also 
the IMF, have already laid down for the country" (Mosley,
1991, p .39).
The idea of conditionality and use of leverage is essential, and perhaps 
inherent, in the policies of major financial agencies currently concerned with
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the general economic policies of development, that is the WB, the IMF and 
USAID (Ibid, p. 20)
"It is quite widely assumed in developed countries that 
‘leverage’, or the use of aid to influence the policies of 
developing countries in one way or another, is necessary and 
desirable" (Ibid p. 22).
The notion of ‘satisfactory’ economic policies relates again to the discussion 
about interests and the contradictory goals of the donors (Haytor and Watson, 
1985, p. 24). Western donors have been accused of using the conditions 
attached to their aid as a means of forcing non-aligned developing countries 
with mixed economies away from state socialism and public ownership and 
toward free-market capitalism. International lending and aid-giving institutions 
-the IMF and the WB and its offshoots- make their loans conditional to 
recipient countries’ provision of a climate favourable to private investment- 
particularly western foreign private investment. Western bilateral agencies 
exert strong pressure on ‘Third World’ countries to make them ‘co-operate’ 
with multinationals.
"Aid policies are used to cement economic dependence: aid 
projects are tied to Western firms; aid is denied to countries 
which have tried to nationalise multinational enterprises; but it 
flows with abundance to countries which provide tax havens for 
foreign companies" (Heatley, 1979, p .27).
Again, as in the case of most aspects of foreign aid, not all donors conduct aid 
at the same level of interventionism. The choice is whether the donor wishes 
to play a pro-active or a reactive role. A donor who chooses the active role 
will find itself driven to set up an ambitious aid agency with specialists in 
each country and each economic sector. The supreme illustration of this 
choice is that of the U.S. At the other end of the spectrum is Austria in the 
1970s, which uses its sectoral ministries to react to proposals with a minimum 
of inter-ministerial co-ordinating machinery (Cunningham, 1974, p. 3).
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The important questions here are, how do recipients react to conditionality? 
And to what extent does sovereignty become an issue? The majority in 
recipient countries wish their governments to exercise full independent control 
over all major policy decisions, unless that control is willingly and voluntarily 
delegated to others. "They do not wish to lose the independence they have 
gained relatively recently" (Mosley et al, p .3, 1991).
While the generally held view, mainly by governments of recipient countries, 
is that aid is a ‘good thing’, certainly some, at different points of recent 
history, have found the strings attached to such aid unacceptable. In general, 
civil servants in recipient countries share the view that they need assistance 
and that, provided it can be obtained at reasonable cost, it should be accepted 
(McNeil, 1981, pp.55-56). However, the use of leverage in imposing policy 
is antagonising to most, especially to politicians. Ministers do not enjoy 
having to change their policies to satisfy a donor, and civil servant do not 
like to submit monthly progress reports (Ibid, p .47).
Since recipient governments need or are made to believe they need aid money, 
and since the interests of some groups in recipients’ country is tied up with 
aid, they, in various degrees, accept such conditionality. Some comply with 
the conditions attached, others just go through the motions and actually try 
and often succeed to various degrees, to evade the conditions. Some do this 
openly, others not so openly. However, there is also a body of opinion that 
rejects the acceptance of aid whatever the terms, either on principle or on the 
basis of its manifest failings. Aid, as White points out, may also elicit 
adverse reactions from conservative religious groups who are hostile to the 
values propounded by the advocates of economic development, from 
organisations representing the interests of small-scale manufacturers 
etc..(White, 1974, p. 137).
The tension, therefore which arises as a consequence of the interventionist 
nature of aid, is of a complicated nature, mainly due to the different individual
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groups within recipient countries who to varying degrees will accept or reject 
conditionality. The conflict that arises, as the following discussion and 
indeed the whole thesis will show, creates the conditions which makes the 
exercise of power by various actors in the aid relationship inevitable.
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON AID:
The above discussion points at some of the factors that play a role in the 
politicisation of the aid relationship. It also shows that donor and recipient 
interests, the domination of strategic over development goals, and the non- 
consultative and interventionist nature of aid, influence the aid process in a 
way that is not conducive to recipient’s development2.
Before moving into the second major part of this chapter, it is important to 
stress an important point which was raised above. A predominantly economic 
analysis is not sufficient in grasping the complexity of foreign aid. The 
political dimension or the aid relationship has to be recognised before any real 
understanding of foreign aid and what shapes it can be understood.
TV HOUSING
The housing literature, like the aid literature, is extensive. Since this thesis 
is not a housing thesis but rather takes a housing project as a case study to 
examine a particular aid relationship, the literature covered here will only 
focus on the following questions: Does the housing literature give an equal 
weight to the three major actors: international agencies, ‘third world’ 
governments and their institutions, as well as the communities? In its 
examination of the role played by various actors, does the literature include 
both an economic and a political analysis? Does it examine the role played 
by the various actors in shaping the housing process? Is there a more specific 
discussion on power relations?
2 Used in its broad sense of the word. Difficulties with definition are recognised.
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A. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF HOUSING INTERVENTIONS
IN THE ‘THIRD WORLD’
‘Third world’ Government involvement in housing is a relatively modern 
phenomenon. Until the fifties, people in the ‘third world’ built their own 
housing. In the fifties and sixties, increased demand for housing in the cities 
led governments to initiate new housing policies. These were translated into 
large scale public sector provision of housing, ostensibly to the low income 
population. These public housing programmes are typified by tenement blocks 
of minimal sized flats of relatively high standard with individual utility 
connections (Wakely, 1988, p. 122).
These ‘Conventional housing’ policies, as they became known, proved not to 
meet the needs of the majority of the low income population. Indeed, the 
latter continued to build their own housing. The process of ‘spontaneous self- 
help’ begins mostly with illegal land acquisition and continues through 
different phases of construction until it gradually reaches varying levels of 
permanence (Harms, 1992, p. 38).
Turner (1963) and Abraham (1966) developed a new philosophy of housing 
which was based on their documentation of spontaneous self-help housing and 
what they found to be the enormous success of low-income people in building 
their own housing and producing basic services in the face of opposition to 
government agencies. Their work also showed that the poor were the central, 
rather than the marginal, group in the urban economy (Williams, 1984, 
p. 174).
The new philosophy found some favour with international agencies such as the 
World Bank. Self-help housing, if put under state control, was seen as 
potentially an approach that could correspond to international agency policies 
promoting market efficiency, privatisation and the minimisation of public
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funding in the ‘third world’. Consequently the World Bank developed a 
housing package which was also adopted by other multilateral agencies such 
as UNCHS and bilateral agencies such as USAID. Funding was then made 
available with the conditionality that housing programmes must adopt the 
following set of principles: affordability, non subsidy, minimum cost, lower 
standards of plot size and infrastructure, cost recovery, replicability and 
charging market value of land, among others. For a decade or more, these 
criteria guided housing programmes in the ‘third world’ and some if not all 
were implemented to varying degrees.
Self-help housing policies, in the seventies and eighties, became synonymous 
with ‘non-conventional’ solutions and embraced two main kinds of 
programmes: upgrading and sites-and-services. Upgrading programmes as 
implemented by the state, support the existing housing situation of low income 
populations living in ‘squatter’ areas. In other words, reversing the previous 
policy of demolition, the support takes the shape of planning, technical 
assistance, services, infrastructure and resource provision (Harms, 1992, pp. 
38-39) to households so that they can upgrade their existing housing. Sites- 
and-services are programmes where sites are provided to households, 
including infrastructure and in some cases core structures such as a sanitation 
unit. The users are then left to complete the housing unit (Ibid, p. 39)3.
B. THE HOUSING DEBATE:
Although the housing debate is a wide debate, there is a recognised central 
discussion which concerns itself mainly with the viability of self-help, its 
meaning, applicability and impact. This debate is led by those who support 
self-help housing and those who are critical of it. While the debate includes 
a number of academics and practitioners in the field of housing, its two major 
proponents are Turner, whose ideas have greatly influenced the sponsorship
3 The latest World Bank housing policy advocates the total withdrawal of the state from 
the provision of housing, limiting its involvement to its role as ‘enabler’ (W.B., 1993).
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of the self-help approach, and Burgess and Pardilla, who represent the major 
critics of self-help housing derived from their neo-marxist position.
1. The protagonists of self-help housing:
There are two major bodies of empirical research on which Turner (1963, 
1967, 1972, 1976) and Abraham (1964, 1966), among other initiators of the 
philosophy behind the self-help approach, base their views. One is the failure 
of ‘conventional housing’ to meet the needs of the poor in the ‘third world’, 
the other is evidence that the poor are, and have always been capable of 
producing their own housing.
Concerning the first point, Turner argues that the housing projects which 
governments provided for low-income families were not only ‘costly, rigid, 
stultifying and depressing’ for their users but they could only house a 
relatively prosperous minority at the expense of the majority (Turner, 1967, 
p. 121). The second point comes out of empirical research which 
demonstrates that in the majority of the main cities of the ‘third world’, 
people themselves organise and help to build most of the new housing units 
without the real intervention of the state (Abioudum et al., 1987; Rodell & 
Skinner, 1983). Turner’s views were influenced by the recognition of these 
facts which led him to redefine self-help in terms of: a social decision-making 
process related to the construction of a house and the relationships between a 
household and its immediate environment in this process (Rodell and Skinner, 
1983).
For Turner, ‘good housing’ is more common where it is locally produced 
through network structures and decentralising technologies and managed by 
people themselves. In this sense, effective government housing strategies are 
those centrally administered policies that protect and make available scarce 
resources, ie. improving the service infrastructure, that will enable and 
stimulate the local provision of housing (Turner, 1972).
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In other words, what Turner is advocating is that the users ought to be the 
major actors in the housing process. They should be allowed to build their 
own housing without intervention except by the state in the role of supporter 
and provider of land and infrastructure. As the description of state self-help 
housing programmes shows, when translated into practice, the main focus of 
Turner’s ideas were lost.
2. The critics of self-help housing:
While the critics of self-help housing might agree on the two premises of the 
supporters of ‘self-help’ housing concerning the limitations of ‘conventional 
housing’ and the ability of the poor to meet their housing needs on their own, 
they disagree that state self-help offers a better solution or that it can replicate 
spontaneous or ‘artisanal’ self-help.
One of the areas of discussion by the critics is that the basis for the rationale 
for self-help housing, which is the replication of spontaneous self-help, is 
basically flawed. Burgess argues State interventions into self-help housing 
" involved an acceleration of the process of subsumption of artisanal (or pre­
capitalist) to capitalist activities" (Burgess, 1992, p. 86). The resulting 
increases in cost to the consumers put the projects beyond the access of the 
majority of those housed in the artisanal settlements, and often seriously 
prejudice the livelihoods of many of the households in project areas (Ibid).
A second area of criticism is what is seen to be Turner’s role in de-politicising 
the self-help housing approach, by presenting it as a natural, spatial and 
technical process rather than a political, economic and social one. "Class 
contradictions and interests are either denied or considered of little relevance" 
(Burgess, 1989, p. 1117). In agreement with Burgess, Slingsby argues that the 
supporters of self-help housing have not entered a discussion of such pertinent 
issues such as interests, redistribution of wealth and power. They did not ask 
the question of whether "..the current market system is flexible enough to
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permit these types of interventionist measures against the logic of its 
functioning”. He also adds that the political consequences of a policy that 
seeks to achieve the integration of the poor into the economic and social 
networks and physical fabrics of cities, is also overlooked (Slingsby, 1987, p. 
134).
A third, and perhaps the most important criticism of the self-help policy is 
that it is compatible with national and international capitalist interests and 
designed to maintain the status quo (Burgess, 1978). This follows the crux 
of the Marxist analysis (Pardilla 1974; Burgess 1978; Portes and Walton 1981) 
which is that no matter how self-help housing activities are organised, they are 
all articulated by the dominant capitalist mode of production and exchange, as 
well as by its boarder ideological and political structures.
Burgess makes the point that in fact it is these structural limits rather than the 
Tack of understanding’ by state bureaucrats of the housing problem, which are 
responsible for the inability of state housing policies-including self-help 
housing projects- to solve the low income housing problem (Burgess, 1989, 
p. 275).
3. The critics of the critique:
The critique of self-help housing has in turn been criticised. A number of 
authors who are engaged in the debate point out the need for self-help 
housing to be reassessed (Ramirez & Fiori, 1992). One of the points 
challenging the critics’ views is their Marxist-structuralist interpretation of the 
state. They are criticised for not recognising that the state is subject to 
contradictory pressures, sometimes succumbing to the need to accelerate the 
pace of capital accumulation, at other times, to the need for social legitimacy 
(Gilbert and Linden, 1987, p. 129).
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Another criticism relates to what is seen as the romanticisation of the 
‘artisanal’ form of housing and the total denial of the capacity of state self- 
help housing to meet the housing needs of the low income population in 
certain circumstances.
"The comparison that should be made, in any useful analysis 
of housing, is not between the idealised artisanal form and state 
self-help housing, but between unpleasant reality of partially 
serviced, self-help houses on purchased, if illegal, land, and 
state-inspired self-help schemes" (Ibid, pp. 132-133).
The impact of self-help on the commodification of housing is a further point 
of discussion. Fiori and Ramirez agree with Burgess that ‘slow 
commodification of housing’ does occur. However they see it as being the 
dominant side effect of self help housing only at the point of intervention 
(Ramirez & Fiori, 1992, p. 26). More importantly self-help housing 
generates new conditions for social organisations and negotiation between the 
state and the users (Ibid, p. 29). They end their argument by saying:
"Today there is a need, in our view, for the detailed and 
patient reconstruction of the articulation between the process of 
‘commodification’ and negotiation as the core of the self-help 
housing question" (Ramirez & Fiori, 1992, p. 30).
The conditions for negotiation and whether or not they exist, would vary 
differently from one context to another. The Latin American context probably 
would, as studies show, be more conducive to such developments. As in the 
case of other aspects of housing, it is almost impossible, as Fiori and Ramirez 
(1992) themselves argue, to analyse this issue out of context.
The above quotation illustrates the new direction in the housing debate 
towards a more political analysis. While economic implications of self-help 
housing are still considered crucial to the discussion, another level, that of 
negotiation is introduced. In this light, the community takes a central position 
in the housing process. The relationship between the state and the community
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is seen as progressing towards more of a dialogue rather than an interaction 
dominated by the state. However, international agencies and their roles and 
relationship with the state still seems to be marginal to the analysis. One 
reason for the exclusion of international agencies could be that the debate is 
mostly conducted in the context of Latin America, where the state rather than 
international agencies are at present the main sponsors of self-help housing.
C. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SELF-HELP HOUSING:
As the review of the housing debate demonstrates, the discussion which 
dominates the housing literature is an economic analysis. The economic 
impact on the target population, is the issue investigated in most empirical 
research in the area of housing.
As mentioned above, the principles of self-help housing were designed to 
reach the needs of large numbers of low income people, yet at the same time 
drastically cutting down on public spending. The contradictions between these 
two broad goals often led to their failure in meeting their first goal. This is 
what many studies in the literature were designed to demonstrate.
"The Bank sometimes appears to be its own enemy. A whole 
litany of principles - affordability, no subsidy, targeting upon 
the lowest income groups, minimum cost, lower standards of 
plot size and infrastructure, full cost recovery, replicability, 
market value of land, and so on have necessarily had to be 
formulated and applied. The principles come into conflict with 
each other and with practicalities" (Portes and Walton, 1982, 
p. 191).
Empirical research shows that these various principles have been implemented 
to different degrees in different contexts. Most importantly it also shows that 
in hardly any project have the implementors been able to follow the guidelines 
as set by the World Bank and other international agencies.
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Affordability is one principle which is most thoroughly examined in the 
literature. Research has been interested in investigating one of the most 
blatant contradictions in self-help housing principles: targeting the low income 
population yet meeting cost recovery. The reason for the introduction of state 
interventions, was to bridge the gap between cost of housing and ability to 
pay. The question is, how can this be achieved when cost has to be fully 
covered by users with no government subsidy?
A central element in the affordability debate is the manner in which 
affordability is assessed. Early World Bank financed projects assumed that 
some 25 % of household income would/could be devoted to housing (Mayo, 
1987 in Wakely, 1988, pp. 128). Research shows that this estimate has 
frequently been far too high: 12-15% or even lower is a more likely 
proportion in situations where up to 70 to 80% of income may have to be 
spent on food alone (Wakely, 1988, p. 127). Empirical studies have shown 
that as a general rule, within the lower income groups, the lower the income 
of the household, the smaller the proportion of income that can be conceivably 
set aside for housing. A greater proportion has to be allowed for food and 
other essentials. Cost of food as a proportion of income, and the 
dependability of income, are by far the principal determinants of resources 
available for shelter (Tym, 1984, p. 211).
The World Bank definition of affordability has changed over time. It started 
by being defined around ability to pay. However, a group associated with the 
World Bank redefined the problem of inability to pay into ‘willingness to pay’ 
(Keare and Jimenez, 1983; Malpezo and Mayo, 1985). This has been 
challenged by research findings which show that low income households have 
little flexibility in their budget to be able to make such choices. It is thus 
unrealistic to assume that it is possible for the low income households to 
reduce other (essential) expenses in favour of housing (Mathey, 1992, p. 386).
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Another issue related to affordability, is the reduction of standards of space 
and construction material. The principle behind this is to bring down the cost 
of self-help housing in order to guarantee affordability and cost recovery. The 
impact of such standard reduction is often studied. The general argument in 
this area is that although these measures have (in some cases) brought 
acceptable housing within the reach of low income households, this has 
resulted in plot sizes that are so small as to inhibit the chances of any 
substantial development of the dwellings over time (Wakely, 1988, 126). 
Studies carried out by Cabannes (1983) and Cheema (1987), have shown that 
some projects in Asia have reached sizes of site-and-services units and 
crowded sanitary facilities which made residences in fact uninhabitable 
(Mathey, 1992, p. 386).
Land tenure is another important principle of self-help housing as well as its 
impact on accessibility to housing has been also part of the present discussion. 
The question is: has regularisation of land tenure and the servicing of low- 
income settlements benefited or have they harmed the poor? The protagonists 
of self-help housing have only stressed the positive impact of legalising 
squatter areas and providing land tenure in both upgrading and sites-and- 
services projects. Zetter, among others, argues that improved tenure can 
create "instability rather than consolidation" as it often causes rents and land 
values to rise and "impose the additional cost of government land and property 
taxes with consequential effects upon affordability calculations" (Zetter 1984, 
p. 229).
Along the same lines, Mathey explains that land regularisation in addition to 
improved infrastructure, have been found to unavoidably increase the market 
value of sites and housing, and make areas more attractive for relatively 
higher income groups (Mathey, p. 387, 1992). This, as research has shown 
(see Daef, 1994) has led to the lower income residents either paying more or 
being pushed out. The displacement of the low income population as a result 
of the implementation of self-help housing is seen as one of its most negative
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impacts. This area has increasingly become a matter of interest to 
researchers.
There is general agreement that the consequences of the conditionalities of 
most donor led self-help housing programmes, have meant that such 
programme have not reached the poor. Even World Bank evaluation studies 
confirm that the original target group of such projects was not reached, at the 
same time cost recovery was not achieved.
As is the case of other areas in the self-help housing discussion, there is 
another argument arising from recent studies showing that some forms of 
interventions can give different results. This position is a reflection of a new 
direction in the literature, mostly in the late eighties, which shows findings 
that reflect some promise for self-help housing in reaching the poor. These 
recent studies have tried to look at benefits in the long run. The findings have 
contributed to new arguments and promise a new level of discussion in the 
academic debate (Stein, 1991; Ramirez & Fiori, 1992). One of the new 
propositions is to support the formation of self-help housing projects, by 
enabling the transfer of resources towards the poor through open or hidden 
state subsidies (Mathey, 1992, p. 389). The ‘enabling approach to housing’ 
is the currently promoted housing policy4.
D. THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN THE HOUSING LITERATURE:
As shown up to this point, the housing literature whether at the theoretical or 
empirical level, has concentrated on an economic analysis at both the macro 
and micro level. Even when the role of the state is discussed, or less
4 The ‘enabling approach’ to housing is a housing approach introduced by UNCHS and 
the World Bank (1987). It aims at providing the legislative, institutional, and financial 
framework whereby entrepreneurship in the private sector, communities and among 
individuals so that they can effectively develop the urban housing sector. Government roles 
are seen as enabling sector development (in Pugh, 1995, p. 64).
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frequently, when international agencies are brought in, it is economic rather 
than political interests and alliances that come to the fore. One of the few 
exceptions to the rule are discussions around negotiation in housing (see 
Ramirez and Fiori, in C. Mathey (ed), 1992). Those engaged in the housing 
debate have themselves realised this shortcoming.
As discussed above, one of the major criticisms by Burgess (1989) of Turner’s 
work is that it is apolitical. He argues that Turner sees both the state and 
housing only in a technical and administrative light.
"It would be a fatuous exercise to try to assess such [self-help] 
projects solely on the basis of economic or technical criteria in 
a situation where demands for the means of collective 
consumption and housing, and the state’s responses to them, 
are treated in political terms and are strongly articulated with 
questions of power” (Burgess, 1989, pp.300-301).
It should be recognise that although Burgess’s work (1989) includes a political 
analysis, he seems to see it as separate from his main argument. The crux of 
his work derives from a Marxist economic analysis. Consequently, he and 
other self-help critics have been criticised for this shortcoming.
”The intensity and extension of state intervention in a form of 
self-help housing policies depends fundamentally upon political 
circumstances. The understanding of those circumstances and 
their implications should be, in our view, the key issues in the 
self-help debate. We believe that it is here that the self-help 
critique has its most apparent limitations" (Ramirez & Fiori,
1992, p .6).
Fiori and Ramirez have started to incorporate more systematically a political 
analysis in their discussion of self-help housing. Their recent work (1992) on 
the potential for negotiation between the community and the state reflects this 
area of interest.
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While not the focus of the housing literature, political analyses has in some 
way been part of three different yet interrelated areas of study. The first, 
which is at the periphery of the housing debate but has some influence on it, 
is the body of literature on urban social movements. The second, is the 
examination of the role that self-help housing might play in altering the 
political make-up of communities. The third, is the discussion around 
community participation, especially in the housing context.
The literature on urban social movement (Pickvance 1976, Lojkine 1978, 
Castells 1983) does touch on the social movements in the context of housing 
but only marginally. Pickvance discusses issues such as participation, protest 
and urban social movements (1976, p .200). Castells makes the point that 
urban social movements are rare and limited in scope and duration, that they 
are in fact ‘the heart of a broader theory of urban social change’ in that sense 
of a ‘redefinition of urban meaning’ (Castells, 1983). Lojkine calls attention 
to the role of the state in financing so-called ‘economic’ infrastructure such 
as roads, harbours, communication networks, at the expense of ‘social’ 
infrastructure such as housing as a trigger to social movements (Lojkine, 
1978, p. 153).
More directly involved in housing as such, the second area of literature which 
include a political discussion, is the debate around the political impact of self- 
help housing on communities. The general view is that in one way or another 
state intervention will always have some sort of political impact:
"State intervention will affect the form of community 
organisation by modifying community and state relations. The 
changes may increase ‘social control’ or may sharpen political 
conflict by encouraging class solidarity over the provision of 
infrastructure and collective services. The outcome will depend 
on the different kinds of state-agency operations" (Gilbert and 
Ward, 1985, p. 14).
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Burgess further clarifies the way in which state self-help housing and 
upgrading projects can have an important function as instruments of regulation 
and control over the urban development process. He argues that in cases 
where communities are in some way involved in decision making, cadres are 
created as part of the institutionalised community development system in order 
to control the process rather than to facilitate real political involvement. 
Burgess then adds that even when there is not a high degree of institutional 
participation, "the ongoing process of paternalism, patron-client and political 
manipulation can weaken the collective structure" (Burgess, 1989, p .302).
Some aspects of the community participation literature also brings a political 
discussion in the context of housing. The on-going debate about the role of 
participation reflects such a discussion. The protagonists for community 
power see housing as a vehicle for communities to express some control over 
their own lives, and to redress political power from bureaucratic structures to 
smaller user-controlled groups. The World Bank on the other hand, justifies 
owner-built house construction and involvement of community organisation 
purely on the grounds of economic efficiency especially in terms of cutting 
down cost (Williams, 1984, p. 177).
Many of those on the political right see community self-help as a way of 
overcoming deficiencies by producing services and at the same time reducing 
dependence on the state. They see it as promoting self-improvement and 
independence, both cherished right-wing values. For those of the left, 
community action most importantly has the potential of raising consciousness. 
Between the two political extremes, many see community participation as a 
means of improving both material standards and increasing the community’s 
role in decision making (Gilbert and Ward, 1985, pp. 175-177).
Paul, followed by Moser, distinguish between participation as a means and 
participation as an end. ‘Participation as a means’ is seeing participation as 
a way of achieving a particular goal, eg cheaper housing. ‘Participation as an
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end’ is seeing participation in itself as the goal, as the goal to achieving 
empowerment. In a review of the experience of the World Bank, Paul 
discusses the different levels of the objectives of community participation. 
His definition of community participation is that it is "an active process 
whereby beneficiaries influence the direction and execution of development 
projects rather than merely receive a share of project benefits". The 
objectives of community participation are empowerment, building beneficiary 
capacity, increasing project effectiveness, improving efficiency and project 
cost sharing (Paul, 1987, p. v). These individual objectives can fit 
categorisation of participation as an end, and participation as a means (Moser, 
1983; Oakley and Marsden, 1984).
Moser suggests that community participation could be studied, based on the 
finding answers to four basic questions. ‘Why participation’: is participation 
seen as a means or an end? ‘When participation’: does the community 
participate at the planning stage or only the implementation or maintenance 
stage? ‘Whose participation’, are the owners the renters, men or women who 
participate? And ‘how participation’, is it just given lip service or is 
consultation in fact about decision making issues? (Moser, 1989, p. 80).
This discussion around the political impact of state intervention on 
communities and the use and interpretation of community participation in 
housing, are of importance to the analysis of my case study. Both these issues 
have played a crucial role in shaping the process of the relationship between 
the state and its institutions on the one hand, and the communities involved on 
the other.
E. DONORS, RECIPIENTS AND COMMUNITIES THEIR ROLES 
AND RELATIONS IN SELF-HELP HOUSING:
While a holistic, economic analysis is important to the understanding of a 
complex process such as housing and housing intervention, it is also crucial 
not to lose sight of the political nature of the various relationships that arise
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from and effect the housing process. It is a process that encompasses 
international, national and community actors with their multitude of sub-sets 
of actors, and therefore it is impossible to imagine a scenario where politics 
takes a back seat. However such recognition is not enough. To reach a wider 
understanding of this issue, the political relationship needs to be studied 
directly.
There are two levels at which this can be done. The first is to identify and 
analyse who the actors and the sub-sets of actors are. This would include an 
understanding of the dynamics of the relationships between the different actors 
and the way in which their interactions is effected by who they are. The 
second level, which is the focus of this thesis, is not only to examine what 
governs these relationships in terms of ideology, interests and alliances, but 
to look into how these various components are advanced by the different 
actors over a particular process. In other words, how it is that different actors 
conduct themselves in order to achieve their goals? What tools do they use? 
How do these change and evolve over time?
The discussion of the first part of this chapter covers a description and 
analysis of donors and recipients of aid, their respective institutions and the 
relationship between them. Considering the first level of political analysis, 
how do these relationships apply to the housing sector? At the international 
level, agencies are responding to different institutions within and outside the 
governments they represent. There are different government bodies, 
administrators and politicians. There are also consultancy firms, construction 
industries and contractors5. The latter three groups may influence the 
housing intervention of international agencies through their political 
constituencies. Therefore any analysis at this level will need to take into 
account these sub-sets of actors and the relationship between them.
5 International agency funded self-help housing programmes often include the import of 
building materials as well as technical support and supervision from western firms.
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At the level of interaction between international agencies and ‘third world’ 
governments, the interventionist nature of self-help housing is quite overt. It 
is important not to forget that in the first place, self-help programmes in the 
‘third world’ (and in some contexts to the present moment), are still 
implemented under economic and political pressure from international 
agencies6. The conditionality involved with self-help housing mean that ‘third 
world’ governments have to change some of their previously chosen policies. 
This, as discussed previously, immediately makes the relationship a political 
one setting up a particular dynamic that will differ from one context to 
another. The ‘third world’ state, in turn, is in no way a monolithic entity. 
Fiori and Ramirez argue that it would be an error not to understand
"..the contradictory character of a state which is always 
ambiguously and tensely held between the immediate interests 
of capital accumulation and the long-term need for social 
stability; a state which becomes itself an arena of political 
dispute and struggle" (Ramirez & Fiori, 1992, p. 29).
As mentioned earlier, while the state often does act according to the economic 
interests of the dominant groups, it is above all a political entity which has to 
respond to public demand in order to keep its legitimacy. In the case of self- 
help housing, the state is often constrained by international agency conditions. 
At the same time the state has to respond to pressures from different bodies 
within and outside it (eg. political parties). There are two broad categories of 
bodies, local and central government bodies, which might have different 
positions concerning housing provision.
"The administrative relations between central and local 
government exert considerable influence over low-income 
housing programmes. These relations are largely influenced by 
the ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ patterns of accountability. In 
theory, at least, the simplest systems should be found in the 
one-purpose organisations with a simple hierarchical command 
and accountability structures. However, even in these 
organisations there are cleavages and alliances which make ‘de
6 This is particularly true of Africa.
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facto’ control far more complex than might appear" (Amos,
1985, p. 165).
Examining one or the other bodies of government, Walton points out the 
contradictions within them. He explains that both within each and between 
each of the groups involved in self-help housing projects "there are generally 
wide, even violent, divergences of views" on which housing approaches are 
relevant. In particular, there are often powerful people in government who 
do not believe in the general self-help approach, and thus project preparation 
and implementation take place against strong and influential opposition. There 
is often conflict between the progressives and the reactionaries in government 
(Walton, 1984, p. 188).
Again a great deal would depend on who the programme or project 
implementing agency is. It might be a government agency or an NGO. The 
way they would relate to other government bodies (central or local), to 
international agencies or community would vary greatly. Moser argues that 
the most important constraint faced by implementing agencies [NGOs] is a 
political constraint. When community participation and decentralised, local 
control are feared by national governments, agencies are unable to adequately 
include community participation components in projects (Moser, 1989, 
p. 119).
This brings the discussion to the relationship between the government and the 
community.
"There are few comparative analyses which identify the reasons 
for the variations between state-community relations. As a 
result there are few general statements about the factors that 
have shaped state-community relations, the covert and overt 
motives for state involvement, and the relationship between 
party politics and neighbourhood organisation" (Gilbert and 
Ward, 1985, p. 16).
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Housing projects generally then become "immersed in a web of politicking 
within and between bureaucracies", leading to lack of coordination, delays in 
the delivery of materials, technical assistance and finance. Even those 
projects that have a stronger horizontal linkages based on cooperative work 
and strong community sentiment will find it difficult to resist the political 
process that accompany institutional participation (Burgess, 1989, p .304).
The community itself, as in the case of the other aggregates of actors, is also 
in no way homogenous. There are different groups operating such as leaders, 
both constituency and/or traditional, different party supporters, home-owners 
and renters, men and women etc.. Important dynamics resulting from their 
roles and positions as well as economic and political interests cannot be 
overlooked. Looking at leaders for example,
" ..leaders who present themselves as responsible for the ‘whole 
community’ often turn out to be firmly tied to one particular 
faction or kin group and may put forward views and solutions 
which are quite contrary to those of their neighbours" 
(Walton, 1984, p. 194-195).
Vertical alliances can also play an important part in shaping the role that 
leaders play in self-help housing projects. Their position vis-a-vis political 
parties will greatly influence their position.
The second level of political analysis is about the way in which such 
relationships, as they were briefly described above, are articulated. While 
actors, their roles, interests, ideologies and relationships might be touched 
upon to various degrees in the housing literature, the way in which they are 
put into action, or, in some cases inaction, is ignored. Since neither the aid 
nor the housing literature provide support in this area, a third body of 
literature, that of power, will have to be examined.
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V THE CONCEPT OF POWER: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
As shown above, while power is often part of the discussion of both foreign 
aid and housing, it is rarely central to either. Discussing the foreign aid 
literature, Mosley states that he was dissatisfied with the analysis in the 
literature which denies the link between aid and political power (Mosley et al, 
1991, p. xii). The same can easily be said of the housing literature.
Power and power relations have been studied in different disciplines: 
anthropology, sociology, political science and international relations among 
others. There is a general agreement among whose dealing with power, that 
it is a complex and ‘slippery’ concept. Some even suggest it should be 
avoided totally.
The inclusion of such a difficult concept as power relations is however 
unavoidable. As will become clearer as the analysis of this thesis progresses, 
it is the reality of the situation under study that dictated that this was an issue 
that had to be examined.
A. SOME METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY OF 
POWER:
Different approaches to the study of power explicitly or implicitly propose a 
methodology through which power relations can be observed. These 
methodologies include techniques of the study of power and choice of 
indicators, the choice of the unit of analysis, other elements important in the 
study of power and forms of power.
1. Techniques and indicators of the study of power:
While most of those who studied power did not discuss the tools they 
employed in their analysis of it, their definitions of power often implicitly 
reflected them.
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Among the schools that focused on the study of power is the pluralist school. 
The pluralists, to whom Dahl (1961), Polbsy (1963), and Presthus (1971) 
belong, have extensively dealt with the concept. Dahl defines power as 
follows: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
B would not do otherwise” (Dahl, 1957 cited in Debnam, 1984, p .3). Their 
methodological approach, the ‘ decision-making’ approach, was designed to 
answer questions about the distribution of power in society. This approach 
was based on the premise that power holders in a society could be identified 
through the examination of important decisions. Their studies were based on 
working back from important decisions to those who participated in them 
(Poulantzas, 1969, p .73). Polbsy, for example, argues that identifying who 
prevail in decision making seems to be ‘the best way to determine which 
individuals and groups have more power in social life (Polbsy, 1963, p. 113). 
Decision making was thus the indicator of the power intervenor (Barnes, 
1988, pp. 10-11).
The pluralists were primarily criticised for what Lukes describes as their ‘one 
dimensional’ view of power (Lukes, 1974, p. 15). The pluralist approach did 
not attempt to study why an exercise of power is successful. Such 
explanations, Joseph maintains, would involve taking into account the 
resources of the power holder and the perceptions of the subjects of power. 
Such categories, she adds, were excluded because they would not easily be 
amenable to empirical verification (Joseph, 1988, p .8). In other words, the 
pluralists did not try to study why certain actors had power nor did they look 
into how this power was exercised.
The neo-elitists have also been interested in the study of power. Their 
approach originated in the work of Batrach and Baratz. However, since they 
never explicitly defined what they meant by power, Debnam suggests the 
following definition to reflect their work:
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"...power can be said to have been exerted where there is a 
conflict of values between A and B; where A threatens B with 
severe sanctions in the event of B’s noncompliance; where A’s 
demand, and the severity of the sanctions, are rationally 
perceived by B; and where A gets his way with B’s 
compliance" (Debnam, 1984, p .6).
The neo-elitist approach, described by Lukes as a ‘two-dimensional’ view of 
power, focuses on the examination of both decision-making and non-decision 
making. Batrach and Baratz define a decision as ‘a choice among alternative 
modes of actions’ (Batrach and Baratz, 1970, p .39) ; a non-decision as a 
‘decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest 
challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker’ (Ibid, p .44). They 
argue that the pluralist approach takes "no account of the fact that power may 
be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to 
relatively ‘safe’ issues" (Ibid, p. 6).
Barnes criticises both the pluralist and neo-elitist methodologies for simply 
looking at the effect of power in a given social relationship rather than 
examining also the power holder and the power process itself.
"We are brought to the point where power is said to reside and 
then, at the last moment, we are made to look away from the 
power itself, as it were, to its consequences. Whatever 
produces these consequences: that is power" (Barnes, 1988, 
pp. 6-7).
The neo-elitist, like the pluralist approach are also criticised by Lukes and 
Frey for not including conflict between goals and interests of power holders 
and power subjects in their study of power (Lukes and Frey cited in Wrong, 
1979, p. 130). It is through the criticism of both approaches that Lukes comes 
up with his own approach to the study of power. His definition of power is 
that "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s 
interests" (Lukes, 1986, p.27). What he calls his ‘three dimensional’ view of 
power implies that power can occur in the absence of actual, observable 
conflict, which may have been successfully averted despite implicit potential
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conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be actualized. What one 
may have is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the 
interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. 
The latter may not express or even be conscious of their interests, yet the 
identification of those interests ultimately always rests on empirically 
supportable and refutable hypotheses (Lukes, 1974, p. 18).
Despite his comprehensive criticism of other schools’ methodological 
limitations, Lukes was unable to propose a methodological solution that would 
go beyond the identification of power holders, when it is that they exercise 
power and the conflict they cause for those over whom they exercise power. 
Why and how power operates was not worked through in his methodology. 
"How power is identified was left to the cryptical brief terms of the 
purportedly crucial definition" (Debnam, 1984, p.2).
The Marxist-structuralists offer a different and more challenging approach to 
the study of power. Their main disagreement with the decision-making 
approach is that power should not be studied at the level of the self-conscious 
action of individuals. They consider power to be a result of a whole system 
of constraints which exist in a society. It is these constraints that the 
structuralists see as determining the nature of decisions which a society makes 
and which also influence their outcome. To them participation in decision­
making by itself, could not then be taken as an indication of the distribution 
of power in society (Joseph, 1988, p.58). Poulantzas explains that the
fundamental defect of the conception of decision-making is that it succumbs 
to a voluntarist conception of the decision making process without placing it 
in the structure within which this process occurs (Poulantzas, in Lukes (ed), 
1986, p. 144).
Althusser’s structuralist-Marxism has led him to a holistic view of power, with 
important methodological implications. His analysis of power has taken the 
form of an analysis of the structures which support the exercise of power in
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society. It is assumed that power does not exist merely because people feel 
powerful, or alternatively, oppressed. Power is a result of the way in which 
society is organised and it exhibits itself in relationships of domination and 
exploitation. It is built into social structures and practices (Joseph, 1988, 
p.49). For Althusser and for those who adopted his approach, practice is 
class practice and power is a term which refers to the sphere of class struggle 
(Ibid, p.50).
Poulantzas defines his concept of power as "the capacity of a social class to 
realise its specific objective interest" (Poulantzas, p. 104, in Lukes, 1974, p. 
54) Poulantzas maintains that within the framework established by structures 
the relative power of different classes will depend upon economic, political 
and ideological organisation of class (Joseph, 1988, p. 64).
"The economic process is class struggle, is therefore relations 
of power- and not just economic power. In the case of classes, 
power comes down to objective positions rooted in the division 
of labour: it designates the capacity of each class to realise its 
specific interest in a relation of opposition to that capacity in 
other classes. It is therefore impossible for power to escape 
economic relations" (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 36).
To study power, Poulantzas suggests a ‘relational theory of power’. He 
argues
"..as applied to social classes, power should be understood as 
the capacity of one or several classes to realise their specific 
interests". "...The capacity of one class to realise its interests 
is in opposition to the capacity (and interests) of other classes: 
the field of power is therefor strictly relational" (Poulantzas,
1978, p. 147).
Interest in the context of class, advancement of interests and degree of other’s 
resistance through their own advancement of interests are thus Poulantzas’ 
major indicators for the study of power. Poulantzas’ methodological approach
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is useful in the context of this thesis especially in terms of his ‘relational 
theory’, though less so in terms of orthodox class analysis7.
The relational theory helps in the examination of international agencies and 
‘third governments’, as well as ‘third world’ governments and communities. 
It provides an interesting tool in understanding to what degree power is 
exercised in so far as it is allowed by the other actors. However, the findings 
of this thesis will challenge Poulantzas’s structural determinism. The issue of 
choice which has little space in his theory of power, the choice of certain 
actors not to exercise power, ie ‘inaction’, proves to be a crucial characteristic 
of power relations in this research. Another problem with structural 
determinism, is the assumption of implicit ownership of power by certain 
classes and the static implications of such a supposition.
Foucault’s conception of power although methodologically elusive, provides 
an extremely important dimension to the understanding of complex and 
dynamic power relations as examined in this thesis. Foucault argues that 
power "..is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual’s 
consolidated and homogenous domination over others, or that of one group or 
class over others" (Foucault, 1980, p. 98).
"It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, 
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power 
is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And 
not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of undergoing and exercising this power"
(Ibid).
Foucault’s definition challenges one of the most serious methodological 
shortcomings of the study of power as a static phenomenon. It seems to offer
7 This thesis will examine mostly relations between national and international agencies 
at the policy level, between ethnicity, leadership and tenants and owners at the community 
level. Class will only be one dimension of the political analysis of power relations.
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a way out of the Marxist-structuralist determinism which assumes that those 
who have political and economic control have monopoly over power.
On the other hand, many of the problems that arise with Foucault’s theory of 
power are related to the way in which his concept of power is ‘..generalised 
to such an extent that it loses any analytic force’ (McNay, 1994, p. 104). 
While this might be the case, what Foucault provides is an opening up and a 
challenge to any sort of determinism when it comes to the holders of power. 
It is this very opening which Foucaults’ definition of power offers 
which enables the exploration of the issues raised in this thesis to take place.
2. The unit of analysis: holistic versus individualistic:
While this discussion deals with a number of important and complex issues, 
one of the centres of the debate is about the context of the analysis of power. 
There are those who propose that power is held and exercised by individuals, 
others see it only in the context of structures. The question is: ".. if we say 
that information about actors is essential to any discussion of power, then 
what is to count as an actor?" (Debnam, 1984, p. 16).
Methodologically the unit of analysis is generally divided into ‘individualistic’, 
ie. seeing the power relationship as being exercised by individuals, or 
‘collective’ or ‘holistic’ implying structures, classes, institutions, society etc. 
Lukes calls this the dichotomy between structural determinism and 
methodological individualism (Lukes, 1974, p. 54). The methodological 
divide, needless to say, has crucial implications in the study of power.
When power is analysed by the pluralist and neo-elitists for example, actors 
in power relations are in fact individuals and small cliques and or factions. 
On the other hand, for marxists, structuralist and functionalists, actors are 
collectivities or structures.
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Most of those who study the literature on power agree that the majority of the 
contributors to the study of power belong to the individualistic rather than the 
holistic approach. Barnes argues that Weber, Dahl and Wrong assign power 
to individuals rather than institutions or entire societies. Although some 
sociologists such as Parsons (1960), Deutsch (1968), Poulantzas (1978) and 
several others, think of power as "..essentially a structural property manifest 
in an entire society rather than its constituent individuals", the mainstream of 
sociologists and political theorists assigns it as a property of the individual 
(Barnes, 1988, p .6). Wrong describes how decisionists, elitists and pluralist, 
"..are all prone to locate power in the resources of the individuals rather than 
in impersonal organisations" (Wrong, 1979, p. 133).
In his criticism of the individualistic approach, Lukes argues that its 
formulation facilitates moral and evaluative objectives. By defining power as 
individualistic one can fix responsibility for action or inaction (Lukes, 1974, 
p .6). Lukes himself was however criticised for not offering a solution and for 
ending up retreating to the same base in methodological individualism that he 
sought to demolish (Debnam, 1984, pp. 17-18).
Althusser, who adopts a holistic approach to the study of power, "..has
pitched his discussion exclusively at the level of structures because he feels
that individual action cannot be considered in isolation from the social
situation.."(Joseph, 1988, p. 11). Certain concepts associated with the
problem of power such as concepts of interests, or exploitation, would refer
in Althusser’s theory to aspects of objective structures rather than to attributes
of individuals. The significance of the experience and perceptions of
individuals can only be understood by reference to the structures of the
formation (Joseph, 1988, p.57). Arendt acknowledges the primacy of
collective resources in her definition of power when she writes:
"..power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to 
act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; 
it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as 
the group keeps together" (Arendt, 1970, p .44 ).
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"The large bureaucratic structures of the modern world 
suggest" ...that "..organisations may be collective or corporate 
actors sui generis, wielding and accumulating power that serves 
neither the goals and interests of their members, nor a minority 
of organisational leaders, nor, for that matter, of outside 
individuals or groups to which the leaders are accountable. ..it 
is for their own self-aggrandisement" (Wrong, 1979, p. 140).
Joseph explains that the structuralist approach "...has tried to go behind the 
study of individuals who exercise power to the structural conditions which 
‘place’ these individuals and define their roles. It has tried to show how the 
intentions of people and their actions are influenced by factors outside their 
control and it has tried to provide concepts which can be used to analyses 
these systemic constraints" (Joseph, 1988, p .60). The structuralists have also 
been criticised for their holistic approach.
"The structuralist approach to power has faced the problem of 
providing concepts by which structures can be linked to action.
In attempting to avoid an approach which awards independent 
significance to individual action, theorists have taken the 
opposite position of not giving action any explanatory role in 
their theory".
Giddens thus finds that the main methodological weakness of the structuralists 
is that individual action, consciousness and experience are excluded from the 
analysis (Giddens, 1976, p. 121 in Joseph, 1988, p. 66).
While the above theories conceptualise the existence of power either among 
an individual/s or within structures, one cannot avoid the question: Does it 
have to be one or the other? Is it not the case that the individual range of 
possibilities to exercise power is drawn out of structures that allow this 
individual to exercise a certain form of power at a given time? Is it also not 
true that there are individuals who would chose to exercise power or not, who 
would exercise one form of power rather than another within the same 
structure? In other words, while power of individuals might be drawn out of 
structures, some individuals while probably restrained by the boundary of such
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structures, can exercise a level of choice in the way they exercise power. 
Other individuals, under certain circumstances might even challenge these 
structures. Foucault, according to McNay, offers the possibility of power 
being exercised in all contexts.
"Power underlies all social relations from the institutional to 
the inter-subjective... To understand power, therefore, it is 
necessary to analyse it in its most diverse and specific 
manifestations rather than focusing on its most centralised 
forms such as its concentration in the hands of a coercive elite 
or a ruling class. This focus on the underside of everyday 
aspect of power relations Foucault calls the microphysics rather 
than the macrophysics of power" (McNay, 1994, p. 3).
While the analysis of this thesis would favour an inclusion of both the 
‘macrophysics’ and the ‘microphysics’ of power, the latter will be primarily 
analysed in the context of the former. What this means is that while the 
exercise of power (conscious or unconscious), action or inaction might be 
exercised by individuals, this exercise is as such because the contextual 
structure allows it. This again does not deny the possibility that structures 
also allow the possibility for challenge and change.
3. The forms of power:
In order to study power in all its complexity, various forms of power need to 
be recognised. The only distinction made above in terms of forms of power 
is the general categorisation of whether it simply implies action, or also 
include inaction. In fact a clear definition of various forms of power with its 
various strategies and tactics is crucial.
Wrong, in his discussion of forms of power explains that the classification of 
forms of power as ideal types by no means imply that all actual power 
relations can be neatly subsumed under one or another labelled form. ". .Most 
power relations are mixed, exhibiting qualities of contrasted types interwoven 
into an apparently inseparable blend" (Wrong, 1979, pp.66-67). Wrong
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distinguishes between different forms of power such as force, manipulation, 
persuasion and authority. Manipulation and persuasion, he argues, are the 
more interesting forms due to their subtlety and effectiveness (Ibid). 
Manipulation, as the thesis will show, is in fact an important form to 
recognise when examining the relationship between donors and recipients of 
aid.
Galbraith suggests another range of forms of power. These are condign, 
compensatory and conditioned power.
"Condign power wins submission by inflicting or threatening 
appropriately adverse consequences. Compensatory power, in 
contrast, wins submission by the offer of affirmative 
reward...Conditioned power...is exercised by changing belief" 
(Galbraith, pp.213-214 in Lukes, 1986).
Deutsch discusses the range of power. He defines it as "the difference 
between the highest reward (or indulgence) and the worst punishment (or 
deprivation) which a power-holder can bestow (or inflict) upon some person 
in his domain)" (Deutsch, 1968, cited in Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1982, 
pp.66-67). A government expenditure on foreign aid and technical assistance 
would be reliable and valid indicators of reward-oriented range of power 
(Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1982, p.71). There is also room for both condign 
and conditional power, which as this thesis will show, could or could not be 
acted upon.
Different forms of power can intersect with different stages of power 
relations. To borrow Blowers’ three stages of the social system, power 
relations can go through a dormant, passive and active stage. He explains that 
a situation may be dormant when there is no conflict; passive when the 
potentiality for conflict emerges but is resisted by various means; and active 
when conflict can no longer be contained and expresses itself demanding 
resolution through political action (Blowers in Healey et al (eds), 1982, 
p. 143).
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Related to stages of power, Law distinguished four themes that are employed 
by sociologists in the understanding of power: ‘power to’, ‘power for’, ‘power 
storage’ and ‘power discretion’. Power storage is the potential to exercise 
power and power discretion is the choice to exercise power or not to (Law, 
1991, pp. 169-170). Foucault, Law explains, does not believe that power can 
be stored because power "..is exercised rather than possessed " it is not 
"...acquired or preserved" (Foucault, 1979, p.27 cited in Law, 1991, p. 169). 
Law however argues that to reject ‘power storage’ is to ignore the techniques 
and strategies by which power is created (Law, 1991, p. 169).
‘Power discretion’, as Law discusses it, is a very interesting concept as it is 
not only a theme and a stage in a power relation, but also part of the strategy. 
The power not to act is a necessary tactic in a power situation . Barnes also 
discusses the importance of recognising power discretion. He explains that 
the ‘power holders’ concentrate not only on capacity for action, but discretion 
in its use. They hold the potential not only to act but the potential to chose 
between different lines of action (Barnes, 1988, p .73). In concluding his 
discussion of these themes of power, Law says: "I want to touch on the 
effects, the methods and the techniques that actors use to store and secure 
discretion in the development of power" (Law, 1991, p. 172).
In general, when forms of power are examined, the analysis stops at 
identifying what form of power is used in a particular social context. What 
this fails to do is to recognise the possibility of the co-existence of several 
forms of power in a particular power relationship and the fact that they could 
also change over time. Different forms might be used at different stages of 
a given relationship, depending on the strategies and tactics that might be 
needed under particular conditions.
The dynamic nature that characterise power relations in terms of its forms, 
tactics and strategies have been particularly well captured by Foucault. He 
argues that one must conduct an ‘ascending’ analysis of power, starting from
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the infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own 
trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these 
mechanisms of power have been- and continue to be invested, colonised, 
utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc. (Foucault, 1979, p. 
235).
What Foucault implies here is a methodology that assumes forms, strategies 
and tactics of power are dynamic. It is the very examination of how these 
change over time and why, that is interesting as well as challenging.
4. Elements which are key to the understanding of power relations:
Various methodological approaches to the study of power include a number 
of elements which are considered to be linked to the exercise of power and 
thus to its examination. In his review of the literature on power, Debnam 
(1984) tries to dissect the different methodological approaches to the study of 
power by examined which ‘elements’ are included by various theorists. 
Rather than going into this analysis in great detail, it would be useful to 
examine just two such elements and how they are considered necessary to the 
understanding of power relations.
Interest and conflict, which themselves are complex concepts, are among 
others, elements that are examined when power relations are analysed. These 
elements are often implicitly rather than explicitly included in the different 
methodological approaches to the study of power. The aid theoretical 
discussion also very much focuses on these two elements. The difference is 
that it stops short of analysing how interests and conflict are manifested in the 
way the relationship of recipients and donors is conducted. Putting it in the 
context of power relations helps in this analysis.
‘Interest’ is a complex theoretical concept which is closely tied into the 
concept of power. As the above discussion shows, the word ‘interest’ was
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mentioned many times whether in definitions or approaches to the study of 
power. It is not only a complex concept but also it is difficult to access.
It is primarily the marxist-structuralists who strongly advanced the link 
between power and interest. It is important to point out that interests are used 
by theorists, such as Althusser for example, as objective structures rather than 
attributes of individuals (Joseph, 1988, p.57).
Poulantzas argued that ‘if functions of the state in a determinate social 
formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, 
it is by reason of the system itself, the direct participation of members of the 
ruling class in the state apparatus is not the cause but the effect" (Joseph, 
1988, p.59). Interest is central to Poulantzas’ definition and method of the 
study of power.
‘Interest’ inevitably raises the issue of conflict. ‘Conflict’ is another element 
of power which seems to be crucial to the understanding of power relations. 
There is disagreement within the power debate about whether conflict is a 
necessary component of power. Dahl writes that it is " a necessary though 
possibly not a sufficient condition that the key issue should involve actual 
disagreement in preferences among two or more groups" (Dahl, 1958 cited in 
Lukes p. 13). Conflict, according to that view, assumes to be crucial in 
providing an experimental test of power attribution: without it the exercise of 
power will, it seems to be thought, fail to show up.
Giddens, on the other hand is unwilling to connect conflict to power. He 
argues that while conflict and interests are linked, conflict and power are not. 
He explains that the relationship between power and conflict is a contingent 
one: "..as I have formulated it, the concept of power, in either sense, does 
not logically imply conflict". This stands against some uses or misuses of 
perhaps the most famous formulation of ‘power’ in the sociological literature, 
that of Max Weber, according to whom power is ‘the capacity of an individual
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to realise his will, even against the opposition of others’. The omission of 
the ‘even’ in some renderings of this definitions is significant: then it 
becomes the case that power presupposes conflict, since power only exists 
when the resistance of others has to be overcome, their will subdued. It is the 
concept of ‘interest’ rather than that of power as such, which relates directly 
to conflict and solidarity. If power and conflict frequently go together, it is 
not because the one logically implies the other, but because power is linked 
to the pursuance of interests, and people’s interests may fail to coincide 
(Giddens, 1993, p. 112).
As shown in previous section, interest is very much the centre of discussion 
in the aid debate. This makes the discussion of interest in the context of 
power relations of particular importance to the analysis of this thesis.
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON KEY METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES:
The above discussion shows how different approaches have tried to study 
power through the identification of who has power, maybe to a lesser degree 
why they have power or how this power is exercised. It also examines how 
power is exercised and how and why relationships of power change over time. 
While this thesis does not adopt a purely Foucaultdian analysis of power 
relations, Foucault’s ideas about the way in which power could be conceived 
provide a crucial insight into the understanding of the findings of my research. 
Had an exclusive structuralist methodological approach been adopted, an 
understanding of the complex and dynamic relations that characterise the 
process studied in this research would have been missed. While Poulantzas’ 
conception of power is an interesting and useful one, it does not go far enough 
to explain the power relations that exist among actors beyond the boundaries 
of class, the various possibilities of holding power and losing power over time 
and the possible challenges to seemingly unquestionable power holders.
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The discussion about forms of power, while it provides a very important tool 
to the understanding of power relations, does not go far enough either. As 
mentioned above, forms are not static, one form does not have to be 
characteristic of one power relationship. In this sense, Foucault’s analysis 
offers a very interesting view of the dynamic character of strategies, forms 
and tactics that dominate power relations. It is the examination of these 
changing and dynamic forms, tactics and strategies over the process in a 
particular context, that can help understand most about power relations.
v n  CONCLUSION
The three bodies of literature provide in their different ways a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of this thesis. While the foreign aid literature 
provides a basis for the understanding of donors and recipients and the role 
they play in the aid context, it is lacking in terms of examining the 
relationship itself, in terms of including a political discussion and in terms of 
examining the populations of recipient countries, their roles in the aid relation 
and the impact that the latter has on their lives. The housing literature, while 
sharing the same weakness of the exclusion of a rigorous political analysis in 
the understanding of the housing process, adds the dimension of populations 
of the ‘third world’ and the impact that state and often donor led interventions 
have on them. The third body of literature on power provides this missing 
dimension of a political analysis. While acknowledging the difficulty of 
reaching a workable operational definition of power, there is enough in what 
Poulantzas and Foucault offer, to attempt an exploration of power relations 
and the dynamic they set in the context under study. Indicators of power, 
forms of power and units of analysis in so far as they are seen as dynamic, 
also provide useful tools for understanding power relations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK:
AH) AND HOUSING IN EGYPT
I INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the Government of Egypt (GOE) and USAID as 
exemplified by the Helwan ‘Housing and Community Upgrading for Low 
Income Egyptians’ project, can be better understood when put in the context 
of Egypt’s political economy in the last two decades. This chapter briefly 
attempts to cover what has been a very dynamic and complex process in the 
modern history of Egypt. The first part will deal with the political economy 
of Egypt since the 1952 Egyptian Revolution and the role that aid played 
during this period; the second part will give some background about the 
housing situation of Cairo and the various government interventions to deal 
with it; the third part, will be a brief background on the Helwan Housing 
Project.
H THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EGYPT AND FOREIGN AID
After centuries of foreign occupation, Egypt gained its independence in 1952. 
Two major policy shifts have happened since then, one towards socialism, the 
other towards capitalism. Throughout its post-revolutionary years, Egypt has 
relied heavily on both multilateral and bilateral economic aid. It started by 
getting aid predominantly from the U.S. and Russia. Then, in 1965, the U.S. 
stopped all aid to Egypt, resuming it again in 1973. Egypt also received 
multilateral aid from the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBD), 
as well as from the oil rich Arab states in both multilateral and bilateral form.
One way of looking at the recent history of Egypt is to examine it according 
to three phases following its presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. During
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these three phases its relationships with aid donors has gone through a number 
of changes. Since this thesis examines the relationship between USAID and 
Egypt, the focus in the following sections will be predominantly on this 
relationship. Also, while Egypt receives various types of aid such as military, 
food and development aid, given the focus of this thesis only the latter will be 
discussed in detail.
«
A. THE NASSER PHASE (1954-1970)
Having led the Egyptian revolution of 1952, Nasser became President of 
Egypt in 1954 after an interim government presided over by Mohamed Naguib 
for two years.
1. The Political Economy of Egypt under Nasser:
Shortly after the Egyptian revolution, the new government headed by Nasser 
took major steps towards political, economic and social reform. Between 
1952 and 1954, Egypt underwent a phase of uncertainty during which the new 
regime was establishing its legitimacy and gaining full independence from the 
British (Ibrahim, 1982, p. 379). Following this phase, and until 1960, a new 
tendency toward the nationalisation of the economy started. This led to rapid 
capital formation by the state. While the beginnings of an inclination towards 
socialism started in the early fifties with anti-capitalist rhetoric in official 
statements, socialism was not introduced until 1961 (Abdel Fadil, 1980, p. 2). 
What follow was a socialist transformation phase between 1960 and 1967 
during which much of the Egyptian economy became an almost completely 
planned system under the control of the public sector (Aliboni, 1984, p. 19).
Starting in the mid-fifties, a number of measures were taken in order to 
achieve some kind of ‘development nationalism’ as part of the socialist 
achievements. These measures included the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
[1956] as well as the nationalisation of other major foreign investments [1956- 
1966], followed by an ambitious industrialisation programme (Ayubi, 1991,
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p. 333). Redistributive measures were also undertaken through a series of land 
reforms (1952 and 1962) and the increasing reliance of the government on 
taxation and subsidies as transfer mechanisms (Abdel Khalek, 1982). Free 
education from schooling through to university, free health delivery and 
guaranteed public sector employment to university graduate were also 
introduced.
In the early sixties Egypt accomplished significant transformation of its 
economic structure achieving its highest rate of growth since the beginning of 
the century while at the same time reducing income inequality (Amin, 1981, 
p. 439). Nasser’s socialism was defined in the Charter of National Action 
(1964), as the pursuit of ‘sufficiency and equity’. By sufficiency he meant the 
expansion of the nation’s total production of wealth and by equity he meant 
a fairer and more equitable distribution of income in society (Abdel Fadil, 
1980, p. 2).
On the foreign front, Arab nationalism as well as ‘non-alignment’ dominated 
Egypt’s foreign policy. At this stage of its history Egypt was the exemplar 
state as far as the third world was concerned (Ayubi, 1991, p. 333). It 
became, in the early 1960s, a ‘Third World political Mecca’ and the 
headquarters for many national liberation movements. Cairo became a major 
meeting place for Arab, African and non-aligned summits, and Egypt’s 
international status and power reached its peak during this time (Korany, 
1986, pp. 91-94 cited in Ayubi, 1991, p. 334). Most Egyptians had a great 
deal of pride in their newly acquired independence and the leadership role 
they had achieved.
The 1967 war and the humiliating defeat by Israel, was a devastating shock 
for Egyptians. The defeat resulted in Egypt experiencing a deep crisis and a 
great loss in its strides towards development and a sense of autonomy and 
leadership. This led to a ‘stagnation phase’ (Ibrahim, 1982, p. 381). The 
Egyptian economy experienced an ‘arrest of the tumultuous growth’ of the
62
previous years (Aliboni, 1984, p. 20). This was a result of the use of a large 
proportion of the country’s resources for military expenditure causing a sharp 
decline in socio-economic investment (op-cit, p. 381).
2. Economic Aid during Nasser’s Presidency:
Aid was received from various donor countries. Both the USSR and the U.S. 
contributed generously during most of this stage. Nasser’s decision to 
exchange Egyptian cotton for Soviet weaponry in 1955, then reaching an arms 
agreement with the Czechs, "thrust Egypt onto centre stage in the unfolding 
drama of the Cold War in the middle East” (Burns, 1985, p. 1). Egypt, at the 
same time turned to the U.S. for economic aid, which the latter saw as an 
ideal way to develop American influence in Egypt. Between 1958 and 1965, 
Egypt was the largest consumer of U.S. food aid (Morris, 1977, cited in 
Burns, 1985, p. 134). During this period the Soviets helped industrialise 
Egypt while the U.S. helped feed its work force. "Nasser had succeeded in 
diversifying his dependency, thereby increasing his room for manoeuvre" 
(Waterbury, 1983, p. 404).
By the mid-1960s Nasser’s criticism of the U.S., especially around the Aswan 
High Dam episode1, intensified. These criticisms were met by threats from 
the U.S. to withdraw its support for Egypt. Nasser reacted by announcing 
that Johnson could take his aid and ‘drink from the sea’2. This is when U.S. 
and Egypt relations ‘reached their nadir’ (Burns, 1985, p. 1). Johnson 
described the situation as follows:
"Nasser’s attitude towards the West grew more and more 
hostile and his speeches more inflammatory. It became 
impossible to maintain congressional support for even token
1 The Aswan Dam was of great importance, as the Americans were approached first to 
finance it but turned the request down giving technical reasons for their refusal. The Russians 
agreed to fund the dam. This put Egypt firmly in the eastern block.
2 This is an Egyptian idiom that closely corresponds to the English idiom of ‘he can go 
and jump in the lake’.
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assistance to Egypt" (Johnson, 1971, p. 290, cited in 
Waterbury, 1983).
Nasser’s defiance of the U.S. was highly acclaimed by the Egyptian public. 
Egypt was then left relying primarily on Soviet aid. In the early years, Soviet 
aid programmes showed sensitivity to Egypt’s nationalist fervour. No explicit 
political or military attachments were sought by the Soviets and their project 
assistance was unconditional. It did not directly call for changes in Egypt’s 
economic policies. However this changed after the 1967 war with Israel 
which left Egypt vulnerable and reliant on the Soviet Union for its security. 
This led to a larger Soviet presence and their interference in domestic politics 
(Weinbaum, 1986, p. 30).
The late sixties were a time when many of Nasser’s policies came under 
examination. The alliance with the USSR was put into question, and changes 
in aid relations started to emerge. However, real changes in terms of aid 
relations were introduced later, during Sadat’s presidency.
The years between 1952 and 1967 in Egypt’s history left a very important 
mark on the majority of Egyptians, especially the young and middle aged 
during this period. Not without its faults3, these years of socialism, Pan 
Arabism, leadership of the Non alliance movement and defiance of the West, 
left many Egyptians with a national pride that later events might have 
threatened but, by and large, were unable to erase. Nasser’s era and the 
impact it had on Egyptian psyche is of crucial importance in understanding, 
among others, the strong feelings of jealously over sovereignty which coloured 
Egypt’s relations with donor countries over the subsequent years. This issue 
will be discussed further in the course of this thesis.
3 One o f the Nasser era’s most serious shortcomings was lack of democracy and freedom 
of speech.
B. THE SADAT PHASE (1970-1981)
Following Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat became president of Egypt. It was 
however only after the 1973 war with Israel, which was considered a political 
success by the GOE, that Sadat gained political legitimacy in Egypt.
1. The Political economy of Egypt under Sadat:
Sadat’s era from 1970 to 1981 saw a withdrawal from Nasser’s socialism. 
Sadat’s own capitalist leaning and adoption of a pro-West ideology in addition 
to the interests of a powerful emerging national capitalist class and pressures 
from the West, led to new economic and social policies. The full 
implementation of these policies was restrained by strong opposition from the 
majority of Egyptians both within and outside government.
The retreat from Nasser’s policies started slowly but gradually accelerated. 
One of the major changes in the economic policies at that time was Sadat’s so-
called ‘Open Door Economic Policy’ or ‘Infitah’. This policy, which was
enacted in 1974, called for the revitalisation of the private sector, opening the 
door to foreign and Arab investment, revoking some aspects of Land Reform 
law and included steps towards the devaluation of the Egyptian currency 
(Ibrahim, 1982, p. 382).
The introduction of these policies not only received the acclaim of the West 
but were enthusiastically welcomed by a minority of Egyptians, mostly upper 
middle class entrepreneurs who were ready to take advantage of them.
"As often happens under post-populist states, a new middle 
class established itself into a new bourgeoisie of wealth and
power defending the status quo from mass demands and
advancing its interests through reintegration into the world 
capitalist system" (Hinnebuch, 1981, pp.442-443).
Although Sadat had promised to provide every Egyptian with economic 
prosperity, by the late seventies it became obvious that ‘infitah’ had not
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produced the general prosperity that had been promised (Burns, 1985, p. 188). 
These policies left the majority of the population disillusioned and dissatisfied.
For two years (1975-1976) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and both 
Western and Arab creditors requested that Egypt makes its economy even 
more accessible to the world market. After some resistance and as a result 
of these pressures, Sadat announced in 1977 that certain food subsidies would 
be lifted. This announcement was received by angry demonstrations in major 
Egyptian cities4. The ‘food riots’, as they were later termed, led to several 
days of uncertainty regarding Sadat’s stability (Sullivan, 1987, pp. 134). 
Consequently the government had to go back on its decision and resorted in 
later times to cutting down on subsidies gradually and without official 
announcement.
Other redistributive measures were also gradually withdrawn. The goal set 
in the sixties to extend basic services to all Egyptians was quietly abandoned. 
This meant a neglect of basic welfare programmes, the deterioration of social 
services and growing inequity in the distribution of income (Waterbury, 1983, 
p. 223).
Despite the fact that Sadat was seen as having done a U turn on Nasser’s 
policies, the former, until the end of his presidency, was in fact unable to 
dispense with all of the socialist policies. The fragile political situation of 
Egypt dictated that a sort of uncomfortable co-existence between capitalism 
and socialism continued. This was one of the major criticism of Sadat’s 
regime from right wing Egyptians, international lending agencies and the West 
in general, especially the U.S.
4 Egyptians are not known for mass political demonstrations. Other than student 
demonstrations, Egypt had not witnessed such outcry since before the 1952 Revolution. For 
the first time since the Revolution, troops were called out to control civil disturbances. At 
least 79 were killed in Cairo alone.
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In terms of foreign policy, Sadat took more drastic measures which put him 
firmly in the Western bloc. Relations with the West were resumed in 1974, 
and new aid agreements were established. At the same time he expelled the 
Soviet military experts from Egypt. This caused a drastic breaking point with 
the Soviet bloc which ended with Sadat unilaterally abrogating the Soviet- 
Egyptian Treaty of Friendship in March 1976 (Burns, 1985, pp. 186-187).
The peace treaty with Israel in the late seventies, was another highly 
controversial step that Sadat took and which changed the course of history. 
This separate peace treaty, besides meeting opposition from a large number 
of Egyptians, cost Egypt its Arab allies. It brought about the ostracism of 
Egypt politically and economically by most of the Arab world (Weinbaum, 
1986, p .38). Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem (November, 1977) and his signing of 
the Camp David agreement (September, 1978), was the last proof that the 
U.S. needed to see in Egypt, and mostly in its president, of a real Arab ally 
in the Middle East.
Summing up Sadat’s era, Sullivan describes his policies as a ‘roller coaster’ 
from Pan Arab ism and Soviet alliance to pro Americanism and cold peace 
with Israel (Sullivan, 1987, pp. 49-50).
2. Egypt and foreign aid under Sadat:
The majority of aid that came to Egypt during Sadat’s time was from USAID. 
It is during the middle of Sadat’s presidency that USAID’s presence in Egypt 
reached its peak. It is also during this stage that the Helwan project started.
The active role that the U.S. played in the resolution of the conflict during the 
1973 war, marked the beginnings of the resumption of relations with the U.S.
"Indeed they rushed into each other’s arms. The U.S. and a 
pliable IBRD immediately mounted a large aid programme, and 
Egypt reciprocated by legislating the open-door policy. The
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great event of this honeymoon was Richard Nixon’s state visit 
to Egypt in June 1974, a last and futile effort to save himself 
from the effects of Watergate. Nixon and Sadat issued a joint 
communique that forecast an era of cooperation and prosperity"
(NYT, June 15, 1974, in Waterbury, 1983, p. 401).
In 1975, the U.S. and IBRD offered Egypt a huge aid package, committing 
the U.S. to $1 billion a year in economic aid. This U.S. economic assistance 
programme in Egypt was the largest of its kind since the Marshall Plan 
(Burns, 1985, p. 1). As it has been described by Burns:
"The Ford Administration had no all-encompassing 
development strategy in mind when it began to shower 
economic aid upon the Sadat government in 1975 and 1976.
U.S. assistance was viewed in Washington primarily as a 
political tool, designed to impress Egyptians at all levels of 
society with the value of Sadat’s American connection" (Ibid, 
p. 183).
Aid to Egypt comprises of three types, namely Public Law 480 (PL 480) food 
for peace, project aid and commodity transfer aid. The first, PL 480, 
comprises mainly the provision of wheat and wheat flour; the second, Project 
Assistance include the direct funding of projects in form of grants mainly 
covering infrastructure, agriculture, health and education sectors; the third, 
Commodity Import Programme including raw materials, capital goods and 
consumables from U.S. suppliers (Abdel Khalek, 1982, pp. 457-459).
The yearly amount of aid to Egypt, as was decided in 1975 and for the 
following twenty years, constituted the largest given to any other country in 
the world with the exception of Israel. Egypt receives more U.S. economic 
aid than the rest of Asia (excluding Israel) and the Near East combined. 
However, the size of aid to Egypt is not the only element that makes this 
relationship unique. Most important of all is the congressional commitment 
that a fixed amount a year has to be spent. This means in fact that financial 
penalties used by donor countries elsewhere do not apply in the case of Egypt.
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It also means that money in the pipeline must be spent by the end of the 
financial year, otherwise it is aid officials who have to answer for the delays.
’’With Washington’s committed to authorising more than $1 
billion yearly in economic aid, it effectively denies itself an 
important means of leverage over Egyptian economic policy.
AID officials cannot with much conviction threaten to withdraw 
or withhold funds from the government" (Weinbaum, 1986, p.
132).
However U.S. aid to Egypt is ‘tied aid’, meaning that projects are chosen on 
the basis of USAID priorities. They follow its set conditions, equipment and 
material have to procured from the U.S. and U.S. consultants and contractors 
are given contracts. The aid agreement with Israel is different. The U.S. 
delivers the whole amount of yearly aid in cash with no interference in how 
it is spent or managed (Handoussa, 1990, p. 110).
These features which are particular to USAID’s aid agreement with Egypt are 
crucial to the shaping of the USAID-GOE relationship and will be further 
discussed in terms of their impact on the Helwan Project.
3. Key elements which played a role in U.S. support:
In order to reach a better understanding of the kind of relationship that existed 
at the signing of the Helwan Housing Project agreement and the years after, 
it is crucial to review the conditions that led to the whole USAID programme 
in Egypt.
While a number of elements were responsible for the huge commitment on the 
part of the U.S. to Egypt, there are three major elements in Egypt’s political 
and economic affairs which had an impact on U.S. financial aid to Egypt.
a. ‘Infitah’ the Open Door Economic Policy:
Following the 1973 war and the restoration of diplomatic relations with the
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U.S., Sadat started showing tendencies towards wanting to move away from 
Nasser’s socialism. The role of the U.S. in encouraging this new direction 
through the offering of aid, was reciprocated by the ‘Open Door Policy’. In 
accordance with the 1973 Congressional directive to foster private initiative, 
USAID has thus been ‘a direct actor in the Open Door Policy’ (Waterbury, 
1983, p. 156).
The U.S. therefore had much at stake in the success or failure of Sadat’s 
economic policies. Popular approval or at least acquiescence in Egypt’s 
political realignment could not be sustained unless measurable progress in 
reversing economic trends were undertaken. This could be achieved through 
broad gains in employment, income and consumption.
"Infitah’s’ affinity with Western economic principles and 
practices and the obvious expectations of massive Western aid 
and investment ensured that the U.S. above all, would be 
perceived as patron of Egypt’s economic liberalisation" 
(Weinbaum, 1982, p .35).
In support of Weinbaum’s analysis Burns also argues that the billion-dollar-a- 
year programme aid was a key element in Sadat’s plans for economic 
liberalisation; "moreover it offered tangible proof of the deepening American 
commitment to the Sadat regime" (Burns, 1985, pp. 186-187).
b. The Food Riots:
While Sadat was slowly implementing his ‘Infitah’ policies, the U.S. and other 
donor and debtor organisations, were pushing for a faster pace of reform. 
This was the reason for Sadat’s announcement of the lifting of some food 
subsidies. Therefore, the ‘food riots’ were seen by some as the real turning 
point in USAID policy. As a senior AID official explained in an interview, 
the food riots were a confirmation that the "poor were desperate and needed 
immediate attention" (Interview with a policy level USAID official, 1988).
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Western pressure to undergo drastic economic reforms were proven to be 
unacceptable in the Egyptian context. The Riots enabled Sadat to argue more 
convincingly with his financial backers that their fiscal demands were not 
politically feasible (Weinbaum, 1986, p. 143). Since this incident the White 
House and the American embassy in Egypt have often taken up the GOE’s 
position, overriding their own AID mission office in Egypt5. Their main 
concern is that political stability is primary, and therefore Egypt should not 
be pushed too far, too fast (Sullivan, 1987, pp. 134-135). The food riots had 
such an impact on both GOE and U.S. officials in Egypt that the event kept 
being used by both as an example of what might happen if increased pressure 
is put on Egypt to adopt economic reform.
c. Peace with Israel:
As mentioned above serious efforts were undertaken by the U.S. to bring 
peace between Egypt and Israel (1974-1979). Sadat’s cooperation during the 
peace negotiations was seen as deserving reward, thus the decision for the 
commitment of further economic assistance to Egypt.
The amount of economic aid given, as several political analysts concluded, 
was seen by U.S. officials as being a product of political calculation and not 
the result of assessment of Egypt’s needs and absorptive capacity. It was an 
amount close to what was given to Israel. This was seen as a way to 
reinforce Sadat’s commitment to his partnership with the American 
Government (Burns, 1985, pp. 183-184).
The loss of Arab allies and opposition at home gave the U.S. another reason 
for supporting Sadat economically. They found that "..without an economic 
‘peace dividend’ underwritten by millions of dollars of U.S. aid, there could 
be no guarantee that the Sadat regime will survive" (Ibid, p. 190). In fact the
5 As the findings of this thesis will show, AID mission officers sometimes get involved 
in meeting the programme or project goals under their supervision, and loose sight of the 
wider political goals of their government.
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connection between U.S. aid, and Sadat’s peace treaty has been made explicit 
by many U.S. officials, an example of which is the following statement 
included in a USAID document:
"Egypt shares with the U.S. a strategic interest in the stability 
of the region and commitment to peace. An important aspect 
of this shared interest is the economic assistance programme.
The basic rationale [for the aid programme] was to demonstrate 
to Egyptians the real benefits associated with the political 
course their leaders had taken" (CDSS, 1989, p.i and p. 1).
Interviews in USAID confirm this view. When asked about the reason for the 
long commitment of USAID to Egypt a USAID interviewee answered: ‘Have 
you ever heard of the Camp David Agreement’ (Interview, USAID, 1988). 
In fact, both Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s were receiving huge amounts 
of aid to further their negotiations. In other words "...the U.S. tied its 
economic assistance programme to the twin goals of sustaining the peace 
process and maintaining economic conditions favourable to Sadat’s survival" 
(Waterbury, 1983, p. 401).
To conclude this section it is important to point out that the conditions that led 
the U.S. to this huge commitment to Egypt remained crucial to the nature of 
the aid relationship throughout the twenty years of its history. The dominance 
of a political and strategic rather than a developmental character of the aid 
relation is key to this relationship and will be discussed throughout this thesis. 
The following quotation summarises this point clearly.
"The motives of American aid to Egypt are political in the first 
place, economic in the second and developmental third. 
Politically, American aid is in some ways a celebration of the 
end of Egypt’s divorce with Israel. Economically, it helps to 
promote sales of arms and grain. Yet, mostly to preserve the 
image, it also has to pay some attention to Egypt’s 
developmental needs" (Ayubi, 1991, p. 338).
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As the discussion in the last chapter around aid shows, and as this thesis will 
demonstrate, the existence of a multitude of goals in the giving and receiving 
of aid, often lead to results damaging to developmental goals. Often the latter 
are sacrificed for the advancement of political and economic interests.
C. THE MUBARAK PHASE (1981-)
1. The Political Economy of Egypt under Mubarak:
Mubarak’s economic policies very much followed in the steps of his 
predecessor, except that mounting foreign debts meant more pressure from 
lending organisations and donors to take more serious steps towards a fuller 
implementation of the Open Door Policy. A structural adjustment programme 
was also imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The political sensitivity 
of such measures meant that this process was slow and not without resistance 
on the part of the government. While ‘food riots’ were the most important 
incident to demonstrate the reason for government reluctance to comply to 
Western pressure for economic reforms, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
became the main issue of the eighties and the nineties.
Unlike Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak’s presidency saw no drastic policy 
reforms. A mixture of privatisation while retaining much of the public sector 
and state capitalism remained Egypt’s most prevalent economic characteristic.
What was seen by some as stubborn refusal to change Egypt’s policies is, as 
Sullivan argues, the result of uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of one 
set of policies vis-a-vis another. This uncertainty is not limited to economic 
planning and in fact afflicts much of the decision-making process in Egypt. 
‘Socialism or Capitalism?’, this question continues to be asked by many 
Egyptian economists, politicians, academics and laymen (Sullivan, 1987, 
p. 48).
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But foreign policy under Mubarak shifted way from that of Sadat. While 
Egypt remained very much under the confines of the ‘Western Alliance’, 
relations were slowly resumed with the Arabs, the Soviet Union, the eastern 
block and non-aligned countries. This new direction in foreign policy was 
met with the approval of the majority of Egyptians.
Egypt’s general foreign policy dilemma, as analyzed by Ayubi, is how to 
survive and interact without compromising Egypt’s sovereignty and 
independence beyond certain limits; how to regain her regional influence and 
her traditional role among Arabs without at the same time provoking Israeli 
declaration of war or U.S. withdrawal of economic and military support 
(Ayubi, 1991 p. 340).
The relationship with the U.S. saw some change from that which existed at 
the time of Sadat. Mubarak wanted to diminish the image of Egypt being the 
‘U.S. client’. At the same, with Egypt’s dire economic condition and the 
government’s inability to find other solutions, the economic dependency on the 
U.S. remained the same. In other words, Mubarak tried to strike the difficult 
balance of showing moderation in relation to his political alliance with the 
West, and more particularly the U.S., while keeping the economic relation 
intact. This meant, as Burns argues, that despite Mubarak’s political position, 
and as a result of the Egyptian economy reaching a point were it had never 
been bleaker, it was more dependent on American assistance than at any other 
time since the post-revolutionary era (Burns, 1985, p. 201).
On its part, although its economic aid commitment to Egypt remained the 
same, for a number of reasons the U.S. became less inclined to give as much 
attention to Egypt’s political sensitivities. A number of actions and policy 
decisions taken by the Reagan Administration created tension in the 
relationship between the U.S. and GOE. Examples of these were the U.S. 
signature of a strategic cooperation with Israel and the bringing down of an
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Egyptian aircraft carrying the Achillea Lauro hijackers6, but above all, the 
momentary refusal of the U.S. to re-schedule payments of the Egyptian 
military debt. The ‘solution’ to the latter was that the bulk of U.S. annual 
economic aid was to be advanced to the GOE in cash to be used to repay the 
debt to the U.S. Treasury (Ayubi, 1991, p. 337).
This kind of ‘schizophrenia’ is typical of the U.S. and GOE relationship. One 
way of explaining such measures, is that the U.S. disapproved of some of the 
GOE political and economic policies, and put economic pressures on Egypt 
in various ways. At the same time, wanting to retain its strategic interests 
with Egypt, the U.S. government continued to provide economic aid through 
USAID. Another explanation, which suggests a less monolithic policy, is that 
in fact different institutions in the U.S. do have different policies and interests 
vis-a-vis Egypt and act accordingly, often in contradiction to each other. This 
discussion will be continued below.
When it comes to the GOE relationship with Israel, it remained very much 
that of a ‘cold peace’. As Israel stepped up its attacks on Lebanon and its 
oppressive policies vis-a-vis the Palestinians, Egypt protested. However, the 
GOE made it clear that it would never take measures that would jeopardise the 
peace agreement with Israel.
Mubarak was also keen to return to the ‘Arab fold’. The first action taken 
that helped achieve this goal, was the recall of the Egyptian Ambassador from 
Israel in protest at the invasion of Lebanon. This was followed by the re­
establishment of diplomatic relations with most Arab States in 1987 and 
readmission into the Arab League in 1989. The Gulf war, in 1991, 
dramatically reinforced Egypt’s strategic position. By joining the coalition
6 Achillea Lauro was a boat with Western passengers which was hijacked by Palestinians. 
The Egyptian plane taking them out, as part of the deal for ending of the incident, was shot 
down by the Americans.
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against Iraq, Egypt was able to return completely to the ‘good books’ of the 
majority of other Arab countries.
The Gulf war, and Egypt’s role in it, however were not so positively received 
by a great number of Egyptians. The war, after all, meant that Egyptians 
were fighting along side Americans killing Iraqi people, ie siding with the 
West, and de-facto with Israel, against Arab Muslims. This war, in other 
terms, was a strong demonstration that the vulnerable balance of the 
relationship between Egypt, the other Arab nations, the U.S. and Israel, is 
potentially explosive.
Debts and economic reform accompanying structural adjustment, as is the case 
with many other ‘third world’ countries, was the predominant concern of 
Egypt in the eighties and nineties. Egypt is in the big league of debtor 
nations. By 1988 its total debt was not far short of $50 billion, amounting to 
half of Brazil’s (the largest in the world), and equivalent to that of 
Argentina’s. Despite its size, Egypt’s debt does not represent such a serious 
problem to the large international financial community as do the large Latin 
American debtors. This is because Egypt’s debts are officially-owed to 
governments rather than to banks (Butter, 1989, p. 123). Egypt is indebted 
to a number of countries primarily the US, France, Japan, Canada, Arab and 
Islamic countries (Ibid, p. 125).
The huge debts of the seventies and the early eighties culminated to a point 
when in 1986 alone, Egypt had to repay an amount of $5.5 billion ($2.9 
billion original debt and $2.6 billion interests), in addition to late debt 
repayment of $2 billion. During this period, tourist revenues were on the 
decrease as well as petrol prices. The latter affected Egypt both directly 
through decreased export revenues, and indirectly by the return of large 
numbers of migrants who lost their jobs in Arab oil rich countries. The latter 
meant, among other problems, a serious reduction in remittance revenue 
(Amin, 1987, p. 104).
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Therefore, as Egypt’s debt grew larger, and the burden of servicing the debt 
became unmanageable, the government was obliged to consent to IMF’s 
economic reform package which it has been pressurised to take on since the 
early eighties. The IMF package recommended for Egypt was to reduce the 
exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound, eliminate all subsidies, and raise the 
interest rate to higher levels together with tightening fiscal and monetary 
policies (Korayem, 1987, p.74). An IMF agreement was signed in 1987 
leading to a ten year debt rescheduling agreement through the Paris Club 
(Butter, 1989, p. 124).
Despite the calling off of billions of dollars of debt, Egypt still needed to 
reduce its public deficit from over 20% of GDP to 6% within 1991-19927. 
This involved increase in tax revenues and the removal of direct and indirect 
subsidies (Waterbury, 1991, p. 28).
The GOE and the debtors remained divided about the way to deal with the 
budget deficit, the level of nominal interests rates, the size of energy subsidies 
and the unification of the exchange rate. Subsidies remained the most 
politically explosive deficit issue. Budgetary subsidies account for 10% of 
GDP in the early 1980s, and although they were cut down to around 5%, 
implicit subsidies remain very high. These mainly affect the price of fuel, 
electricity and food. If implicit subsidies are included this amounts to around 
20% of GNP in the eighties (World Bank Report, 1990, cited in Richards, 
1991, p. 1724).
7 Although the fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in 1988-89, it is still useful to 
mention Egypt’s political economy in the nineties. This is important in two major ways: first, 
it gives insight into the directions that the GOE was taking, which might not have been 
obvious at the time of the fieldwork; second, the way that the GOE dealt with the IMF and 
the WB, very much follows the strategies the former employed vis-a-vis USAID in the case 
of Helwan.
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The position that Egypt took during the Gulf war of deploying its troops to 
help liberate Kuwait was compensated by the writing off of billions of dollars 
worth of military and economic debts by the US, Saudi Arabia, Quatar and 
Kuwait (Waterbury, 1991, p. 28). The U.S. cancelled $6.7 billion of military 
debt; Egypt’s Arab Gulf allies cancelled an additional $6.5 billion, cutting the 
total debt to roughly $37 billion (Richards, 1991, p. 1728).
Shortly following that, and after long negotiations, the second large agreement 
was held in 1991 when a deal was made by official Paris Club creditors to cut 
Egypt’s debts ($40 billion) by half if it successfully undertook IMFAVB 
reforms (Nicholson, Financial Time, 1994).
"In May 1991 a letter of intent was finally signed with the 
IMF, followed by a WB Structural Adjustment Loan 
agreement. It is notable that these agreements commit GOE to 
implement a ‘certainly comprehensive’ programme and 
commits the GOE to ‘genuine reform’" (Richards, 1991, 
p. 1728).
This agreement, as it was with previous agreements, was seen as promising 
Teal change’. However as previous experience shows the GOE still remained 
cautious about implementing it. The further devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound has become the next striking point in the IMF-GOE negotiations. The 
IMF is pressing Egypt to devalue its pound by anything from 25% to 40%. 
To this the GOE announced ‘we will never devalue’ (Op.cit, 1994). 
Mubarak’s policies, especially as illustrated by the way he and his government 
have handled the debt situation, have been described as those pertaining to 
gradualism. The following analysis by Sullivan summarises this view:
"Mubarak’s government appears to speak with one voice by 
using one word: gradualism. It describes the pace at which the 
government is willing to undertake economic (and perhaps) 
political reform. Officials from various ministries ...all say 
Egypt agrees with foreign-aid donors on the need for economic 
reform as a prerequisite to development. Such reform will 
come about only on its own timetable, taking into consideration
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Egypt’s political and social environment which, these officials 
say, USAID, the IMF and the World Bank and other donors 
ignore" (Sullivan, 1990, pp. 319-320).
One of the main reasons why for years the GOE has been able to secure 
foreign debt relief has been its ability to show its political stabilising role in 
the region to be in the interest of its creditors. Its strategy to deal with IMF, 
WB and other debtors, was to undertake slow and gradual reforms while at 
the same time undertaking a long series of negotiations, bargaining and 
stalling. For example it took the GOE five years of concentrated pressure to 
start implementing IMF’s structural adjustment package. Later from 1988 to 
1990 there was a continuous stream of IMF missions to Cairo with agreements 
‘to be signed’ but not finalised. The support of the U.S., which responded to 
Egypt’s political fragility seriously, was also used to the limit. The 
introduction of these reforms in this manner had enormous social, economic 
and political consequences. However, had they followed the pace the IMF 
and WB wanted, they might have been disastrous. The GOE’s strategy, and 
the way it was portrayed in the media (mostly government controlled), was 
also politically apt. It was important that Egyptians were shown that 
organisations like the IMF and the WB could be defied which is important to 
Egyptian sensitivity to foreign encroachment. Of course this message was 
never accepted by those groups of Egyptians (Muslim fundamentalists and 
their supporters, among others) who reject outright what is seen as Western 
presence in Egypt symbolised by USAID, but also by the intrusion of the IMF 
and WB in what is seen as Egypt’s internal affairs.
Despite what is seen by the debtors as ‘too little too slow’ (Shindy, 1984, CP, 
p. 11), enough economic measures were introduced to increasingly be felt by 
the majority of Egyptians. As the facts above show, although Egypt seemed 
to defy pressures for implementing full reforms, it in fact implemented them 
partially even before the signing the 1987 agreement. For example in 1982, 
some food subsidies were cut in an incremental carefully tailored approach
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avoiding mass reactions. Price controls were lifted from some agricultural 
products (Weinbaum, 1986, p. 149). Investment in the private sector 
increased a great deal. The budget for the private sector in 1982-1987 was 
24%, in comparison to 10% in the sixties and 17% between 1980-1982 (Ibid,
p. ID-
The economic reforms led to a widening income inequality which most 
adversely affected Egyptians without family members working abroad, those 
tied to fixed income and small rural landowners (Weinbaum, 1986, p. 42). 
This coupled with the cutting down on subsidies on food, electricity and 
water, cutting spending on social services, namely education and health, as 
well as decreasing the size of the public sector and government support, has 
had enormous implications for the lives of the low income population.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt has been one of the most 
important political consequences of the deteriorating economic conditions of 
the majority of Egyptians. While economic factors are by no means the only 
reason for this movement8, however there are no doubts it is one of its 
contributing factors.
"The Islamic trend which was initially encouraged by Sadat9, 
has found its main appeal among the young educated groups 
who have been hurt by the outcomes of ‘infitah’. Such groups 
have now rebelled against this very State that has began to 
attack both its symbols and its institutions" (Ayubi in Tripp,
1989, p. 11).
The gradual withdrawal of the state from the provision of services and its 
inability to meet the population’s needs left a serious vacuum which was filled
8 There is no attempt here to explain the reasons for Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. 
It is a very complex problem and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
9 In his effort to combat communism in Egyptian universities, Sadat encouraged the 
formation of a new political leadership, that of Muslem groups.
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by private voluntary organisations (PVOs). The majority of these are Islamic 
charitable associations10, which have developed efficient social services: 
schools, day care centres, hospitals, and clinics. Many of these PVOs are run 
by different Muslim groups who through gaining more legitimacy over the 
years have started to be more overtly political.
"Mosques are providing alternative support services as foreign donors 
push Egypt out of such services in their effort to reform governmental 
policies" (Interview with CRS official, in Sullivan, 1990, p. 330).
2. The relation between GOE and USAID under Mubarak:
By the second half of the eighties, USAID funding to Egypt constituted more 
than double that given by other donors. By 1992, the total U.S. Economic 
assistance to Egypt was $18 billion. The distribution of aid comprised of 42% 
of economic aid money was in Project Assistance, 27.5% to the Commodity 
Import Programme, 21.3% in Food Aid and 9% in Cash Transfer11. The 
latter was introduced in 1984. These dollar grants assisted in the relief of 
Egypt’s balance of payments problems and supported the Egyptian 
Government’s efforts to undertake structural reform of the economy (Status 
Report, 1992, p. 1).
There is a continuing debate in the development literature about the merits of 
case transfers as opposed to other forms of aid. That aid to Egypt is ‘tied aid’ 
while all aid given to Israel is in cash transfer, is highly resented. USAID 
Cairo officials see themselves as caught between the GOE that wants to 
convert all economic assistance to cash transfers thereby terminating USAID’s
10 This is a relatively new phenomenon in Egypt. While the Church, and other Christian 
organisations, have traditionally provided such services, the Mosque was, until recently, 
simply a place for prayer.
11 Between 1984 and 1991, cash transfers totalled nearly $1.4 billion (Zimmerman, 1993, 
p. 85). Most of the cash transfer money was used in the repayment of military debts 
(Mitchell, 1990, p. 45).
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presence, and senior officials in the U.S. government who would like to do 
the same (Springborg, 1989, pp. 274-275). The economic interests that the 
U.S. has in Food aid, Commodity Import and Project Assistance, is a major 
reason why they will have to remain part of USAID programme. As 
Zimmerman, who worked as a USAID desk officer for Egypt, argues ’’Many 
U.S. companies are nearly as dependent on the aid relationship as are the 
Egyptians" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. 93). (This issue will be discussed in more 
details in chapter 4).
In terms of USAID’s sectoral priorities in the eighties and early nineties, it 
added to its repertoire in the following way: in addition to continuing funding 
projects in agriculture, health, basic education and infrastructure, human 
resources and local development have become new areas of interest in Project 
assistance. USAID also initiated programmes encouraging the private sector, 
such as the provision of credit to Egyptian private companies for the purchase 
of commodities and equipment from the U.S., and providing credit to small 
and micro enterprises (USAID Status Report, 1992, p. ii). By the mid to late 
seventies Egypt, and more particularly Cairo, was suffering from a serious 
deterioration of its infrastructure. Some of USAID funded projects in this 
area succeeded in tackling this problem (see Sullivan, 1987, pp. 118-119).
a. Policy dialogue and economic reform:
Policy dialogue was introduced as part of USAID in Egypt in the mid 1980s. 
In 1992 USAID Status Report contained the following statement:
"Policy reform continues to be the centrepiece of the USAID 
programme, emphasising structural adjustment and sectoral 
reform measures that support movement towards a free market 
economy led by the private sector" (Ibid).
At the time of the introduction of a ‘policy dialogue’ USAID came to the 
conclusion that despite the infusion of one-fifth of total U.S. foreign 
assistance, the Egyptian economy showed few signs of ‘taking o f f .  Therefore
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there was general consensus on the necessity to ‘more actively develop and 
utilise policy leverage’ (Springborg, 1989, p. 257). This led to the decision 
of USAID increasingly becoming an instrument for achieving policy reform 
in the country. This newly emphasised direction, was announced in the 
Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS), as follows:
"Today, with a much improved infrastructure in place, 
attention has turned to the Government of Egypt’s economic 
policy environment as the focus for the next stage of effort.
The government’s current economic policies are a meld of 
Nasserist socialism and ‘infitah’ capitalism. Neither is working 
well’ (CDSS, 1989, p.i).
Another reason for the shift in policy, as explained by the CDSS, was that 
under its previous multi-sectoral and multi-project, combined with 
Congressionally-mandated assistance, USAID had limited leverage to press for 
reform (Ibid, p. 2).
Two basic channels were used to achieve this goal: the first was the 
introduction of a ‘policy dialogue’ programme; the second was its partnership 
in the process of reform initiated by the IMF and the W.B. Policy dialogue 
took the form of discussions between U.S. officials and GOE officials mostly 
at Cabinet level. The ‘dialogue’ meant in principle more interventionism in 
Egypt’s internal affairs. A few years into the new approach, however, 
showed that this had little impact in terms of policy changes. These policies 
were oriented towards economic reform such as free market, cutting down 
on subsidies, privatisation etc., all measures pertaining to structural 
adjustment. Actually economic reform has been a part of USAID agenda 
since the 1970s, ie. long before the IMF agreement of 1986-1987 (Sullivan, 
1987, p. 134). The second channel was the role played in debt negotiations. 
USAID saw itself as a partner in the economic reforms with other debtor 
organisations. As shown in the previous section, USAID’s role was both as 
a partner and a buffer. Because the U.S. has since 1979 provided 
approximately two-thirds off all economic assistance to Egypt and because it
83
plays the leading role in the IMF and World Bank, it is the principle force 
behind these efforts (Springborg, 1989, 256-257).
USAID was thus seen as an ‘active participant’ in a ‘donor consultative group’ 
negotiating agreements with the IMF and the WB aimed at multilateral debt 
rescheduling.
"We expect the IMF to take the lead on policy discussions regarding 
exchange rate unification ... USAID, IBDR and other donors will 
focus on policy issues such as agriculture, energy and industry" 
(CDSS, 1989, pp. i-ii)
b. Criticism of aid:
There are a number of social, economic and political reasons that USAID in 
Egypt has been criticised. It would be a big task to try to cover such criticism 
in this chapter. This section will only briefly summarise these points of 
criticism that seem to most influence Egyptian and American public opinion 
and thus have most impact on USAID and GOE relations. In 1982, the A1 
Ahram A1 Ekdesady12 published a number of articles criticising USAID in 
Egypt. A couple of years later the American University in Cairo organised 
a conference where a number of Egyptian and American academics gave 
papers reviewing and criticising USAID’s role in Egypt. There were also 
addresses given by Egyptian politicians and senior USAID officials trying to 
answer the mounting criticism. Since then a number of intellectuals, 
politicians, academics and journalists have been engaged in a debate about 
USAID in Egypt. The Egyptian and American media have also covered what 
is often seen as USAID’s blunders.
The criticism can be broadly divided into two large categories: first, the 
effectiveness of aid and its contribution to economic development; second, the 
political implications of the aid relationship.
12 This is a good quality publication and the most widely read Egyptian semi-official 
newspaper, A1 Ahram.
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In addition to the size and extensive involvement of aid in Egypt, USAID in 
Egypt is criticised for its allocation to what is seen as low priority 
programmes for the majority of Egyptians, and the concentration of funding 
for consumption rather than production (Bishai, 1984; Handoussa, 1984, 
1987). A1 Ahram A1 Ektesady articles in 1982, criticised USAID in Egypt for 
promoting capitalism to the detriment of the poor (Weinbaum, 1986, p. 160).
The quality of these programmes and projects and their failure to meet their 
goals, has also been the focus of much criticism. There has in fact been no 
shortage of USAID project debacles to give the critiques of USAID plenty of 
support. Some of these are U.S. built buses [which were so noisy they were 
given the name ‘the voice of America’ by Egyptians], a sewage project in 
Alexandria which polluted the city’s beaches, fish projects and bakeries that 
produced neither fish nor bread, and "a housing project that spent $100 
million without producing one new dwelling" [referring to the Helwan 
Project]- and so the list goes on. These projects often got the attention of the 
media both in Egypt and the U.S.
"As the number of such foul-ups has mounted over the years 
and USAID’s position become more embattled, so has it 
become increasingly wary of projects that might attract negative 
comments in the media" (Ibid, pp. 275-276).
In 1992, CNN launched a wide attack on USAID in a four part series of 
‘Special Assignment’. A major issue covered in these programmes were high 
incidents of corruption among senior USAID officials and USAID contractors 
which was seen as USAID’s ‘criminal misuse of aid money’. The 
programmes also concentrated on what was seen as disastrous projects which 
did not only not reach their goals but actually harmed those they were 
supposed to help.
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‘Tied aid’ is at the centre of the USAID debate. The comparison to ‘pure aid’ 
given to Israel is often made. Tied aid is seen as a ‘protectionist’ measure, 
which reduces the real value of the aid given. This, as Beshai among others, 
argues, leads to an extra cost which is the difference between the cost of 
importing from the tied source and the cost of a cheaper source (Bishai, 1984,
p. 68).
This is a criticism often voiced by government officials dealing with AID, as 
chapter 3 will show. The amount of aid that goes back to the U.S. in the 
form of purchases of American goods and payments to American consultants 
as part of ‘tied aid’, is often seen as the most exploitative part of USAID. 
Estimates that 35% of U.S. funds are consumed by consultancy fees, or 75% 
covering the purchase of U.S. goods and services are often quoted 
(Springborg, 1989, p. 275). A major part of the funds are automatically re- 
channelled to American consultancy firms, research institutions and to the 
purchase of American machinery and equipment (Handoussa, 1987, p. 36). 
A large part of the debate around aid, and which has the most echo with the 
Egyptian public, is this area of U.S. economic interest in aid. One of the 
highly publicised Ahram A1 Ektesady publications, is a thesis highlighting 
these issues (see Galal, 1988).
In the political arena, USAID’s reliability and sustainability has also been a 
focus of discussion. Because USAID’s goals since the late seventies have 
been justified more on political than on economic or development grounds, the 
impact of USAID is predicted to be as liable to fade quickly should U.S. 
policy-makers ever lose interest in Egypt or come to doubt its friendship 
(Weinbaum, 1986, p. 157).
One of the major worries of a number of Egyptian scholars have been what 
they see as the high visibility or the promotional side of USAID. The 
handclasp logo displayed everywhere, is seen as a symbol of this approach. 
The fact that USAID is so interested in local-grassroots level projects is seen
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as their way of getting to research, visit and implement projects in villages 
and towns in Egypt. This kind of presence, which is viewed as seeking to 
develop a kind of loyalty from low income Egyptians is considered by many 
(including the GOE) as threatening and dangerous (see Morsey, 1988, p. 376 
and Galal, 1988, p. 89).
U.S. officials on the other hand, take the exact opposite position concerning 
the issue of visibility. Lack of visibility for USAID achievements is seen as 
one of its weaknesses. "All of our work is under the ground, we never 
produced anything like the High Dam built by the Russians or even the Opera 
built by the Japanese", said one USAID official (1988).
The major point of contention against USAID’s role in Egypt, has always 
been that of sovereignty. The worry that USAID officials constitute a 
‘shadow cabinet’ as it is been termed by some, is very much at the heart of 
this line of criticism. With USAID’s vast mission in Cairo, approximately 
350 permanent staff members (number in 1989), its size surpasses any other 
mission in the world (USAID in Israel was at this point run by 3 employees). 
Real worries about what the mission is up to started when detailed and 
penetrating data gathering and research, that was financed by American funds 
in Egypt in the early eighties, alarmed many Egyptians (Ayubi, 1991, p. 338). 
The degree of interference in Egypt’s affairs has always been questioned. The 
GOE’s perceived compliance to USAID meddling in Egypt’s policies, has 
been tied into the interests that Egyptian capitalists and officials have in the 
preservation of the relationship.
"When a ruling elite decides to pursue a development strategy 
based on foreign capital, it follows that all necessary steps will 
be taken to ensure and entice its creditors" (Dessouki, 1981, 
p. 413).
As a reaction, a large majority of Egyptians question whether the price paid 
for the taking of aid is worth it. Therefore growing numbers of Egyptians
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"..appear willing to forego U.S. economic support if that is the necessary 
price to end perceived U.S. affronts to Egypt’s pride and dignity" (Weinbaum, 
1986, p. 157)". The key to understanding USAID in Egypt is that it is 
predominantly strategic in character. This, as mentioned above, has coloured 
the whole relationship, and will be the focus of the discussion in this thesis.
m  THE HELWAN HOUSING PROJECT AND HOUSING IN EGYPT
USAID, in its attempt to identify areas to invest in, saw housing as one of the 
countries’ priorities. Housing is one of the major shortages in terms of social 
provisions in Egypt, particularly in urban areas. Cairo’s housing problem is 
one of the gravest in the world. Governments over the years have not been 
able to cope, and the majority of Egyptians have had to find often 
unsatisfactory solutions on their own. The GOE interventions were seen by 
USAID to be failing to solve the increasing housing problems mainly because 
of old fashioned and ineffective housing policies. USAID then decided to 
‘demonstrate’ a ‘new’ housing approach with the view that it would be 
adopted by the GOE in its future housing policy. This ‘new’ housing 
approach, namely sites-and-services and upgrading have, as discussed in 
chapter 1, been tried with various degrees of success in a number of ‘third 
world’ countries, mainly in Latin America.
When the agreement for the Helwan sites-and-service and upgrading project 
was signed in 1978, it was the first of its kind in Egypt with the exception of 
another project funded by the World Bank. The latter, the Egypt Urban 
Development Project, was introduced in 1977.
Since one of the most widespread phenomenon of the housing situation in 
Cairo, is squatter areas, upgrading was seen to be the most appropriate 
strategy. Sites-and-services, was seen to be a way of meeting some of the 
housing shortage, and a way of providing units in Helwan for those workers 
who live far away and have to use public transport. Not only were housing
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problems targeted in this project but also transport problems. The latter 
figures quite highly on the list of USAID objectives.
Housing in Helwan is in fact a microcosm of the housing situation in Cairo. 
Because it is a major industrial site in Egypt, hosting a potentially sensitive 
urban population, it has over the years been the site of various housing 
developments and interventions. Helwan is composed of old neighbourhoods 
of upper and lower income housing, old villages, squatter areas, public 
housing of the sixties and of the seventies, as well as one of the five new 
satellite towns, the 5th of May Town. Initial discussions about the Helwan 
Housing Project started in 1976, with yet another attempt at meeting the 
housing needs of Helwan factory workers (see Chapter 4).
A. THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THE HELWAN 
HOUSING PROJECT:
The Helwan Project was initiated at the very time when USAID had 
committed its full support to Egypt. This was just after the Camp David 
agreement and the introduction of ‘Infitah’ policy. As discussed above, 
realising how these policies had caused Sadat’s vulnerability at home, U.S. 
officials decided that they should start identifying projects to meet the needs 
of the low income population. In other words, USAID saw that its role was 
to fund Projects which were identified as serving low income groups in order 
to insure the survival of the regime.
"The State Department had no undertaking as dramatic as the 
construction of the High Dam upon which to pin American 
prestige, but it was hoped that the cumulative political effect of 
a collection of smaller projects would rival the enormous 
symbolic impact of the High Dam" (Burns, 1985, p. 183-184)
The Helwan housing projects was one of the first of such ‘smaller project’. 
When asked about the conditions under which the Helwan Housing project
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was initiated, the reaction from USAID officials in Cairo was that at that time 
the mood was ‘everything for Egypt’(Interview, USAID official, 1988)
B. CAIRO’S HOUSING PROBLEM:
The housing problem in Cairo is huge and complex. What follows is a very 
brief description of the problem and some of its causes. Cairo is one of the 
largest cities in the world. Its population went from half a million at the turn 
of the century to 12 million in 1992, representing around 22% of the total 
population of Egypt. The population increased by a rate of 19.3% between 
1976 and 1986. By 1986, Cairo reached a density of 28,258 inhabitants per 
square kilometre (CAPMAS, 1988).
In addition to natural population increase, migration from rural areas account 
for a large proportion of this huge increase in Cairo’s population, especially 
over the last forty years. As a result of the decreasing capacity for agriculture 
land to meet the needs of rural populations, and the attraction of city life, 
rural populations accelerated their migrations to the city in the 1970s. Several 
reasons have been identified for this increase in migration: the location of 
major industries, relatively better services and public utilities in cities and the 
surpluses of farm labour (Rugh, 1984, p. 236).
Considering that Cairo’s urban structure and its public facilities were laid 
down (in the forties) for two million people, the consequences for such huge 
increases in the population in terms of both housing and infrastructure 
shortage is immense. Various Egyptian governments have failed to deal with 
these problems over the years and the impact of this is most acutely felt by the 
poorer majority of Cairo’s population. In fact housing interventions failed to 
meet the housing needs not only of the poor, but even of middle income 
Egyptians.
90
Therefore, given that a large proportion of Cairo’s population was shut out of 
the urban housing market, they were left with no alternative but to find illegal 
.shelter on publicly or privately owned land. It is estimated that squatting 
accounted for over half of all housing construction activities in Cairo between 
1975 and 1985 (USAID, 1985, p. 35).
Most low income neighbourhoods, as well as newly urbanised villages 
recently incorporated in the city of Cairo, have seemingly reached saturation 
point. Yet more and more pressure is put on space year after year (Rugh, 
1984, pp. 20-21) . They have become some of the most densely populated 
areas of the world. One of the strategies for dealing with land scarcity in 
these neighbourhoods is to subdivide houses and apartments into smaller, often 
one room dwellings. In turn the owners of these houses, often subdivide them 
to accommodate their adult children and their families and sub-let other units 
to raise some extra income. In these cases cooking and most often toilet 
facilities, are shared by as many as five to six households. This overcrowding 
often leads to dire living conditions. Having reached saturation point, other 
methods of coping with housing shortage had to be explored.
Different squatting methods became widespread in Cairo. Rooftops represent 
one of the last stages of urban crowding. Dwellings were constructed on 
rooftops using banged-together wooden sheds composed of boards and roofed 
with corrugated tin roofing. It is estimated that around half a million live in 
such rooftop dwellings in Cairo (Potter, 1985, p. 86). The cemeteries of Cairo 
also constitute a living space for an estimated one and a half million 
inhabitants.
Most widely and rapidly spreading however are large squatter areas around 
the fringes of Cairo. Most of these communities have settled on farm land or 
government owned land which is largely desert land. Because of their 
illegality, they are outside official city planning and management limits and 
therefore do not receive government services and facilities such as paved
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roads, piped waster, sewers and solid waste collection services (Oldheim, 
1987, p. xv). However, though limited and often inadequate, most squatter 
areas managed over the years to get access to such facilities through various 
means and strategies. Unlike the case of many other ‘third world’ countries, 
construction materials and standards in squatter areas are generally little 
differentiated from other lower income ‘formal’ neighbourhoods. The 
inhabitants of squatter areas are quite heterogenous. Some are rural migrants 
and others are urban dwellers who either escaped from other more crowded 
Cairo neighbourhoods or could not afford them. In terms of income level, 
squatters are varied. They may belong to the poorest of the poor or the 
middle classes. Recently, as the present research shows, more and more of 
the latter group have increasingly been forced to live in squatter areas.
Government reaction to squatter areas have been precarious over the years. 
Squatters do violate many laws. However it is rare for the government to take 
punitive actions against them. Although there have been a number of eviction 
incidents over the years, this by no means was done systematically. Both the 
political sensitivity of such actions, and the government’s inability to find 
alternative solutions to the serious housing shortages, have inhibited it from 
taking strict measures against squatters, and generally turning a blind eye to 
the whole situation.
C. GOVERNMENT HOUSING INTERVENTIONS:
In order to put the Helwan Housing Project into context, this section will 
briefly review the different attempts made by the Egyptian government to deal 
with Cairo’s housing problems over the years.
Since the early fifties, housing policies have gone through various stages: 
from a series of unsuccessful attempts to house the poor to complete neglect. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the state in its ‘redistributive’ effort under 
Nasser, got involved in building public housing units to accommodate the low
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/income population. These buildings were typically five story walk-ups, 
composed of two to three roomed apartments of between 30 and 60 square 
meters. These were rented at heavily subsidised rents, where the room cost 
was one Egyptian pound. In 1962-1963 alone, 21,000 units were built nation 
wide (Waterbury, 1982, p. 335). However these units failed to meet the 
needs of the ever-growing population of Cairo and most often they did not 
reach the poor. Although these housing units were affordable to low income 
groups, the majority went to lower middle income groups, many of whom 
were government employees.
This by no means suggests that the public housing provision of the sixties was 
ineffective. In a city like Cairo where the majority of the population, not only 
the poor, suffered from housing shortage, public housing in the sixties was an 
attempt towards a real solution. While the design of these buildings produced 
small, unattractive and monotonous units, over the years the inhabitants of 
these flats were able to transform them beyond recognition. The way the 
blocks of buildings were spaced allowed for extensions. Many of the 
inhabitants were able to extend their flats by one to two rooms. The creativity 
and organisation that it took, has been studied and used as examples for policy 
in other third world countries (see Tripple and Wilkinsom, 1987). The 
decision to locate public housing projects in major streets of Cairo in the 
sixties, was also advantageous in that the inhabitants were close to markets, 
workshops, schools and hospitals.
"This policy of integration of the urban poor into the city 
reflected the governments’ concern with social goals which 
included preservation of the social fabric and minimisation of 
economic hardship involved in relocation" (Hassan, 1984, p.
59).
Parallel to building public housing, government policies at that time were 
highly protective of renters. Rent control laws were issued which cut down 
rents by 50%, and owners were neither allowed to raise the rents nor to end
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a rent contract. Though controversial and with negative results in the long 
run, especially in terms of the rate of new construction and maintenance, this 
law, at the time, allowed access to secure shelter for thousands of households.
In the seventies, under Sadat, fewer public housing units were constructed. 
The cost of meeting the housing deficit was considered beyond government 
means and such populist measures were increasingly seen as distortions of the 
market efficiency needed for development (Hinnebusch, 1981, p. 452). The 
hope was that unfettered private consumerism would generate a ‘trickle down’ 
effect. Rent control laws also started to be gradually relaxed. The state 
however announced that it would mitigate the disparities in the availability and 
distribution of housing in three ways. The first was to continue to build 
housing at subsidised rent. The second was to provide public land and 
subsidised credit to building co-operatives. The third was to construct new 
towns in the desert in close proximity to Cairo and Alexandria (Waterbury, 
1983, pp. 341-342).
In the early eighties, the Egyptian government started reviewing its housing 
policy by reducing standards and size, minimising subsidy and emphasising 
cost recovery (El Gohary, 1991, p. 44). The major housing interventions in 
Cairo from the late seventies to the present, was the construction of new 
towns. In 1977, the GOE decided the only way to solve the huge housing 
problem was through a national decentralisation strategy. Out of this an 
ambitious national development project of constructing Satellite and New 
Towns on desert land was launched (Jenssen, 1981, pp. 211-212). The policy 
of constructing these towns was to redirect urban expansion where it does not 
threaten precious agriculture land. LE600 million were spent on this project 
up until 1985. The four New Towns, approximately 60 Km large cities, were 
meant to be autonomous centres. The four Satellite Towns, were around 30 
Km from cities and were meant to be only partially autonomous (Feiler, 
1990). The isolation of the New Towns meant that the spread potential of new 
towns to effect the economic and social development of a certain hinterland
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or periphery was lost (Jenssen, 1981, p. 212-213). The other policy that also 
governed these towns was that it was targeting owner occupiers thus changing 
GOE rental policy in public housing. This meant that it was only affordable 
to middle income earners and not the poor. As a result of these new housing 
policies, and especially in the more remote towns, and despite huge shortage 
in housing, large number of plots remained empty. For example three of 
these towns had around 85% of the plots unoccupied (Feiler, 1990).
In an attempt to fill these empty units, the MOH has tried several strategies 
one of which was to use them for reallocation. For example as a result of a 
slum clearance carried out in 1980, a number of households were reallocated 
to the new town of Madinet Al-Salam. Research shows that this move has 
caused huge social and economic hardship for these households. The town is 
situated two to nine kilometres beyond Cairo airport. Although workshops 
were available for sale, most of the reallocated men and women could not 
afford them. Among the many problems that occurred as a result of such a 
move was that most breadwinners had to commute to seek work in the inner 
city having to bear the cost and the long hours spent on transport (up to two 
to three hours a day) (Hassan, 1984, pp.60-61).
IV CONCLUSION
As this chapter shows, Egypt’s last forty years have seen a number of policy 
changes under its three presidents. It is in the light of these changes that the 
relationship between the GOE and USAID and the way it has evolved over the 
years can be explored. Sadat’s pro-Western position, especially following 
Nasser’s rejection, in the context of Egypt’s strategically important position, 
have led to a unique relationship between Egypt and the U.S. While 
Mubarak and his government did not quite carry through his promise to be a 
devoted political, and even more important, economic client of the U.S., the 
aid relationship has not been interrupted. The way in which this fragile
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relationship has been maintained reflects a prominent characteristic of 
Mubarak’s regime.
The GOE under Mubarak is a regime that has proved in many respects to be 
reactive rather than proactive. The long and constant ‘reaction’ to foreign 
organisations, even though often resistant, seems to be all consuming. Little 
over the last decade and a half has been invested in economic development. 
It appears to many that the main goal of Mubarak’s regime is to survive; and 
in the process, not to push any group or entity far enough for them to take 
drastic measures against Egypt in general, and against the government in 
particular. These entities include on the one hand the debtor organisations, 
and countries like the U.S., other Arab countries, Israel; and on the other 
hand the majority of the Egyptian public with its growing discontent and 
manifesting itself most clearly in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
As this chapter demonstrates, various U.S. institutions, and most particularly 
USAID, have not been simply at the receiving end of the GOE strategy of 
‘gradualism’, but are at the same time an instrument in its implementation. 
The U .S .’s role as go-between with the IMF and the W.B. is an important 
example. But also, and even more importantly, the U.S. has also tried to help 
the GOE to pacify Egyptian discontent with the growing conditions of 
economic hardship. These various dynamics will be considered in the 
examination of the relationship between USAID and the Egyptian government 
through its manifestation in the Helwan Housing Project.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INITIATION AND FORMULATION 
OF THE HELWAN HOUSING PROJECT
I INTRODUCTION
The manner in which the Helwan Housing project was initiated and the 
negotiations that took place before, during and after the signature of the Grant 
Agreement, were crucial in shaping the project process and its impact. This 
chapter will deal in some detail with the key stages of this process and the 
various dynamics that emerged from the various relationships between the 
major actors involved at this early stage of the Project.
H INITIATION AND SIGNATURE OF THE GRANT AGREEMENT
While the idea for the Helwan Housing project emerged in 1975, the actual 
signature of the Grant Agreement took place in the middle of 1978. It is 
important to examine the events of this stage of the project in the context of 
what was happening in terms of the U.S. and GOE relations around the time 
of the signature of the agreement. As chapter 2 shows, from mid to late 
1970’s, the time the Project was being decided and the Grant Agreement 
signed, Egypt’s peace negotiations with Israel were on the way, with the U.S. 
as intermediary. Sadat was initiating his "Open Door Economic Policy". The 
majority of Egyptians were feeling increasing economic pressures, reflected 
in the ‘food riots’.
The U.S. was in full support of Egypt during this period and the fact that the 
U.S. role was politically motivated was never denied by American officials. 
As Stone, the head of USAID in Cairo, said:
"The U.S. wants above all to help stabilise and strengthen 
Egypt so that it can continue to pursue a peace oriented foreign 
policy and be a strong and reliable friend to its allies." (Stone,
1984, p.5).
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In Washington, U.S. assistance was seen as a "..political tool designed to 
impress Egyptians at all levels of society with the value of Sadat’s American 
connection". (Burns, 1985, p. 185)
A. THE INITIAL ‘IDEA’ OF A HOUSING PROJECT:
The director of USAID housing office during a visit to Egypt in 1975, 
suggested to USAID Cairo office that USAID headquarters would be 
interested to fund a big housing programme in Egypt (Interviews with USAID 
officials, 1988). A series of studies were then initiated and funded by USAID 
in 1976-1977 to evaluate the housing situation in Egypt. Based on the result 
of these studies, a joint U.S. and Egyptian consultants’ team prepared a report 
entitled "Immediate Action Proposals for Housing in Egypt" (The Nathan 
Report1 (NR), 1982, p.5). "The highly subsidised nature of public housing 
and continually rising construction costs" (Project Paper, 1978, p .l)  were 
identified in the report as two of the major reasons for housing shortage in 
Egypt.
Following the thinking of the time around ‘non-conventional’ housing, USAID 
decided to fund a project that would be a ‘demonstration’ project to change 
GOE’s housing policy. Egypt’s ‘conventional’ housing policy of building 
public housing in the shape of five story walk-up apartments, was found to be 
an inefficient way to solve the housing shortage and presented an extra load 
on the Egyptian economy. Consequently, the report stated that ‘the GOE 
budgetary resources devoted to housing even though increasing, are clearly 
inadequate to the needs of Egypt’s poor’ (Project Paper, 1978, p .l) . The 
team then suggested a number of guiding principles for immediate action such 
as: reducing cost by reducing size and standards; increasing level of cost 
recovery; and establishing a housing programme to meet needs of the lowest 
income people (NR, 1982, p.5).
1 The Nathan Report is the first independent evaluation done by an American firm. It 
will be extensively quoted here as it is a good, quite objective document that covers the early 
stages of the project.
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Following the "Action Proposal" USAID decided to embark on another series 
of studies to identify specific housing demonstration projects. Consequently, 
the Office of Housing financed three studies that were conducted by U.S.- 
Egyptian firms in mid 1977.
The reports recommended five housing projects, among which two were the 
‘Helwan upgrading’ and the ‘New Cooperative Community’ projects (NR, 
1982, p .6). USAID chose the two Helwan projects which it decided to 
combine into one, including both the upgrading and ‘new community’ 
components. The idea then was to co-finance a housing project which would 
demonstrate the possibility of a ‘new’ approach to meeting the housing needs 
of the low income population. As one USAID key official explains, Helwan 
was chosen because it was inhabited predominantly by factory workers, with 
the idea that they represent a vulnerable and potentially politically explosive 
sector of the population (Interview, CHF consultant, 1988).
As described in chapter 3, the economic and political situation was such that 
the majority of the population who were not getting any of the benefits of 
peace and the economic opening to the West, were seen as a threat to the 
regime. That was the basis for the choice made by USAID of the target 
population. Factory workers were seen by U.S. consultants and officials as 
a sensitive political group who are often subject to political unrest. A CHF 
consultant explained that to meet factory workers’ needs was a way to pacify 
them and win them over (Interview, CHF, 1989). This explanation was 
supported by a USAID official who said that the sentiment at that point was: 
"Let us support little factory workers. They are a strong political group, we 
cannot afford to anger them" (Interview, USAID, 1989).
The notion that factory workers are the most likely political group to rebel 
under economic pressure at that time in the history of Egypt, would not have 
been held by those with better knowledge of the Egyptian context at the time.
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And in fact, as this thesis will partially show, political unrest with the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the late eighties and nineties came from elsewhere.
B. THE PROJECT PAPERS:
While the original estimate to produce the project papers was six months, it 
took USAID about 18 months from April 1977 to August 1978 to prepare the 
Implementation Plan, Project Paper and Grant Agreement (NR, 1982, p .6). 
The Project Paper which was prepared by CHF in coordination with USAID, 
instead of being ready in November 1977, received final approval in July 
1978. It was based on a number of reports contracted by USAID and 
produced by U.S. firms. These reports covered a range of areas: an 
environmental assessment (done in accord to USAID regulation), a finance 
and credit report, and an engineering and feasibility study (NR, 1982, pp. 6- 
7). The Project Paper covered the technical, financial, economic and 
institutional aspects of the Project.
C. THE SIGNATURE OF THE GRANT AGREEMENT AND 
NEGOTIATION WITH MOH:
USAID documents written at that time suggest that all the stages prior to the 
signature of the Grant Agreement involved negotiation and even ‘working 
together’ with the GOE. Interviews with USAID officials describing how 
procedures normally go, also supports that. However interviews with the 
Agency and CHF staff as well as close reading of the documents, show that 
the involvement of GOE at this stage was nominal.
The first real negotiations between USAID and the GOE started after the 
Project paper and Grant Agreement were written and ready for signature 
(1978). According to a high level MOH official who was directly involved 
in the negotiations, the ‘new’ housing approach was seen as an interesting 
experience at that point. The atmosphere was quite relaxed in terms of GOE 
and U.S. relations for this was the height of the Sadat era. The only objection 
that the Egyptian team had at this point was about the high fees to be paid to
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U.S. consultants. "Their budget for U.S. consultancy fees was $17 million 
but we bargained with them till we got it down to $5.7 million" (Interview, 
ex-high official in MOH).
In accordance with the USAID agreement with Egypt, the GOE has to 
contribute 50% of Project budgets. According to the rate of exchange at the 
signature of the Agreement this meant that USAID was to be responsible for 
$80 million and GOE LE56 million. The latter sum was decided to be partly 
in kind (Land etc, estimated at around LE35 million) and partly in cash 
(around LE10 million). The estimates given by the Egyptian negotiators about 
the value of the land, were in fact quite inflated. This ‘deal’, according to 
MOH and the Agency officials, was something the Egyptians were proud at 
having achieved in their negotiations with USAID (Interviews, 1988-89).
It seems that nothing else other than these two points was negotiated and that 
all the conditions in the Project documents were "well received by the GOE" 
(NR, 1982, p .6). This fact later received harsh criticism from the Agency 
staff members at all levels. They saw that this was a key reason for problems 
they faced throughout the history of the Project (Interviews, the Agency, 
1988-89).
Reports, as well as various announcements from high USAID echelons, 
insisted that procedures for funding projects entailed that the GOE submit 
proposals and that USAID responds to them. Once projects are approved, 
then it is claimed that the GOE is a full partner in negotiations throughout the 
project phases. These claims are then contradicted by statements such as:
"..although the AID Cairo mission now is more actively 
discussing project progress with Egyptian officials, the 
Egyptian government continues to have a minor role" (U.S.
General Accounting Office Report, 1985, In Morsey, 1986, 
p.375).
101
D. THE NATURE OF USAID-GOE RELATION DURING THIS STAGE:
This stage in the life of the Helwan Housing project was crucial in shaping the 
process of the project and the relationship between USAID and the GOE. The 
main problem was that USAID ignored GOE priorities, and thought that it 
could use its leverage through funding a huge project to change policy without 
GOE involvement.
While USAID’s ultimate goal in Egypt has always been a strategic one, it saw 
itself achieving it best through helping the GOE towards a more efficient path 
of economic development. Introducing new policies, housing being one of 
many, was thought to be a means towards this goal. The words of a senior 
USAID sum up this position:
”AID sees itself as a developer rather than a bank. We deal 
with projects that help in changing policy. This is our way to 
help run the Egyptian economy” (Interview, Senior USAID 
Official. 1988).
The assumption on the part of USAID was that because of the position it held 
in Egypt, all it needed to do in order to change a policy was to demonstrate 
how it could work. So in the case of the Helwan Housing Project, as a 
USAID official explains, the USAID was not interested in the success of this 
project as an end in itself, it was interested in changing policy (Interview, 
USAID Official, 1989). Among other aims, it wanted to create a new 
economic system which will encourage the mobilisation of private savings and 
would guarantee cost recovery while cutting down on subsidy; to establish 
lower and more flexible planning and building standards; give land tenure to 
‘squatters’, by-pass the established bureaucracy by creating an autonomous 
new institution (the Agency) to implement the Project and other similar 
projects (Project Paper, 1978).
USAID seemed, in this case, to have completely ignored the fact that Egypt 
had its own agenda. It also underestimated how difficult it would be to try
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and alter it. As a prominent former diplomat explained:
"Some of our expectations about the political value of economic 
aid in Egypt seem incredible in retrospect. But you must 
remember that we were new to the game" (interview in Burns,
1986, p,7).
In his discussion of the way the relationship between USAID and GOE could 
be improved, Hopkins argues that not only do the priorities have to be 
mutually agreed upon, but they must be justifiable in terms of the internal 
norms of each of the two bureaucracies in the context of the political process 
of each of the two states (Hopkins, 1984, p .38).
While USAID came up with a package all laid out in the documents, GOE did 
not offer an alternative package, it did not state its objectives, conditions or 
policies. The natural questions then to ask at this point is why GOE accepted 
the Project Paper as it was? Why did it not negotiate for conditions closer 
to its own objectives? Why did it not even explain that the conditions offered 
did not fit the complex reality of the Egyptian political, economic and 
bureaucratic system?
What most interviewees agree to is that USAID was offering funds for which 
the GOE was in great need and therefore did not reject the proposal. They 
did not want to alter any of the conditions for the project because they did not 
want to jeopardise getting the funds. As described by a number of 
interviewees in the Agency, while there might have been one or two senior 
officials in the MOH who were interested in a new approach to housing, the 
rest of the negotiating team were really not convinced of its viability in the 
Egyptian context (Interviews, the Agency and MOH staff, 1988-89).
In addition to that, as shown in interviews with the Agency staff, the signature 
of the agreement was not taken seriously by the GOE. The signature was not 
seen as a final commitment. The idea that eventually the government would
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be able to do things their way, was predominant. In other words, the GOE 
appeared to view this stage differently from the Americans. While the latter 
spent a huge amount of time and money to produce the Project "BOOK", the 
GOE on the other hand saw this stage as a formality they need not worry too 
much about. As Hopkins explains, Egyptians involved in such projects see 
the Americans as relative newcomers who insist on more studies in order to 
convince themselves that the program direction is right. The Egyptians, 
however feel they would rather get on with the program than spend time doing 
studies (Hopkins, 1984, p.43). Other reasons given by interviewees for the 
low level of negotiation on the part of the Egyptian team at this stage, was, 
as one CHF Egyptian consultant said:
"They were poor negotiators because they were ignorant of 
what upgrading and sites-and-services meant so they were 
intimidated by all the jargon and were unable to discuss it in 
detail"(Interview, CHF Egyptian Consultant).
Another added:
"If you look at the list of the Egyptians that signed the 
agreement you would find that they were all politicians, or 
bureaucrats or professionals. There were no technical people 
which explains the many technical weaknesses in the Grant 
Agreement" (Interview, Egyptian CHF consultant, 1989).
This view was supported by an employee in the legal department of the 
Agency who argued the following:
"If there was a legal consultant on the team we would not have 
been suffering now from so many problems. The Grant 
Agreement is full of legal loopholes" (Interview, the Agency,
1989).
Others including some USAID interviewees, put most of the blame on USAID 
for the many problems that came out of this stage for the project. Their main 
point was that the Helwan Project should not have taken off when there was
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no agreement on the objectives from GOE. This, one official added, was the 
basic reason for the obstacles that inhibited the Project’s progress (USAID 
Official, 1989).
There is also a general agreement that the objectives that USAID put forward 
were too numerous, too varied and many did not fit Egypt’s reality. This was 
confirmed by a CHF consultant who had long years of experience with the 
Project. He said:
M..many of the objectives were unrealistic. For example cost 
recovery. You cannot make cost recovery as an objective when 
this contradicts so many other policies in the country. This 
was however typical of projects agreed on in the mid seventies 
in Egypt" (Interview, CHF Employee, 1988).
In short, USAID came with a whole package of changes ignoring the existence 
of an already complex well established system. Whether it was ignorance of 
this complexity that made USAID act in this way, or that it did it thinking that 
it could overcome it through such a high budget Project, or it was a 
combination of both, is a question to be investigated. Whatever the reason, 
the result was quite detrimental to the Project, as will be shown below.
ffl THE TENDERING AND CONTRACTING PHASE
The major activities that occurred during this phase were the creation of the 
Agency and bidding and contract negotiation.
A. THE CREATION OF THE AGENCY:
In response to the Grant Agreement, a ministerial decree was issued 
pertaining to the establishment of the new agency (EAJP) to implement 
agreements held with foreign governments. The Chairman of the agency is 
delegated the authority of the minister to deal with the personnel, financial and 
administrative affairs of the agency (Ministerial decree no.48). The 
description of the role of this institution, as it appears in the Project Paper is 
as follows:
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"An implementation unit in the MOH headed by a director, 
will be directly responsible for orchestrating the inputs of the 
various agencies and for overall management, supervision and 
evaluation of the Project. He will be guided by the decisions 
of the steering committee which will be chaired by the MOH"
(Project Paper, p. 15).
The employees of the Agency, engineers, accountants, administrators and 
social workers, were all selected from within the MOH. They were given 
75% more than their Ministry salaries2.
B. THE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTOR AND CONSULTANT FIRMS:
From the time of the signature of the Grant Agreement in mid-1978 until early 
1980, the main activity was around bidding and contract negotiation for the 
three main consultancy firms responsible for the implementation of the 
Helwan Project.
The Project Paper implementation schedule estimated that the target date for 
two of the three U.S. consulting firms to commence work was October 1978. 
In fact the actual work started in 1980. The delay was due mainly to the long 
bidding procedures and contract negotiation.
Competitive USAID bidding procedures have been among the most time 
consuming and criticised feature of the usually cumbersome U.S. aid 
bureaucracy (Weinbaum, 1986 p. 102). In interviews with the Agency and 
CHF staff, there were many complaints about how unduly long and complex 
USAID bidding procedures were. The procedures as shown in USAID 
documents, include the following steps: public advertising in the States; 
invitation for bids with precise specification and all terms and conditions; 
public opening and reading; evaluation; award to responsible bidder with 
lowest responsive bid (Project Implementation Paper, 1988, p.v-7).
2 This was in the shape of bonuses, but in fact were fixed. This is the only way that 
government employees can be paid extra money.
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These procedures which the Project documents indicated took between four 
and six months, the Agency interviewees said took much longer. Three of the 
old timers on the Project argued that this was another reason why U.S. 
consultant firms should not have been involved. "The U.S. firms do not only 
use up most of the Project budget, but it takes ages to recruit them” one of 
them explained (Interview, 1988). On the other hand USAID officials, while 
admitting to the long procedures, maintained that this was the only way to go 
about it efficiently. In his analysis of USAID-Cairo, Weinbaum explains that 
USAID’s rigidity has forced its clients to "endure a labyrinth of details and 
delays" (Weinbaum, 1986, p. 101).
Delays and obstacles occurred with each of the three major contracts with 
U.S. firms. The CHF contract was one of the major contracts in the Helwan 
project. CHF was the consulting firm contracted to provide technical 
assistance to the Agency. Its responsibility consisted of advising, assisting 
and training staff members of the Agency (NR, 1982, p.i). USAID-Cairo 
wanted to select CHF, as it was already involved with all the preliminary 
studies, without having to go through the usual bidding procedures. However 
USAID-Washington insisted on competitive bids. CHF was evaluated and 
selected in agreement with the MOH toward the beginning of 1979. Then 
contract negotiations started, and CHF submitted a cost proposal for $5 
million. The original cost for this contract was, as it appears in the Project 
Paper, $2.8 million. The then chairman of the Agency objected to the $5 
million, saying that the contract price was too high, and that they did not need 
nor did they want technical assistance (NR, 1982, p. 12). This fact, which 
was confirmed in an interview by another ex-chairman of the Agency and by 
CHF staff, was the reason that CHF had to submit another proposal 
(Interview, 1988). It cut down the terms of the contract and reduced its team 
size and came up with a budget of $1.9 million (NR, 1982, p. 13).
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The second major contract was that with Basil-WBLT-Nassar3 (BWN). As it 
appears in the Nathan evaluation and as interviews with the Agency and CHF 
staff indicate, the architect-engineer contract was an issue for objection by the 
Agency and the MOH. Again as soon as BWN’s submitted a cost proposal 
of $15 million, the Agency and MOH objected to using an American firm. 
The original cost estimate in the Project Paper was $3.69 million. Although 
this cost was not escalated for inflation, it was still way below BWN’s 
proposed budget. After four reduced proposals were submitted, the contract 
was finally signed at the price of $5.6 million in the middle of 1979. The 
negotiations thus took one year to be completed and the work did not start 
until the first quarter of 1980 (NR, 1982, pp. 13-14).
The participation of an Egyptian firm in the design of the HNC houses was 
part of the Grant Agreement. Thus the contract with the Arab Bureau for 
Design and Technical Consultation4. A number of the Agency employees 
however claimed that it was as a result of pressures on their part that USAID 
accepted that an Egyptian firm be involved. The Agency seemed to consider 
this to be one of their negotiation conquests.
It took USAID more than a year to evaluate the list of Egyptian architectural 
and engineering firms responsible for the design of the HNC housing solution. 
After the AB was selected at the beginning of 1979, the negotiations for this 
contract were again delayed. The contract was finally signed in mid 1980 
after the price was reduced to LE330,000 (around $4925,300) (NR, 1982, 
p. 15)
In addition, a number of Egyptian firms were contracted for the design and 
installation of the infrastructure in the upgrading areas as well as in the
3 This was a joint American-Egyptian firm. They were responsible for planning, 
architecture-engineering, procurement, construction, management and supervision.
4 The Arab Bureau was contracted to design and prepare contract documents for the 
houses and community facilities.
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building of community services. Again the Agency interviewees claimed that 
they pressured USAID into accepting that this work should be done by 
Egyptian firms. A USAID interviewee however said that the bidding was 
announced in the States but no American firms applied. He explained that 
the contracts were too small to attract Americans (Interview, Egyptian USAID 
Employee, 1989).
Contracting, as with the bidding process, started by being quite complicated 
and time consuming. However, after procedures between USAID and the 
Agency were simplified no major delays occurred.
C. THE IMPACT OF THIS STAGE ON SHAPING THE PROJECT 
PROCESS:
It is important to stop at this point and try to look into the most significant 
issues raised during this stage and the impact they had in the shaping of the 
Project process.
The first issue here is around the creation of a new agency to implement the 
Helwan Project. USAID thought that by creating a new institution it would 
achieve the following objectives: to establish an institution to be responsible 
for future Projects within the GOE; and to avoid the difficulties in the 
Egyptian bureaucracy and to speed-up implementation5 . However, as the 
Project process shows, the effect was the opposite. Interviewees explained 
that the newly developed institution took a long time to get established and 
assume its role. They explained that the Agency started off being weak, and 
although it later gathered momentum it still did not have enough power to 
fight on all fronts (Interviews with USAID, the Agency and MOH, 1988-89). 
So instead of being a dynamic institution able to execute new ideas, by the 
mere fact that it was a new institution in an established government
5 Since the creation of EAJP several similar institutions were created which are 
government institutions but with a mandate to carry out functions that are meant to cut out 
bureaucratic delays.
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bureaucracy, it was paralysed by entrenched obstacles and had to face a real 
battle with all. Also the fact that the Agency was never given legal autonomy 
was a reason for its limited authority.
Reading through the USAID Project documents one is struck by the obsession 
with this new institution. It seemed as if the whole project was only a means 
to reach this end, ie to create a new institution. "The Helwan project can be 
used to develop an institutional capacity to carry on the program in other 
regions of Egypt" (Helwan Housing and community upgrading, 1984, p.4). 
Therefore by creating this new institution, all the pressure was put on the 
Agency to negotiate a controversial Project. In trying to by-pass the 
bureaucracy a number of the most key institutions and agencies were felt 
alienated and as a result they caused delays throughout the life of the project. 
One of the major institutions that the Project managed to alienate most was the 
Governorate and then later even the MOH6.
The second issue is about the reluctance of the Agency to employ U.S. firms. 
The negative effect resulting from lack of proper negotiation on the part of 
GOE over the Grant Agreement, first became apparent at the contract 
negotiation stage. It took only a year after the Grant agreement was signed, 
for the MOH and the chairman of the newly developed the Agency to 
challenge one of its terms. The cost given by the U.S. firms were seen to be 
extremely unreasonable. The objection that U.S. consultants were not 
necessary, immediately arose. While both the MOH and the Agency might 
have known that their objection would probably not reverse the agreement, 
they used it as a point of bargain. They did succeed in pushing the cost 
down, which they considered to be a victory. However by the end of the 
Project, as will be shown in the next chapter, the U.S. firms’ budget got way 
beyond even the U.S. firms first estimates.
6 This will all be discussed more fully in the next chapters.
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USAID interviewees were very clear about the inevitability of employing 
American firms. As one senior employee said: "AID is tax payers money, 
they like to see that they get something out of it" (Interview, USAID Senior 
Employee). A CHF consultant added:
"Americans hate the idea of aid, they basically don’t care about 
the outside world. The only way to convince them is to show 
them through various ways that it is of benefit to them" 
(Interview, CHF American Consultant).
The issue of employing U.S. firms will remain a hot issue of discussion 
throughout the Project and a source of major complaint from most Agency 
staff as well as Egyptian consultants working for CHF. The cost of 
employing them was seen as eating up most of the grant. Their role as 
assistants and trainers was also unacceptable on the part of the Agency staff, 
who saw them as having inferior capabilities to their own. This created a 
great deal of resentment among Egyptians on the Project, which affected the 
relationship between them and their American counterparts. The American 
consultants, contracted by the Agency and at the same time playing the role 
of the consultant, trainer and adviser resulted in tension around ‘who had 
power over whom’. More of this analysis will come up in the next chapter.
While the previous phase consisted of negotiations between USAID and GOE 
represented by MOH, in this last phase the Agency resumed its role in the 
Project, and added a new actor to the project.
The Agency was meant, at the point of its creation, to take control of the 
Project with both USAID and MOH as support institutions. However what 
actually happened was that the Agency allied itself with MOH and was, at 
different stages of the Project’s life, in a more or less confrontational 
relationship with USAID. The role of both USAID and MOH as described 
in the Project documents was supposed to be basically that of funding and 
monitoring. However, as described above, the whole discussion around U.S. 
consultant firms showed that USAID was forceful in pushing things in
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accordance to the Grant Agreement. Project documents and interviews show 
that USAID officials felt things were slipping out of their control. What they 
thought was a final non-negotiable document, i.e the Project Paper, was being 
challenged. According to both CHF and USAID interviewees, the fact that 
the Egyptians were questioning such a basic item in the Agreement, came to 
them as a real shock. It was only then that they realised that they had a battle 
on their hand.
While the Agency in its alliance with MOH officials did not win the battle 
over the U.S. consultants, a battle they probably knew they would not win, 
they did however succeed in pushing down the fees. This alliance between the 
Agency and MOH, as will be shown in the next chapter, did not always 
remain as such. This triangle between the Agency, MOH and USAID proved 
to be quite dynamic, with alliances shifting all along the Project process. 
It very much depended on the different interests of each of these three actors 
and how they would gain most if they allied themselves with a particular actor 
against the other around different issues.
IV PLANNING AND DESIGN PHASE
The Agency played an important role during this phase. It became responsible 
to reviewing and approving the plans and designs produced by the U.S. and 
Egyptian firms. It also acted as coordinator between these firms on the one 
hand and the Egyptian agencies and institutions responsible for giving planning 
and design approvals on the other hand. It was also responsible for the design 
of community facilities in the upgrading communities. CHF’s role was to 
help the Agency in its activities, especially the managerial and supervisory 
ones. It also started to take the role of go-between, between USAID and the 
Agency. After CHF stepped in, USAID started taking less of an active role 
in running the project. Its role was mostly to approve plans and designs. 
BWN’s role was mainly technical. It worked on the urbanisation plan and the 
design of the Helwan New Community (HNC) infrastructure. It also spent
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time negotiating around keeping to the standards as they were set in the 
Project Paper.
The Arab Bureau was responsible for the design of the Model Housing Estate 
(MHE). Its position was to push Egyptian standards, rather than U.S. 
standards as they appear in the Project Paper. Finally, the main role of the 
Governorate and various utility operation agencies during this stage was to 
give approvals on plans and designs. Their position was absolute refusal of 
USAID proposed standards.
A. THE HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY:
Empty desert land was chosen for the Helwan New Community (HNC) 
component of the Project. This was the site for 7, 200 plots with 
infrastructure and facilities to serve a population of around 100,000.
1. The Urbanisation plan:
This phase started with the preparation of the Urbanisation Plan for Helwan 
New Community (HNC), which began in the middle of 1980. The Plan was 
the first job executed by the U. S. -Egyptian venture BWN. They worked with 
the Arab Bureau and CHF to produce this document (HNC Urbanisation Plan, 
1985, p. 11). While it was estimated that this stage would be completed in 
four months, it took ten months. A number of agencies had to review the 
plan before it could be implemented. As stated in a USAID document, the 
long and complicated procedures were for the following reason:
"..it became necessary to reconcile fundamental differences of 
approach in terms of requirements of the Ministry, the 
comments and recommendations of various consultants, and the 
project goals as outlined in the Project Paper, as well as the 
basic agreements originally reached between the governments 
of Egypt and the United States" (Ibid, p .22).
It was claimed, in that same document, that each stage of the development of 
the plan was done in coordination with the General Organisation of Physical
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Planning in order to ensure that all requirements were done in accordance with 
Egyptian practice (Ibid, p. 11).
This fact was denied by both a number of the Agency staff as well as in the 
Nathan Evaluation Report. The major problems occurring during this stage 
was that the BWN team members did the preliminary design work in Athens 
and the urbanisation planning in New York. BWN which expected to receive 
quick approval for its plans, got a rejection from the Agency. The major 
reason given for this rejection was that BWN presented the agency with only 
one final plan instead of alternative plans7. BWN was consequently given an 
extension to prepare alternative plans and make a number of revisions. This 
took about six months to finish, after which one of the plans was finally 
approved by the Agency (NR, 1982, p. 17).
2. Design of the Infrastructure:
The second stage, the design of the infrastructure, started at the beginning of 
1981 and finished in the middle 1982. Besides the General Organisation of 
Physical Planning and the Planning Review Board, various sectoral agencies 
also had to give approval to the designs. Because these agencies were not 
involved in the design process, and because of the ‘new’ standards8 used and 
of course because of their own complicated bureaucracy, it took a long time 
to get the designs approved. They were rejected by most of these agencies 
and asked to be redesigned according to Egyptian standards.
An attempt was then made following the suggestion of CHF, to solve this 
problem. A committee was formed with representatives of the different 
sectoral agencies as members. This however was not done in the spirit of 
having them participate in the process. The main purpose was to co-opt
7 This is not necessarily a requirement when dealing with Egyptian firms. In this case 
difficulties were imposed because they are ‘American and should know better’.
8 The standards suggested were lower than Egyptian standards.
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them. This fact was quite shamelessly admitted in the Project document. One 
Agency high echelon employee said that these people were paid a fee to attend 
the committee as a bribe in disguise (Interview, the Agency, 1989). As Gabele 
argues in his evaluation (1987), these sectoral representatives felt they were 
‘serving two masters’ [the Agency and the sectoral agency they belong to]. 
This, he explains, led to last minute rejections ‘when the representative was 
wearing his ‘agency hat’ (CHF, Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 1987, 
p. 12).
The end result was that the ‘new’ standard were still rejected. For example, 
one among the agencies that objected was the Electricity Board. They asked 
for the electricity system to be redesigned. BWM explained in a 
memorandum, that the changes requested were not due to errors in the 
original design, but to the system selected by BWN. The latter argued that this 
system was completely acceptable in the United States. As a result of the 
objection of the Board, the system had to be redesigned to a "rather complex 
one costing considerably more money" (BWN memorandum, 1982, in NR, 
1982, p. 224). Therefore, in all cases, BWN had to comply with the local 
authorities’ requirements on standards rather than on the requirements as 
shown in the Project Paper. As a result, according to BWN estimates, the 
sewer system cost 20% more than a comparable American design, and the 
electric system 60% more (Ibid, p. 227).
3. Procurement of Materials:
Another activity which occurred during this phase was the procurement of 
American materials and equipment for the project. Approximately 
$12,000,000 (15 % of USAID contribution to the budget) worth were imported 
during the planning and design phase (HNC Urbanisation Plan, 1985, P. 13). 
Like the contracting of U.S. firms, procurement of materials from the U.S. 
represents another major issue for resentment on the part of the Agency team
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and some of the Egyptians among the CHF staff9.
4. The Design of the Model Housing Estate (MHE):
The design of the Model Housing Estate (the model housing for the sites-and- 
services) was the responsibility of the Arab Bureau. This activity took place 
between the middle of 1980 and the beginning of 1982. There were two 
issues of disagreement over this work: one was the lot size; the other was the 
foundation designs. Another major issue of disagreement was around lot size. 
Not only did the Planning board disapprove of the lot size as designated in the 
Project Paper, but so did the Agency and the Arab Bureau. The Egyptian 
standards exceeded by far those established by USAID in the Project Paper. 
This debate took several months to settle as the Arab Bureau wanted the lot 
size to be 150 Sq meters while USAID insisted on 50 Sq meters 10. At the 
end it was decided that the size of the lots would be closer to USAID’s plan 
(Ibid, p .226). The problem around foundations was about the soil conditions 
and the most appropriate system of foundation (NR, 1982, p .21). This issue 
around foundation proved to be a very controversial one during the 
implementation phase.
B. UPGRADING ACTIVITIES:
Hardly any work at all took place towards the upgrading component of the 
project in 1980. A plan was set by CHF to identify one of the communities 
in which to start upgrading activities. One of the major reasons for the delay 
was that Agency staff was only interested in HNC and would not, at this 
stage, spend any time on the other components of the Project.
9 This will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
10 Reduction of plot sizes is very much part of donor led housing policies at the time 
(chapter 2).
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In mid 1981, the contracted Egyptian planning and engineering firms started 
producing the urban land use plans and infrastructure designs of the upgrading 
areas. As in the case of HNC, because of the lower standards proposed by 
the Project, long delays occurred in getting sectoral agency approvals. This 
was due to rejections on the part of these agencies on the basis of 
unacceptable standards. Therefore major redesign work had to be undertaken 
with little overall reduction in standards affecting recoverable cost (CHF, 
Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 1987, p 10).
As the next chapter will discuss more fully, the issue of standards was seen, 
by USAID and CHF as one of the largest failures of the Project. USAID 
interviewees argued that Egyptian officials insisted on the best standards just 
because of the American money in the Project. This, they explained was why 
the standards they requested were the same as those used in the best 
neighbourhoods of Cairo. These facts were denied by the Agency employees 
who said that infrastructure standards were uniform in Egypt, that they do not 
vary from upper to lower income neighbourhoods. These standards, as one 
of the Agency previous chairman explained, have never changed since they 
were introduced by the British early this century (Interview, CHF Egyptian 
Consultant 1989).
The design of the community facilities, which are part of the upgrading 
activities, did not have to go through many delays. They were designed in- 
house using standard government designs (Op cit, CHF, 1987, p .8).
C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STAGE OF THE PROJECT:
The role of the MOH became quite eclipsed during this phase while other 
institutions became more predominant. The main actors that played a role 
during this stage were: U.S. firms (including CHF), the Agency and Sectoral 
agencies. The dynamics of the relationship between them was mostly set off, 
at this phase of the Project, by the issue of standards, cost recovery and 
replicability. Again the USAID assumption that the signature of the Grant
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Agreement meant that all GOE agencies and institutions would change their 
regulations for this Project, was challenged. This was further complicated by 
the fact that all these agencies and institutions were approached after the 
planning and designing was done and they had no involvement in the process. 
This meant that the whole purpose of early involvement and being engaged in 
a dialogue which might have led to some changes, was not achieved. While 
USAID did not have an active role during this phase except in supporting 
BWN in its effort to lower standards, many of the obstacles that occurred 
during this phase were due to the approach it took in the first stages of the 
Project. The alliance here was between the Agency and the sectoral agencies. 
What the Agency wanted to do was to speed up the operation but not 
necessarily convince the Egyptian agencies to accept the lower standards.
As a result the sectoral agencies had the last say each time with the exception 
of the case of lot sizes in HNC. No changes occurred in standards which 
meant that one of USAID’s most important objectives failed to materialise.
The second major issue is around the roles of key agencies and Project 
management. The issue of who was supposed to do what and what were the 
boundaries of each of the three key agencies i.e the Agency, CHF and 
USAID, becomes prevalent during the design and planning phase. Because 
management roles were not clearly defined in the Project Plan, a certain 
degree of confusion occurred at this stage especially between the Agency and 
CHF. The latter found itself involved in the everyday management of the 
Project. There were many complaints in CHF documents and in interviews, 
that the Agency used them to perform a large proportion of specific Agency 
staff activities (Internal document/mid-term evaluation, 1984, pp.ix-x). What 
was actually happening was that the Agency staff members did not see the 
relevance of having an American agency providing them with training and 
technical assistance. Interviews with the Agency staff members show that 
although they might have learned some things from CHF staff, they often felt 
they had much longer experience, more knowledge and higher levels of skill
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than CHF consultants. Many of the Agency interviewees questioned the 
consultant status of most CHF members. They found that most were too 
young, had not much experience outside their countries and were basically 
bureaucrats rather than experts. The best quality they found they had was that 
they spoke the same language as the funders, and were good at writing 
reports.
This is basically how CHF undertook the important role of go-between. 
USAID also found this role convenient. They knew CHF was aware of the 
score i.e. what the Project was expected to achieve. Therefore by working 
closely with the Agency, CHF had a better chance advancing the ideas of the 
Project and at the same time keeping USAID informed of the progress of 
events. It was then that USAID became less obviously involved in the 
Project, something which until this point was an issue of resentment on the 
part of the Agency.
V CONCLUSIONS
USAID in its position of co-funder had the potential of absolute power, at 
least in terms of allowing the Project to go ahead or to terminate it. The 
Project Paper and Grant Agreement were approved by the GOE, they 
constituted a legal document, USAID had the money at its disposal with a veto 
power over expenditure and had all the backing of a well established 
bureaucracy to help it carry out the work. So a number of possibilities were 
available to USAID to exercise a large degree of power and control over the 
Project process. However, USAID chose not to exercise its power.
The fact is that USAID reserves the right to veto the expenditure of any 
USAID funds financing proposed programmes, plans or activities that USAID 
staff judges will not adequately meet the objectives set by such programmes 
(NR, 1986, p. 143). Also, as much as aid could be offered as an incentive to 
reinforce certain desirable behaviour patterns on the part of the recipient
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country, aid could also be denied as a political sanction for behaviour 
considered contrary to USAID interests. Various levels of sanctions could be 
used ranging from terminating aid given to a particular country, to refusing 
to increase the amount of aid, or to suspending funds committed to a certain 
project (Burns, 1987, pp 4-5). Knowing these facts about how USAID usually 
operates raises the question of why they did not exercise their rights in these 
cases. In the words of Galbraith, this means USAID chose to remain at a 
‘passive stage of power’ (Galbraith, 1986, pp. 213-214). In other words it did 
have the potential to exercise power, but chose not to. Their decision for 
‘inaction’ could also be categorised, using Law’s language, as ‘power 
discretion’ ie the power to chose not to act over the choice to act (Law, 1991, 
p. 34). This, while it explains what their decision was in this case, still does 
not answer why they took this decision.
USAID only chose to use the Grant Agreement in the case of employing U.S. 
consultants and the procurement of U.S. materials while it chose not to, over 
the issue of standards. It did not use its leverage to insist on the issue of 
standards despite this being crucial to the whole ‘demonstration’ purposes of 
the Project, and the fact that it meant the need for subsidy, no cost recovery 
and non-replicability. This perhaps raises the question of interest. Perhaps, 
USAID’s interest in the commercial side of the Project outweighed that of the 
principle of changing GOE approach to low income housing cost and 
efficiency. What could be seen as ‘Conditioned power’11 was again not 
exercised.
Both the MOH and the Agency chose not to fight the huge, and seemingly, 
impenetrable bureaucracy of the sectoral agencies to stop the lowering of 
standards. Long delays occurred and there would have been unlimited delays 
had USAID not compromised on the standards. In this case, while on the 
surface the MOH and the Agency had no power, it in fact was able through
11 ‘Conditioned power’ is a term used by Galbraith (1986, pp. 213-214) to describe 
power used to change the belief of others.
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the use of manipulation, which according to Wrong, is one of four forms of 
power which alongside persuasion, is an extremely subtle, and at the same 
time effective form of power (Wrong, 1979, pp. 66-67).
The question of why the relationship between USAID, MOH and the Agency 
was conducted in this manner can only be fully understood, when put in 
context of the further development of the Project process. This will be 
examined at more closely in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
UPGRADING: INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS 
AND IMPLEMENTATION
I INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this chapter will be around the Upgrading component of the 
Helwan Housing Project. As the Project progressed, relations and roles of 
different agencies, institution and organisations became more defined and 
alliances developed. To demonstrate how the interaction of the different 
actors shaped the upgrading process, this chapter will describe some of the 
upgrading interventions with a particular focus on these relationships.
As described in the last chapter, during the early stage of the Project USAID 
had apparent control as it had in its grasp the Project Paper (PP) with a 
signature from the GOE agreeing to all the conditions on the ‘new’ housing 
approach. It also had a clearer vision, in comparison to its Egyptian 
counterpart, about what it wanted to achieve. As the Upgrading component 
of the Project progressed the rules of the game started shifting. The Agency 
started to consolidate itself as an agency in its own right with its own 
approach which, without openly stating it, continued to be largely in 
disagreement with most of the principles of the PP. Well into the 
implementation phase, various GOE agencies, in their role of review and 
approval of plans and designs, continued to turn down proposals that did not 
comply with their guidelines.
H BACKGROUND: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
As described earlier, the Project objective was not only to implement a 
housing project. It also aimed at introducing reforms into GOE institutions. 
The creation of the Agency was the most direct attempt at this reform. 
However, the institutional reform goal was not only to create a new agency 
with new ideas. The Project was also seen by USAID as a ‘means’ to cause
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radical changes in a number of existing Egyptian institutions. This was over 
ambitious, as USAID and CHF interviewees admitted in retrospect 
(interviews, 1988-89).
Both attempts, as this thesis will demonstrate, failed to a large extent. USAID 
took it for granted that its relationship with the Agency1 would become a 
comfortable patron-client relationship. This did not happen and was challenged 
early on by the Agency senior staff. The Agency resented what they saw as 
USAID interference (Interviews, 1988-89).
USAID also believed that the implementation of the Helwan Project with its 
new approach would challenge the policies, procedures and guidelines of 
sectoral agencies and would eventually lead to drastic reforms in their old 
approach to housing. Not only did this hope prove impossible to achieve in 
those organisations included by design in the PP, but it was even less likely 
in the multitude of other agencies and organisations which were de-facto part 
of the process and were totally beyond the influence of USAID and the 
Project.
HI THE DESIGN AND PLANNING PHASES OF UPGRADING
While issues of design in Upgrading were discussed briefly in the last chapter, 
since issues of design and re-design continued well into the implementation 
phase, more detail will be covered here. Seven ‘squatter’ communities in 
Helwan were identified for upgrading. The upgrading component of the 
Helwan Project necessitated that the Project staff worked through Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs). This meant that the first step in starting work 
in each of the seven communities was to identify such organisations. In some 
of the communities, one or several of these were fully developed, in others 
they were less so. For the latter case, the Project staff gave support for such 
CBOs to take shape so as to be the local counterpart for the project.
1 USAID was after all the creator of the Agency.
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A. DESIGN OF THE ‘COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME’:
The community Development Programme included a number of components: 
a vocational training programme in two of the upgrading communities, a 
cesspit emptying programme, solid waste programme, literacy classes for 
women and men, and youth programmes for men.
The Project Completion Report (PCR) explains that the Agency community 
development teams and CHF staff worked closely with the CBOs to establish 
these programmes and to provide equipment and administrative, financial and 
staff support. They also developed management training for the associations 
and assisted them in developing a more active voice within the Ministry of 
Social Affairs2 and the local Helwan administration and political structure 
(PCR, 1988, p. 31). Closer reading of Project papers as well as interviews 
with the Agency and CHF staff and members of community associations, 
raises a number of questions about the nature of the role the Project played in 
the development of these associations and the degree of the latter’s 
involvement3.
Egyptian consultancy offices were hired to provide solid waste and collection 
designs in the upgrading communities. The work was carried out by two 
different consultants in 1981-1982 (Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 
1987, p. 31). Each used a different system, one a modern motorised system 
and the other the traditional system of donkey and cart. It took them around 
eight to ten months to design the system after a study of circulation, cost, etc. 
Then the two systems were tried out as pilot studies in Rashed and Ghoneim 
(two of the upgrading areas). One of the consultants hired, explained that 
long discussions then followed between USAID and CHF about which system
2 All CBOs and NGOs have to be registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. Requests 
can, and often do, get turned down if there is any suspicion around political affiliations.
3 These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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to use. They decided they did not want the donkey and cart system, which 
the consultant suggested, and chose the motorised system of collection 
suggested by the other consultant. He said that he tried to persuade them that 
the traditional would be best for various reasons: the system worked perfectly 
well even in upper income neighbourhood; the cost would be one fifth of the 
motor car system; and the ‘zabaleen’ (garbage collectors), are close by and 
they use a technology of dispensing of garbage which avoid pollution. 
However, he added, they still chose the motorised system (Interview, 
Egyptian Independent Consultant, 1989). Based on that choice, as documents 
show, cars were purchased from the U.S. to be used in the upgrading areas. 
The intention was that the cars would be handed over to Community 
Associations, an issue which as time progressed, became a source of conflict.
B. DESIGN OF LOAN PROGRAMMES:
Home Improvement Loans Programme and Small Business Loans Programme 
were seen as two of the most successful and important innovations introduced 
by the Project. CHF and the Agency were responsible for the design of the 
two programmes. Since the procedures followed for the planning and 
implementation of Small Business Loan Programme are similar to the Home 
Improvement Loan Programme, and since the latter had a much larger impact 
on the communities, it will be discussed here in detail.
The Home Improvement Loan Programme (or the Loan Programme for short) 
was designed to provide Helwan informal community residents with access to 
credit for improving their homes. The objective of this was to make a major 
departure from past Government and private efforts in Egypt in providing 
long-term housing loans. The new approach was to provide loans at 
"..modest interest rates intended for the lower income residents of informal 
settlements with nonetheless an expectation of significant cost recovery" (Mid- 
Evaluation Project Report, 1988, p. 12).
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Household income and affordability studies, based upon analysis of the 
Helwan factory worker income and monthly household expenditures, were 
prepared by CHF staff in 1980. Implementation of a trial programme in Zein 
(one of the upgrading communities) began in March 1981, showing mixed 
results. Design modifications occurred accordingly. CHF’s role as consultant 
was to assist the Agency to develop the Loan Programme. This constituted 
the establishment of the loan programme criteria and procedures, as well as 
preparing promotional material (PCR, 1988, p .33).
Following the Project Paper requirements, a semi-national mortgage Egyptian 
bank, the Credit Fonder Egyptien (or the Project Bank) was contracted to 
establish a branch bank operation in Helwan and to accept savings and 
deposits of beneficiaries and administer the Loan credit programme in the 
upgrading areas. Once the Project Bank took over its responsibilities on the 
Programme, it refused to follow the Programme plan concerning eligibility 
criteria. Adjustments were made accordingly which represented yet another 
fundamental defiance to what was a crucial attempt at introducing a new 
policy by USAID.
This was another serious shortcoming of the programme, which was 
expressed as such by CHF interviewees, was around eligibility criteria. The 
PP stated clearly that the loans were to be provided to the low income 
population and the only condition to get a loan is that the clients should be 
permanent residents. The Project Bank however objected to this condition 
maintaining that as the target population had no legal title to the land, only a 
salary4 could be used as a guarantee to replace legal title. Reports as well as 
interviews show that CHF tried to push the Agency towards insisting on the 
application of the terms of the agreements as laid out in USAID documents. 
".. CHF believes the Agency is obligated by the terms of the PP to establish 
a mortgage loan programme for lower income Egyptians” (NR, 1982, p. 123).
4 The condition was that only salaried people (this mostly means men) can get loans. 
A non-salaried person needs two salaried people to act as the formers’ guarantor.
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Again, here it seems that CHF found itself alone trying to reinforce PP 
conditions. Interviews with the Agency staff showed that they actually 
supported the view of the Project Bank concerning eligibility criteria. Most 
thought the Programme as it was, was already too generous and that it was 
already quite a risk to lend people money on what they considered to be very 
fragile guarantee (Interview, Agency Employee, 1989).
The failure to establish eligibility criteria to include community members 
involved in the informal sector, seems to be the most serious shortcoming of 
the Loan Programme. This is particularly true in the case of women who are 
largely involved in the informal sector. The implications of such a failure are 
of great interest in the context of this work. Again here as in the case of 
standards and land tenure, it was the will of an Egyptian institution [the 
Project Bank] which was to prevail. This again shows how the Egyptian side 
used the tactic of not questioning any of USAID assumptions, but when the 
time came, it simply implemented things in its own way. As shown above, 
most Agency staff were in no way convinced that more flexible criteria should 
be applied. The fact that they did not make these convictions known was 
because they knew they really did not have to. They knew the Project Bank 
would do it for them, as sectoral agencies and the Governorate had done 
before, and consequently would take the blame alone. In that manner they 
avoided a confrontation with USAID and at the same time got the Programme 
to take the shape they wanted. The question to ask however is the same 
question asked before about standards, that is, why is it that USAID did not 
put up a bigger fight? Could they not have said ‘easier eligibility criteria or 
no money for the Programme’? The same answer applies here: things were 
already far behind schedule so they just wanted things to proceed. Both the 
bank and the Agency knew that and used it.
C. REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF THE UPGRADING WORKS:
The review and approval of designs took 31 months (Mid-Project Evaluation, 
Report, 1984). After plans, designs and redesigns were completed they had
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to be approved by all agencies directly and indirectly involved in the Project. 
The first stage of such reviews and approval was obviously done by the 
Agency. The Agency, advised by CHF, went through the upgrading designs 
and planning criteria and participated in the review of all urban plans and 
designs for infrastructure and community facilities (PCR, 1988, p. 36) before 
they were sent to the other agencies.
1. USAID review, approval and monitoring:
Once designs and plans have been completed and were given Agency 
approval, they were then presented to USAID for its review and approval. 
There was a great deal of criticism on the part of the Agency and CHF staff 
about how time consuming USAID review and approval process was. One 
Agency interviewee said:
"The Americans are even worse bureaucrats then the 
Egyptians. The review and approval procedures of USAID 
took ages. They hold a big share of the responsibility for the 
long delays of the Project" (Interview, Agency Employee,
1988).
The system of review and approval applied did not always go smoothly, as 
there was controversy around the level of intervention USAID had the right 
to exercise. The question was whether USAID’s signature was a simple 
formality or whether it had the right to interfere in the running of the project 
ie in the actual decision making. This issue took a long time to be resolved 
as it seems that the role of USAID was never clearly spelled out. In the Mid- 
Project Evaluation of the Project this issue is discussed as follows:
"The covenants and conditions precedent to disbursement of 
project funds set forth in both the Project Paper and the Grant 
Agreement between USAID and the MOH give USAID very 
broad review and approval powers, and the right to veto the 
use of any USAID funds for expenditures deemed technically 
inadequate to meet the objectives of the project" (Mid-Project 
Evaluation Report, 1984 p. 109).
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Therefore, while the right to approve disbursements gave USAID an important 
monitoring role in the Project, it did not clearly indicate to what degree 
USAID could have a say in the running of the Project. The Nathan report 
described how USAID considered it had within its prerogative the right to 
recommend and even require the incorporation of USAID conceived 
improvements. Thus USAID undertook its own technical review and the 
appropriateness of a sewage plant, for example: size, cost, specifications, and 
location were appraised. It also then made recommendations regarding design 
and, further, made its approval contingent on the acceptance of those 
recommendations (NR, 1982, pp. 143-144). The Mid-Project Evaluation also 
reported that against the Agency advice, on a number of occasions USAID 
suggested some design changes which were subsequently rejected by Egyptian 
sectoral agencies, and the whole operation caused more delays (Mid-Project 
Evaluation Report, 1984 p .69).
The discussion around USAID’s level of control in the Project started when 
in one of the coordination meetings the vice chairman of the Agency at that 
time raised the following questions:
"Project success requires team work. What role does AID play 
in the team? Policy? Technical advice? Monitoring? When does 
AID have the ‘right’ to participate? And when should it wait 
for an invitation? Which subjects should our consultants discuss 
with AID and which only with permission from the Agency?"
(NR, 1982, p. 142).
Complaints about USAID’s desire to be at all times in full control of the 
Project were also voiced by CHF staff. A senior staff member informed the 
Nathan team that USAID requested CHF to share work plans and programme 
concepts papers with USAID for its review and comment prior to submission 
to the Agency. Typically, such requests, when granted, were followed by 
instructions on how work should proceed or in what form a programme 
component should be structured. This use of CHF to control project 
direction, a CHF official complained, put CHF in an awkward situation with
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its clients [the Agency]. As a response, the Agency chairman at the time, 
requested that CHF can respond to USAID inquiries only when put on paper 
(Ibid, p. 141).
The issue of USAID interference was followed up later and brought to a 
senior USAID official by the chairman of the Agency. The latter responded 
by saying that USAID approval was for management purposes only:
\.th ey  should not be concerned with, for instance the size, 
location or enrolment of a school or health service. USAID 
should be concerned only that the necessary actions are 
undertaken to implement the Project successfully and that 
records should be kept so that progress can be monitored and 
audited" he said (NR, 1982, p. 144).
USAID also took some steps to try to reduce its administrative involvement 
by instituting the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) system. This system 
limited the approval and review process to a single programme action, such 
as for instance the construction of a school (Ibid, p. 143-144). One of the 
major reasons for the confusion around the level of involvement is that ‘Host 
Country Contracts’, of which the Helwan Project is one, appears to have a 
lack of internal guidelines defining the role of USAID in such projects. 
Subsequently, the Agency chairman stated that his understanding was that 
USAID’s role was to be limited to administrative approvals, monitoring 
progress and technical assistance on progress (Ibid, p. 144).
Interviews carried out with the Agency and CHF staff as well as evaluation 
reports show that although these early discussion did clarify a number of 
issues, the problem remained more or less the same for another three years 
into the Project. "At the beginning of the Project USAID was a nasty partner 
interfering and applying close supervision. Later things became much more 
relaxed, even lax." (Interview, CHF Consultant, 1989).
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2. Sectoral agencies reviews and approvals:
As mentioned in the last chapter, before implementation, the designs and plans 
had to be ultimately approved by GOE agencies responsible for design and 
those who later are responsible for operation and maintenance. In the case of 
the Helwan Project the number of agencies that fell under this category was 
seven for the infrastructure and six for the community facilities.
Chapter 4 showed how the original urbanisation plans for the whole project 
(including HNC and upgrading) were rejected by the GOE sectoral agencies 
because of their refusal to approve lower standards. This issue will be 
discussed here in some detail, specifically around upgrading.
a. Standards:
As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the objectives of the Project was 
to ‘demonstrate’ to the GOE that a reduction of public sector housing 
subsidies can be achieved through reducing standards of housing. The Project 
Paper, had called for:
"..the introduction of new, innovative site planning and 
physical design solutions... which will substantially lower the 
per capita costs of infrastructure and housing below current 
public sector practice in Egypt" (Mid-Project Evaluation, 1984, 
p. 84).
However there was insistence by the sectoral agencies that upgrading designs 
incorporate existing Egyptian standards and existing Egyptian master plans 
(Ibid, p. 116). Documents explain that the Agency, in its role as the 
implementor of the Project, tried to get the approval of the designs with no 
success. The agencies would not change their minds. Consequently there 
were long delays as initially none of the parties involved wanted to 
compromise. Eventually, when it was realised that nothing would change the 
minds of the agencies, a decision was taken by the Agency and CHF that the 
infrastructure designs would have to be readapted following Egyptian
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standards. However, responding to on of the objectives of the PP to achieve 
cost saving, the new plan included a reduction in road width which meant no 
access for ambulances (Ibid, p .60), the use of compact and unpaved roads, 
and the elimination of the electric network (CHF internal document, Mid- 
Project Evaluation, 1984, p.x). The redesign of the infrastructure was 
executed by the same Egyptian and expatriate consulting Engineering firms 
which did the original designs.
It is clear that although the Grant Agreement was signed by the GOE 
approving lowering standards, when it came to the execution such signature 
was irrelevant. For the standards to change, an Agency senior staff member 
said, a signature is never enough, "..rules and regulations must change 
through long political, legal and technical channels" (Interview, Agency 
employee, 1988).
Despite their knowledge of this fact, the Agency staff as executive of the 
project and responsible to implement it within the framework of the PP 
document, went through the motions of pushing for the lower standards. 
Whether they did this thinking the rules would change because of the nature 
of this particular Project, or whether they were just doing it to demonstrate 
their good will to USAID, is not totally clear. The interviews carried out 
around this issue did not help to reach a conclusive answer. It became clear 
at this stage that the Agency staff themselves were not convinced of the 
viability of lowering standards. Instead of openly opposing USAID, they 
decided to leave it to the agencies to do it for them. They felt that their 
position would be undermined vis-a-vis USAID had they openly showed 
resistance to one of the major principles of the Project. Their power lay in 
their knowledge that the agencies would not give approval. This meant that 
what they wanted all along would be executed without them having to 
compromise their position vis-a-vis USAID. This was the same strategy that 
the GOE officials who signed the Grant Agreement employed. This remained
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one the strongest strategies that the Egyptian side used to get their own way 
throughout the Project.
In other words, the apparent alliances at this point of the project was, on the 
surface, between USAID, CHF and the Agency on one side, and GOE 
agencies on the other. The reality was that USAID helped by CHF were 
pushing a reluctant and unconvinced Agency to persuade GOE agencies to 
change its housing policy. The Agency simply went through the motions to 
keep being in USAIDs ‘good books’ and at the same time helped to maintain 
the status quo by supporting ‘old’ policies it really saw no reason to 
change.
b. The Upgrading Coordination Committee:
The bureaucracy of the sectoral agencies is such that the process of approval 
is very time consuming. Even the process of getting approvals for orthodox 
plans is extremely lengthy. After it was clear that the issue of lowering 
standards was a lost cause, the Agency, with the technical assistance of CHF, 
finally formed an inter agency steering committee (PCR, 1988, p .36). The 
function of this committee was not about lowering standards but simply to 
provide a formal forum for the resolution of revised designs and land 
acquisition. It was given the name the Upgrading Coordination Committee. 
It was formed by members of all the sectoral agencies involved, as well as 
representatives from Cairo Governorate, Helwan District Authority, the 
Agency, consultants and contractors.
A number of CHF and USAID interviewees criticised the Agency for not 
having followed the PP plan to get this committee working earlier. At the 
early stages of the Project, the senior staff of the Agency rejected the idea of 
the committee as a waste of time. As a number of senior Agency 
interviewees explained later on, and after the leadership of the Agency 
changed hands, the idea to finally get the committee into action was seen as 
the only way to get the procedures to run more smoothly. "The Agency had
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to fight on too many fronts with all these ministries and agencies. Very little 
time then was left for the actual work", one of the Agency interviewees said 
(Interview, Agency Employee, 1988). An ex-Agency senior staff member 
said:
"These people were not going to do the work for nothing. Our 
only way to guarantee that procedures do not take endless time 
was to get them on our payroll. This had to be done under the 
umbrella of fees for attending committees"5 (Interview,
Agency employee, 1989).
CHF interviewees saw that although this tactic seemed to work it did not 
provide long term solutions. One of the CHF interviewees explained that:
"The Agency staff in their relationship with GOE agencies 
acted like businessmen...forgot about process and changing 
policy. They just saw each bit as a hurdle that they had to 
overcome" (Interview, CHF consultant, 1989).
3. Land tenure and governorate control:
The provision of legal land tenure was one of the main Project objectives of 
the upgrading component6. Yet by the official end of the project, the land 
title issue had not been resolved 1.
It was only in 1984, four years after the start of the implementation of the 
upgrading Project, that the GOE started to address the issue of selling land to 
squatters in Egypt. A series of laws were issued, starting with Law 31/84, 
which empowered Governorates to dispose of land through negotiated sales.
5 There is a system in Egypt where it is possible to pay members for attending certain 
committees. In this case to get the committee members to attend and give resolutions this 
semi-legal way of providing incentive was seen to be necessary.
6 The land tenure status of the 7 ‘squatter’ communities are either ‘hekr’ which means 
land owned by the state and leased on a long-term basis, or encroachment.
7 In fact this problem was not resolved until I last checked in 1996
The various decrees issued in 1984-85 did not define the modalities of land 
transfers. This meant that Governorates were given wide discretionary powers 
to define their own operational procedures (El-Messiri, 1989, p. 3). It took 
another three years for Cairo Governorate to set up such procedures, but 
subsequently there were still title allocation and procedural obstacles which 
resulted in no sales taking place.
The success of the Upgrading Component of the Project relied on a resolution 
to the land tenure issue. The two main reasons for this were first, to provide 
secure access to housing to the target group and thus to encourage investment, 
and second, and most importantly for the Agency, to recover costs.
A number of the Agency staff had originally taken the position that this land 
belonged to the Project and therefore the Governorate had no right to it. One 
of the Agency interviewees argued:
"The Governorate is giving us trouble about the land. This 
would have been another source of funds for us. They claim 
the land belongs to them. How could it be theirs if it is part of 
our capital in the project? The land is counted as part of our 
share of the $80 Million." (Interview, Agency Senior 
Employee, 1989).
Most staff in the Agency however realised that the question of land title would 
not be easy to resolve and that actually the Grant Agreement does not change 
the fact that the land belongs to the Governorate8. Once this fact was 
established, long negotiations took place between the Agency and the 
Governorate around land tenure, during which the latter was adamantly against 
the principle of granting land titles. The Governorate’s main argument was 
that granting title in one area could imply granting titles in all informal areas 
in Cairo (PCR, 1988, p.29). This was another confirmation that the law 
changes a regards land ownership were in fact totally disregarded by the
8 All state owned land is in fact considered as under Governorate control.
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Governorate. The latter still held the position that as owner of the land it had 
no intention to sell to ‘illegal’ occupants. Commenting on this point, a 
USAID employee said:
"The Governorate find that giving land title to squatters is 
revolutionary. They think these areas should be bulldozed and 
developed. Of course they could never really do that but they 
still do not want to let it go" (Interview, USAID Egyptian 
Employee, 1988).
Another USAID senior official added:
"The Governorate has always been dead against giving land 
titles. Only now after long negotiations with the Agency they 
are just starting to consider the possibility" (Interview, USAID 
American Employee, 1988).
The Agency and CHF interviewees explained that CHF Egyptian staff played 
a very important role in the long negotiations with the Governorate. One of 
them said:
"We have been working very hard with the Governorate to get the land 
issue off the ground. We need to get our share9 in order to meet cost 
recovery. They have been absolutely uncooperative for a long while. 
However through years of dialogue they are starting to finally accept 
the idea. Now the major problem is that they are setting unrealistic 
figures for the price of land", (Interview, Egyptian CHF Consultant,
1989).
According to the Agency and CHF interviewees the Ministry of Housing’s 
(MOH) support would have been crucial in this respect but that they were not 
interested. The MOH was embarking at this point on building New Cities, 
and any other housing initiative was considered a waste of time. Their 
signature of the Grant Agreement was again a formality and they never
9 The Agency had made a deal with the Governorate that it would take a percentage of 
the price of land which would cover the expense of the water and sewage pipes provided by 
the Project.
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intended to implement such drastic policy changes such as giving land titles 
to squatters. Therefore when approached by CHF and the Agency to put 
pressure on the Governorate, they refused to cooperate (CHF and the Agency 
Interviews, 1988).
While the Agency staff went through the motions of trying to solve the 
problem of land titles, some among the senior staff were quite ambivalent 
about it and seemed to support the views of the Governorate. This 
represented a real paradox since resolving the issue of land tenure was in fact 
in the interest of the Agency. Its survival as an organisation was reliant on 
cost recovery which primarily was to come from the selling of the land in the 
upgrading communities10.
As the above discussion shows, land tenure seems to be one of the rare issues 
where USAID, CHF and in some ways the Agency, were on the same side. 
Interviews showed that they all agreed land title was an essential component 
and that the governorate refusal was a big drawback to the development of 
upgrading, cost recovery as well as any chance for replicability. However, 
and was in the case of standards, it was the Egyptian Government agencies 
that had the last say in the matter. USAID officials seemed to believe11 that 
if they had worked with the Governorate rather than the Ministry of Housing, 
the Project would have had a better chance. Arguing along these lines, a 
USAID official said:
"We should have worked with the Governor not the Minister.
The former was never a participant which led to problems of 
the land tenure and cost recovery in the upgrading areas. And 
also lots of delays occurred in other things, obstacles that were 
created because he was not involved. Prices went up because
10 The Agency was created to run the Helwan Project but with the view that it would also 
run similar future projects. This meant that, in the case no new projects were being funding, 
funds would be available from the Helwan Project to be used in other upgrading areas. 
Without this money the Agency as an institution was under threat to be dissolved.
11 This was at the time the research was being carried out.
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of the delays. Consequently it is either the [Egyptian] 
Government or the people who will have to pay for the extra 
cost" (Interview, USAID Senior Employee, 1989).
It is important to remember that the role of the governorate as owner of the 
project land was never discussed at the early stages of project negotiation. 
When at a later stage their involvement was inevitable, the obstacles they 
created came as a total surprise to USAID. When USAID discusses ‘lessons 
learned’, or what it will do if ever it funded another upgrading Project, it 
holds the view that in future projects it would work with the Governorate not 
the Central Government. The question to ask is to what extent does USAID 
realise that in taking this path it would be overlooking the range of other 
obstacles that Central Government, if marginalised, would in its turn be 
capable of creating.
IV IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT
Implementation of the upgrading work started three years after the signature 
of the agreement, two years behind schedule. Even then, owing in part to 
lack of staff, the project started in only three communities (NR, 1982,, 
p. 165). The Project documents explain that the implementation of the 
upgrading components occurred in the following sequence: The first 
programmes implemented was the Loan Programme [1981], followed by the 
construction of the community facilities[1982] and then the infrastructure 
[1985](Mid-Project Evaluation Report, 1984, p. 138).
While the previous section of this chapter describes the issues that were raised 
in the design of various programmes, the following section will get into the 
implementation of these same programmes.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOAN PROGRAMMES:
The Loan Programme organisation, training, promotion and monitoring was 
the responsibility of the Agency assisted by CHF, while the financial
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management was the responsibility of the Project Bank (PCR, 1988, pp. 32- 
34). The first steps towards the implementation of the Loan Programme 
started in 1981. By 1985 it was fully functioning in six of the seven 
upgrading communities (Ibid, p .33). By 1988, the time of the completion of 
the Programme, 2,800 loans had been given to the value of LE4.5 million. 
The average loans was between LEI,000 and LE2,000 (CHF Evaluation 
Report, 1989, p .9).
The Programme started with social workers going from door to door 
explaining the system of the loans. The head of the Agency social worker’s 
team, explained that there was a lot of resistance as the first as people were 
too apprehensive to ‘borrow from the Government’. This meant for them that 
there could be real danger if they could not meet the repayment of debt. ‘Our 
job’, she added, ‘was to reassure them’ (Interview, Agency Employee, 1989). 
Another problem, as the next chapter will show, was that people were 
reluctant to get involved in a repayment system which involved interest.
According to the Agency interviewees, inhabitants of the upgrading areas 
quickly realised that to be part of the scheme meant they were de-facto given 
legal tenure. This was what really got the programme going. Some suggested 
that there were a number of borrowers who decided to get involved in the 
scheme just because they needed this security and not that they needed to do 
any construction. Consequently, in mid-1983, pressure was applied for the 
introduction of a new condition around obtaining a licence for any building 
construction, a requirement which necessitated proof for land title (Mid- 
Project Evaluation, 1984, p. 13). This meant that there was a freeze on the 
programme which was lifted at the start 1984 after long negotiations between 
the Agency, the Governorate and the Helwan District. The agreement was 
that borrowers were not allowed to use the money in building new units or in 
using up more land. (Ibid pp. 44-45) These restrictions were not seriously 
controlled and therefore borrowers were able to ignore them. At the 
beginning of the Programme the borrowers were given access to subsidised
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building materials, which cut the prices down by 30% to 50%. In 1985 
subsidies for building material were cancelled nationwide which had a really 
detrimental effect on the Programme (Interviews, 1989).
Otherwise, Project reports as well as interviews with the Agency and CHF 
staff show that the Loan Programme was seen to be a success, maybe even 
the greatest success among the upgrading activities. There were however 
some reservations which were expressed about the limitations of the 
Programme. The first of these was about the loan acquisition procedures. 
They were described as cumbersome and excessively time consuming. 
Applicants for the loans had to deal with a team composed of social workers 
from the Agency, an engineer-technician from the Agency and a staff member 
from the Project Bank. Another issue that was raised was that although the 
original objective was for home improvement, the loans were actually used for 
expansion of the units and even the rebuilding of houses. Nathan’s evaluation 
team made the following observations:
"Construction followed the standard pattern: red brick bearing 
wall or skeleton frame with brick infill. No difference in 
quality was noted between the initial construction and the 
expansion funded through the programme" (NR, 1982, p .72).
The reports show contradicting views in the evaluation of the usage of the 
loans and its benefits. In one report the fact that loans were used for 
expansion rather than for improvement was seen as positive, in others as 
negative. One thing that this ambivalence demonstrated was that the Agency 
and CHF did not really establish what the purpose of loans was.
B. COMMUNITY FACILITY CONSTRUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE:
After the long delays in the design and approval, the community facilities 
(schools, CBOs and clinics) followed by the infrastructure construction finally 
started in the upgrading communities. It seems that construction did not face 
too many problems except those relative to management and coordination.
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The institutional structure being what it was, coordination and getting things 
done on schedule were the major problems that faced construction. The 
actors directly involved in construction were the Agency assisted by CHF in 
their capacity as managers, coordinators and supervisors. Then there were the 
two major engineering firms overlooking the contractor’s work. In the case 
of the community facilities, the Agency in its role as designer was responsible 
for the close supervision of work. While the supervision of the infrastructure 
was left to the engineering firms, the Agency still had the responsibility for 
overall supervision.
In addition coordination problems, Project reports and interviews identified 
encroachment on land reserved for the Project, as being one of the major 
problems that occurred during construction. This problem was seen to be a 
result of failure to identify and reserve land at each site (Mid-Project 
Evaluation Report, 1984, p .84). One of the Project reports explain that 
encroachment was mostly due to the long span of time that occurred between 
design and construction. "Often these long waits were caused because of poor 
planning, lack of coordination or change of mind" the report argues. In one 
of the upgrading communities, for example, there was a delay of more than 
two years between completion of original designs and the eventual 
commencement of construction (Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 1987, 
p.24).
The major way that the Agency, at the suggestion of CHF, found to solve this 
problem was to seek the help of community leaders and also community 
members. In some areas members of the community representatives dealt 
with this, in others the Agency had to resort to the Helwan District and even 
the police (PCR, 1988, p .28).
A CHF report suggests that the involvement of the community residents in 
ensuring that land identified for facilities remains vacant may be an effective
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mechanism to use in the future (Mid term Evaluation, p. xii). This, it seems, 
was successful in one out of the seven upgrading communities.
It is interesting that it was largely the problem of encroachment that got 
Project personnel to discuss ‘community participation’. Actually CHF 
consultants and the Agency staff often categorised ‘good cooperating’ 
communities and successful leadership by the extent to which land 
encroachment was or was not prevalent12.
1. Water:
With the exception of the delays caused by the disagreement over standards, 
the installation of water networks occurred without major problems. However 
there were certain discrepancies between what appears in reports on one hand 
and information collected through interviews at the Agency and Arab 
Rashed13 on the other. The first discrepancy is about the proportion of 
houses to which water lines were connected, the second is around whether or 
not water pipes were in fact functioning.
It is stated in evaluation reports that the water supply and sewer network 
designs were based on providing services to each house wherever possible 
(Mid-Project Evaluation, p. 86). When interviewed the Agency community 
team members confirmed what Rashed interviewees said about water pipes 
being connected only to houses in the main streets. This meant that those 
living in side streets had to pay for their connections to be installed14.
2. Sewage:
While the sewage network was being constructed, there was a growing 
uncertainty that the off-site collector to which the network was to be
12 This issue will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
13 The case study for this thesis.
14 More will be discussed in the next chapter.
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connected would be completed on time. However as the reports show, as the 
construction had already started, ‘there was no option but to go ahead’ (Mid 
Term Evaluation, 1984, p. vii).
The original plan was to dispose sewage effluent from the sewage network 
installed in the upgrading areas into the Helwan Waste-Water Master Plan 
Dorsh system, a Project funded by the European Common Market. In 1983, 
it was realised that the Dorsh system would not be completed as expected in 
1985. In view of the expected delay and the necessity to have a system in 
place to serve the upgraded communities, USAID and the GOE agreed to 
finance construction of an off-site collector and a sewage treatment plant that 
would collect and divert all waste-water and sewage disposal of the upgraded 
communities to the Tebbin Sewage Treatment Plant. The cost of this 
arrangement, at that time was about LE4 million or $4.8 million15. Also in 
January 1985, USAID-Egypt agreed to rehabilitate the Tebbin Sewage 
Treatment Plant to handle additional flows generated in the new communities. 
The rehabilitation was completed in November 1986 at a cost of about LE6,76 
million (about $5 million at the 1986 rate of L E I.35) (The USAID Audit 
Report, 1988, p .32).
Consequently the Agency prepared a contingency plan for construction of an 
interim off-site collector to serve the upgrading areas (Mission Response to 
Audit Report, 1988, p. 8). However in 1986 and after the publication of the 
advertisement of bids and the approval of the short list of qualified firms, 
USAID and the Agency reversed the decision made two years earlier and 
agreed to cancel the plan based on the assumption that the Dorsh system 
would soon be able to address the needs of the upgraded areas. Later, in 1988 
it was announced that the Dorsh collector would be completed in 1992 
(USAID Audit Report, 1988, pp.32-33).
15 The 1985 exchange rate was of $1 =  LEO. 83
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In its response to Audit criticism, USAID Mission in Cairo explained that the 
off-site construction of infrastructure was not originally a part of the scope of 
the Helwan Project. The decision to drop it was taken after an engineering 
review concluded that it would not be cost effective to construct and it would 
be eventually redundant. This again was based on the assumption that there 
would only be a six months delay between completion of the upgrading 
community infrastructure and completion of Phase I and part of Phase II of 
the Dorsh scheme (Response to the Audit Report, 1988, p .8).
Project reports as well as CHF and the Agency interviewees explained that 
since all the upgraded community sewage networks were completed in mid- 
1988, this meant that sewage lines were completed but not operational. This 
also meant that the lines would be in place but not connected for at least four 
years, while the water connections in these areas were operating already. The 
effect of this miscalculation, in hindsight has been seen unanimously as 
disastrous.
As mentioned in the USAID report, the safety of the unused sewage network 
could not be assured. Also, the construction company’s one year guarantee 
would have expired by then (Audit Report, 1988, p .33). A CHF report also 
explains that the sewer system was likely to suffer physical damage from 
silting and accumulation of cement dust and would require renovation prior 
to becoming operable (PCR, 1988, p.28). According to a CHF consultant the 
cost that would eventually be needed for rehabilitation of works in about 5 
years would prove to be higher than the cost estimated for the interim off-site 
collector (Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 1987, p .35). This is in 
addition to the cost of health hazard and the cost the community had to bare, 
paying for sewage disposal. This view was confirmed by the Audit report 
which argues the following:
"There is a possibility of deterioration of the approximately
$7.4 million cost of unused systems. Also the continued use
of substandard facilities by occupants of the upgraded
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communities increases their exposure to acknowledged health 
hazards "(Audit Report, 1988, pp. 32-34).
The Agency staff also supported the view that the off-site collector decision 
caused a lot of harm. One senior staff member said:
"The refusal of USAID has immense consequences. God only 
knows, but I would not be astonished to find that the upgrading 
communities are using the sewage pipes anyway. This would 
lead to a real disaster" (the Agency, Interview, 1989).
As the above quotation illustrates, the Agency members blamed the off-site 
collection decision on USAID. Although the Project and Audit reports 
describe the decision as a joint one between the Agency and USAID, all the 
interviews show that it was solely an USAID decision. Both the Agency and 
CHF interviewees said that they strongly supported the construction of the 
alternative off-site collector. While USAID reports as well as staff 
interviewed on the subject maintained this decision seemed to be a valid one 
at the time it was taken, both the Agency and CHF interviewees criticised the 
decision bitterly. A senior Agency architect explained:
"After the sewage plant plans were ready for implementation 
USAID refused to carry it out. They hired this American 
consultant who gave a decree that it was not cost effective.
They were very stubborn, and no argument on our part would 
make them change their minds. This really made me furious 
as a lot of money and time was spent on the [alternative] off- 
site design" (the Agency, Interview, 1989).
A CHF consultant with long experience of the Project argued that the reason 
for the sewage-water problem now is that USAID is very much into 
‘hardware’.
".. they rushed into building sewers before knowing where the 
waste water will be collected. The off-site collector should 
always be ready first. It is like putting the cart before the 
horse. And all this to save $5 million" (Interview, CHF staff 
member, p. 19).
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A senior CHF consultant who came after the off-site collector decision, 
commented:
"There are two basic rules about upgrading: one, sewage 
comes in before water; two, don’t put in pipes before you 
know where they will go. When USAID decided to get 
involved directly in the decision making it led to these 
unfortunate results" (Interview, 1989).
A senior Agency staff member who was around during that time explained:
"The USAID Project Director then was a very reasonable man. 
But he had to accept the decision of the AID consultant who, 
based on promises that Dorsh will be ready soon, said no to the 
alternative. But who takes such promises seriously? I later 
discovered that what was behind the whole scene was that this 
AID consultant was backing another company that lost the bid. 
This was proved by the fact that he said: ‘O.K I will reconsider 
my position, only if you go through another bid’" (the Agency, 
Interview, 1989).
Corruption accusations towards USAID and its consultants were also made by 
a senior ex-official in the Ministry of Housing. He said: "..they are highly 
corruptible". He added that at one point he had complained to the director of 
the USAID Cairo mission about an AID official which led to the latter’s 
immediate expulsion. He said to the director: " This guy stinks". He was 
choosing contracting offices who asked for higher fees and it was obvious he 
had deals with them. Many do such things, he added. "This is the reason why 
there is such a fast turn over at USAID, it helps avoid the corruptibility of 
their position" (Interview, Senior MOH official, p .6).
The off-site collector ‘affair’ remains one of the most controversial issues in 
the upgrading project. The extent of the harm this decision caused to the 
communities will be closely examined in the next chapter. It is crucial 
however to discuss here what it meant in terms of the relationships of the 
actors involved. First of all, one can see here that for the first time the 
alliance of USAID and CHF was broken around this issue and CHF and the
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Agency were on the same side. However the Agency was completely helpless 
in this case and was unable to exercise any form of power. In an interview 
with a USAID staff member, he challenged the fact that the Agency was 
powerless in this situation.
"This was a wrong decision from the part of AID and is now 
under investigation by the auditors. However the Agency went 
along with it because upgrading always assumed second 
position. The Agency chose to use all its bargaining, powers 
only for the Helwan New Community n e g o t i a t i o n s ; ' ( U S AID 
Interview, p. 19).
This accusation that the Agency was not really interested in upgrading was 
also often brought up by CHF interviewees. The latter argued that the 
Agency staff were mostly interested in seeing new units built and that the 
viability of upgrading was always questioned. Interviews with some Agency 
staff did confirm these views. Although most said things like ‘upgrading is 
the only solution for squatter areas’ they also tended to call ‘squatter’ areas 
‘cancerous’ and ‘filthy’ and were worried that upgrading may encourage their 
expansion.
The lack of understanding and interest in upgrading, as CHF interviewees 
argued, seems to have been also shared by USAID. One senior CHF staff 
member said:
"Upgrading was fashionable in the 1970’s and this is why 
USAID wanted to finance this Project. As USAID staff 
members in charge of the Helwan Project were mostly 
engineers, they saw this Project as an infrastructure rather than 
a housing Project". (Interview, CHF staff member, 1989).
Another CHF interviewee argued:
"They [USAID] consider urbanisation as evil. Deep inside 
they do not believe in upgrading because this would encourage 
urbanisation and rural-urban migration. What they do not 
understand is that rural people don’t migrate for water and
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sewage but for employment" (Interview, CHF staff 
member, 1989).
There is no doubt that if the views expressed by CHF interviewees are right, 
then this explains a lot about the way both the Agency and USAID acted all 
along in the Upgrading Project. However when the Helwan New Community 
component will be discussed, and considering that both organisations were 
interested in this component, this issue will have to re-considered.
3. The Management and Supervision of Upgrading Works:
Management and supervision was primarily the responsibility of the Agency. 
An Agency team, headed by an engineer, had the responsibility to make sure 
that works of infrastructure and building of community facilities were done 
according to plan. The other team members were two technical assistants and 
two social workers whose role was to liaise with the community (Evaluation 
of Upgrading Construction, 1987, p.23). There were long delays caused by 
a shortage of senior field engineers (Ibid, p.25). This shortage was mainly 
due to low Government salaries (even with the extra 75% Agency staff 
received), and the differential between salaries in the public and private 
sector. This made it difficult for the Agency to retain and to recruit staff. 
The absence of senior as well as middle management posts had a critical 
effect on the rate of project implementation (Mid-Project Evaluation Report, 
1984 p. 101). In order to solve this problem, CHF recruited and paid at a 
private sector wage level, mid level and upper level management staff for the 
Agency (Internal Document, Mid-Project Evaluation Report, 1984, p. 101).
The role that CHF played in this respect was crucial, if somehow 
questionable. Interviews as well as reports raised the question of replicability 
and how most of those employed by CHF, instead of the Agency, would leave 
at the end of the Helwan Project taking with them the expertise they gained. 
This was in fact what happened even before the end of the Project, when 
things started to slow down. The best of the CHF Egyptian staff had already
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found work in other foreign-Egyptian firms. Another problem caused by the 
employment of Egyptians by CHF on behalf of the Agency, is that most of 
these people had split loyalties and often in situations where the Agency, CHF 
and USAID disagreed, were not sure whom to support. On the whole they 
supported USAID and CHF views on upgrading. The Agency employees 
were also ambivalent about the CHF people because on the one hand they 
often had more respect for their capabilities than they had for the American 
staff, on the other hand they resented their high pay and their support for 
American concepts (Interviews, CHF and the Agency, 1988-89).
Another issue that raised a lot of discussion about CHF’s management role, 
was around the level of their involvement in the actual carrying out of the 
work. At the end of the first year, the first CHF team leader, reported that 
CHF had at the Agency’s request found itself undertaking tasks beyond the 
contract. It explained that it executed work directly rather than in its role as 
advisor. Despite CHF’s effort to sort out this issue the problem remained 
unresolved. The question is whether it was realistic to expect that the 
Agency, as a newly founded agency, should have taken the full load for 
implementation. The Project was in motion and time tables had to be met 
(NR, 1982, p. 130),
"..under such pressures, development goals such as replicability 
and technology transfer tend to yield to the demand of Project 
execution" (Ibid).
Throughout the Project, CHF tried to define its proper role and to have its 
position accepted by USAID and the Agency. The Mid-Project Evaluation 
Report explains that in numerous memoranda and several contract amendments 
CHF had tried to formulate its position. This was a response to criticism it 
received from both USAID and the Agency either for working in areas 
outside its scope of services or for failing to meet contractual obligations 
(Mid-Project Evaluation Report, 1984, p. 107). Commenting on this point, 
one of the CHF upgrading consultants said:
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"The Agency tended to rely on us to do things for them, take 
the ball and run with it which we often did. This was not 
supposed to be our role" (Interview, CHF staff member, 1989).
Another CHF interviewee also explained:
"The Agency formed a real dependency on CHF. They relied 
on us too much. They wanted us to implement, not just advise 
which was not our job" (Interview, CHF staff member, 1989).
On the other hand the Agency had its own views about CHF staff which 
perhaps contradicts the fact that it was reliant on the latter. Many Agency 
interviewees said that CHF often brought ‘incompetent’ consultants in who 
were not really needed, just for the over-heads and to give work to their CHF 
staff who have very little to do in the States. However they found that as 
CHF staff spoke the same language as USAID, they should handle the reports 
and other communications required by the latter. This, most Agency staff saw 
was the main role of CHF.
y  CONCLUSION
It is important at this point to try to pull together some of the most important 
issues that were unresolved in the Upgrading Component. It is also necessary 
to analyse these issues in terms of the way they fitted into the Project process 
and the way in which this process was shaped by the relations of power and 
control between the key actors involved.
The major issues which had the strongest impact on the result of the Project, 
as identified throughout this chapter, were the off-site collector, standards, 
land tenure, cost recovery and eligibility criteria. All these elements were 
interrelated in that the failure to implement one meant that the others also 
could not be implemented. The fact that land was not legalised meant that 
eligibility criteria to get Loan Programme was limited to salaried employees. 
The failure to lower standards, to give land tenure, and to produce a
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functioning infrastructure meant that cost recovery could not be achieved. All 
this also ultimately meant that the effect of the Project on the target 
population, although positive in some areas, was not so on the whole- either 
things did not improve or the effect was clearly negative16.
USAID’s assumption was that the Upgrading Component as laid down in the 
PP would be followed. Strong financial backing of USAID plus the U.S. 
expertise of a consultant office, and a newly created Egyptian agency with 
absolute loyalty to the Project, were considered by USAID as a recipe for 
success. As shown in this chapter, one by one these assumptions were 
challenged. One of the first challenges was in the way the Agency made it 
clear from the beginning that it refused a patron-client relationship with 
USAID. Then throughout the Project process, and although there were no 
more such confrontations between the Agency and USAID, the former 
consolidated as a fully functioning agency in its own right. In the early days 
of the Project, the Agency had very little to say about the guidelines of the 
Project, the organisational structure, the financial system or the involvement 
of certain institutions such as the Project Bank for example. The Agency also 
had very little control over funds. It therefore had to find its own areas of 
power and control. Its major strength came from the knowledge it had about 
the functioning and dynamics of other GOE agencies. This combined with the 
fact that it was not pressured for time, meant that it did not need to openly 
oppose the principles of the PP. Its major strategy was simply to leave it to 
the GOE agencies to this job for them. It also managed to find leeway 
accessing more funds through CHF, such as using the latter to employ and 
pay for consultants for the Agency.
Although, as shown above, with the exception of the off-site collector (and 
even here the extent to which the Agency really wanted it implemented is 
questionable), the Agency employees were ultimately able to get programmes
16 This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
151
implemented following the conventional approach with which they felt most 
comfortable. The question that still remains is why USAID allowed it. After 
all, it had the signature of the GOE on the PP, had veto over expenditure, and 
eventually was primary funder of the Project. One answer is that USAID just 
wanted to spend its allocated budget, without causing apolitical confrontation, 
something that could have happened had they withdrawn the funding of the 
Helwan Project. The Agency, and other Egyptian agencies knew that the 
Congressional Agreement17 with GOE signed in 1975 made the possibility 
of such an action very difficult. The Agency, as well and MOH senior staff, 
also knew USAID’s main job was to spend the money in the pipeline, and by 
this stage of the Project a huge amount of budget finance was stuck in the 
pipeline.
USAID, as argued in the Mid-Project Report, although eager to see that funds 
were properly utilised and that tangible results were produced with 
investments, should have remembered that a lasting impact would have been 
achieved only if the programme and approach were accepted and 
institutionalised by the GOE. This realisation should have prompted USAID 
to be cooperative, responsive and creative in the way it monitored the project, 
albeit within the guidelines of USAID policies and procedures (Mid-Term 
Project Report, 1984, p. 114). As shown in this chapter, USAID took a very 
active role at the beginning of the Project which had negative rather than 
positive results. This however changed over the years of the Project. As 
USAID lost control over the Project development and saw it deviate from the 
original principles, it seemed to have reached a point where it wanted the 
Project to be completed at any price.
CHF’s role and its access to power also changed over the period of the 
Project. While CHF’s alliance with USAID was expected by all parties
17 The Congressional Agreement, as mentioned in chapter 1, include that a fixed amount 
of initially $ 1 Billion to be spent on AID in Egypt annually.
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involved, CHF always maintained that the Agency was their client18 and that 
they were doing their job in the boundaries set by the Agency. In fact, and 
although the Agency kept questioning the level of CHF staffs skills, they 
were the only ones who had real knowledge about what upgrading meant. As 
shown above, neither the Agency nor USAID had any experience serious in 
upgrading. This put CHF in a very privileged position. Also, and as time 
progressed, the role of go-between meant that CHF had made itself 
indispensable to both the Agency and USAID. The level of CHF’s control in 
the Project also increased greatly after it was given the responsibility to hire 
Egyptian consultants on behalf of the Agency. The latter were often high 
calibre professionals and they were knowledgeable of Egyptian rules, 
regulation and strategies which gave an extra strength to CHF’s knowledge of 
the Egyptian context.
18 CHF was hired by the Agency to be their advisers in the Project.
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CHAPTER 6
UPGRADING COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF ARAB RASHED
I INTRODUCTION
Up to this point the thesis has focused on the planning and management side 
of the Project. In this chapter the discussion will be about Arab Rashed, one 
of the seven upgrading communities which was chosen for this study1. This 
chapter is the result of six months of regular visits, observation, discussion 
and interviews with both ‘leaders’ and community members. 200 households 
in the community were selected using cluster sampling. 34% of the 
interviewees were women and 66% were men. Structured interviews were 
used (with closed and open-ended questions) and more general discussions 
were also hold with the spouse, if available, as well as with other members 
of the household. 20 households out of the 200 were also visited regularly 
over a period of five months for more in-depth interviews and discussions 
with both women and men. Interviews were also carried out with personnel 
who were responsible for the planning and implementation of the Upgrading 
component. The major focus of the description and analysis will be on the 
way Project implementation and interaction between the Agency and the 
community has played a role in the internal relationships of various groups in 
the community. Again the dynamics of the relationships will be viewed 
through the way in which the use of power and control of various actors have 
influenced the Project process.
As the last chapter shows, the upgrading targeted informal communities in 
Helwan with 200,000 inhabitants (PCR, 1988, p .l) . The upgrading activities 
included Home Improvement Loan Programme and ‘Community 
Organisation’, the construction of water and sewage networks and community 
facilities (Ibid, p .8).
1 The other six communities are: Izbet El Bagour, Sidqui, Zien, Arab Ghoneim, 
Ghoneim El Balad and Kafr El Elew.
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This chapter will be divided into two basic parts. The first part will cover the 
history and development of Arab Rashed as a community. This will put the 
Project into context as well as trace the various dynamics operating in the 
community prior to the Project. The second part will be a description and 
analysis of the changes in inter community relations which did or did not 
change with the Project.
n  DESCRIPTION OF ARAB RASHED
‘Arab Rashed’ takes its name after the ‘Rashed’ clan. The reason that 
‘Rashed’ is preceded by ‘Arab’, is that they consider themselves Arabs in two 
ways: one, ‘Arab’ is used to mean Bedouin, or nomads; two, Arab also refers 
to the fact that they come from the Arab Peninsula. While Egyptians are also 
considered Arabs, their identity as ‘Arab’ is complicated. To put it 
simplistically, whenever Egyptians identify themselves as Arabs, the majority 
would do so as part of their political rather than ethnic or cultural identity. 
The settlement of Arab Rashed lies to the south-west of the city of Helwan 
and occupies an area of 21 ha. A textile factory on the south and west 
completely isolates the community along this perimeter, while a cemetery and 
bus garage form the limits of the development at the northern end and a road 
and a railway station define its boundaries on the Eastern side. There are two 
main entrances to the community. The first is the Garage Street, which is a 
wide paved road2, and the second is the Cemetery entrance which is bordered 
by swamps of both solid and liquid waste.
The physical characteristics of Rashed, are in fact not much different from any 
other poor neighbourhood in Cairo except that it is perhaps less overcrowded 
than most. Most of the community streets are unpaved3, they are narrow and 
dusty. The main streets in Rashed are about four to five meters in width with
2 The road was paved by the Project.
3 With the exception of the main roads built by the project.
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no side walks. These are crossed by narrower alleyways and dead ends. Built 
in benches to the outside walls of houses are a common feature. Men often 
sit there and socialise.
Around 30% of houses are of the old village type construction, made of mud 
or reinforced concrete mostly built in the 1950s. Those are one to two floors, 
some quite spacious with 4 to 6 large rooms. Some are subdivided into 
separate rooms with shared bathrooms, and rented out, or occupied by the 
owner’s adult children. Some have had additional floors added on from the 
early seventies onward. There are also less sturdy and smaller 2 to 3 floor 
buildings and these constitute about 35% of buildings. These are composed 
of small apartments of on average between one and two rooms. Again 
bathrooms are shared in these cases. Around 25% of buildings were built in 
the late seventies onward. They were built with reinforced concrete and of 
relatively good quality, and are often between 3 to 4 floors, with small to 
medium size apartments (two to three rooms). Five to six story buildings still 
constitute a small minority of around 10% of buildings. Of the last two types 
of housing, the ground floor is divided into commercial and service shops (see 
photos of Rashed, p. 157).
In 1982 the population of Arab Rashed was 16,000 and in 1989 it was 
estimated to be 25,000. With a population density of 625 per/ha in 1982 and 
a maximum density of 1400 per/ha, the predicted saturation population is 
28,500 persons (Helwan Housing and Community Upgrading for Low Income 
Egyptians, 1984, p. 16). The Rashed population, is again little differentiated 
from the majority of the overall urban population. The average household is 
composed of 5.9 members, the average number of children is 4.2.
72% of households were composed of nuclear families, and 28% were 
extended families. The survey shows that 92% out of the main adult males 
and only 12% of the main adult females were economically active (see Table 
6.1 for details).
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Examples o f the residential environment in Rashed (1988)
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Table 6.1
Percentage distribution of adult males and females by economic activity
Economic Activity Men Women
Factory workers 46 16
Informal sector - services 16 42
Informal sector - commerce 5 12
Skilled workers in the private sector 20
Civil servants 7 30
Service staff in government (e.g. 
guards, cleaners)
6
A. THE HISTORY OF THE AREA:
The settlement of Rashed came into existence when a number of families from 
the Ayaidah tribe settled there in 1944. Later, in the early sixties they were 
joined by rural migrants first from upper and then from lower Egypt. In the 
seventies, a number of Caireens also came to settle in Rashed.
1. The origins and characteristics of the first settlers:
The settlement of Arab Rashed was named after Rashed Mahmoud El Sane’, 
the elder of Arab aelat (families) who first settled in the area. According to 
the oral history, these families belonged to the Ayaidah tribe. As one of the 
Rashed elders explained, the Ayaidah’ tribe originally came from north 
Yemen to Egypt at the time of Amr Ibn A1 Ass Islamic conquest. It was one 
among 72 tribes that came from the Gulf, who had first lived in Sinai and in 
the Eastern desert as semi-settled bedouins (nomads).
Under the Ottoman empire, Mohamed Aly, as the history is told by the elders 
of Rashed, wanted to get them to settle and cultivate land. Some of the Arabs 
accepted the offer and in return for land, they settled in the East delta and 
acquired Egyptian nationality. Others, the Ayaidah included, refused. In 
order to keep their tribal political system they moved west. Some of them
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order to keep their tribal political system they moved west. Some of them 
then settled in Helwan in 1865, in the low lands of Helwan A1 Balad and A1 
Saff4 in the midst of agricultural land owned by the Pashas. As one of the 
elders of Rashed described, they got involved in the cultivation of the land as 
hired labour for the Pashas, who owned large plots of land, Ismael Pasha5, 
for example owned 2000 feddans in Helwan (Rashed Elder, 1988).
Large factories started to be erected in Helwan. The first was the Silk 
Factory built in 1920. Then there were other major factories such as the dye 
factory in 1927 and the Cement factory built by the Danish in 1931. Helwan 
was also a winter resort where Pashas had their ‘castles’. Parts of it were 
modernised when the main roads paved by the Khedewy6 in the late 19th 
century (Rashed Elder, 1988).
Rashed Mahmoud El Sane’, Rashed’s head of the clan at the time (1930’s), 
was given the job of head guard for the two main factories. He then started 
to help other kin to find jobs as guards for the other factories as well as for 
‘Pasha houses’. This meant that the Ayaidah had a total monopoly over the 
position of guards in the area. Those who were contemporaries of that time, 
said they were doing a very good job as guards for factories and palaces. 
They acquired a special status in the area because they were respected by all 
and known for their dignity.
T h e  Pashas respected us because we respected ourselves and 
had treasured our dignity. The ‘fellaheen’7 on the other hand 
have no pride and accepted to be degraded and were thus 
treated like slaves” (Rashed Elder).
4 Two villages in Helwan.
5 The grandfather of the last King of Egypt.
6 The Ottoman ruler of Egypt.
7 The Arabs of Rashed call their compatriots who are not of bedouin origin , ‘Egyptians’ 
or ‘fellaheen’ (peasants).
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The position of guards, according to Rashed clan members, allowed them to 
have special relationships with the police as well as first hand contact with the 
Pashas. The old generation tended to romanticise this period saying that these 
were ‘the good old days’. They explained that contrary to what is claimed, 
the Pashas were very humane and ‘once you showed you had dignity they 
treated you with respect’. These ‘good times’ as they described them ended 
for them when the 1952 revolution came. The police had a stronger hold after 
this and they lost their privileged position of keeping law and order. The 
"children of nobodies started to show muscle on us"8, one of the elders 
exclaimed referring to the policemen.
Up until the 1952 Egyptian revolution the Rashed families retained their tribal 
political system. Their tribal authority, as one of the Arabs proudly 
explained, embraced all those belonging to the Ayaidah tribe from Bayad to 
Sinai, transcending territorial boundaries. Each clan was headed by a Sheikh 
Fekra. At the time of the King, the Arabs of Rashed explained, they were left 
free to live their Arab life. They were permitted to escape the ‘slavery’ that 
the Egyptians had to endure. They were, for example, not drafted into the 
army (Arab Elder, 1988).
"The Arabs were not asked to enrol in the army nor were they 
mobilised to work in national works such as digging the Suez 
Canal or the annual work of fighting the floods by putting 
guereed (reed) on the banks of the Nile and its canals. The 
Arabs refused to participate in what they considered to be the 
slavery of the Egyptian peasants. Even the British knew this 
about us" (Arab Elder, 1988).
With the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the ‘Arabs’ were all issued identity 
cards as Egyptians and the tribal system was formally abolished. Commenting 
on this one Rashed elder said:
8 This echoes very much what ex aristocracy would say about this period.
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"Nasser did glorious things but he took away from us our 
rights as Arabs. Although we had to abide by Egyptian rules 
in terms of having Egyptian identity cards botakat. registering 
for birth and death certificates and inscribing in the army, we 
however managed to retain the old system of tribal authority 
and tradition (Rashed member, 1988).
As this chapter will show, although the Arabs of Rashed have been fully 
integrated in the wider Egyptian civil society and political system, there is no 
question that their identity is still very much tied into their Arab-bedouin 
roots. They still see themselves as Arabs and have great pride in having 
retained their tribal political system for as long as they could and ‘not giving 
it up’ like other Arabs who did in the last century. This and their sense of 
superiority vis-a-vis the ‘Egyptians’ has had very important implications in 
general for the way the community developed over the years, and more 
specifically for the power relationships between Arabs and those who settled 
later in the community.
2. The development of Arab Rashed as a community (1944-1978):
A massive flood in 1944 destroyed the huts in the low land of Helwan, 
including those of the Rashed families’ homes in A1 Saff. The Arabs 
explained that they were saved by the Red Crescent9 which was then under 
the auspices of Princess Fawzia10. They were relocated to the higher lands 
of what is now the settlement of Arab Rashed (Arab Elder, 1988)11.
3. Population expansion:
For a few years the only inhabitants of the new area were Rashed families. 
Helwan, in the meantime, was becoming a fully developed industrial city that
9 The equivalent of the Red Cross.
10 The sister of King Farouk, the last King of Egypt.
11 One of the Arabs telling the story said he tried to dig out the Red Crescent archives 
to find the document that describes this incident but could not find them.
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attracted workers from all over the country.
The second half of 1950’s witnessed a heavy industrial boom, especially in 
1957 when large factories such as the Iron and Steel factory were built. This 
meant a large number of job opportunities were available. In response, rural 
migrant all over the country came to find jobs and settle in Helwan.
The Government, in an attempt to provide housing to these migrants, 
embarked on building five story public housing units, massaken, in the centre 
of Helwan. These units however only accommodated a small proportion of 
workers. The majority was left to find housing for themselves. They settled 
in the several communities, such as Rashed, around Helwan.
Inhabitants of Rashed explained that the first migrants who settled in Rashed 
came from Upper Egypt (South of Egypt). A number of male workers were 
recruited to work in the cement factory in Helwan in the middle of the 1950’s. 
They were followed by more of their male relatives and acquaintances who 
also came to find work in Helwan. They were then followed by people from 
Lower Egyptian (north of Egypt), mostly recruited for the textile factory in 
the early 1960’s. The third, and most recent group of migrants who settled 
in Rashed, were those coming from other parts of Cairo. This category, who 
started coming in the mid 1970’s, came to find cheaper housing rather than 
work. Describing how the migrants first came to settle in Rashed, one of the 
early migrants from Upper Egypt said:
"One member of the family would come and send back for 
brothers, cousins and friends. Then once they are settled, 
slowly go to bring back their women and children. My cousin 
came here in 1962 hiding from a family feud, found a job then 
sent back informing me there were jobs available, so I 
followed" (Migrant from Upper Egypt, 1989).
Another migrant explained that the reason some people came to Rashed was
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that in many places, like for example Fayoum12, there were no job 
opportunities except agriculture.
"When your father is a tenant and does not need lots of hands 
the children are sent to school and no longer want to work on 
the land. This is what happened to me and most of my 
brothers. At the age of sixteen I came here and worked in a 
bakery" he said (Interview, 1989).
Another added:
"Most of those who came to work in Helwan were villagers 
who were in Cairo for their military service and did not want 
to return to their villages. Their success in settling down and 
finding jobs in the city encouraged other members of the 
family to follow them" (Interview, 1989).
The pattern of how migrants came to Rashed follows Abu Lughod’s 
description of the way Egyptian migrants settle in cities usually choosing to 
live in areas of the city that retain basic similarities to the village (Abu 
Lughod, 1977). Such a pattern was also found to have been predominant in 
other areas, especially in recently urbanised villages which were integrated 
into the Cairo metropolis (Taher, 1986).
While the description of the settling-in seems like a natural and smooth 
process, it was in fact not devoid of conflict. Although the settling in of 
migrants in Rashed was not resisted by the Arabs, the integration of those 
migrants into the community was never complete. Discussions with both 
Arabs and early migrants show that the relationship between Arabs and 
migrants was based on mutual obligations binding the two parties. The 
migrants had to abide by the ‘urf (customs) of the Arab owner in exchange for 
giwar (rights of protection) the Arab would provide. That was the cornerstone
12 A village in the north of Egypt.
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of a patron-client relationship13 between Arab and migrant. This system of 
patronage dominated the early years of the development of the Rashed 
community and has not completely disappear even today. The migrants kept 
mostly to their village of origin identity and retained their own system of 
leadership. The most respected and often wealthier member of the village of 
origin would be considered kebeer el ela (the elder of the family). His14 role 
was mostly restricted to solving disputes among members of the village of 
origin or to represent them in intra-village disputes.
Underlying all the aspects of Rashed life is the dichotomy that exists between 
the Arabs and the migrants, who are all ‘Egyptians’ or ‘fellaheen’ as the 
Arabs call them or ‘newcomers’ as they arrived and settled at a later stage in 
the area15. The latter resented the Arabs for their claim on the settlement 
and their ‘presumed superiority’. When talking about the migrants the Arabs 
imply that the ‘fellaheen’ are in Rashed settlement out of their generosity as 
they ‘allowed’ them to settle on their land. This however did not seem to be 
the only reason why they see the migrants as deserving less in the community. 
The migrants are seen to be these ‘fellaheen’ who do not hold the same strong 
traditions and customs that the Arabs hold. They above all, are viewed by the 
Arabs as not having the dignity and self respect that they the Arabs have. The 
‘fellaheen’ or ‘Masreveen’ were also seen to be less Muslim then the ‘Arabs’. 
As one of the Arabs put it: "They are Muslimeen seif (Muslim of the sword)
13 Patron-client as it is used here means ‘..a bond of personal obligation being used by 
the patron to subordinate the client to his/her will. For the client, to enjoy the protection and 
material resources controlled by the powerful, has to return loyally the benefits received" 
(Chubb, p.6).
14 Kebeer el ela is a status only given to men in this society.
15 ‘Newcomers’ is a term used to describe those who have settled in urban Egypt in an 
area previously occupied by a distinguishable social group, for example an old village that was 
incorporated in the city. They are often considered as ‘newcomers’ even if they had been in 
the community for decades. All that it matters is that they came after the original inhabitants 
(see Taher, 1986).
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not like us ‘Muslimeen ressalaa’ (Muslims of message)"16 (Arab elder, 
1989). The Arabs in Rashed take this as a very important fact which, as they 
explained, was the reason why an Arab man can marry a ‘fellaha’ (peasant 
woman) while an Arab woman is not allowed to marry a ‘fellah’ (peasant 
man)17.
While all migrants or ‘newcomers’ are considered as inferior by the Arabs, 
there is a noticeable hierarchy among the former. Those from upper Egypt 
are more accepted than those from lower Egypt while the Caireens come at 
the bottom of the ladder. Those from Fayoum [lower Egypt] hold a special 
status because of their tribal origins. The fact that this preference corresponds 
with the order of the migrant’s arrival to Rashed, is probably not reason 
enough for the hierarchy. The Upper Egyptians are seen by the Arabs as 
having more characteristics in common with themselves than the others. Also 
because many settled in the fifties, they were able to acquire large plots of 
land which made of some of them landlords, thus with high status.
The ‘newcomers’, on the other hand, also have their dislikes for the Arabs of 
Rashed. The biggest complaint about them is that ‘they think they own the 
place’ and that they stick together and only look out for their own interests 
rather than the those of the community in general. They were also often 
described as grabbers, opportunists, greedy and even dishonest. Some were 
also described as lazy and large consumers of drugs. They are criticised for 
having too many wives and too many children. Some added that the Arabs 
were backward people and one proof of that is that it took them a long time 
to realise the importance of education and that only this last generation of
16 This refers to the belief that the Arabs from the Gulf became Moslems because they 
believed in the religion while the others, like the Egyptians, became Muslims as a result of 
loosing the war at the time of the Arab conquest. This means they became Moslems out of 
fear not out of conviction.
17 This seems to follow the same rule that governs marriage with non Moslems. In Islam 
men are allowed to marry non Moslem women while women are not allowed to marry non 
Moslem men.
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parents are sending their children to school. When discussing the Rashed 
community with the ‘newcomers’, many expressed their dislike for the 
community especially those who came from Cairo in the late eighties.
(see table 6.2 on origins of community members in my sample).
Table 6.2
Percentage distribution of female and male interviewees and their spouse 
by place of origin
Place of Origin Women Men
Upper Egypt 52 55
Lower Egypt 20 20
Arab Rashed 18 15
Cairo 8 10
3. Housing:
When the Arabs first settled in the area, they felt, for the first time, secure 
enough to build permanent houses. Omar (1988) explains that there were two 
major factors that contributed to this security. One is that they were allocated 
this land by a legitimate institution headed by the Princess. Second the fact 
that the new location was on high land, meant they felt sheltered from natural 
disasters. They thus built solid houses on large areas of around 1500 and 
2000 square meters. They used random stones and cement dust for their 
walls and dried straw covered with a layer of cement dust and mixed mud for 
their roofs. They were thus transformed from Arab kheich (Arabs in tents) 
to Arab heit (Arabs in walls) (Omar, 1988, p .36).
In 1956, Law 344 was issued forbidding construction without a licence. In 
response, the inhabitants of Rashed sought to obtain licenses. They were 
denied the licenses and announced as illegal occupants of Government land.
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The land that they occupied was given the status of hekr 18, i.e Government 
owned leased land. In response they registered the land they already occupied 
as hekr land. This meant they had to pay rent to the Government as well as 
taxes, which they have been doing since then. They also registered larger 
plots of land to ensure that they had legitimate rights to them (Ibid, p .79). 
The new system did not change their view that the land is rightfully theirs. 
They nevertheless decided to go along with the Government and pay rent. 
This was their way to play the Government’s game in order to be left alone 
until the time would come when they could prove their claim to the land. 
Meanwhile, they subdivided and sold land to the ‘newcomers’.
In the period between 1944-1956, land in these areas had no market value. 
It was only when the first migrants came to Rashed that land started to be 
seen as a commodity owned by the Arabs. The ‘fellaheen’ were seen by the 
Arabs as having no claim on the land. Therefore they had to buy the land 
from the ‘legitimate’ owners, the Arabs. The first arrivals were thus sold 
pieces of land of around 500 square meters. Some Arab interviewees said that 
the price that the migrants were charged was symbolic; others claimed that 
the land was given to them for nothing. This was denied by some of those 
who acquired land at the time.
"They came [the migrants-newcomers] here and we allowed 
them to build their houses on our land. Most of the Arabs did 
not charge for this land. I personally have around me, on my 
land, five house that I did not charge for", one Arab said 
(Interview, 1988).
By the 1960’s a clearer commodification of housing was established. The 
increased demand for housing over the years, as well as the increased profit
18 This is land owned by the State and leased on a long term basis to the occupants of the 
land. Squatters may in some cases be granted this status (Regulation of Land Title, 1989, 
p.l). The conditions that govern ‘hekr’ land means that the land has to be already occupied. 
So if a house is pulled down, the land is no longer in-lease and the tenant cannot add units on 
the house horizontally either.
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that monopoly on land has proved to be, led the Arabs to build one to two- 
roomed houses and sell them to ‘newcomers’ instead of selling just land. 
These houses were paid for in instalments over a number of years.
Most houses in Rashed were incrementally built by adding more rooms over 
time. In the late sixties red brick started to be used for construction, and 
roofs were replaced. Thus rooms and even floors were added, and they were 
consolidated over the years. Unlike the misconception that squatters build 
shacks or potentially collapsible houses, a number of engineers from the 
Agency and CHF confirmed what some of Rashed inhabitants said about the 
solidity of their houses. One American CHF consultant said:
"Egyptians, when they build for themselves, build well. 
Housing in squatter areas in Cairo might not be aesthetically 
nice but it is always strong and permanent. When the 
foundation of the Rashed Cooperative building were checked, 
there was so much iron and cement that the building could 
easily take another three floors. People in the squatter areas 
build conservatively even wastefully" (Interview, CHF 
Consultant, 1988).
In the early seventies the Rashed settlement started expanding by building on 
the fringes. Because of the increased demand and increased value of land, the 
Arabs reduced the sizes of plots from 500 to 200 or 150 square meters. 
While houses up to this point were mostly of village type style19, one to two 
floors apartment buildings started to be erected, similar to those in other low 
income urban building in Egyptian cities.
The construction of houses as well as the additional units were done by local 
contractors. They were usually paid for in instalments. This was a system 
that helped home owners, even among the poor, to improve and expand their 
houses. The local contractors were usually second generation Arabs. This 
meant that the Arabs had monopoly not only over land but over construction
19 These were typically one floor houses, made of mud brick and with straw roofs, with 
rooms surrounding a courtyard.
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as well. Until the late seventies the majority of houses in Rashed were one 
floor houses, some had a second floor while very few were three floor houses. 
One of the early migrants who is the kebeer el ela of Bani Sweif in Upper 
Egypt, said that he was the first to build a three story house in Rashed and 
people called it the ‘tower of Rayess Mostafa’20 (Interview, Upper Egyptian 
Migrant, 1989). Migrants often boast that they were the ones who brought 
about change and ‘civilisation’ to the area. It is their way of challenging what 
they see as the alleged superiority of the Arabs. Because they came at a later 
stage than the Arabs, they were the first to abandon the rural style of housing 
design and materials and started using more modern material and building in 
the style prevalent in urban Cairo at the time.
The rental system was introduced when not only relatives but baladvvat 
(people from village of origin) came to live in Rashed with migrant owners. 
In these cases some had to pay for their rooms. This was frowned upon by 
Arabs who found renting out rooms in one’s house degrading, and another 
reason to despise the ‘fellaheen’ who have ‘no respect for customs or 
privacy’21 . Later Arabs also started renting out rooms, but as they claim, 
only in houses they owned and did not live in. The introduction of the rental 
system in Rashed meant that the Arabs were losing their tight grip on the 
housing market. They still had control over land and construction, but no 
longer absolute control over who settles in the community, where and under 
what conditions. They were also slowly losing the patron-client relationship 
that they were so careful to preserve. This, rather than their desire to protect 
customs and privacy could be the real reason for their harsh criticism of 
migrant home owners renting out rooms.
20 ‘Rayess’ is a term of respect.
21 Privacy here refers mostly to the segregation of women. The ‘Arabs’ here saw 
themselves as more respectful of this tradition than the ‘Egyptians’ or ‘fellaheen’.
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Although it was the migrants who introduced the rental system, it was 
eventually the Arabs who made the most of it. While migrants tended to rent 
out rooms in their houses, the Arabs started constructing apartments of 
different sizes to rent out. In no time they were making a business out of 
renting out housing units for those who could not afford to buy land or 
houses. By the mid-seventies land was getting scarcer and prices of both land 
and construction material went up. This meant that demand for renting 
accommodation increased drastically. As will be shown below, the rental 
business underwent a real boom when the Home Improvement Loan 
Programme was introduced in 1981 and rent went up.
According to estimates of those who work in the construction business and 
other informed inhabitants in Rashed, the price of one meter sq of land was 
LEI in 1958-59, LEI,5 in 1968-69, LE17 in 1978-79 and LE90 in 1988-89. 
Rental accommodations for one room and shared toilet was around LE6 in 
1978-79 and LE20 in 1988-89. Rent for two rooms and shared or private 
toilet was around LE20 to LE25 in 1978-79 and LE40 to LE45 in 1988-89.
In this survey, out of the sample of 200 households, 61 % of the interviewees 
owned their homes, while 39% were tenants. 44% of the latter paid an 
average of LEI5 in rent, 29% paid LE25 and, 21% paid LE35 and 6% paid 
LE45.
B. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM-LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNITY 
ORGANISATION:
How did a settlement like Rashed, which is considered by the authorities as 
an illegal settlement, manage to organise itself and form a fully functioning 
community with both an internal organisation and link with the wider society? 
This section will deal with the political and organisational process Rashed 
went through and the role that different leadership and social groups played 
in this development.
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As shown above, when the community was still in its early stages of 
development, the tribal political system was the predominant system. The 
Arabs also succeeded in building a link with the wider society through their 
position as guards. Their success in creating networks with people in 
authority, like the police and district level employees, meant that such 
relationships were not completely severed even with the political changes that 
occurred after the 1952 Revolution. When the migrants settled in, they also 
had to abide by the rules of the Arabs both because of the existence of a 
clearly established internal political system and the monopoly of the Arabs 
over land. The internal affairs of the ae’lat as well as of the mahaliat were 
dealt with vertically following the tribal system in the case of the Arabs and 
the kebeer el ‘ela the case of the migrants. However when it came to 
community level issues it cut across ‘ethnic’22 lines and that was when 
patron-client relationships prevailed. The position of power that the Arabs 
held, however, still did not translate into their being seen as leaders by the 
migrants.
Since most of the links to the authorities were through the Pashas and factory 
owners, after the 1952 Revolution, the Rashed communities’ links with the 
authorities weakened for a while until they found another way to establish new 
contacts and networks. New community organisations developed in the 
1960’s which provided the community with new opportunities. The first of 
such organisations was the Youth Club which developed out of the efforts of 
a group of young people of both Arab and migrant origin. It was a new 
forum for decision making as well as a new link to the outside world that 
allowed for a younger leadership to develop away from that of the elders of 
the community.
22 Ethnic as used here is seen in the broader sense of the word, meaning that people felt 
they belonged to a certain group different from another.
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In 1968 a group of young men got together and formed a group who built 
their own headquarters for a youth club23. The idea came when a group of 
young men who played soccer in sahat cha’bvia24 wanted to have their club 
and their own space in the community. They approached the appropriate local 
channels, the elders of Rashed, to help them get permission from the Helwan 
District office. The elders rejected the idea and refused to help on the 
grounds that they saw no good coming from it (Omar, 1988, p .44). So the 
young men approached the District Office directly and got permission to use 
a vacant area used as a sewage dump. They then collected money from the 
community, filled in the sewage basins and erected the building which they 
named Rashed Youth Club. As those were times under the Nasser Regime, 
when such youth activities were encouraged, the District’s Director attended 
the opening ceremony and declared the club a legitimate institution under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Youth (Ibid, p.46). The elders of Rashed did not 
welcome this whole venture as it was the first time that such a communal 
activity took place without their involvement nor even their approval. This 
was the first challenge to their patronage position both as Arabs and as elders.
The youth club was not just a place for entertainment and for playing soccer. 
It was also a place where young men met and discussed community matters. 
It also provided a forum for the first time for both Arab and migrant men to 
come together. It was however soon realised that since the club was linked 
to the Ministry of Youth (a non political institution), it was not allowed to 
organise politically and therefore had very little power. The club members 
felt they needed to be more active in a political institution in order to get their 
voice heard. They encouraged Rashed community members to run for the
23 Youth Clubs started to be erected in cities and villages of Egypt in the early 1960’s 
as part of a scheme providing all young people, not only those belonging to high income 
families, with a chance to enjoy sports and other recreational activities. These clubs are 
supported and supervised by the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The attention and support 
given to these clubs in the sixties has faded greatly over the years.
24 They are similar to Youth clubs only they are just open fields mostly used for soccer.
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Itehad El Arabv El Ishteraki (Arab Socialist Union)25 elections representing 
Helwan El Balad26. They consequently organised meetings and campaigned 
for candidates. Nine inhabitants of Rashed, mostly Arabs, won the elections 
and joined the Itehad El Ishteraki as representatives of Helwan El Balad.
This second major venture organised again by the youth of Rashed was done 
this time in a way to include the elders. This meant the latter did not feel left 
out and thus gave all the support that was needed. The elders also saw this 
as a new opportunity to regain some of their position with the authorities 
(Rashed elder, 1989). The Club provided a headquarters for the Rashed 
National Assembly members. Very importantly, members of the Itehad El 
Ishteraki. because of their position, were able to make contacts with 
Government officials in key Government institutions.
One of the most important results that came out of being part of the Itehad El 
Ishteraki was to get electricity and water installed in the community. Up to 
1969 the community of Rashed had no infrastructure connections. In the case 
of most squatter areas in Cairo, infrastructure is a rare commodity. The 
government maintained now as it did then, that it had no obligation to extend 
infrastructure to what it considers are ‘illegal settlements’ and finds it 
convenient to ignore the existence of such settlements. This however does not 
mean that ‘squatters’ do not have their own means to get such services. Their 
ability to do so depends greatly on their resourcefulness and ability to organise 
and establish contact with the right people. The Rashed settlement was able 
to get a limited piped water system installed and electricity in 1969. Up to 
that point water was fetched from public taps close by, a small canal at some
25 El Etehad El Eshteraki (the Arab Socialist Union) was the Government party. It 
developed from the National Party which replaced all parties in 1957. The bases for the Arab 
Socialist Union was units in schools, factories, villages and city districts (Hopwood, 1982, 
P-91).
26 A Helwan district.
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distance from Rashed or from the neighbouring factories27. The system of 
sewage disposal was that of septic tanks which were periodically evacuated 
using evacuation cars. This system was still in use in Rashed up to my last 
visit to the community in 1990.
A limited piped water system was installed. In addition to three public taps, 
water connections were built only into those houses whose owners could 
afford to pay for them. Those who were around at the time explained that 
water and electricity connections were installed through peoples’ own efforts. 
For example in the case of the electricity, the people did the digging, bought 
the cables, then hired people to install the wires. Commenting on this point, 
one of Rashed interviewees said:
"It was through our own efforts and no thanks to the 
Government that we were able to turn this settlement into a 
fully functioning community. We got water and electricity 
with the help of Salem Tamaa [a Youth Club leader at the 
time]".
The Itehad El Eshteraki was however abolished in 1975- it was seen as 
representing too much of Nasser’s ideology. Some of its functions were taken 
over by another institution the Mail is El Mahal i (Local Council). Only two 
members of Rashed were elected for this council in the late seventies28.
One of these two was Salem Tamaa, a young Arab man who really shone in 
the community during this period of the late sixties and seventies. He worked 
in the Helwan District Office, where due to his having been a member of both 
the Itehad el Ishteraki and later the Majlis El Mahali plus his charismatic 
qualities, he established good contacts in the District. Although stories told
27 In fact even after the Project had introduced a wider and improved water network, 
22% of households in my sample still had no water connections in their houses.
28 The Majlis El Mahali at the time this study was done(1989) had ten members from 
Hewlan El Balad, none of them from Rashed.
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about him might have been exaggerated by the fact that he died at the young 
age of 32, there is no question that he was an active and a born leader who 
did a lot of good for the community. His was a name community members, 
both Arab and migrants, mentioned often when issues around leadership where 
raised during this research. People said things like "..since Salem died there 
is no one who really cares for this community".
When the Itehad el Eshteraki was abolished, Salem Tamaa was one of a small 
group of young people who thought of the idea to create a new organisation 
in Rashed which would be equipped to provide social services to the 
community. Services, as a member of this new organisation said, "..that was 
Government duty to provided to us, but never did". The youth club was not 
seen by this group of young people as being the right forum for such a task. 
The majority of the members of this new group that initiated and built the new 
organisation were Arabs.
An unused piece of land, close to the entrance of the Community, was chosen 
as the place to erect the new building for the Community Development 
Cooperative. The Cooperative was to operate under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Some of the present Cooperative committee 
members explained that a committee of thirty of them was formed to gather 
donations which went towards the building of the Cooperative. There were 
many volunteers, they worked in 24 hour shifts, got the builders in the 
community to work for a reduced wage and those who had no skills just 
helped with the digging, carrying etc. "Sometimes we worked during the 
night as it was summer, and we all enjoyed it tremendously. It gave us such 
a sense of achievement", one Cooperative members explained (Interview,
1988).
The Cooperative was ready for operation in 1977. It had a nursery, offered 
adult education classes for women and men and sewing classes for women. 
It also provided a meeting place where men gathered in the evenings for
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entertainment purposes and to discuss community issues. Most saw the 
Cooperative as their new link to the formal institutions outside the community.
Unlike the Club, the Cooperative was not seen as a challenge to the Arab’s 
position in the community. Since the founder of the Cooperative, Salem 
Tammaa, was an Arab, and since he managed to include the elders in the 
creation of the new institution, he gained the support of his kinsmen. 
Although the newly developed younger generation’s leadership was given 
some level of autonomy from the elders, the alliance between the two was 
never broken. This alliance, and support of the Arabs for the Cooperative 
was the reason the Cooperative is often seen by the community of Rashed as 
an Arab institution. While there is a strong Arab presence in it, the 
Cooperative is in fact in no way predominantly Arab. For example five out 
of the nine members of the Cooperative committee are migrants, all of 
originally from Upper Egypt. All committee members are home-owners and 
four out of the nine are contractors. Therefore the Cooperative committee 
members represent a relatively privileged stratum of the community. This 
might justify why, while in fact not all Arab, they are viewed as being 
exclusively so.
Competition between the Club and the Cooperative started when the latter 
offered to get both institutions together under the same management. 
However, because funding from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the 
Cooperative was more generous then that given by the Ministry of Youth to 
the Club, this was seen to be a threat to the latter. As members of the Youth 
Club explained, they feared that the Cooperative would try to monopolise 
them and that they would be annexed to them, like a take over (Omar, 1988, 
pp. 52-56). The competition and bad feelings between the Club and the 
Cooperative was complicated by the way in which members of the former 
were perceived to be the majority migrants while those of the latter 
predominantly Arab. As a result the two institutions worked parallel rather 
than together and each decided to consider the other as irrelevant though an
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irritant. Discussions around the relationship between the two organisations 
showed that Cooperative members were dismissive of the Club members, the 
latter were resentful of the Cooperative. This relationship, as will be 
discussed later, became openly hostile after the Upgrading Project started.
m  THE ARRIVAL OF THE PROJECT
As the last section of this chapter shows, Rashed in 1981 was a functioning 
community with established internal organisations with links to government 
institutions. It also had solid if not aesthetically pleasant housing, a market, 
mosques, clinics and pharmacies. As is the case in the majority of squatter 
areas and even some formal low income areas of Cairo, it lacked a 
comprehensive water, sewage and garbage disposal systems. It also had no 
schools. Children had to walk between 30 and 40 minutes to the nearest 
school.
A. PERCEPTION OF SQUATTERS BY PROJECT IMPLEMENTORS:
The last chapter shows how the GOE agencies that had to give permissions for 
upgrading activities, created various obstacles because they were basically 
against the idea of the Project. The Government position was that ‘squatter’ 
settlements are illegal. While they could not eradicate them because it was 
politically impossible to do so, they chose to ignore them. They believed that 
upgrading such settlements meant that they were given the green light to 
expand and spread. In fact, informal settlements are spreading at a rate of 
400 hectares a year in Greater Cairo (EQI, 1986, p .l).
Now the question is, how did those who were responsible for the 
implementation of the Helwan project view ‘squatter’ areas? Obviously the 
way ‘squatters’ were seen influenced the way the project progressed especially 
in the sphere of community organisation and participation. Interviews with 
the Agency, showed that most maintained stereotypical ideas about squatter 
populations. ‘Squatter’ areas were often perceived to be inhabited by a
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homogenous group of people, rural migrants, who live in shacks that were on 
the verge of collapse, and surrounded by ‘filth and disease’. Opinions about 
them and whether or not they needed help, were derived from sentiments 
which were and continued to be at best paternalistic and at worse 
contemptuous. The Agency employees went through intensive training 
organised by CHF around new approaches to housing solutions. They were 
thus supposedly sensitized to seeing ‘squatter’ areas as a ‘fait accomplis’, and 
to dealing with them instead of ignoring them or wishing to bulldoze them. 
Despite that, most still had ambivalent feelings about ‘squatters’.
As one senior Agency engineer puts it:
"Squatters have always been punished by the Government by 
refusing to provide them with water and sewage. I agree that 
it is dangerous to encourage such cancerous expansions. 
However this project is helping them have a better life, they 
are Egyptians after all!" (Interview, the Agency, 1988).
Another Agency interviewee argued:
"Squatters are all over Cairo, there is nothing we can do to 
stop that. We therefore can help them live a better life. This 
Project, for example, changed the lives of the people in the 
upgraded areas from the life of animals to that of semi humans’ 
(Interview, the Agency, 1988).
An Agency interviewee said:
"The upgrading is the only way to guarantee that those who 
live in squatter areas live a better life. The problem did occur 
already and the only way to salvage it is by giving the people 
proper facilities. It was proved that people move faster than 
the Government. Upgrading is forbidden in fear that it will 
encourage expansion. In fact expansion is going very fast 
anyway and nothing can curb that. The squatter areas are 
everywhere, they are filthy and a cancerous growth. The fact 
that very little is done to deal with this problem just shows how 
few people around care about this country" (Interview, 1989).
Another senior staff member while acknowledging that the idea of Upgrading 
is good in principle, did not always see upgrading as a good solution as it
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depends on the location of the squatter area. Some of the areas that were 
upgraded in this project, he explained, are in close proximity to the Nile. 
Such locations should be kept for luxurious neighbourhoods. These areas 
should have been pulled down and luxury flats and tourist hotels built on 
them. He added:
"The inhabitants of the squatter areas could have been 
transferred to one of the new cities. A similar thing happened 
in an area called El Mohamady were there were huts and so on 
and the whole area was wiped out and a garden is replacing it.
The people were transferred to A1 Salam City29. It was the 
perfect solution and the best way to clean the area. The same 
should happen in a neighbourhood like Boulac30. It should be 
wiped out and another Zamalek should be created" (Interview,
1989).
If after the ten year experience to the Helwan Project, a senior Agency 
employee still believes in bulldozing and displacing people to remote areas, 
one wonders what the implication of that is on future housing policy in Egypt.
There were various reasons given for why ‘squatter’ areas need upgrading. 
An ex-senior Agency employee explained that Cairo’s ‘civilised’ areas are 
composed of about 4 million people, the remaining 6 or 7 million are 
‘squatter’ settlements. The latter who have no services, he explained, blame 
it on the Government which is seen as the enemy.
"This results in intifada (uprising) because these people are 
envious of those who are privileged in society. People in 
Zamalek31 pay 5pts for the meter of water while it costs 
squatter people five pounds. They are excused if they burn 
down Cairo. So to provide them with service is not just out of 
social awareness but mostly for ‘our’ own security. I live in
29 One o f the five New Cities built in the desert.
30 This is a well established old low income neighbourhood with an estimated population 
of half a million.
An upper income group neighbourhood which is used by all Egyptians as the example 
of wealth especially in the context of social injustice.
Mohandeseen32 and we are surrounded by hungry people, 
those living in Meet Okba33. There are increasing numbers of 
robberies. Those people living on the fringes come in for work, 
they see how the wealthy live and they wonder why they do not 
get a piece of the pie. I sat with Brown [director of AID] and 
explained all that to him". He added (Interview, the Agency,
1989).
When it comes to USAID staff, although upgrading was originally the idea of 
their organisation, the tendency of some was to think that upgrading was a 
compromise. When they spoke about upgrading, the question was whether in 
fact this was a viable solution or whether it was just a patch up job. One 
USAID official who was involved in the Project at its beginnings said:
"AID officials who planned this Project were not housing 
people but rather infrastructure experts. They had doubts that 
upgrading would work. They only did it because it was 
fashionable at the time" (Interview, the Agency, 1988).
A CHF consultant confirmed this view by saying that it was the Urban rather 
than the Housing department that dealt with the Project. So they knew 
nothing about housing, only infrastructure.
CHF consultants, as it seems, were the only ones who knew about Upgrading 
Projects and Community Organisation. However their approach to both, as 
the rest of this chapter will show, tended to be conservative and limited to 
getting the job done efficiently.
One of the most interesting points raised in the discussion around why squatter 
areas should be upgraded, is the view shared by both the Agency and USAID 
that ‘squatter’ areas if neglected further will turn into areas of political unrest 
and revolution. Squatters and slums are identified by USAID as ‘the 
phenomenon of urban marginality’ which is a seen as potentially threatening
32 Another higher income neighbourhood.
33 A low income community located in the middle of Madinet El Mohandeseen.
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‘hot beds of revolution’. This view led USAID to get involved in extensive 
urban aid Programmes in Third World countries (Mayo in Moser, 1989, 
p .91). Quite prominent in the minds of both Americans and Egyptians 
involved in the project, especially those at policy level, was that the project 
served to appease and pacify potentially dangerous elements in society,. To 
have better access and thus more control over squatter communities was a 
motivation that quite a few officials from both sides had.
These were some of the ideas and attitudes that coloured the project process 
in the upgrading areas. The mismatch of the preconceived ideas and 
stereotypes held by the employees and the community ‘representatives’ about 
each other was one of the important elements that influenced the interaction 
between the two sides. The other mismatch came out of the different interests 
that project staff and community representatives had in the project. The 
former was trying to get a job done with as little difficulty as possible. Their 
lack of respect for the communities, their rights and collective wisdom meant 
that they overlooked their real needs and interests. The communities, as the 
next section will demonstrate further, had little involvement in the process, 
with the exception of those who were identified as the leaders. The latter’s 
interests, in the case of Rashed for example, was to get the best out of the 
project for their own interests, especially as regards gaining more legitimacy 
as leaders and consequently more power in the community.
B. COMMUNITY ORGANISATION AND ‘PARTICIPATION’:
Community organisation and participation became important components of 
the 70’s and 80’s housing projects. It became one of the preconditions 
included in international funders’ ‘packages’. Community participation, in 
particular, is at the centre of debate in the housing and development literature 
raising several issues among which are its viability, exploitative potential and 
promise to communities for more access to power. While the first two issues 
are not of particular relevance to this study, the power issue is. The existing 
power relationships in Rashed prior to the introduction of the Upgrading
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project were discussed in the last section. This section will discuss the way 
in which this was shaped over the ten years of the project.
Community organisation was one of the upgrading objectives cited in the 
original Project Paper. CHF in its capacity as the only organisation involved 
in the Helwan Project that had any expertise in upgrading, was responsible for 
community organisation. Thus, a community organisation conceptual 
framework was prepared by CHF and presented to the Agency (Nathan 
Report, 1982, pp. 161-162). Community organisation, as defined in the 
various project papers, was limited to the involvement of local community 
organisations and leaders rather than community as a whole. Existing 
community organisations (eg Rashed Cooperative) or new community 
organisations created for the purpose of the Project, were to participate in the 
planning and maintenance of community facilities as well as to protect land 
designated for facilities from encroachment (Project Paper Excerpts on 
Community upgrading, 1987, p. 10). The community in general and its 
involvement in the Project was given lip service. They were to be informed 
about the components of the Project and asked to cooperate in keeping facility 
sites available. The definition of community organisation and participation as 
it appears in one of the documents is as follows:
"Community organisation techniques are extensively used to 
encourage community participation. Community associations 
initiate and manage their own community facilities, solid waste 
collection and septic tank services and other community 
programmes... Working with community associations,
comprehensive urban planning ensures that the construction of 
schools, sewer and water, roads, electricity and other 
community facilities meet the needs of the residents in each 
community" (Helwan Housing and Community upgrading,
1984, pp.5-6)
Many similar projects are criticised for their use of the terms ‘community’ 
participation when in fact it was ‘leader’s’ or ‘local association’s’ 
participation. Most of the implementors did not really see the distinction 
between leaders, associations and communities. There were two major
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problems which coloured the community organisation and participation process 
from its early stages. The first was around the identification of who the 
leaders were in term of the degree to which they really represented their 
communities. This operation, as will be shown below, seems to have been 
done quite haphazardly, which had important implication for the power 
dynamics within communities. The second was that even these community 
leaders were not involved from the onset of the Project.
Project papers as well as interviewees, when discussing the issue of 
community participation, claimed that the upgrading communities were 
involved in the decision making every step of the way. In fact, as was shown 
in the previous chapters, there was no mention of the community in the pre­
implementation stages of the project. They were contacted only at the time 
of implementations after all the plans as well as choice of contractors was 
decided. The following quotation is just one of many that show that the 
communities were in no way part of every step of the Project:
"After the original plans/designs were executed and as they 
were getting reviewed for approval, the Agency started to 
establish contact with two of the upgrading communities where 
implementation of the Project was to start" (PCR, 1989, pp.
30).
The implementation of ‘community organisation’ followed a number of steps. 
These steps, as described in the Project documents, started with the 
identification of the leadership of each community. Then through this 
leadership the community was informed about the upgrading components 
(Mid-term Evaluation, 1984, p. 121). Then community organisations and the 
communities they represented, participated in determining priorities among 
upgrading interventions, specified sites and contributed in the design and 
planning (Evaluation of Upgrading Construction, 1987, p .30) Lastly, they 
were taught how to use and maintain the facilities and programmes after 
installation (Mid-term Evaluation, 1984, p. 121).
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Each of these steps will be discussed in the following section trying to point 
out the implications of the activities undertaken in the community 
organisation and participation process and the manner in which they were 
implemented.
1. Identification and establishing rapport with leaders or local organisations:
The Agency Community Development Team (CDT) with the Egyptian CHF 
social staff34, approached those they saw as the leaders of the upgrading 
communities to involve them in the Project. In most upgrading areas, easily 
identifiable local organisations were seen as the forum where leadership 
operated. In the case of Rashed, the Cooperative represented everything the 
project implementors needed. Again lip service was paid to the inclusion of 
other leaders, but this was limited to the CDT asking the Cooperative 
members to invite other leaders to attend meetings. In fact early meetings 
seemed to have been conducted in this manner, but this formality soon 
disappeared.
In other communities where local leadership was less visible, newly created 
community institutions were developed to deal with the Project. In this case 
centres were built and members were recruited by the Agency team (Oldheim, 
1987, p. 105).
After the first steps of establishing rapport and describing the Project 
components to the community organisations, the CDT, the Project Completion 
Report explains, then worked closely with the organisations to establish these 
programmes and to provide equipment and administrative, financial and staff 
support. They also developed management training for the organisations and 
assisted them to develop a more active voice within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and the local Helwan administration and political structure (Project
34 The differentiation between the EATP and CHF staff was not made by the Cooperative 
nor the Club, they were all referred to as members of EATP
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Completion Report, p.31). The following stage was to use these organisations 
as ‘the primary vehicles’ to introduce ‘self-help’ projects.
There are three major assumptions in this approach that can be easily 
challenged. The first is that leadership is easily identifiable and that 
outsiders can ‘create’ it if it seemed to be non-existent. The second is the way 
the Project reports talk about ‘introducing self-help’ as if the very existence 
of these communities is not a product of self-help. The third assumption is 
that the staff of these organisations, which have been functioning for years, 
need to be taught how to deal with political institutions. Obviously these 
associations and communities were able to survive in a hostile environment by 
being highly organised, knowing every trick in the book and becoming experts 
at dealing with Government.
While Project papers and interviews with the Agency and CHF employees and 
Cooperative members, left no doubt that the Cooperative of Rashed was the 
legitimate leadership of the community, this fact does not seem as clear to 
community members. When the leadership of the Cooperative was discussed 
with the Rashed community, this ‘fact’ was questioned. Most saw the 
Cooperative as the place where services such as the nursery or illiteracy 
classes are given. Some of those who did see it as fulfilling other roles such 
as solving disputes or the place where meetings are held to solve community 
matters, said that the Cooperative used to hold an important place in the 
community only when Salem Tamaa was alive. They saw the Cooperative, 
at the time that the fieldwork was taking place, as an organisation that only 
serves ‘their own people’. ‘Their people’ meant in some cases the Arabs, the 
Upper Egyptians or the home owners, depending on who was saying it. 
Commenting on this point one of the CDT said:
"Most migrants reject the leadership of the Arabs in the 
community. This is one reason they do not accept the 
leadership of the Cooperative because it is seen as Arab 
dominated" (Interview, 1988).
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The manner in which leadership was identified and the impact of that on 
community organisation will be described and analysed in great detail below. 
However, in order to help put the next sections into context, some of the 
implications of this process will have to be clarified at this point.
There is no doubt that CDT were aware of the existence of other forms of 
leadership in Rashed. It however decided to ignore this fact and work only 
with the Cooperative. No effort was made to create a forum where various 
significant groups in the community were represented such as the Club 
members, migrants, and tenants. Women of all groups where also 
marginalised from the process. The CDT actually seemed to have encouraged 
factionalism and splits in leadership to achieve its own interests and to keep 
in control. As will be further clarified below, they used the competition that 
existed between the Cooperative and Club to keep the former in line.
In order to understand this point more fully, it is important to examine the 
Project’s objective in attempting to implement community organisation and 
participation. Both documents and interviews show that the main purpose of 
involving the community was to get the various upgrading activities 
implemented successfully. ‘Community participation’ followed a recognised 
pattern which as Moser describes, it entails that the community organisations 
protect sites, maintain services and promote programmes. In other words 
community organisation is seen as a way to achieve efficiency, a means to 
improve Project results rather than linking participation to empowerment 
(Moser, 1989, p .83).
2. Informing and promoting the project:
After the contact with the Rashed Cooperative was made and support to the 
Project was guaranteed, the Cooperative members were asked to invite 
community members and leaders to meetings about the Project. The first 
meetings were about informing the people about the project. Other meetings
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followed which were promotion rather than informative meetings. The latter 
meetings were mostly about the Home Improvement Loan Program.
The first meetings were mostly of a public relations kind where a number of 
community members and leaders were invited by the Cooperative, as a way 
of gaining legitimacy and support. While Cooperative members claimed that 
these meetings were open to all, community members with whom this issue 
was discussed said they were never invited to such meetings. Very few even 
knew of the existence of the meetings.
In fact, as interviews show, only 7 % knew of the existence of the project as 
a whole. Most only knew of one or two components (75.5 %). 17.5 % did not 
know of its existence at all. 21 .5 % acknowledge the achievement of the 
project in building the school, 22% mentioned the infrastructure, and 16% the 
loans. Most said the project was implemented by the Government. Some gave 
the credit for these achievement to Salem Tamaa the previous Cooperative 
committee chairman. They said that it was due to his efforts and his contacts 
that the Government finally fulfilled some of its obligations towards the 
community (Interviews with Rashed community members, 1988-89).
When asked about why community members knew so little about the Project 
as a whole, Rashed Cooperative members said that it was their intention not 
to promote the Project, as a ‘big Project’ funded by the Americans. They said 
they did no want to provide the latter with the propaganda they wanted.
When it came to the Home Improvement Loan Programme, this was another 
matter. The majority of people in Rashed knew that the loan came from the 
Americans. Special meetings were organised for the promotion of the Loan 
Programme, where this time everyone was invited. Both the Agency and 
Cooperative interviewees explained that it took a long time to get the loan 
scheme accepted by the people. Very few people applied for it at the 
beginning. Most Rashed inhabitants, as it was described in Chapter 5, were
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suspicious of the loan, they were worried what the consequences would be if 
they could not repay the loans, and they were worried about the religious 
implications of the interest. Reba, which is the practice of loans with interest, 
is considered a sin in Islam 35. This led the CDT to organise meetings to 
promote the Programme and try to reassure people that there were no risks 
involved. Religious people were also invited to interpret the loan system that 
tried to make it religiously acceptable.
While the Loan Programme has already been discussed chapters 4 and 5 from 
the institutional point of view, the discussion here will be from the community 
point of view. When discussing their role in the promotion of the Loan 
Programme, the Cooperative members said that without their support the 
Programme would never have taken off. This was one of the examples 
brought up by the Cooperative members of how nothing could have worked 
without their support. This issue was usually brought up in the context of 
what they saw as the Agency letting them down at the later stages of the 
Project. Commenting on this point, one of the Cooperative committee 
members summed up what most of the others said about it, as follows:
wThe successful implementation of the Loan Programme was a 
proof that the Agency could do nothing without us. They tried 
the loan system in other areas but they failed because the 
people were suspicious. Here also there was discomfort 
because of that interest business. But we gave the people the 
green light which immediately made it acceptable" (Interview,
1989).
While the Loans Programme was introduced in 1980, it took about a year for 
the Rashed inhabitants to feel comfortable enough to apply for loans. 610 
loans were given in Rashed for an average of LE2000 per loan. Loans were 
used mostly for the completion of the construction of houses, adding a floor
35 This is a highly controversial issue in the whole of the Muslim world. The discussion 
is mostly around banking and whether or not dealings with the banks is against Islam. 
Religious people are engaged in the debate and those among them who condone are criticised 
by some for being ‘Government people’.
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or fixing a roof. The loans were used as follows: 41 % for complete houses, 
34% construction of two rooms, 17% construction of one room, 6% 
construction of 3 rooms (CR, 1988, Appendix C). In my survey, of the 53 
who took the loans, 35% rebuild their houses, 23% added a floor, 15% fixed 
the roof, 7% built additional rooms and the rest did repairs, repainted walls 
etc.
Because of the failure of the Project implementors to obtain land tenure for 
the community, the eligibility criteria to get loans was limited to home owners 
who were salaried employees. Formal salaried employment was the only 
collateral the bank would accept instead of land ownership. Those involved 
in the informal sector had to have as guarantor someone who is a salaried 
employee. This meant that the majority were in fact excluded from the loan 
programme. In this sense this Project was no different from any old housing 
project in Egypt which only gave access primarily to Government employees, 
something that was against the basic principle of this particular ‘demonstration 
project’.
As already mentioned in the last chapter, one of the major reasons why the 
home owners in Rashed found the idea of the loans attractive, was that it gave 
them de-facto legal tenure. The idea was that no one could really challenge 
the legality of their home ownership when they were part of a Government 
loan scheme. This fact led home-owners, Arabs, in the majority, to get a 
stronger hold on their position and many were further encouraged to get 
access to more land and build more houses, mostly for rent. As Omar 
describes in her research, since they did not need expansion (they already had 
enough house space), the Arabs chose to reconstruct their homes (Omar, 
1987, p .86). New building materials were used which allowed them to keep 
up with migrant housing built or expanded at later stages to their own houses. 
All this led to another construction boom from which contractors, mostly 
Arabs, benefited. Discussing this point, a member of the Cooperative 
community and a contractor said:
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"The loans helped the local contractors and local builders to 
find jobs which led to a general economic boom in Rashed.
Now the same people are suffering from unemployment. 
Labourers used to have us contractors on waiting lists, now 
they look for us to say they are available if we needed any 
work to be done” (Interview, 1989).
Again the knowledge that four out of the nine Cooperative committee 
members are contractors, also helps understand their enthusiasm for the Loan 
Programme. Their close involvement in the Programme by being both its 
main promoters as well as providing the headquarters for the operation played 
an important role in enhancing their political leadership and, in some cases, 
their economic position.
3. The impact of the Home Improvement Loans:
In Rashed, the Home improvement loans were given to 580 home owners (53 
of the 200 household in the sample). Because of the condition regarding 
public sector employees, 53.5% of home-owners interviewed were denied 
access to the loans. Arabs and those of Upper Egyptian origin36, some of 
the others claimed, because of their connections to the Cooperative leadership, 
were able to get loans even when they did not fit the eligibility criteria, which 
caused resentment.
The repayment of the loans, according to most of the borrowers, constituted 
a financial burden mostly to those who had no tenants or economically active 
children. Home owners who took loans had to pay between LE20 and LE35 
a month for 15 years in instalments. While the majority complained that this 
has been causing them financial hardship, most admitted they would never 
have been able to improve their houses or add new units had it not been for 
the loans.
36My survey shows that 50% of those who took loans were Upper Egyptians, 27 % were 
Arabs, 16% were from Cairo and 7% Lower Egyptians.
190
The instalment repayment had, in turn, serious implications for tenants. Not 
only were they not allowed to get a share in the benefit of the loans, but their 
already vulnerable position as tenants was further jeopardised. Many home 
owners who took loans and made improvements or added units to their 
housing, and who had tenants, put up the rent. Those who could not afford 
to pay extra rent, were often asked or forced to leave. Research carried out 
in Rashed in 1991 which specifically examines displacement of tenants, show 
that the introduction of infrastructure in the area has attracted a number of 
higher income households to Rashed who were able to pay higher rents. This 
meant that the original tenants had to compete with the newcomers and some 
could not afford the new rents. Of a sample of 126, 14 tenant households 
were forced to move out (Daef, 1994 p. 90). In 1986, an adjacent squatter 
area started to develop on what was marshy land with hazardous 
environmental conditions and had no infrastructure, not even electricity. By 
1991, 360 plots were occupied. Half of the 33 households in D aef s sample 
in this area were found to belong to the same category of Rashed tenants had 
been forced out of their homes (Ibid, p. 243).
There were a number of reasons for such displacement, which are common 
to upgrading Projects in general. However in this case there was the added 
complication that the Project components were in fact not completed. With 
the issue of land tenure unresolved, the community was still considered 
‘illegal’, and tenants were in a vulnerable position. One does not have to be 
around the community very long to notice the tension that exists between 
home owners and tenants. Most tenants live under the threat of losing their 
homes as they have no binding legal claim to their rented accommodation. 
Very few have contracts as home owners are reluctant to issue such 
documents. With the increased demand for housing, tenants often accept to 
rent housing without a contract because it is just a matter of taking it or 
leaving it. Although Egyptian law37 protects tenants in the sense that owners
37 This law is at present (1996) under revision
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cannot expel tenants who have been living in units for over two years even 
without contracts, this law is not always enforced. Because the tenants of 
informal settlements feel more vulnerable than others, few resort to the 
authorities. Another reason why they often do not complain to the police, is 
that owners often have contacts with the police and tenants have learned this 
lesson very quickly. The owners are also often in a position to harass tenants 
and make their life so miserable that they give up and they move out. As 
tenants describe it, and as was witnessed during the research, owners often 
use various strategies to make life uncomfortable for them. They pick fights 
around the use of water and electricity, around the children of tenants being 
noisy etc. The intimidation and harassment of tenants often got quite vicious 
and many stories are told about this. As one member of the CDT who 
worked for a long time in Rashed explained:
"Tenants cannot rely on the law to protect them. What it all 
boils down to in the end is who is tougher and whether the 
tenant can bare the intimidation and abuse of the owner" 
(Interview, 1988).
The owners on the other hand complain that tenants are reckless, that they 
mistreat the property and throw water in the septic tank which causes 
overflows and ‘harm the houses’ foundations’. They also blame the tenants 
for the ever increasing charges in water and electricity bills38. One owner 
was complaining about the children of the tenants saying"., as they are 
walking they brush themselves against the walls of the house, they will cause 
the walls to wear down".
There are two major reasons why owners often want to get rid of their 
tenants. The first is when they want the space for their own marrying 
children. The second reason is when the owners want to raise the rent and the
38 Electricity bills are usually kept in the name of the owners to prevent tenants from 
using these bills as proof of their tenancy.
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tenants refuse to comply, or cannot afford it. In this case they want to get rid 
of them and rent out to others who are willing to pay more.
With the implementation of the Loan Programme this whole problem was 
greatly exacerbated. The home owners, in getting de-facto legitimacy to their 
home, acquired even more power over the tenants. The loans also provided 
them with new ways of getting rid of their old tenants. In many cases, as 
many of the tenants explained, they lost their houses when loans were used to 
rebuild the house or for other works. In these case, tenants were asked to 
leave supposedly until the work was done (from a couple of months to a year). 
At their return, the tenants were asked for a raise of up to 300% in rent. The 
rent per room went from LE5 to LE10 in the sixties and seventies, to LE15 
to LE30 after the introduction of the Project. Those who could not afford this 
increase were not allowed back. In this process many lost their rooms.
When asked about this issue, the Cooperative members confirmed that there 
were indeed many problems between owners and tenants. They said that there 
was a committee formed by one of the Cooperative members called the lagnat 
al mossalahat (reconciliation) committee which deals with such fights. The 
member explained that the committee’s role is to mediate and try to find a 
middle ground solution to help both parties. Another member of the 
committee also said :
"The biggest problems between people here is a problem 
between owners and tenants due to the former’s greed. I am 
well known for mediating in such problems. A tenant would 
come to me with his complaints and I would give a judgment.
Even newcomers to the area know of me. People would come 
to my house and even if I am just back from a long day of 
work I go with them to solve their problem" (Interview, 1989).
Few of the community members know about this committee. Of those who 
did, most said they did not think the committee was fair. They explained that 
they tend to be biased to the owners.
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The Loan Programme has had important implication for the power relationship 
between home owners and tenants. The role that the Cooperative played, in 
its promotion of the loan, is also important in terms of its position on the one 
hand vis-a-vis the community and on the other vis-a-vis the Agency and CHF. 
The Cooperative was seen by those who did get the loans as the facilitating 
link between them and the Project. Depending on whether the loan was 
judged to be positive or negative for those who got it, the Cooperative gained 
or lost points in terms of its status in the community. For those who were 
excluded from the Loan Programme, either because they worked in the 
informal sector or were tenants, the Cooperative’s bias toward ‘their people’ 
was confirmed. After the initial resistance of the community to the loan and 
the role that the Cooperative played in promoting it, this created a feeling 
among the CDT that it actually needed the Cooperative to make the 
programme a success. The Cooperative, on the other hand needed the Project 
to strengthen its position and acquire the status of the strongest leadership in 
the community.
3. Setting priorities, approving design and location:
As discussed in chapter 5, project documents and interviews show that one of 
the activities in community organisation was the participation of community 
organisations in the decision making around choosing services they needed, 
designs of community facilities and location of such facilities. However, as 
discussions with Cooperative committee members show, the meetings held 
around such issues were often one-sided. The ‘community representatives’ 
were not allowed to suggest changes in design or choose locations. When 
they did they were told by the Agency that these were technical matters, and 
that they must just take it or leave it. One of the members of the Cooperative 
committee said:
"They claimed that the whole project was built on community 
participation. What they did was ask us here to arrange for 
meetings where we would invite the members of the 
Cooperative’s committee, traditional leaders and the Club
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committee. We did that. Then what it amounted to was them 
describing to us the part of the Project under discussion. If we 
objected to a point they said ‘no this is technical, do you want 
it as we describe it or not at all?’ So of course the person who 
objected would shut up in fear that the other members would 
accuse him of losing this part of the deal" (Interview, 1989).
A favourite example that was given to illustrate this point was the discussion 
around communal septic tanks which were built for water disposal in the 
interim until the sewage started working. There was a big controversy about 
the design, the location and maintenance of these tanks. The fact that the 
tanks soon became dysfunctional, made the septic tank issue an even better 
example of how things went wrong when the Agency and CHF did not listen 
to the Cooperative.
"They [the Agency] decided to override us about the septic 
tanks. We have been building these tanks for years, we know 
our soil, but they decided they knew better. The result is they 
are not working and all this money was wasted" a Cooperative 
member explained.
Another added:
"There were seven of them built and they cost about 
LE300,000. The Agency insisted on building it in a way we 
told them would not work. They did a study, and based on it, 
decided on the locations. We told them this will not work as 
they were in the midst of the houses. One of them said it 
should not be too far so that women don’t have to walk to 
dispose of the water. But now you can see we were right.
The pits started to fill up, get blocked, attract insects etc.
This caused the residents around the pits to fill them up with 
cement to block them completely. We told them [the Agency- 
CHF] to get someone to maintain and supervise the tanks they 
said ‘no get your own people’".
Cooperative members also explained that the engineers did not put enough 
openings for the water to go underground. The few openings were close to 
the surface which made it dangerous for the foundations of the houses. The 
result was that the bottom which was filled with pebbles became impermeable
195
and so there was a constant overflow. They added that the fact that the 
evacuation cars only came once week made it impossible to keep the tanks 
from overflowing. Concerning this issue, an Agency employee who worked 
in Rashed for many years said:
"The Rashed people raised objections about the communal 
septic tanks, they did not like the idea, nor the location. But 
of course the views of the engineers always win in the end.
The inhabitants misused the septic tanks and that is what 
blocked them. They are an immature community. These tanks 
cost LE68,000" (Interview, 1989).
Most Agency employees argued that there was nothing wrong with the 
technical side of the septic tanks. They said that the community members 
thought they know it all, while they know nothing about engineering matters. 
They were blamed for wanting to interfere in everything. "We consulted them 
in all matters which made them want to take it too far. At one point we had 
to put them in their place as they became too big for their boots", a CDT 
member said. The Agency employees blamed the failure of the system on 
people’s misuse of them and they often used quite strong words about the 
community members’ ‘ignorance’ and ‘filth’ One Agency senior employee 
said:
"The people in the upgrading areas are dirty. No point in 
upgrading services when people themselves are not upgraded.
They must be educated to live like human beings" (Interview,
1989).
When asked about the misuse of the tanks, Cooperative members explained 
that it is true that the women were not used to separating used water and solid 
waste.
"The septic tanks were covered with a grid so the solid things 
in the dirty water, accumulated and rotted and were covered 
with insects. It is true that this is because the women lack the 
awareness but we told the Agency to employ someone to guard 
and clean up regularly, but they did not" (Interview, 1989).
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A member of the Club committee in his resentment at not having gained 
anything from the Project, commented on this saying:
"There was not enough awareness raising of how things 
should be used and maintained . The septic tanks are all 
blocked and who is responsible? Now because there is no 
place to get rid of used water, filth is everywhere. Our football 
court is the peoples’ favourite place for dumping dirty water 
and garbage. I feel that if we put up a wall around it we will 
cause more filth all around Rashed. It seems like we are doing 
the Project people and the community a big service" 
(Interview, 1989).
Another example of what a member of the Cooperative calls a ‘community 
participation’ disaster, was the manner in which a decision about the width of 
the main entrance road to Rashed was taken. The road went in between the 
Cooperative building and the football court of the Youth Club. The width that 
the Cooperative asked for meant that it would encroach on the court, which 
caused the Club members to protest. In recalling the incident, a Cooperative 
member said that the Agency had suggested that the width of the road be 8 
meters and they wanted it to be 12 meters (see photo, p. 198 for construction 
of road).
"Because this time they could not say it was a technical matter" 
he added," they decided to do what they wanted by creating a 
problem between us and the Club. They went to them with our 
two proposals and naturally the Club asked that the road be 6 
meters".
At that point, four years into the Project, as one of the Club members 
explained, the Youth Club had a very bad deal from the Project. They had 
given up a large piece of land for building the primary school and did not get 
anything in return. Not only were they alienated from even the nominal 
sharing in decision making, but many promises given to them were broken. 
They had been promised that the Youth Club building would be expanded and 
that a fence would be built around the football court, and they got neither. 
They decided consequently that they would not compromise on this matter.
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The road under construction in Rashed
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The Cooperative then suggested that they and the Club members should meet 
to settle their problems. According to the Cooperative members, the CDT 
however insisted, against the latter’s advice, that this was a matter to be 
decided in a public meeting. As a result of CDT’s coming and going between 
the Cooperative and the Club, and making a big issue of this, Cooperative 
members explained, the day of the public meeting ended up with half the 150 
people present in hospital and the rest in the police station. The CDT was 
late for the meeting, arguments started which led to fist fighting.
Cooperative members explained that while there were always hostilities 
between them and the Club, in the past, they were still able to have joint 
meetings. After this big fight over the road this stopped. The CDT was 
blamed for that. Club members however said meetings between them had 
stopped long before that, but they agreed that the CDT meddling had 
aggravated the situation.
Both Cooperative and Club members agreed that the CDT played the 
Cooperative off against the Club on several occasions to stir up problems 
between the two organisations. A Club member explained that when the 
Cooperative caused the CDT any problem they resorted to the Club to get the 
Cooperative back in line. He added: "This is what they did in other 
communities as well. They played leaders off against each other in order to 
weaken leadership and strengthen their own position" (Interview, 1989). 
This point of view was confirmed by Cooperative members, as one of them 
said:
"When they [CDT] felt we were dissatisfied with some aspects 
of the project, they decided that things had gone to our head 
and we needed to be taught a lesson. They did that by 
resorting to the Club as a way of showing us we were not 
indispensable. When they found the club was no use to them, 
they came back to us" (Interview, 1989).
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This discussion brought out examples of what the CDT actually did in order 
to keep control over other upgrading communities. Ghoneim was one of the 
communities that Cooperative and Club members used as an example to prove 
their point. The Agency and CHF also spoke of Ghoneim as a community 
where leadership was unsuccessful, but for different reasons.
Cooperative and Club members explained that Ghoneim did not have an 
institutionalised leadership, so the Agency felt the need to create one. 
Therefore a cooperative building was erected and a leadership was formed for 
the purpose of the Project. But, they explained, the new leadership was weak 
and the Agency soon realised that they were not doing their job well. So the 
Agency created problems in the community which led to the destruction of 
the previously existing leadership as well as the newly created one. To prove 
the potential danger that the CDT could cause to leadership, one of the 
Cooperative members said:
"The agency was not able to mess up our leadership here 
because we are well established and strong. However in 
Ghoneim because the leadership of the cooperative was created 
by the Agency, they were fragile. When the Agency decided 
to put them and the other leadership up against each other it 
destroyed them both" (Interview, 1989).
A Club member also said that from the way the CDT behaved in Rashed, he 
could understand how they ‘messed about’ the leadership in Ghoneim. A CHF 
consultant argued that experience in upgrading areas showed that when 
leadership was created artificially, community organisation did not work. "It 
worked in some areas where there was real leadership. When leadership was 
created for the purpose of the Project it did not work", (Interview, 1989). 
The CDT said that Ghoneim had a weak or corrupt leadership, so they had to 
create a new one. One of the CDT explained that:
"Sometimes the leadership is not successful. In Ghoneim for 
example the head of the new Cooperative was a crook, he took 
the money for a building in his pocket. We were able to get 
the people to unite against him" (Interview, 1989).
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This stage of the Project implementation in Rashed, is the phase that shows 
best how the power struggle between various actors materialised. The 
‘informing and promoting’ phase had left the Cooperative confident that it was 
indispensable to the success of the Project. It had maintained its role as the 
sole representative of the community and succeeded in keeping all other 
leadership at bay. The CDT not only went along with this monopoly over 
representation, but it encouraged it. However, during the ‘priority and 
design’ phase, when the Cooperative disagreed with the CDT over issues like 
the septic tanks or the road, then the CDT found ways to threaten this 
monopoly by resorting to other leadership structures in the community.
4. Preventing encroachment:
The fourth and the most important component of ‘community organisation’ 
and participation for the Project implementors, was the prevention of 
encroachment on land designed for construction of facilities and services and 
then later the protection of the sewage network. As the Evaluation of 
Upgrading Construction put it:
"..ensuring that further encroachments which might jeopardise 
works to benefit the community do not occur..is probably the 
most important aspect of community participation in upgrading 
programmes" (EUP, 1987, p .31).
Thus, the Agency and CHF measured the success of community organisation 
by how much community organisations failed or succeeded in preventing 
encroachment. Community organisations were put into two categories, those 
who cooperated and those who did not. Organisations which prevented 
encroachment described as having ‘cooperated’ with the Project. In other 
words, cooperation was not measured by their involvement in the decision 
making or in the actual implementation of upgrading activities, but rather by 
how seriously they took their policing role. The Rashed community was 
always given as an example by the Agency and CHF staff as one of the best 
communities in this role.
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5. Maintenance and running of community service:
The last activity that community organisation was to achieve was the 
maintenance and running of services, especially the evacuation of septic tanks 
and garbage collection. In Rashed, these activities became the responsibility 
of the Cooperative after the upgrading Project completion in 1988.
With the water network installed and the sewage network still not in 
operation, the septic tanks needed to be more frequently evacuated. There 
were always private sector cars servicing Rashed, but the higher demand for 
their services led to higher charges (around LE8). As a result, a number of 
evacuation cars were purchased by the Agency with the intention of handing 
each community a car under the supervision of community organisations. 
When the Project ended, however, the cars were left to operate in the 
communities (with a charge of LE5) on the condition that they would still 
belong to the Agency, that they would be driven by an Agency driver and that 
it would remain in the Agency garage. The arrangement was that the 
community organisations would get one third of the service charge for running 
the car and the Agency two thirds. The Rashed Cooperative saw this as a 
great injustice and a breaking of the promise that the car would be handed 
entirely over to them to run as well as to keep the revenue. Long negotiations 
occurred around this issue but the Agency would not change its mind. It was 
yet again an example of the difficulty that the Agency had in letting go of 
control over the Project. The Cooperative then tried to get its own way by 
refusing to pay the Agency. After a number of letters were exchanged, the 
car was withdrawn. After about six months, the Cooperative reluctantly 
decided to give up and pay what it owed to the Agency and got the car back 
on the terms of the latter.
The dispute over the evacuation car caused a lot of resentment on the part of 
the Cooperative members. They claimed that the Agency had promised them 
full control of the vehicle but had changed its mind. They saw this as just 
another disappointment, one of a long list of broken promises. One of the
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Cooperative members said:
"The way we ran this vehicle was a great service to the 
community. They only had to pay LE6. After the vehicle was 
taken back by the Agency the private sector took the 
opportunity to exploit the people by raising their price from 
LE8 to LE10. In the meantime the car was collecting rust in 
the Agency garage just because they don’t give a damn about 
us" (Interview, Cooperative member, 1989).
Another added that as a result of withdrawing the car, people who could not 
afford to evacuate their septic tanks regularly which caused overflows 
(Interview, 1989). The Cooperative members also found it unacceptable that 
they were doing all the work of taking orders and organising the rounds and 
that they should get so little in return. "Also isn’t it unfair that the revenues 
should go to the Treasury when we could use the money for the benefit of the 
community?" one of the Cooperative asked (Interview, 1989).
Commenting on the issue of the evacuation car, the Agency staff explained 
that there was no way they could just give it to the Cooperative. They said 
that they had never promised such a thing since the car is Government 
property and its revenues had to go back to the Government. The 
Cooperative, a member of the CDT said, was just trying to win a bargain, 
that they were being greedy. "They wouldn’t pay their dues so we held back 
the car to teach them a lesson", he added (Interview, 1989).
The evacuation car was not the only service the Cooperative was supposed to 
run. As the last chapter shows, two intensive studies were undertaken in 
Rashed to decide on the most suitable garbage collection system. The final 
decision was that modern vehicles were to be purchased instead of using 
traditional garbage pickers. This resulted in the purchase of vehicles from the 
U.S. to be run by the community organisations of the upgrading areas. These 
however, unlike the evacuation cars, never left the Agency garage. The 
Agency staff explained this was a result of administrative problems with the 
customs. It seems they were brought in by cutting through some of the red
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tape which became problematic later. The problem of these vehicles was 
unresolved until the completion of this research in 1989.
Although the Cooperative members knew that they may never get to see the 
garbage vehicles, they seemed reluctant to find another alternative. They 
blamed the Agency for the accumulated garbage everywhere in the 
community, but they were worried that if they found another solution they 
would definitely not get the vehicles. They risked losing the evacuation car 
and were willing to wait for years to get the garbage vehicles, in both cases 
to the overall detriment of the community.
IV CONCLUSION: THE AFTERMATH OF THE PROJECT
The upgrading process in Rashed highlights a number of important issues 
regarding the relationships between different actors as well as the resulting 
impacts, both economic and political. The major set of actors involved on the 
organisational level were: the Agency-CHF, the Cooperative and the Club; on 
the community level, there were the landlords and the renters. Rashed, in 
both its organisations and its community, had their ‘ethnic’ divisions of 
‘Arabs’ and ‘Egyptians’-‘fellaheen’, the latter again including the Upper and 
lower Egyptians, as well as the Cairenes.
In terms of the relationships between the Agency-CHF and the Cooperative, 
the conflict that occurred around the evacuation of the septic tanks, though on 
the surface of little significance, was in fact a catalyst for the power struggle 
that developed over the years of the Project. It illustrated the complaints and 
resentments that each party had towards the other. At the start of the Project 
there was a potential conflict in the relationship between the Agency-CHF and 
the Cooperative. The Cooperative was suspicious of what the Project intended 
to do in the community. The Project implementors held negative stereotypes 
of squatter communities. However, pushed by their realisation that it was in 
both their interests to establish a good relationship between them, they 
managed to create a seemingly harmonious one. The Agency-CHF knew they
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needed the Cooperative as a way into the community as well as the 
Cooperative building as a headquarters for their work. The motivation was 
never that of community ‘participation as an end’-it was a purely ‘as a means’ 
to have a local headquarters in the community39. The Cooperative on the 
other hand was delighted to resume the role of representative of the 
community, and if not real, at least nominal partners in the decision making 
process. The fact that a government agency was dealing with the Cooperative 
as the community representative was in fact giving the latter some sort of 
legitimacy in this particular role which it previously did not have. In fact, as 
discussions above show, many community members denied the representation 
of the Cooperative because of the Arab domination in it. Renters also raised 
the issue of alliance of the Cooperative members with landlords. The issue 
of representation of the Cooperative was doubtful.
The alliance between the Agency-CHF and the Cooperative did not last long. 
The superficial harmony between the two started to ‘crack’ when the 
Cooperative started to disagree with the CDT and the latter made overtures 
to the Club to show the Cooperative that they were not indispensable. The 
relationship then went through a number of ups and downs during which each 
party tested the other on how far it could go without breaking the link.
When the Project ended, the Cooperative members were left disillusioned. 
They felt that the Project implementors did not deliver all the goods. They 
felt that they had been used by the Agency-CHF and were not given what they 
were promised in return. In addition to the vehicles, the Cooperative 
members said they were promised a health centre, a preparatory school and 
a post office. "We provided them with a place to work, helped them in every 
way but they broke many of their promises" (Interview, 1989), was a typical 
comment of Cooperative members. They also said things like: "they [the 
Agency/CHF] used us a lot at the beginning then they dropped us when they
39 I refer here to Paul (1982) and Moser’s (1984) typology reviewed in Chapter 1.
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did not need us any longer" (Interview, 1989). They explained how they were 
always told they were the best community that the Project had worked in, but 
then in the end all the other communities got better deals.
The relationship between the Cooperative and the Club, which had always 
been conflictive, was left even further damaged by the Project. This was the 
result of the Project singling out the Cooperative as its headquarters as well 
as later using the already existing competition between the two leaderships to 
keep the Cooperative in check. This, it seemed, was very much a strategy the 
Agency employed to maintain its powerful position during the Project process.
Another major criticism about the Project that the Cooperative members 
agreed on was that the Project "killed" community mobilisation. They said 
that before the Project, people were always willing to participate in doing 
things for the community. The major examples given as proof of community 
initiative was the financing and construction of both the Club and the 
Cooperative buildings. "Now when we ask the people for financial or other 
kinds of contribution, they say "let the Americans do it", a Cooperative 
member said.
In terms of the community members, most resented what was seen as neglect 
on the part of the Government, and in this particular case, the Agency, of 
their needs and interests. They felt they never got any services from 
Government and always had to resort to their own resources to make the area 
habitable. Most had very little notion about what the Upgrading project in its 
entirety was all about. Only those who were involved in the Loan Programme 
and those who were seeking land tenure, knew to varying degrees of the 
existence of a project that was implemented by a government agency, ie, the 
Agency. Those who took loans saw the Agency and GOE in general as 
making profits out of the poor. They complained that the interest were too 
high and often brought up the issue of interest as a sign of defiance to 
religion, ‘something the Americans can impose, but a Muslim Government
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should never accept’. Land tenure and the difficulties they faced, was blamed 
on a ‘...greedy Government that is trying to make a profit out of the pockets 
of the poor’. The renters saw the project as an example of the ‘..alliance that 
always exists between the haves and the haves nots’. The alliance here was 
perceived to be between the Government, the landlords, and the Cooperative 
members (the latter groups mostly seen to be Arabs) on the one hand and the 
renters (mostly newcomers) on the other.
Therefore, overall, the impact of the Project on Rashed, was to widen the 
already existing splits and often exploitative relationships between and among 
community organisations and community members. The split was broadly 
between ‘Arabs’, landlords and Cooperative on the one hand and 
‘newcomers’, renters, the Youth Club on the other. Since the majority of 
Arabs are landlords they were able to get the most out of the Project. The 
Cooperative, which is dominated by Arabs, were in support of this process. 
Since the Club was marginalised during the Project process, ‘newcomers’ had 
no channels of representation.
Therefore, while the Project was meant to meet the housing needs of whole 
communities, the failure to recognise social diversity resulted in the exclusion 
of some groups. At best they were marginalised, at worst they were left 
worse off. The Project’s impact on the housing market resulted in tenants 
having to pay higher rents, and/or suffering harassment from landlords, and 
in some cases losing their homes. They were the major losers in the 
Upgrading component of the Project.
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CHAPTER 7
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS: 
THE HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY
I INTRODUCTION
The Helwan New Community (HNC) is the second component of the Helwan 
Project (see Appendix 5 for plans of the HNC). As described in chapter 4, 
the HNC was intended to be the development of a new town with around 
7,200 plots, to house approximately 100,000 factory workers and their 
families. The location of the HNC is in a desert area south of Helwan (see 
map in Appendix 1). Serviced land, with infrastructure and community 
facilities, and plots were to be sold to factory workers for them to build their 
own houses. The main goal of the HNC component was to demonstrate to the 
GOE that a new approach to housing is viable. However, and due to many 
constraints, the core housing1 concept to be followed in the HNC was 
changed to Sites-and-Services2 and then eventually, half of the HNC was built 
as complete flats. The MOH decided to build three and five floor walk-up 
flats, a return to conventional housing on the same site which USAID had 
chosen to prove that conventional housing was the ‘wrong’ approach. This 
decision was the most interesting development which occurred during the 
implementation of the HNC, and perhaps the most controversial in the whole 
Project.
The construction of the HNC met with long delays, mostly due to conflict 
between the main actors involved and their conflicting views and interests. 
The reasons for these delays were the subject of an official investigation. In 
the introduction to one of USAID’s Audit reports, the team explained that the 
main purpose of its investigation, is the need to understand why "as of June
1 Buyers are provided with a serviced plot of land, a toilet and/or kitchen and a loan to 
construct the rest o f the house.
2 Buyers are provided with a serviced plot land, and a loan to construct the rest of the 
house.
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1988 , not a single low-income family occupied a house in the new 
community.." (Audit Report, 1988, in Lessons Learned, 1990, p.iii).
This chapter will follow the different phases of the implementation of the 
HNC, with an attempt to understand the different dynamics between actors 
that were triggered by this part of the Project process.
D BACKGROUND
The implementation of the HNC component of the Project started in 1983 and 
is still on-going while this thesis is being written. The HNC went through a 
number of phases which will be discussed in detail in this chapter. After the 
design and planning discussed in chapter 4, the first phase of the 
implementation was the installation of the infrastructure which began in 1984, 
the construction of the Model Housing Estate (MHE), followed by the 
construction of three and five storey walk-up apartment buildings, and then 
lastly the ‘construction by owner’ units. There were thus two construction 
methods being followed: In five of the ten neighbourhoods of the HNC, the 
conventional approach to housing in the form ready-made flats; and in the 
remaining five neighbourhoods the non-conventional Sites-and-Services .
By the time this research was ending, workers and their families were starting 
to settle in one of the five ‘completed flats’ neighbourhoods, and housing 
construction was underway in another two neighbourhoods. These three 
neighbourhoods consisted of 4,750 units. In the Sites-and-Services 
neighbourhoods, a total of 1,151 (one neighbourhood) have been sold to target 
factory workers who were receiving loans to construct their own units 
(Progress Report, 1988, p. 14).
m  INSTALLATION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE
The construction of infrastructure was originally scheduled to start in 1982. 
However because of design and contract delays it actually started in 1983. 
Scheduled to finish in 1986, this meant that the construction was to take 75
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rather than the planned 40 months (HNC Urbanisation Plan, 1985, p .3). 
Actually only one neighbourhood was handed to the Agency by the contractors 
in 1986 (CR, 1988, p. 16) and all the infrastructure construction work was 
finished by 1988. Five years after the initial completion date CHF was able 
to announce that: "Despite its history of implementation frustrations and delay, 
the New Community is now on the brink of achieving project purposes and 
has the opportunity and resources to do so" (CR, 1988, p. 14).
What then were reasons for the long delays? Different interviewees had 
different reasons to give for the delays, and the lists are often long. However 
basically three reasons emerged. The first two were seen by the Egyptians to 
be the most critical. These are: first, that the material and equipment had to 
be imported from the U.S.; and second, that the predominantly American 
firms were hired to do most of the design, construction and supervision work. 
The third reason, mostly identified by USAID, was the lack of cooperation of 
other agencies such as the Governorate, tax and custom authorities.
Despite the fact that there were few technical problems that arose during the 
construction of the infrastructure, the process was interrupted mainly by the 
bureaucratic and political reasons mentioned above. The issues of the use of 
American firms and the purchasing of U.S. materials were documented in 
chapter four, in relation to earlier stages of the Project. In the implementation 
stage, these issues continued to emerge as major sources of conflict.
With respect to purchase of U.S. products, the discussion was about the 
increase in the agreed price, which raised the issue of why U.S. products were 
promoted in the first place. The procurement of American materials and 
equipment for the infrastructure was estimated in 1985 to be approximately 
$12,000,000 (HNC Urbanisation Plan, 1985, p .67), about 25% more than the 
original estimate. Part of this increase was as a result of the Consultant’s cost 
in procuring the products which was originally estimated to be $310,000. The 
actual fee requested by Basil-WBTL-Nassar (BWN) was $814,000, which 
meant an increase of $504,000 (BWN letter, 1985, p. 3). Some opposition
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newspapers got hold of this fact and objected strongly. They criticised 
USAID for using most of the funds which are supposed to be invested in 
Development Projects, for the purchase of U.S. material and paying huge 
sums to American firms. In response to this, BWN wrote a letter to the 
Agency chairman explaining the reason for the rise in fees. He said that it 
was the result of delays in procurement because of delays in the design 
schedule. In addition, the letter explains, that "..to satisfy all the regulations 
of USAID and the Egyptian Government it was necessary for the Consultant 
to hire additional staff to accomplish the work" (Ibid, p .3).
The rise in the price of purchased products aggravated the Agency and again 
made them question both the initial agreement to procure from the U.S. and 
the reason that led the GOE to accept such ‘unreasonable’ conditions. When 
asked about this point, one senior MOH employee who was among those who 
signed the Grant agreement, said:
"We were led to believe that the purchase of equipment and 
material from the States and the use of American ships was a 
must. Later we discovered this was in fact negotiable. 
Transporting the goods on Egyptian ships could have been 
much cheaper" (Interview, 1988).
The Agency staff members explained that the cost of the procurement was not 
the only problem. The procedures around importing also caused long delays, 
a problem, they argued, that could have been avoided had Egyptian material 
been used. While USAID staff blamed most of the obstacles that occurred 
during the construction of the infrastructure on these long and tedious 
procedures, they however disagreed with the argument that the solution to this 
problem was not to import the product in the first place. They explained that 
the problems were caused by GOE bureaucracy - rigid rules and the lack of 
coordination that exists between different institutions (Lessons Learned 
Report, 1990, p. 28).
Although USAID funded Projects are exempt from both customs and taxes by 
Presidential decree, the laws within the responsible institutions were not,
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apparently, consequently altered. Accordingly neither gave up on their 
regular import rules. The obstacles created by both the Tax Department and 
customs were described by the Agency senior employees as a manifestation 
of the dislocation of different GOE institutions from each other. The rules 
and procedures that govern these institutions, they explained, remain 
unchanged despite new high level Government agreements, even Presidential 
ones. This pattern can be explained in terms of bureaucratic inefficiency. 
However, as some of those engaged in the area of policy analysis (Braken, 
1981; Grindle, 1981; Clay and Shaffer; 1984) would argue, it is all too easy 
to blame bureaucrats for the non-implementation of policy. They contend that 
it is in fact lack of political commitment of policy makers which result in 
elements such as rules and procedures are not being put into place, obstructing 
implementation.
Many incidents that occurred during this stage, were a result of the different 
and sometimes contradictory rules present in GOE bureaucracy3. An incident 
that occurred during the import of some materials for the construction of the 
HNC infrastructure is a good example that illustrates this point. At one point, 
delays in customs occurred because of laws governing types of material that 
are allowed to be imported into the country. One ex-senior Agency staff 
member describes the incident as follows:
”One time we [the Agency] had this big shipment of material 
(cables and pipes) liable to rusting. They were left in 
Alexandria port for six months. Meanwhile we were running 
around trying to clear it. One of the obstacles was that it is 
forbidden to import anything that is produced in Egypt ‘Kanoon 
tarcheed al esterad’4. So we had to get a letter from the cable 
company saying they did not produce this particular size of 
cable. But then we had to pay a ground fine which of 
LE150,000. We bargained and got it down to LE4,000" 
(Interview, 1989).
3 There are, for example, new laws and a legislation which does not override older ones 
and policies that are not carried through in procedures etc.
4 An import control law.
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USAID employees often argued that another reason why importing products 
took so long was that the Agency staff did not perform well in its job as 
‘facilitator’. The delays in the release of products from Customs, were seen 
by the Project Evaluation team as a sign of the Agency’s lack of political clout 
(Lessons Learned, 1990, p.28). This view, although seen as unfair by the 
Agency staff, cannot be disregarded. It is true that different Egyptian 
agencies can cause obstacles for each other, but finding solutions faster than 
it took the Agency to achieve, is not unheard of. Therefor a legitimate 
question is whether the Agency really wanted to solve these problems 
efficiently and quickly. Was it not that every obstacle that occurred which 
proved USAID’s conditions in the Project Agreement wrong, a point in the 
Agency’s favour? This will be further discussed below.
Perhaps the most important issue that arose during the construction of the 
infrastructure, was the high cost of the contractors. Conflict resulted in 
infrastructure cost over-runs largely because of the increased expatriate 
consultant engineering costs. Negotiations and renegotiations around fees 
often became so conflictive that it caused the work to come to a halt. The 
arguments were mostly between the Agency on the one hand and BWN and 
Perini on the other - with USAID asked by both sides to arbitrate, and 
always, according to the Agency staff, ‘taking the side of the Americans’ 
[Perini and BWN]. Around this point, The Project Completion Report argues:
"The focus on the problems resulting from infrastructure 
construction, particularly on contract disputes and cost conflicts 
between the Agency and the expatriate construction contractor 
detracted attention from other project components. In 
particular, planning for housing development was neglected"
(CR, 1988, p. 14).
Both BWN and Perini charged higher fees than the amount agreed upon in the 
original contracts. Since the Helwan Project follows the system of ‘Host 
Contracts’5, the Agency had to give its agreement to any financial changes to 
the initial contracts. In the case of BWN, though reluctantly, the Agency
5 Explain different kinds of contracts.
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gave its agreement. However in the case of Perini, it refused the request for 
claims that amounted to $7 millions. Despite the Agency refusal, USAID 
went ahead and paid Perini, an action that infuriated the Agency staff. In 
response, USAID in an attempt to appease the Agency’s anger, decided it 
would not pay the extra amount from the Project’s budget. The agency staff 
explained that USAID was put under pressure by congressmen to support 
Perini’s request. An Egyptian CHF consultant commented:
"The capitalist system is at work here. The Agency refused to 
cooperate in the case of Perini. The Perini firm supports a 
congressman in the States, he is asked to help their case, he 
puts pressure on USAID and the latter responds by paying 
Perini" (Interview, 1988).
The Perini case, the Agency staff members argued, was not the only case of 
U.S. firms’ greed, as they saw it. American contractors, they argued, relied 
on USAID backing and therefor they had no reason to restrain themselves 
from making huge profits. When the Agency staff, whether senior or junior, 
are asked about what they thought of the Project, their predominant answer 
was: ‘They gave us with one hand and took it back with the other’. They 
would explain that if you add the $19M to BWN, the $10M to CHF, and the 
$27M to Perini this totals $56 millions, ie two thirds of the U.S. share of the 
project budget (Interview, 1989). The initial amounts agreed upon were $5, 
$7, and $15 millions respectively6. The increase in fees in fact defies what 
was a victory of the early negotiations between USAID and the GOE when the 
latter pushed down fees to be paid to U.S. firms (see Chapter 4).
In reaction to these claims that the U.S. firms overcharged for their work, 
BWN came up with a number of justifications. One of these was that due to 
the delays in construction that the budget for supervision had to be increased 
(BWN, 1985, p .3). In answer to this an Agency senior employee argued that 
the American firms were able to increase their profit, due to a clause in the 
contract which is part of the American system, whereby firms get paid until
6 A footnote on inflation.
214
the work is done and not according to deadlines. He added: "this was the 
reason they kept stalling" (Interview, 1989). The view that American 
consultants intentionally delayed the work in order to make more money, was 
held by many Agency and Egyptian CHF staff, a CHF Egyptian consultant 
said:
"The long delays during infrastructure construction benefited 
the American consultants and contractors, the meter was 
running and they were making more and more money at the 
expense of the Project" (Interview, 1989).
The issue of the U.S. firms and products, as shown below, was not only 
criticised by Agency staff.
"Participants of the USAID design team", the evaluation team 
suggests, "..had a large vested interest in making the Helwan 
project happen because of their ideological bias and for future 
potential contracts and job posting which resulted in a more 
optimistic position during the preparation phase" (Lessons 
Learned, 1990, p .3).
This view was pushed a step further by an ex-GOE senior employee who was 
present at the signature of the Grant Agreement. He suggested that there 
might have been corruption underlying the choice of U.S. contractors 
(Interview, 1989). However, an Egyptian CHF consultant argued that USAID 
should not be criticised for hiring American consultants. The Egyptians who 
signed the Agreement share the responsibility for agreeing on this condition.
"USAID did not cheat anyone, they were clear from the start.
They stated in the Project agreement the conditions pertaining 
to U.S. equipment and materials as well as U.S. contractors.
So if the GOE did not like it they should have refused then.
But to sign the contract then later object is unacceptable" 
(Interview, 1989).
This view was also shared by a senior Agency staff member who said:
"USAID has this clause in the grant agreement that American 
consultant offices are to be hired for the project and that
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American products are to be imported. They cannot be 
criticised for that—it is a patriotic stand. Also about the 
products, they cannot allow that products to be imported from 
Russia for example”7 (Interview, 1988).
When Agency staff were unable to influence the Project process, they often 
traced the reason to the initial Grant Agreement. Those who represented the 
GOE in the signature of this agreement are then bitterly criticised for their 
weakness and lack care for Egyptian interests. They saw many of the items 
of the Agreement to have been drawn up in a way that deprived them of 
having control over the Project process. This was seen by many Agency staff 
members, especially senior staff members, as making their job in influencing 
decision making around the different Project stages very difficult.
The tension that occurred during the construction of the infrastructure between 
the Agency, the U.S. firms and USAID, was mainly the result of Agency staff 
feeling that the Project had deviated from a development project to a ‘money 
making business’ for a number of American firms. USAID’s role in making 
it possible to exploit the situation to their benefit also influenced the 
relationship between the Agency and USAID staff. While the Agency and 
USAID’s relationships in other stages of the programme varied from 
indifference to irritation, the situation here was more serious. Hence the 
Agency’s, perhaps not overtly, obstructive behaviour in dealing with other 
GOE agencies. When it came to the issue of U.S. consultants and contractors 
or material, because of the Congressional-GOE agreement on tied aid, USAID 
was able to exercise its power to get this part of the Grant Agreement 
implemented. However when it came to material being released from 
Customs, manipulation was used by the Agency to cause obstructions. In this 
particular situation, only another Egyptian agency could shift the decision of 
the one employee whose guidelines say that the materials violate the import 
rules. They would know the right moves and above all, have the will to solve 
the problem. USAID found itself powerless in this situation.
7 This was the time prior to the end of the cold war.
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IV THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CORE HOUSING AND THE 
MODEL HOUSING ESTATE
According to the Project Paper, the idea of the HNC was based on the 
principal of core housing. The size of the plots was to range from 50-65 
square meters. The unit was to start from a basic wet unit8 of 4 square 
meters and range up to a 30 square meters three room house. Most were 
assumed to go up three floors (Lessons Learned, 1990, p. 15). A feature of 
the project was the construction of model houses for prospective buyers to 
select from. A Model Housing Estate (MHE) was therefor built as proto­
typical demonstrations of the different construction stages of different plot 
sizes. The 186 units were completed at a cost of $1,920,795. In 1984 (Audit 
Report, 1989, p. 12), the MHE was completed by MAK (the Construction 
Company) and formally accepted by the Ministry of Housing in 1984 (HNC 
Urbanisation Plan, 1985).
Again there were delays in the construction of the MHE. It was ready for 
public viewing in the spring of 1984. This was more than 36 months after the 
Urbanisation Plan was approved. According to the Grant Agreement the 
MHE was to be completed in 1980 ie four years earlier (Audit Report, 1988, 
p. 12). The construction of the MHE, BWN who was responsible for the 
supervision of the work carried out by MAK, explained, took 27 instead of 
10 months due to delays caused by soil problems (op. cit., 1985, p .3).
In laying the foundations of the MHE, the engineers encountered serious soil 
problems, identified as shifting clay soil. Accordingly, construction was 
stopped and new foundation designs were made (Audit Report, 1988, p. 13). 
There was disagreement between the Arab Bureau and BWN on how to deal 
with the problem, but finally, with USAID intervention, the American choice 
was followed and construction went ahead. Not too long after the completion 
of the 186 units, serious cracks appeared in the walls which showed that the 
construction of the foundations was faulty. Consequently the Agency hired
8 Meaning the toilet.
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a consultant whose conclusion was that the contractor did not discover the true 
nature of the soil through inadequate soil testing, and therefore did not 
construct suitable foundations (Ibid, p. 13). Thus the MHE units, which were 
initially intended to be sold, were left empty with no decision taken about how 
they could be put to use.
In discussions of the MHE, interviewees raise two important issues. One is 
a discussion on the quality of the soil and the choice of the project site. The 
second is the contractor’s ‘bad’ technical choice and, again, USAID’s 
partiality towards American consultants.
"USAID interfered in every step and every operation. AID 
staff are not a technical staff, they are administrators and 
experts in monitoring. They just blindly backed the Americans 
when there was a disagreement. This led to too many mistakes 
occurring" (Interview, 1989).
The site of the HNC was selected during the feasibility study stage of the 
project, based on the recommendations made by a representative of the 
consulting firm in charge of the project’s study work (Lessons Learned, p .8). 
Many reports, including the Audit Report, concluded that the site selection 
was poor and that inadequate soil testing had been done. The engineering 
feasibility report does point out under its technical soundness analysis that 
‘development of the new site is difficult due to the presence of underlying 
limestone’ (Lessons Learned, 1990, p. 9).
In the Agency’s opinion, as argued by a senior employee who joined at the 
later stages of the Project:
"The major problem of this project is the choice of the site. It 
is not suitable for low income housing because of the nature of 
the soil. The foundations are extremely expensive. The cost of 
the foundations is five times as much as the cost of foundation 
in land with no problems. As it is now, it equals the cost of 
the building itself, which is ridiculous especially when it comes 
to low income housing. Choosing a site is in itself a science.
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When it comes to making a final decision about the choice of 
a site, it is not enough to make exploratory soil testing. But 
they did just that!” (Interview, 1989).
This view was supported by the 1988 USAID Audit Report which investigated 
the matter of the site selection and concluded that there was no evidence that 
the designated area was tested for soil characteristics before its selection in 
1978. Soil testing, the report adds, occurred only in 1980 at the same time 
as the Urbanisation Plan was designed. All those interviewed by the USAID 
Audit team agreed that the soil testing was not sufficient and that testing 
should have been done before any construction took place (Audit Report, 1988 
pp.9-10). Early evaluations discussed this issue reporting how the Project 
Paper acknowledges the difficult site conditions and anticipates high 
excavation cost noting that extraordinary care must be taken to adapt dwellings 
to the existing topography. However, it further notes that most of the site 
provides optimal conditions for economical construction of foundations 
(Nathan, p .37). In other words, testing did show problems but because it was 
not sufficient testing, the problem was identified in an area smaller than it was 
later discovered.
Further testing showed that in addition to the thick layer of clay running 
through it, the site was used as a storm drainage area and a garbage dump. 
The Audit Report also reveals that two senior Egyptian Engineers agreed that 
it was well known that the area of the HNC was covered with a thick layer of 
clay. One of them said he gave his advice that it was an unsuitable site before 
the final decision about the site was taken, but ‘..nobody listened’. 
Commenting on this point one CHF consultant said:
"The site was surrounded by another public housing project as 
well as squatters from each direction. The logical thing for 
those who chose the site was to wonder why this particular 
stretch of land was left empty. Obviously everyone, including 
squatters, knew about the land, but not the HNC experts" 
(Interviewee, 1989)
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Not everyone agreed that the site decision was a bad one. Although critical 
of many aspects of the project, the Lesson Learned Report argues that the site 
"..was actually in an excellent location for housing. It was located on the new 
ring road that was under construction in Helwan" (Lessons Learned, p. 16,
1990). Although all the Agency interviewees blame USAID and its American 
consultants for the choice of the site, early evaluations such as the Nathan 
evaluation convey that MOH also thought of the selected site as being the best 
choice. The report also adds that all parties were aware of the potential 
difficulties and cost penalties (NR, 1982, p .37).
In having to deal with a problematic site, a decision had to be taken about the 
best technical approach for construction. When the construction of the MHE 
started, the Arab Bureau which tested the soil, questioned whether area D, the 
area where the MHE was to be constructed, should be used at all. BWN 
conducted a study on the area and concluded that it foresaw no problem 
(Nathan, p .37). They suggested a technique that would deal with the difficult 
soil conditions, which the Arab Bureau did not accept as viable. The 
differences around this issue took about ten months to resolve. At the end, 
work resumed due to BWN insistence and USAID support. Consequently, 
MHE construction went ahead and major cracks developed in the units 
(Lessons Learned, 1990, p.27).
In both the case of the site selection as well as the technique chosen to remedy 
the resulting problem, the tendency was just to get on with things at the lowest 
cost possible. This, in both cases gave the exact opposite result in the long 
run and affected the results of the project through delays and extra cost for 
both the Project and the clients.
The Agency staff saw MHE with its cracked walls as a symbol of the 
inadequacies of U.S. firms and USAID. The MHE was considered by the 
Agency as the first tangible proof that the Egyptians were right and that had 
they done all the work, none of this would have happened. For the first time 
during the implementation of the HNC, the balance was tilted in favour of the
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Agency. Despite the enormous waste in money and time that the failure of 
the MHE represented, the Agency staff members seemed to have welcomed 
it as it was their chance to take control of the Project at this point.
A decision was taken by both the Agency and USAID to convert the core 
housing approach of the HNC to Sites-and-Services, or as the Project Reports 
call it ‘construction by owner’ approach. There were many reasons given for 
this change in approach, one of which was that the core units were rejected 
by the potential buyers. Another, which seemed a more plausible reason9, 
was that cost overruns meant that the budget could no longer afford to build 
core units (CR, 1988, p. 14)
V THE DECISION TO BUILD COMPLETED FLATS
In 1984 the Minister of Housing at that time10, on his first visit to the site, 
rejected the idea of Sites-and-Services and gave instructions to build 3-story 
walk-up buildings. As visiting sites, is one of the jobs ministers are expected 
to do, he came to see how the ‘notorious’ project was doing. His aim was to 
announce to the press that ‘x’ number of units would be ready for consumers 
by a certain date, when he would come back to cut the ribbon. What he 
found was something totally different, something that was progressing slowly 
with, in his view, unpromising results. He declared that he found it a waste 
to give one plot to one family when the same plot could house three families. 
This major change in the project, which meant a return to the sixties and 
seventies GOE approach to housing policy, was not seriously opposed by any 
of the agencies involved, including USAID. This led the Agency to undertake 
the Project’s first major housing effort. A decision was taken to build 4,972 
flats in three of the ten neighbourhoods. With the assistance of the MOH, the 
Agency obtained a loan from the Egyptian General Organisation of the 
Building and Housing Cooperative and subsequently began construction of the
9 More plausible because no where else in the Project did buyers’ wishes really matter.
10 He was known to be against the idea of the project.
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apartments for sale to the target group. Although it seemed at one point that 
the conventional mode of development would take over the entire HNC 
programme, this did not occur in the end (CR, 1988,p. 14). The next three 
neighbourhoods were sold as plots to be developed with accordance to the site- 
and-service concept.
1. The reasons for the decision to construct flats:
The result of this change meant a conventional take-over, thereby defeating 
the Project intentions with regard to the demonstration of the combined public- 
private sector approach. Considering that the main goal of the Project was to 
‘change Egypt’s housing policy’, this decision, therefore, can easily be 
considered the most controversial and the most confrontational in the whole 
Project. Not only did the Project fail to change policy, but the GOE managed 
to build ‘conventional’ housing on the very site chosen to demonstrate the 
viability of such a change. This was the final demonstration of how self-help 
housing, whether core housing or Sites-and-Services, was never acceptable to 
the GOE.
The Minister of Housing at the time was building New Towns in the Desert, 
and was therefore not interested in any other housing intervention. Beyond 
the five cities under construction, all that he and other senior MOH officials, 
could consider at all positive was the number of housing units added to the 
stock every year. Hence a completed unit with second and third stories, was 
seen as more in congruence with this goal.
The reasons cited above show why the MOH/GOE wanted conventional 
housing. What is less understandable is the reason why the Agency welcomed 
the idea. The agency staff, and more specifically its senior staff, underwent 
training, attended workshops both in Egypt and in the U.S., as well as visited 
countries where self-help housing projects were successful. They were thus 
prepared and seemed to be the promoters of this ‘new’ approach. So what 
happened? In the opinion of CHF interviewees, the Agency staff responded
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to the pressure put on them by the Minister of Housing to give up on Sites- 
and-Services because they never really bought the idea of self-help housing. 
"Their acceptance for it was superficial, they never really internalised it". 
This is why they so easily gave up on it" one CHF staff member explained 
(Interview, 1989). Another added, "..the Agency staff jumped at the idea of 
Public Housing. They felt that ‘this is something we know about’ (Interview,
1988). the Agency staff were also apprehensive about the ability of the poor 
to build ‘proper’ housing. They were convinced the sites-and-services would 
simply turn into a slum area-something they did not want to be associated 
with. Therefore the Agency staff could not fight the controversy over the 
acceptability of the self-help housing concept. Also, "outside pressure to 
produce housing led the Agency to undertake the project’s first major housing 
effort" (CR, 1988, p. 15).
"After the appearance of the cracks in the MHE everything 
seemed to have been brought to a stand still and we were 
starting to despair. We therefore welcomed the Minister’s 
decision and the fact that he provided us with the funds needed.
Finally things started moving" (Interview, the Agency, 1988).
The view that public housing would also mean more units was shared by most 
Agency as well as some Egyptian CHF consultants. A senior Agency 
interview said:
"It is ridiculous to give a plot of land to one worker when you 
can give it to five. Also the sites-and-service system for 
speculation, renting and even selling is easy. It will be more 
an investment than a way to finding a solution to a housing 
problem" (Interview, 1989).
Introducing a new dimension, a CHF Egyptian consultant added, "I personally 
think that by benefitting a larger number of people, Public Housing is more 
equitable than Sites-and-Services" (Interview, 1989). There were only a small 
minority of the Agency staff members who opposed the idea of reverting to 
conventional housing, one of which was a senior employee who said:
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"The politicians, when they come and visit the sites they give 
orders that no one opposes. They usually know nothing about 
the project, and they destroy things by saying one word which 
cost millions of pounds" (Interview, 1989).
Although most of the reasons discussed above seem to be legitimate reasons 
why the Agency staff welcomed the idea of the construction of flats, the 
reason that seems most to have influenced their decision was that it was their 
opportunity to finally be in control of the Project. The Agency staff, some of 
them ‘la creme de la creme’ of the MOH, were treated by USAID and the 
U.S. consultants as trainees whose job it was to learn a new trade, that of 
‘unconventional’ housing. All along, when they objected to the technical 
approach of the American Architect-Engineers, they were told ‘this is how 
core housing or Sites-and-Services Projects are built’. Then when the cracks 
in the MHE appeared this was finally an indication of their professional 
stance. The MOH decision came at a good time. They felt then that ‘the 
Americans have been wasting a lot of money and time and produced nothing, 
it is our chance to show them real results’. Suddenly they were allowed to do 
something within their expertise, and the funding for it came from the GOE. 
They were finally in charge.
2. Why did USAID accept the change in approach?
The even bigger question is why USAID did not oppose the Minister’s orders. 
Why did it accept such a challenge to its authority if not a breach of the 
contract? As described previously, the purpose of the project was to 
demonstrate alternative methods of utilising ‘scarce GOE resources’, and to 
rely upon significantly greater participation from Egyptians in solving their 
housing problems (Answer to Audit Report, 1989, p .l) . Answering the 
question of why it accepted the MOH decision, a senior USAID official 
explained:
"USAID did not provide leadership, it simply left things to 
drift. It accepted GOE stalling which led to accepting things 
against Project principles. The decision to build flats is an 
example. Nothing was happening for a long time so GOE
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decided to achieve something quickly and in their view 
efficiently” (Interview, 1989).
A CHF senior staff member said that USAID gave in so easily to the 
construction of the flats because those who were involved in the project were 
mostly engineers who themselves knew very little about housing. "What seem 
to have upset them most was the tearing down of infrastructure11 rather than 
the building of flats" (Interview, 1989). Another CHF consultant argued that 
by the time the decision to build flats was taken, policy in USAID had shifted 
from hardware to process. "The interest changed from construction in the 
70’s to process ie decentralisation in the 80’s", he added (Interview, 1989). 
This view was indirectly supported by USAID officials who in their discussion 
of the Helwan Project, seemed to view it as a big mistake that would never 
be repeated. They all said that USAID had no intention of getting involved 
in housing projects again12.
Another senior USAID interviewee said that the reason why AID did not put 
up a fight was that the change in project direction came as a result of an order 
given by a Minister. This meant that it was a political decision and in this 
case USAID is sensitive about taking issue.
This latter view that so-called political decisions cannot be challenged by 
USAID was rejected by an AID official who was leading the new USAID 
‘policy dialogue’ initiative in Egypt. In answer to the question about how 
USAID operates when there is a shift from a grant agreement on the part of 
a host country, in this case Egypt, he said:
"When things are done against the Project agreement we send 
the recipient government a bill with all or part of the amount 
we have already spent. No country relinquishes its old policies 
easily. We therefore need to do a bit of head-knocking
11 During the construction of the flats, the original infrastructure was tom down. This 
will be discussed further later in the chapter.
12 And they never did.
225
sometimes, ..because of our special agreement with Egypt we 
cannot withdraw money and send it back to the States. We just 
pour it into the Waste Water Projects which absorbs a lot of 
money. We however did not have to resort to such a measure 
in this Project” (Interview, 1989).
He then added: "GOE has its way of embarrassing us. We also have our 
visitors from Congress and so we have to show them results" (Interview, 
1989). A similar view of how USAID operates, was described in one of the 
USAID evaluations as follows:
"Once under way, if major disagreement on policy arise there 
are only two viable options: 1) cancel the project; 2) stop the 
project and reach a new agreement on policy and objectives 
which is acceptable to both parties. USAID chose to do 
neither, it took a non-viable course which was a constant 
struggle with the GOE over all aspects of the Project in a never 
ending dialogue which led to delays, mismanagement and 
mistakes" (Lessons Learned, e.s 1990, p .2).
This latter view was supported by an Egyptian CHF staff member who argued 
that "USAID acted very suspiciously around this decision. They played dumb 
and decided to ignore things until it was too late to reverse the decision" 
(Interview, 1989).
In fact USAID found itself in a corner. It was desperate to see results, to see 
housing units built and occupied. Most importantly, it was desperate to 
spend the money in the pipeline.
3. Other institutional and technical reasons that made the construction of 
flats possible:
Besides the fact that the Agency supported the Minister’s decision and that 
USAID did not put up a fight against it, there were other reasons why the 
diversion from one of the main goals of the Project was so easily executed. 
The policy changes as well as high staff turn-over in all the major institutions 
involved in the Project, played a major role throughout the Project process. 
As the Audit Report points out, a key element in construction is the continuity
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of Project management so that there is a clear, consistent and agreed-upon 
approach to what is being done. The Project suffered a great deal from the 
continuous turnover of key personnel from both USAID mission and the GOE. 
The lack of continuity resulted in a changed approach to the project which 
dramatically altered the way in which it was executed, reflecting a 
fundamental change in its project goal (Audit Report, 1989, p. 12).
One of the favourite arguments of USAID, the Agency and CHF interviewees’ 
is how most of the Project’s difficulties are a result of this discontinuity. The 
MOH and Land Reclamation, a senior Agency official explained, also went 
through different stages of being part of or separated from the Ministry of 
Reconstruction. He described the changes as follows:
"When MOH and Land Reclamation were again annexed to the 
Ministry of Reconstruction, the Agency staff was then 
transferred to the Land Reclamation building. It was just 
physical relocation, but has its significance. The Minister then 
did not want anything to do with the Project and the result was 
good as we were given the freedom to work without 
interference" (Interview, the Agency, 1989).
An Agency engineer added:
"The major reason for the problems we got from the MOH is 
this marriage and divorce of the Ministries of Housing and 
Reconstruction. Those who did not believe in the housing part 
so did their best to weaken the Project and even sabotage it" 
(Interview, 1989).
Most interviewees would go to great length to count all the different MOH 
Ministers and USAID project directors during the project’s ‘long life’. The 
Minister of Housing who negotiated the contract, an Agency senior employee 
explained, ‘understood and liked the principal of self-help housing’. He was 
gone after one year and was succeeded by four other Ministers, none of whom 
accepted the Project. The Minister who followed, as described above, was 
seen to be the most adamant opposer to the Project. This is always illustrated 
by the exclamation: "During his seven years in office, he never visited the
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site!". Everyone argued that the main reason he is so against this project is 
that he saw New Cities as the only answer to housing in Egypt. As a senior 
ex-ministry of Housing employee said: "New cities are his baby-that is all he 
is interested in" (Interview, 1989). The Minister who came next was the one 
who decided on the public housing. An Agency interviewee argued that 
because he was a military man by background, as was the head of the Agency 
at the time, he needed to assert his position in the hierarchy (Interview, 1989).
Generally, as one of the senior Agency staff members argued, the politicians 
do not understand the Project and they do not support it.
"The main problem is with Ministers of Reconstruction as they 
do not care about type of housing, infrastructure and so on.
All they care about is how many units are built. Housing is a 
different thing-its a whole livable place, not only concrete" 
(Interview, 1989).
It was not only the MOH which had such a high turn over of senior staff, but 
also USAID and the Agency. AID had six Project Directors during the 
Project. The responsibility of Project Director is to work closely with the 
project implemented, monitor the progress of the Project and coordinate all 
contacts between them and USAID. The fact that there were so many, each 
with his13 own views and approaches, had an adverse effect on the Project’s 
progress. Some, CHF and the Agency staff explained, interfered and meddled 
in the internal affairs of the Agency which made the latter defensive and 
distrusting. Others did not know their job which hindered the Project’s 
progress.
The same goes for the Agency chairmen, again there were six of them, during 
Project. Although most Agency and CHF staff members agree that at least 
three were good, this, they argued, did not help the Project. Each had 
different ideas about the Project and different techniques in handling the
13 They were all men
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various actors involved in it. Commenting on this point, an Agency employee 
said:
"Not only is high turn-over problematic, but it is complicated 
in our case because, we Egyptians, when we get a new 
position, we destroy everything our predecessor has done and 
want to start all over again" (Interview, 1989).
Many of the issues raised in this section could apply to the Project as a whole. 
Because the decision to build flats is the most flagrant example of the 
contradictions that characterise the Helwan Project, these more general issues 
were often raised when the decision to revert to conventional housing was 
discussed. For example the discussion above about the lack of continuity of 
leadership, although it had a negative effect on the Project as whole, it was 
most blatant in this case.
Another similar sort of issue that this discussion raised is the fact that when 
a demonstration Project is to be attempted, it should be done on a smaller 
scale than the HNC project. The Lessons Learnt report suggest that:
"A more modest Project should have been introduced and 
finished more quickly. Helwan was too large, and even if it 
had not had technical problems it would have taken years to 
construct; so there is ample time for those people opposing the 
concept to drag their feet and attempt to get it changed—exactly 
what happened" (Lessons Learned, 1990, e.s.p.2).
As will be shown in more detail elsewhere, the size of the Project was 
discussed very often by all agency interviewees, who all agreed with the latter 
report that for a ‘demonstration project, the size of the Helwan Project was 
ridiculously large. Changing policy was also brought up frequently.
"Experience has shown that donors cannot buy policy changes 
even when the amount of funding is substantial. Policy change 
comes about only when the host country is convinced of the 
wisdom of the policy change as it applies to their own political, 
economic and social conditions. In Egypt these conditions 
never developed" (Lessons, p. 13, 1990).
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The design of projects should take into account local practices and approaches. 
"...Sites-and-Services were very much ‘in vogue’ in the late 1970’s...As 
described by one person ‘this was a concept seeking a project in Egypt’" 
(Lessons Learned, 1990, e.s. p .5)
VI CONSTRUCTION OF THE FLATS
The construction of the three and five story walk-up apartment buildings 
started in 1988. 4,972 flats were under construction in Neighbourhoods 1,2 
and 5. The bidding for the construction which was a national bid14, was won 
by a large Egyptian contracting firm, which was to build the units following 
the same design specifications originally drawn for the Sites-and-Services. 
There was one major problem that occurred during construction which caused 
further delays and was grossly wasteful of Project money. The infrastructure 
connection modules15 which had already been laid had to be excavated in 
order to lay the foundations. Three different reasons were given for the 
excavation. The first was that the difficult soil conditions necessitated that 
digging had to go deeper than anticipated and thus the connection modules had 
to be dug out. The second reason was the decision to change to apartment 
buildings necessitating the redesign of the infrastructure. The third was that 
the original decision to install the modules before the foundations was a 
mistake. In other words, there was a disagreement on whether the excavation 
was necessary because of the soil condition, of the greater number of people 
to be catered for in the flats or the technical impossibility to put in the 
foundations for flats after the infrastructure connections were already installed.
In their discussion of this issue, the USAID’s auditors blamed the destruction 
of the infrastructure on the decision to construct three story buildings on land 
that had been serviced for self-help housing. They argued the following:
14 This part of the Project, as described above, came out o f GOE funds. This meant 
the condition of involving American firms did not apply.
15 These are the structures that connect individual units to the larger infrastructure 
network.
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"The Sites-and-Services concept of construction, which was 
implemented at a cost of about $30, was largely destroyed in 
neighbourhoods 1, 2 and 5 because of the deep digging 
required to put in a proper foundation after all infrastructure 
had been constructed" (Audit, 1988, p. 10-11).
The Project Completion Report, on the other hand, explains that unit designs 
and problems posed by unsuitable soil conditions made it difficult for 
contractors to carry out the construction of the foundations without damaging 
or destroying the infrastructure connection modules (CR, 1988, p. 15). An 
Evaluation Report supported the view that the problem lay in the fact that the 
infrastructure was completed before the installation of the foundations.
"This", the Report adds, "has proved to be a big problem.
With all the sewage, water and electricity connections plus 
narrow streets, the contractors found great difficulties in 
digging out and building foundations without causing 
considerable damage to the connections" (Evaluation Report,
August 1989, p .26).
The Lessons Learned Report also discussed this point, arguing that:
"USAID apparently felt that the plot connection modules should 
be installed at the time that the overall infrastructure was 
constructed. The Egyptian firm felt otherwise; said that this 
was inadequate and that Egyptian contractors could not deal 
with such a construction technique. The Egyptians [AB and the 
Agency] felt it should be done when the housing unit 
construction started. USAID prevailed, and these connection 
modules were eventually broken off when the Egyptians went 
to deeper foundations (Lessons Learned, 1990, p.27).
In its analysis of this issue the Report further explains that, due to many 
unsatisfactory technical decisions on the part of BWN, there was concern that 
the firm was not qualified to undertake this type of project (Lessons Learned 
Report, 1990, p .28). The Report then raises the question about the viability 
of the initial decision to split up the design and supervision work, with BWN 
doing the infrastructure and site work and the AB doing the design of the 
community facilities and the housing.
231
"One can question why two contracts were utilised when the 
design of the buildings and housing is so closely related to the 
site and infrastructure design", the Report adds (Ibid).
The one point most Agency and USAID interviewees agree about is that this 
problem could have been avoided if the work had started on one 
neighbourhood, or even less, to check if things could work the way they were 
designed. The Agency employees explained that those in USAID who were 
in charge of the Project wanted to follow the Project Paper to the letter. They 
just wanted to go from one stage to the next, first installing the infrastructure 
and then starting on the construction. The Agency staff exhibited a great deal 
of anger about the loss of money due to what they see is the U.S. contractors’ 
incompetence. Again they blame it all on USAID.
"Their insistence on installing the infrastructure connections", 
one the Agency senior staff said "cost us a lot. Now USAID 
finally admitted that the design was a mistake. Foreign 
consultants, even those who know very little, are very 
arrogant. They always feel that they know better than the 
nationals" (Interview, 1989).
Most complained of what they saw as constant interference and pressure on 
the part of USAID which was behind many problems such as the foundations 
of the HNC.
"I heard that in Israel USAID does not deal with project 
implementation-they give them the grants and that is it. In 
Egypt they cause a lot of harm by their interference, often on 
issues they know nothing about. This waste caused by the 
infrastructure damages was investigated by the auditors and was 
the reason for senators coming to visit the site" (Interview,
1989).
Looking closely at the issue of the infrastructure excavation one can only 
wonder how much pressure USAID had to exert on the Agency to go along 
with the American technique. Did the Agency staff really put up a fight at the 
time of the construction of the connection modules for what they saw to be the 
right order of construction? Or, as some USAID employees claim, did they
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only start objecting when the foundations construction started and problems 
occurred? According to a USAID staff member: "The Agency employees 
always say ‘we told you so’"(Interview, USAID, 1989). Another added:
"It was only after the departure of the consultants that the 
Agency started to complain about them. Any mistake they now 
blame on them. They say ‘Your Americans did this or that, or, 
it was their decision, their advice’" (Interview, USAID, 1989).
Around the point of how far the Agency really did argue its case, an Agency 
engineer said:
"USAID takes advantage of us because some of those who 
headed the Agency were weak and could not stand strongly up 
enough for what we all agreed were the right technical 
solutions. When AID threatens to withdraw its money the 
Egyptians weaken and in that way USAID was able to ‘ride us 
and dangle their legs’" 16 (Interview, the Agency, 1989).
It was difficult to find out whether, in the first place, AB and the Agency 
found that the American’s technical solutions were not viable during the time 
of execution or judged them as such in retrospect. And if indeed they were 
initially against them, whether because this was a new approach to housing 
construction, the Agency staff, were intimidated into thinking that maybe this 
is how it is done. Also the fact that USAID gave its support to the American 
consultants might have been another reason the Agency felt that USAID was 
then to be held responsible for any disasters should they occur.
VH THE CONSTRUCTION OF SITES-AND-SERVICES
While the construction of the flats in three neighbourhoods was struggling 
along, thinking was going on about the future of the rest of the 
neighbourhoods. The Minister of Housing who gave the order for the 
completed flats, only stayed in office for one year. Since, in any event, his
16 This is an Egyptian expression. It means that the person riding thinks of the ‘ridden’ 
as one would think of a donkey, ie that the one riding is the master and expects nothing but 
obedience from the ‘ridden’ and the one ‘ridden’ accepts his/her position.
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decision was never put on paper, and the new Minister had little interest in the 
Project, there was an opportunity for change. CHF staff, who were the only 
people interested in Sites-and-Services, suggested to the Agency to return to 
the original Project plan for the rest of the neighbourhoods. The Project 
Completion Report announces that:
"Sites and services was not totally defeated as in the end, as a 
result of partially the institutional maturity of the Agency and 
the development of a self-financing scheme, the Project is 
proceeding along the lines originally intended" (CR, 1988, 
p. 14).
As will be shown later, the decision to go back to the original plan was not 
to apply to all the remaining neighbourhoods. Also both of the reasons given 
by the Report concerning the ‘maturity’ of the Agency and the development 
of a financing scheme, are questionable. A number of reasons were given as 
to why the Agency consented to again go back to the Sites-and-Services, but 
the most plausible was the unavailability of funding from the GOE to build 
completed flats. Since USAID would only finance Sites-and-Services, the 
decision was then to go ahead and sell serviced plots in two out of the 
remaining seven neighbourhoods.
After CHF came up with the self-financing scheme, a scheme that provides 
loans to the plot buyers to construct their housing, USAID was willing to fund 
as much as LEI 1,000,000 ($5,000,000). This amount covered 100% of the 
construction loans, providing funds for as many as 1600 participants for 
foundation and ground floor construction. Disbursement of these funds was 
contingent upon three conditions: actual plot sales and actual commitments of 
construction loans; demonstration of the successful progress of the 
implementation of the Construction Loan fund; and following the basic 
principles of the Grant Agreement that participants or groups of participants 
should take the responsibility for construction and not GOE (Project 
Memorandum, August 1987, pp. 1-2).
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Although the Project Reports considered the reversal to plot selling rather than 
completed flats a triumph, the actual manner in which the so called Site-and- 
Service was implemented actually defies the very purpose of this approach. 
As described in Chapter 3, the main purpose of Sites-and-Service is to let the 
owners build on their plots, choosing their own design and building material, 
following their own means and their own pace.
Because the Agency staff never accepted the idea, they planned the 
construction process in a way that put them in complete control at every stage. 
In their view, this was the only way to ‘prevent the creation of a slum’. Two 
long lists of steps had to be followed, the first to get the plot contract, and the 
second to complete the construction of the unit. In order to get a plot 
contract, there were eight steps to take. These steps, including screening for 
eligibility criteria, submission of a long list of documents, filling out 
applications, down payment for the price of the land, signature of the contract 
and the designation of plots. With this contract, each buyer was eligible for 
a bank loan for construction.
The plots, 1,151 in the two neighbourhoods, were then grouped into blocks 
(30 to 40 plots per block) and representatives of each block were chosen. 
This was a very important step, because the block representative, or ‘block 
captain’ as they were named by CHF, represented all block members during 
construction on a volunteer basis. Again this was a deviation from the 
original plan. One of CHF’s main roles in the HNC was, in addition to 
devising the loan scheme, to form cooperatives out of the plot purchasers. 
However, mainly because the system of cooperative in Egypt is different from 
that in the U.S., and because the Agency was really not interested, it was not 
implemented. Consequently, the role of the cooperative was taken by the 
block captain which was to assist plot purchasers with unit design, soil 
investigation, supervision of plot construction as well as having access to the 
Agency and the Bank (CFE) for all financial transactions.
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The choice of the ‘block captain’ as some buyers and even the Agency staff 
described it, was very haphazard. Often the members of a block did not 
know each other, and were not given enough time to find out about each 
other. They were told by the Agency staff that they belonged to a particular 
block and were asked to elect a representative on the spot. As a result, in 
some cases the person who volunteered for the position got it. In other cases, 
it was the person who, during the long and tedious steps of applying, proved 
to be the most enterprising person and ‘who seemed to know his way around’, 
who was chosen. The arbitrary manner in which the ‘block captains’ were 
chosen and the key role they were given during the construction of the plots 
turned out to have very important implications.
There were ten steps that had to be followed from the time of the acquisition 
of the plot till the completion of the construction of the ground floor. The 
first steps had to do with the choice of contractor, the supervising engineer 
and the soil investigator. The Agency gave the block representatives a list of 
‘trustworthy’ contractors, engineers and soil experts from which they had to 
choose. When asked whether the buyers could get their own people, the 
Agency staff said :
"Yes, they could, but they have to meet certain conditions.
The person has to belong to a registered firm, he has to have 
been in the construction business for at least five years amongst 
others" (Interview, 1989).
The Agency staff explained that hiring people outside the list was discouraged. 
They explained that they had had a few bad experiences where things went 
wrong when a contractor or engineer outside their list was given the job.
Commenting on this issue, an Agency staff member said:
"They are free to choose whoever they want. However we told 
them that if they get ripped off or face any other problem they 
should not come to us. They will have to bear the 
consequences of their choice" (Interview, 1989).
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The next step was to get permission from the Agency if buyers want any 
minor changes in the house design. Again, as the Agency interviewees 
explained, very few changes could be allowed in the design, indeed any 
change is strongly discouraged. This point was seen by the buyers as a great 
imposition on their choice of the house they want to live in. Many of the 
buyers tried to make changes in the designs which the Agency rejected. One 
of the major design changes wanted by buyers was to build balconies, a 
feature all Egyptians like to have in their houses. This was turned down 
because, as some Agency staff argued, it was a trick that would allow the 
owners to make horizontal expansions in the future. Others said that the street 
width was too small for balconies. An Agency staff member said: "If they 
build balconies they will touch. There is simply no space for this".
Space was seen by most buyers as a crucial problem. Not only were there 
complaints that the streets were very narrow, but that the plots were also very 
small. The size of the plots was a highly controversial issue. Commenting 
on this a CHF staff member who has long experience in sites-and-service 
projects said:
"The main purpose was to make it tiny so as to force vertical 
expansion and to control speculation. This simply shows how little all 
the agencies involved in the planning and design know or care about 
housing and peoples’ housing (Interview, 1988).
Returning to the construction steps; after the initial steps had been taken, the 
construction of the units themselves were divided into six steps, each step to 
be following a schedule controlled by deadlines. Payment for each stage was 
done after the construction was checked by the Agency technical staff. When 
all the requirements were seen to be met, the captain of the block was given 
‘approval vouchers’ and with invoices from contractors he could then 
approach the Project Bank (CFE) to receive payment.
Although the original plan was that the loan would cover the expenses of the 
foundations and the first floor, in fact it did not. Because of all the reasons
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mentioned above, the delays in the construction of the infrastructure, soil 
difficulties and excavations of the infrastructure modules, the cost went up. 
According to the Agency, the loan covered 80% of the cost, and according to 
some buyers and contractors, the loan covered only 60% and even less. One 
very angry buyer complained that more and more money was requested from 
the contractor, and that he had to add as much as 50% in addition to the 
instalment paid by the bank at every stage of the construction process. When 
confronted by such complaints, the Agency staff said that this was not their 
responsibility, that of course things cost more than the original estimate but 
that the buyers have to cover the difference: ‘Do they expect everything on 
a silver platter?’, an Agency staff member exclaimed (Interview, 1989).
Having been told initially that the loans would cover the cost, most of the 
buyers did not make provisions for these extra sums of money they had to pay 
to the contractor. Many complained that they found themselves in a tight 
financial situation. The fact that they had to meet the demands of the 
contractors before the work went on, and since the deadlines put by the 
Agency also had to be met, very little choice was left but to pay.
The description above shows the tight control exercised by the Agency 
whereby virtually no leeway was left to the buyer to do any of the decision 
making regarding design, material, builders, timing for construction or 
payment. In addition to these difficulties, the Agency devised the system in 
a manner which allowed one person, the ‘captain of the block’, who was not 
even properly elected, to have the say in all decisions concerning the 
construction. The ‘captain of the block’ acted as a go-between and the buyer 
had no direct contact, either with those who were supposedly hired by him/her 
or with the Agency. This often made the buyers feel like they were 
completely cut off and had absolutely no say on a house that is supposedly 
being built for them, a house they owned. One does not have to be in the 
Agency headquarters for long to find out how many problems were created by 
such a system. Many buyers complained about alliances being formed 
between the ‘captains of the blocks’, the contractor and the engineers.
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Complaints were often around foul play. One buyer was saying: ‘We all 
wonder how come most of the captains are already building their second 
floor? where did they get the money from?’.
The Agency, in response to the many complaints about the representation 
system, said that there was no way to change it. They added that they could 
not deal with each buyer on his/her own, that it was enough to deal with 16 
‘block captains’ and the huge paper work and supervision that this entails. 
They also maintained that because the design of the blocks were such that 
houses share foundations and walls, the construction needed a high level of 
coordination that would be difficult to achieve. The immediate question that 
comes to mind is, if this was the case, then how are the buyers expected to 
do it without the Agency when they start expanding vertically? Any 
knowledge about how Egyptians have been building and expanding houses for 
generations, clearly proves that they are indeed capable of a high level of 
coordination as well as ingenuity. That houses are built and rooms added, 
horizontally as well as vertically, if not aesthetically pleasing, shows a high 
level of creativity.
However the Agency staff, when talking about the ‘beneficiaries’, do so in a 
manner that gives them very little credit. They are often seen as ‘ignorant’, 
‘not capable of rational decisions’, ‘they do not know what is best for them’. 
Consequently ‘they have to be kept under tight control and supervision in 
order to protect the HNC from them lest they turn it into a slum’.
How it is that the housing construction as described above is called ‘builder 
by owner’, ‘sites-and-service’ or ‘self-help’ housing is difficult to justify. The 
only difference it has in comparison to the completed flats is that it is 
horizontally expandable. It would have been very interesting to add much 
more to the discussion about what the buyers thought of the Project and its 
effect on their lives. However this will not be possible here as the houses 
were still under construction and the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods had 
not moved in yet at the time this research ended.
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v m  CONCLUSION
This chapter, in its review of the HNC component and the manner in which 
the reversal to conventional housing was made possible, raises many of the 
issues that the Project as a whole raises. It clearly shows the resistance on the 
part of the government to changing its policy, the conservatism of Egyptian 
government agencies and their vested interests in retaining the status-quo. It 
also shows the tendency of USAID to give in for the sake of economic and 
political interests at home and abroad, including keeping the ‘pipeline’ 
flowing. The very clear split between Egyptian and American views, their 
interests and the way they chose or chose not to use their potential power, 
while underlying the whole of the Helwan Project experience, is crystallised 
during the implementation of the HNC.
As the implementation of the HNC progressed, the conditions that allowed 
that the whole goal of the HNC to be defied, were in the making. In order 
to satisfy the condition of hiring U.S. firms and importing U.S. goods, long 
delays and high costs were the outcome. There were direct and predictable 
reasons for the delays and costs, such as the long GOE bureaucratic 
complexities, the high cost of import of materials and transportation. There 
was also unpredictable reasons for the delays such as the MHE site choice and 
foundation disaster. The other was that the inadequate division of labour 
between Egyptian and American firms in the construction, the most obvious 
result of which was the excavation of the infrastructure connection modules.
For five years, unlike in the case of upgrading component of the Project, the 
Agency was more or less marginalised from the main decision making 
process. It seems that the objections they made about construction techniques 
were not heard by USAID as it went along with the American choice of 
technique. This raises the question of whether these objections were made 
loud enough to be heard. Then, during a stage of the Project when USAID 
was in a weak position, a visit from the Minister of Housing tilted the balance 
in favour of the Agency. Finally they were in control and USAID accepted
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the decision. From this moment, and even in the case of the so called ‘sites- 
and-service’ neighbourhood, the Agency was and continues to be in-charge. 
Now USAID in turn did not object, as at this point they only wanted to see 
the Project completed and the budget spent.
Considering most of the reasons given about why USAID gave up on such an 
important aspect of the Project, leads to the conclusion that in fact they would 
have lost more by insisting on the initial approach. Both the high cost of the 
delays in infrastructure installation and the cracks in the MHE had weakened 
their position. There were huge amounts of money blocked in the pipeline, 
and as discussed earlier, it is the primary job of USAID in-country to spend 
its budget on time. Above all, the media17 in the U.S. was starting to use 
Egypt and particularly the Helwan Project as an example of USAID 
inefficiency and members of Congress where pouring in to visit the Project 
and wanted to see results. All of these were successfully used to the utmost 
by the MOH and the Agency to advance their own interests.
The big question then is how did all that happened during this phase of the 
Project affect the target population? The next chapter will discuss this issue 
at great length.
17 CNN produced a documentary which was very damning o f USAID (see chapter 3)
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CHAPTER 8
THE EFFECT OF THE PROJECT 
ON THE HNC FLAT BUYERS
I INTRODUCTION
"The sign calls these houses 'Helwan New Community for 
Low Income Egyptians'. This is not 'new ', it is not a 
'community', it is not 'fo r  low income'. It is low cost, low 
quality, low space, low facilities and low service housing".
This was an opinion given by one of the many discontented flat owners about 
their new housing. The last chapter described the implementation process of 
the Helwan New Community (HNC) component and how it led to the decision 
to build and sell flats instead of plots. This chapter will be about the 
population of Neighbourhood Five, the first of the five neighbourhoods of 
completed flats in HNC to be occupied. A number of housing blocks were 
ready for habitation in the summer of 1988 and occupants started to move in 
shortly afterwards (see photos, pp. 243-244).
Neighbourhood 5 is composed of three story high buildings with two flats on 
each floor. Two blocks of the buildings were constructed back to back with 
a court yard in the middle. The blocks of flats were built following three 
models of different sizes: A, B & C, of 56.25, 67.50 and 84.37 sq. meters 
respectively (see Appendix 6 for house types). They were then distributed to 
the applicants according to the formers' income and their household size. The 
buildings, built in bricks, were left without plastering. Services and facilities 
such as shops, schools, places of prayer and clinics were not yet constructed 
at this stage.
The discussion in this chapter will be examining, as chapter 5 did in terms of 
the upgrading component, the impact that the Helwan Housing Project had on 
the its target population. It will be testing the second half of the hypothesis 
presented by this thesis, that the project contributed to the vulnerability of the
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An example Neighbourhood 5 under construction 1988
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Entrance to a block o f flats, Neighbourhood 5
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population it was meant to be serving. The chapter will start with a brief 
description of the social and economic conditions that were most directly 
affecting the lives of the population of Neighbourhood 5 at the time that they 
were moving into the flats. Following this, there will be a closer examination 
of how the buyers of the flats view the Project, their opinion of the Agency 
and USAID, the economic and social effect of the Project on them and the 
way they were coping with the new situation.
H BACKGROUND: THE POPULATION OF NEIGHBOURHOOD 5
At the time of the fieldwork, there were around 270 flats occupied. 200 of 
these were randomly selected for the survey. 57 % of the interviewees were 
women and 43% were men. Structured interviews were used for the 
collection of the data (with closed and open-ended questions) followed by 
more general discussions with other members of the household. 20 
households among the 200 were also visited regularly over a period of four 
months for more in-depth interviews and discussions with both women and 
men.
198 of the 200 buyers were male public sector factory workers. Although 
there was no conditions that excluded female factory workers from buying 
flats, the assumption of all those involved1 was that the flats were for heads 
of households, interpreted as men only.
In terms of the general characteristics of the households in the sample, 91 % 
of them were nuclear families, and the rest were extended families2. 30% of 
the couples had been married for 6 to 10 years, 26.5% for 11 to 15 years and 
17.5 % from 1 to 5 years. The majority of the households had young families.
1 This includes USAID, the Agency and CHF staff, factory administration as well as the 
factory workers themselves.
2 Most of the households with extended families (80%) including the father and/or 
mother of the adult male.
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Among the 185 households with children, there were 309 children under the 
age of 6. The average household size of the new occupants was 5.12 (see 
table 8.1 for different sizes of households and table 8.2 for origin of 
occupants). Table 8.3 outlines the interviewees’ level of education.
Table 8.1
Percentage distribution of household by size
Household size Percentage
1-3 13
4 22
5 27
6 21
7-10 16
Table 8.2
Percentage distribution of female and male interviewees and 
their spouses by place of origin
Place of Origin Women Men
Upper Egypt 34 38
Lower Egypt 30 30
Cairo 25 24
Helwan 10 8
Table 8.3
Percentage distribution of female and male interviewees and 
their spouses by level of education
Education level Women Men
Illiterate 74 63
Read and write 7 3
Primary 4 9
Preparatory 1 8
Secondary (regular) - 1
Secondary (technical 12 13
Tertiary 1 3
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Following are some of the social and economic conditions affecting the lives 
of the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5.
A. CUTS IN REAL WAGES AND THE EMPLOYMENT CRISIS:
The Egyptian government, as the largest employer in the country, has 
provided secure work opportunities to millions, both in the civil service and 
public sector employees. GOE had a strict policy against lay-offs. The 
deterioration of the economic situation internationally and nationally as well 
as the introduction of measures pertaining to Structural Adjustment3 meant 
that government employment policies could not be maintained. The rate of 
growth of expenditure on wages dropped from 23.1% in the 1984/1985 
budget, to 15.6% in the 1985/1984 budget to 5.4% in the 1986/1987 budget. 
This was a response to IMF recommendation to slow down the rate of growth 
of public sector employment (Korayem, 1987, p .68). In 1987 real wages of 
government workers fell to nearly half of their 1973 level while it fell to 90% 
in public enterprises in the same time period (WB, 1991, p .95).
Economic recession and the newly introduced economic policies negatively 
impacted on real wages of those already in employment, and most seriously 
restricted new entrants to the labour force in the public sector. With the 
private sector not expanding, as the 1980’s progressed labour force growth 
outpaced employment. Open unemployment climbed to 9.2% in 1986, an 
increase from 7.4% in 1976. Three quarters of the 1.2 million labour force 
looking for jobs in 1986 were 16 to 25 years of age and slightly over 84% 
were graduates of secondary and post-secondary schools (WB, 1991, p. 94).
These were the conditions with which the population of HNC had to cope with 
at the time they moved into their new flats with their new financial 
obligations. Since the buyers were all public sector factory employees they
3 Although Structural Adjustment policies were officially introduced in 1992, the GOE 
had already slowly started to implement some of its policies by the second half of the eighties.
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were therefore all in employment. However, their real wages had fallen. 
They were also affected indirectly by shortages in employment opportunities 
in two ways: some of them were unable to get second jobs; other members 
of the household, especially women and adult children, could not find work.
1. Employment and wages among Neighbourhood 5 factory workers:
The great majority of flat buyers, as mentioned above, were male factory 
workers, 60% of whom were mid-level skilled workers, 23% high-level 
skilled workers, 11% white collar workers in factories and 6% service 
workers (e.g. guards).
Wages in the industrial public sector consist of the basic wage, monthly 
incentives, as well as a portion of the profits which are distributed yearly 
according to profits and overtime. In the public enterprises, as in the case of 
other government employment, salaries are paid monthly.
The so-called incentive system in public sector industry, consists of the 
payment of an extra amount, which is a percentage of the fixed wage (a wide 
range from 25 % to 200% of the pay). The incentive system, in theory, comes 
out of profits. However, up until 1988, incentives were not a real reflection 
of profit. They were more or less a fixed additional percentage of the wage 
which helped to supplement the wage without the sum being a long term legal 
obligation. Incentives were therefore totally relied on and were considered by 
the workers to be permanent (Interview, 1989).
The major discussion around incentives was about their recent decrease and 
fluctuation. Most of the factory workers in Neighbourhood 5 explained that 
about two and a half years previously (1986/1987) incentives started falling.
"When incentives are just 25 % of the pay, this amounts to very 
little if your pay is already small. There has been a drop in 
incentives during the last three years and especially in the last
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three months. This is what the Steel and Iron factory incident4 
was all about. These are workers who do a hazardous job, it 
negatively effect their health, so they need to be paid more to 
deserve compensate for this. They now have to pay the price 
in prison" Abu Mohsen explained5.
For some, workers over-time payments for working extra hours was a way of 
dealing with the increase demands of living expenses. In addition, a drop in 
availability of extra working hours was seen as another reason preventing most 
from making ends meet. In some factories there was no longer extra work 
available. In others there was a ceiling put on the number of extra hours for 
each worker, as there was increasing demand for it. Abu Leila said:
"I do as much extra working hours as there is extra work. But 
it is not enough. After the system of shifts was introduced in my 
factory there is no more extra hours. Now we have a 
maximum of one hour a day and seven hours if we work on a 
Friday [the rest day] but we can only do that every third 
Friday" (Interview, HNC, 1989).
The decline in real wages for public sector workers made multiple job holding 
a necessity for financial survival for most. Although it is illegal for 
government employees to hold a second job, the law governing this is very 
loosely reinforced and second jobs are quite widespread. It was estimated that 
one out of five public sector workers hold a second job (WB, 1991, pp.96- 
97). Government jobs were often kept for security and the second job, which 
was often in the informal sector, helped the household to survive.
4 During the fieldwork, workers in the Iron and Steel factory in protest at decreases in 
incentives, went on strike by organising a sit-in in the factory. The response of the 
Government was to send in fully armed police, who shot bullets in the air injuring several 
workers.
5 ‘Abu’, means father and ‘Um’, mother. ‘Abu’ or ‘Um’ would then be followed by 
the name of their oldest son or in case a man or women has no male children, by the name 
of their eldest daughter. This is the traditional respectful way to address adults with children. 
(Note: all names o f interviewees used in this thesis are fictitious).
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The discussion about what interviewees thought of second jobs centred around 
the increasing difficulty of getting such jobs and the implication that this had 
in terms of survival strategies in an increasingly demanding situation. In most 
cases whether they did succeeded in getting a second job or not, around 70% 
of the factory workers interviewed expressed a need to do so.
Some explained that they were obliged to do unskilled work, such as for 
example street vending, because they no longer find work were they could use 
their skills. There were also those who spoke of having had second jobs but 
the newly introduced legislation in the late eighties put a working time limit 
on all service workshops which had to be closed by eight in the evening6. 
This meant that workers had a more limited number of hours they could work 
in those workshops. For those who said they did not have another job, most 
agreed that they could not see how they could survive without another job 
with the economic situation in Egypt being what it was. They argued that 
even skilled labourers and educated people could not find employment, which 
left those who are looking for a second job with very little hope. "The whole 
country is at a stand still, there is no money and consequently no work", Abu 
Mohsen said "What job can one find? No one finds jobs nowadays. There 
are educated people who do unskilled jobs because of unemployment" Abu 
Salah commented.
2. Employment among other household members:
Since 98% of the home owners were male factory workers, when examining 
potential income earners among other household members, this included 
women, mainly wives and daughters, sons and other relatives. Reliance on 
second income earners is obviously very important for low income 
households; in my sample only 11% of households had a second income 
earner, two thirds of which were women. Women in Egypt, and especially
6 Up to this point there were no deadline for retail or service closures. Some shops 
opened all through the night.
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low income women in urban areas in Egypt, face big obstacles in finding 
work opportunities or income earning activities7. In the HNC only 8 % of 
women were income earners and half of them only started working after the 
move.
A number of women in HNC started working to help pay the instalments. 
Most women expressed their wish to contribute to the income of the 
household, however they did not feel the economic situation was favourable 
in terms of work opportunities. There were also problems, especially among 
those with young children related to the demands of reproductive work and in 
particular to child-care. Since very few (2 %)  moved with a mother or mother 
in law, the latter obstacle to their mobility was particularly problematic.
Six women started little stands in front of their houses selling such things as 
cold drinks, biscuits, candies and batteries. These little businesses did not 
often prove to be economically viable, and, in some cases, caused problems 
with their men folk. With respect to his wife’s new activity of selling 
foodstuffs in front of the house, Abu Ali was complaining that his colleagues, 
who are also neighbours, are teasing him mercilessly about it. He explained 
that he wanted to stop all this in order to save face, but that he simply could 
not do it as his pay plus his after hours work could not in any way support his 
family of eight.
Women’s work is seen by many men and some women as ‘shaming’. The 
man has to be seen as the provider. If his women folk work it means he has 
failed to do his job as a man. There were many who made comments like: 
‘The man is the provider. Islam did not encourage women to work’. Or even 
more emphatic, as one man whose wife is a secondary school graduate said: 
‘Islam forbids women to work. The money that she will make will go on
7 Considering the difficulty around definition of ‘work’, especially in trying to capture 
women’s work, probing questions as well as discussions and observations were used to get 
information on this issue.
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clothes and as well as to pay for bad nurseries for the kids. "I would rather 
sell my clothes then let my wife work. I am too hot blooded for that".
With respect to other household members, there were only 9% of households 
with extended family members living in the flats. This is a small proportion 
compared to Rashed which had 25% of its households as extended families. 
Only three of those belonging to extended families contributing to the 
household income. Of the sons who were out of school between the ages of 
14 and 28, (19 in all), only five were working and contributing to the 
household. The rest were either in military service8 or unemployed. Of the 
daughters who were out of school, between the ages of 13 to 23, (27 in all), 
only three worked and contributed financially to the household.
Among school leavers or potential school leavers, boys of 12 years and above 
usually start working as apprentices during the summer holidays if they are 
still in school or find a permanent job if they have left school. In HNC, as 
was the case in Arab Rashed, it has become an increasingly slim possibility 
for these boys to find jobs. As the situation of unemployment was worsening, 
more experienced workers remained in their old jobs instead of moving on. 
This left little chance for younger job seekers to find jobs.
The fact that most households (89%) were dependent on one income earner 
had enormous implications for the survival strategies of the inhabitants of the 
HNC. The sudden rise in expenditure which resulted from their move to the 
new residences, resulted in the need to find alternative sources of income and 
to get some members of the household to consider seriously bringing in an 
income for the first time. As a result some established social values were re­
evaluated and re-negotiated.
8 All males above the age of 18 must do military service unless they are university 
students, in which case they do their service after graduation.
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B. PRICE INCREASES: FOOD:
At the time of the field work, while incomes were at a standstill or 
decreasing, the cost of living was increasing sharply. Food is a major 
expense for low income populations. According to World Bank estimates, the 
lowest income category of households in Egypt spend 75 % of their income on 
food (WB, 1991, p. xvii-xviii). Discussions on price increases in HNC 
always centred on food items. 91 % of interviewees said that food constituted 
their highest monthly household expense. The survey shows that average 
household expenditure on food per month was LE82.5. 12.5% said they
spend LE40 to LE50 on food, 32% of households estimated that they spend 
between LE90 to LE100, 22% said they spend LE120 to LE130.
A large proportion of Egyptians (93%) rely on buying subsidised food using 
ration cards (Ibid., 1991, p.54). From 1970 and for a decade and a half, the 
cost of the ration subsidy programme grew dramatically to the point where in 
the mid-1980’s the cost was almost 20% of the total government budget. In 
1989 cost containment measures were introduced. This involved three 
components: raising ration/subsidy prices, reducing the number of items
included, and reducing the quantities subsidised. The government reduced the 
size of the ‘Baladi’9 loaf from 160 grams to 130 grams, ie in fact price per 
more than tripled (Ibid., p. xvii-xviii). Between May and August 1989 the 
prices of foods consumed by the lowest income urban consumers increased by 
40%. Approximately 80% of this price increase for food is due to the higher 
price of bread (Ibid.).
Bread is the staple food for Egyptians in general and for low income 
Egyptians in particular. Each meal of the day is composed of what is called 
‘ghomoos’10 which is the main dish accompanied by bread. The quantity of
9 ‘Baladi’ means traditional. ‘Baladi’ loaf, is a flat, round and thin loaf with some 
similarity to pitta bread but with higher nutritional value.
10 ‘Ghomoos’ usually cooked food that is eaten with bread.
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the ‘ghomoos’ depends on affordability, in some cases a regular plate of 
vegetable could feed a household of five or six if eaten with two or three loafs 
of bread by each. Until 1978 the loaf of bread cost one piaster (pt). There 
was an attempt by the government then to raise it to 2 pts, which led to the 
large scale food riots, leading the government to go back on its decision. 
However the size of the loaf gradually became smaller and the price rose 
gradually this time without a formal announcement11. In 1988/89 the price 
of the smaller size was 5 pts, and in some areas 10 pts.
When discussions were carried out around living expenses, the price of bread 
always came on top of the list of priorities, accompanied with heightened 
expressions of outrage. The issue was often presented by a calculation of how 
much is spent on ‘bread alone’ every day and what this meant in terms of 
monthly expense. If one considers that each adult member of a family 
consumes between 4 and 6 loafs of bread a day and each child between 2 and 
3 in an average household size of 5.12, this amounts to around 17 loafs a day 
which would cost 85 pts a day. This means that the average family in HNC, 
as in the case of Arab Rashed spent around LE25.5 a month on bread alone. 
Um Soad, the mother of four children all under the age of 10, said that she 
buys LEI worth of bread a day.
The discussion of the price of bread often brought back the memory of the 
food riots of 1978. This raised the issue of "why people protested then and 
they are not protesting now" as Abu Leila asked. The most prevalent 
argument was that having Emergency Regulations12 means that people are 
scared and to prove this the example of the Iron and Steel factory incident was 
brought up again.
11 A senior USAID official said that this was US advice to the GOE.
12 Emergency Regulations were introduced after Sadat’s assassination in 1981 and were 
never lifted. One of the items of these Regulations is that police have the right to make 
arrests and imprison individuals if they are among a group of more than five and are seen to 
be causing a disturbance.
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In addition to the price of bread, the price of other food items was also 
discussed at great length. The majority argued that some of these items had 
recently become beyond many of these household budgets. There were many 
comments said like: ‘Just a year ago pasta was for 16 pt, now it is for 80 pt. 
The price of rice went from 60 pt last month to 80 pt this month’. Both 
pasta and rice were part of the rationed food items. The consumption of milk, 
which is seen as a major nutrient for children, had also been cut down by 
many households. This, perhaps more than any other, was given as an 
example of the very real sacrifices various members of households were 
making. Feelings of guilt that children are no longer properly fed, were often 
expressed, mostly by mothers.
The inhabitants of HNC held very strong views about the reasons for the rise 
in the cost of living. The government was seen by the majority to be 
responsible, some blamed it on the local economy and some saw it as a result 
of world economy.
Government’s lack of care, corruption and alliance with of ‘those who control 
the economy in Egypt’ were seen as the major reasons for the rise of prices. 
Government, for the majority of the interviewees was seen as a ‘non caring’ 
entity that does nothing to help its people. Their comment on government’s 
explanation that prices are up because of Egypt’s debt, is that the debt exists 
as a result of the ‘big people and their theft and the money they keep in Swiss 
banks’. Ex-Ministers were seen as a major groups among ‘..those who 
control the economy’. There was a great deal of talk about how they used 
their positions to ensure they become successful businessmen after they leave 
office. Their money ‘..in Swiss Banks" was often referred to as . . ‘probably 
enough to repay Egypt’s debts’.
The question many raised, was why should the poor pay for it? "They make 
as much money as they want, the money of the people goes to their pockets 
so there is no more money so there is borrowing and debts and it is the poor
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who pay the price" is a very commonly made statement by the inhabitants of 
Neighbourhood 5. Another is: "It is not true that we are a poor nation the 
country is rich in resources but all the money goes to the powerful". Senior 
politicians were seen as uncaring individuals who are ignorant about the 
‘regular citizen’ struggle to live.
"They do not believe that people are suffering. What do they 
know about us? They say do not believe opposition papers.
Why would we not believe them and believe die government?
The government over the years have been promising that the 
poor will be taken care of. All we have seen is more and more 
hardship"
C. WITHDRAWAL OF FREE SOCIAL SERVICES: THE CASE OF 
EDUCATION:
The rise in education expenses was always cited by the populations of HNC 
as an example of a sector that affects their lives most. The establishment of 
free social services such as education and health, was considered by most as 
one of the major achievement of the Egyptian revolution13. According to the 
World Bank report, the Ministry of Education expenditure per capita or per 
student was reduced by a fifth in the late eighties (WB, 1991). Authorities 
have instituted modest fees to compensate for the decline in budgetary 
allocations for supplies and other non-wage expenditures. There was 
increasing evidence that the cost of education was becoming prohibitive for 
the parents in the poorest population groups and that dropout rates in low 
income areas were on the rise as a direct consequence (Ibid).
The cost of education however did not stop at the introduction of a ‘modest 
fee’. The distribution of free books and note books was also cancelled. In 
addition in the late 1970s the Ministry of Education institutionalised the 
practice of group tutoring within government schools. This involves offering 
after-hour tutoring where groups of children who needed extra help would be
13 See Chapter 3.
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given extra lessons for a ‘nominal fee’14. The reason given for this system 
was to control the practice of group tuition which had become endemic in all 
schools15. This however never succeeded in getting rid of private lessons16. 
The so-called group tutoring in schools meant that half to three quarters of the 
students were pressurised into attending, and due to the large numbers per 
group, the lessons if given at all, were ineffective. This meant that students 
were still forced to receive private lessons often by the same teachers, and this 
again, as will be shown later often occurred under duress.
Therefor a student has to pay the annual fee of LE20 to LE30 in primary 
education, which according to WB estimates, represent 5 to 7.5% of the 
yearly income of a government employee (WB, 1991, pp. 117-118). In 
addition, LE3 to LE5 Egyptian pounds a month per subject for in-school 
tutoring, plus LE5 to LEI0 per month for private tutoring were paid out. In 
addition to this there are also books, school uniform, shoes and often 
transport. 24% of households estimated that they spend between on average 
LE15 per month per child on education while 19% said they spent around 
LE20.
Despite the additional expenses for education, most parents in HNC still 
attempted to keep their children in school.
The above is a summary of the conditions in which the buyers of the flats 
found themselves at the time of their move to the new flats. The move and 
the impact of the Project, as my hypothesis states, contributed to their
14 Around LE5 per month in the late eighties.
15 This system, which started to be practised on a large scale in the eighties, meant that 
smaller groups within each class would get extra tutoring from their teacher in school after 
hours for a fee.
16 Only the very top students of a class are exempt from attending these lessons, and 
sometimes not even them.
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vulnerability. A number of case studies illustrate this point in more detail (see 
Appendix 7) 17.
m  THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PURCHASE OF THE NEW 
FLATS
Most buyers were pleased that they were able to get access to new flats, 
Three major reasons for the attractiveness of the new housing were cited: 
35 % of the buyers said that they found the best feature of the flats to be that 
they were going to be home-owners for the first time. 30% said that the 
location, so close to the place of work of the factory workers, was the most 
positive feature of the flats. 13.5% said that having no landlords, who are 
always ‘a source of trouble’ was the what they found most rewarding. 
However, the fact they had to wait for so long to get the flats, on average 3 
to 4 years, had been a source of many problems - the most serious of which 
was the increase in the price of the units.
A. THE DILEMMAS POSED BY THE INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF 
THE UNITS:
When the fieldwork in Neighbourhood 5 started, the buyers had been moving 
in over the previous three months. Some had moved in to stay, and others 
were still going back and forth between their old accommodation and the new 
flats. Several reasons were given for why the latter could not settle down. 
Most common of these were that their flats still needed repair and/or 
decoration, or that the family had to stay behind because of children’s schools.
17 The way in which the Helwan Project contributed to the vulnerability of the HNC 
residents in the context of the wider economic situation will be illustrated with four case 
studies representing four categories of households in terms of the degree of the impact o f the 
Project on them.
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During my first visits all that the inhabitants of the flats spoke about was the 
financial burden caused by the purchase of the units18. The common theme 
that ran through this discussion was around the question of how a Project 
could possibly be for low income people when it was so expensive.Most of the 
buyers argued that low income people could not afford the price especially 
after it was increased. Some argued that they felt ‘cheated’ and ‘trapped’ as 
the price they were promised went up considerably. They explained that 
meeting the payment demands meant indebtedness and sacrifices. A few 
(around 12%) said that although they were disappointed by the price increase, 
they could still afford it. Most of the latter had also been paying high rents 
before. The buyers speculated on a number of reasons for the increase in 
price. They saw it as a result of lack of care about their welfare, poor 
management and corruption among others.
A number of the new arrivals had their story to tell about how, when they 
first heard of the Project, they felt it was their way out of what they described 
as difficult and sometimes impossible housing conditions. When they did 
apply in 1984, they thought they would get affordable housing in a matter of 
a few months.
It was only in 1986 that they were given more details about the price and 
system of payment. Although many did not have the cash to make the down 
payment, they thought it was an amount they could raise in one way or 
another. In fact in 1986 when the contracts were signed, the down payment 
was set at LE600, LE700 and LE800 for models A, B and C respectively. 
These amounts, the buyers were told, represented 10% of the cost of the 
units. They were also told that the rest would be paid over 30 years with 4%
18 I very clearly presented myself as a research student who is totally independent of the 
EAJP, the Government or USAID. I am sure that initially some of the people I visited still 
thought I could influence things. But as the time passed, most started to realise I had no 
leverage and could not influence Project conditions.
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interest. Many explained that having calculated what this meant, they figured 
they would have to pay around LE15 to LE20 monthly.
By the time the buyers signed the contract they found that they had paid 150% 
more than was first promised. They had to pay LE1551, LE1781, LE2391 
as first instalments and the monthly payment were set for LE35, LE38 and 
LE42 for models A, B and C respectively. Thus, having planned for a budget 
which they felt was affordable, by the time they moved in the price had, they 
argued, had gone well beyond their means. Abu Soad, whose household is 
composed of a wife and four young children explained:
"If you add the first instalment to the monthly instalments plus 
the 4% interest to the bank, this would amount to LEI6,000.
If the cost as announced by the Agency ranged from LE6,000 
to LE8,000 where does the rest of the money go?" (Interview,
1989).
There was a lot of discussion about what was seen as the injustice of the 
situation that led them into paying so much more. Abu Amr, one of the A 
model flat buyers, was highly organised in terms of paper work and keeping 
records for all the payments. He produced his receipts and explained the 
following:
"They [the Agency] first said they will take 10% of the price 
of the unit as first instalment, but they themselves did not know 
what the price would be. In 11/1987 they said that the value of 
the land and the unit was LE6000 for model A. We were asked 
then to pay LE687. In 20/7/1988 we were told that the value 
of the flat went up to LE9000 and accordingly we were asked 
to pay another LE703. Two months later, at the time we were 
handed the flat they [the Agency] said the price of material and 
labourers went up again and we had to pay another LE161.
Then we had to pay seven month of rent LE277 in 8/1988 plus 
LE50 for the price of writing a contract which in fact is not 
signed yet. I got my unit in May 1989" (Interview, 1989).
As was often explained by the buyers, they were never informed of the new 
increased price. They kept getting bills one after another. The stories were
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often about how the factory workers, all men in this case, came back from 
work feeling desperate and frustrated after receiving yet another bill 
demanding more money. They would sit and discuss it with other household 
members. The discussion was often about dropping the whole plan to buy the 
flat or thinking of yet other ways of raising the money. In order to raise more 
money, the choice was often between selling more precious belongings, and/or 
borrowing from different sources. What seemed often to be agonizing 
decisions, were not always taken on the basis of consensus. As the different 
stories were told, it appeared that it was one of the partners who was more 
eager to go ahead and buy the flat no matter what. Depending on who in the 
household was the most desperate to go to the new housing, it was this person 
who kept pushing for ways to reach this goal. As will be shown below, the 
consequences of these different levels of eagerness to move, proved to have 
quite damaging effects on the household at a later stage. Um Mostafa who 
lived with her in-laws and was very miserable in her housing arrangement 
described how she kept pushing her husband to meet the payments:
"Every time he came home with this angry and determined 
look in his face I thought ‘oh God not another bill’ and it was.
You will not believe the effort I had to make to persuade him 
to go along with it. I was desperate and was therefore ready 
to sell everything we had to move. The last thing I sold was 
the television which we had recently bought and had not even 
finished paying its last instalments" (Interview, 1989).
Abu Manssoor who felt this was his last chance to get out of the ‘dark hole’, 
as he described his old room, said that he had to trick his wife into selling the 
fridge to meet the last payment.
"She had given up and did not want to hear about Helwan any 
more. But I was not going to let go. Not after all we already 
sold. Not after all this time", he added (Interview, 1989).
In addition to all this, most buyers found it necessary to fix things in the 
house to make it ‘habitable’. The units were handed to the buyers with 
unpainted walls, floors covered in dried cement stains, water taps that did not
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work, pipes that leaked, doors and windows that did not close properly and 
electric wires which were not connected properly. Many of the buyers 
decided, often because they had no choice, to live in the flats without 
spending any more on repairs and wall painting. Others, either because they 
could afford it or borrowed money, spent often large amounts of money 
improving their flats19.
Despite the increase in price and additional expenses, most buyers said they 
felt too involved to let go of the flats at this stage. The argument was that 
despite the price which was seen to be beyond their means, they felt it was 
very difficult to withdraw and just forget about the possibility of moving to 
a new apartment. In fact, penalties were set for those who withdrew from the 
Project. A number of examples were given about how colleagues of the 
buyers who did withdraw had lost money. Abu Haguer explained:
"Some withdrew their money but lost money in the process as 
they had them pay for all the paper work for the last three to 
four years. Not only did this shatter their dream but also had 
them loose money" (Interview, 1989).
Discussion around this issue showed that despite their predicament, most 
(83%) found themselves in a position where they had been waiting for 4 to 5 
years for this place and had invested in it emotionally and financially and were 
unable to let go at this late stage. There were many reasons discussed about 
why most found it nearly impossible to withdraw from the Project. Some had 
to do with real tangible reasons such as loss of money. Other reasons given 
were the difficulty of forgetting about the new apartments at this stage. As 
is implied in Abu Haguer’s explanation, loss of money was not the major 
reason for many to withdraw from the Project. Rather it was the ‘shattered 
dream’. What seemed to be really bad housing conditions, led many buyers 
not to turn down the HNC flat even if it was economically crippling. The 
main argument was that they were left with no real choice. Abu Soad said:
19 This issue will be discussed at more length in second part of this chapter.
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"People are forced to pay this price only because they have no 
choice” (Interview, 1989).
Abu Haguer said that he lived with his family and paid only LE3 a month. 
"My wife", he added "insisted to move to be independent". Um Haguer 
explained:
"We lived with another eight people, plus us five sharing three 
rooms. It was so crowded and I did not get to even speak to 
my husband without everyone getting involved in our 
discussion".
Abu Mostapha who also said he suffered from over-crowding described his 
old housing situation as follows:
"We were crammed into two rooms with two other families.
All of us shared one bedroom and the rest with in-laws20.
Here we are paying a lot and we are living far from our 
married children, but things were getting unbearable" 
(Interview, 1989).
Um Mostapha added that although the housing situation was very hard, she 
could have borne it except that her husband insisted on the move.
Other than over-crowding, other physical housing conditions were also 
mentioned as reasons for accepting the HNC flats. Abu Leila, among others 
described his previous house as follows:
"I was forced to take it because we lived in very bad conditions 
in the basement and had no proper windows. The electricity 
had to be on all day plus there was a constant flow of water" 
(Interview, 1989).
20 Generally, according to tradition, second generation couples would live with the 
husband’s parents. Increasingly, however, due to the housing crisis, if there was no other 
choice they would live with the wife’s parents. This can reflect negatively on a man’s pride.
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There were various descriptions of areas that lacked infrastructure and 
suffered from disastrous environmental conditions. Ma’ssara was one of 
these21. Talking about his neighbours Abu Amr, who had lived in Ma’ssara 
over the last ten years explained:
MI thought of withdrawing but found that in a place like 
Manshiet Nasser the key money is LE3000 and rent LE70 per 
month. Others, like my neighbour lived in poor conditions in 
Ma’ssara, no water, pollution from cement factory. These 
really had no choice (Interview, 1989).
There were also many accounts about landlords and the harassment that they 
as renters experienced from landlords. These stories echoed those that were 
told in Arab Rashed (chapter 6). To escape from such harassment was 
perceived by many as such a priority that the financial burden had to be 
tolerated. In most such cases the landlords having been informed that the 
HNC buyers were moving out, had started making plans for the empty units. 
The fact that the latter had to stay on for four or five years, led to an even 
worse situation whereby the landlords getting impatient and increasing the bad 
treatment. Um Salah told the story of their landlords, who wanted her rooms 
to use as a workshop.
”They harassed us all in the most horrible way. We were in 
the lower floor and they occupied the first and second floor.
They threw dirty water on our clean washing and garbage at 
our door-step. They did not miss any occasion to pick fights 
with me and my husband. They even hired a boy to beat up 
our children. We complained to the police but did not manage 
to get their protection” (Interview, 1989).
Abu Soad explained:
21 Ma’ssara is located north of Helwan, on the Cairo-Helwan road. It is an extremely 
polluted area as it is in close proximity to the Cement factory. All trees around the area have 
calcified. It also lacks infrastructure, and is therefore surrounded by both liquid and solid 
waste.
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"Owners do their best to get rid of the renters to get others 
who would pay more. This is the plague of our times. To be 
told that there was a chance of old renters moving out is bliss 
for them. Going back on it means real trouble" (Interview,
1989).
The argument about the issue of feeling trapped in a situation that was not a 
real choice, brought out feelings of frustration because the HNC Project was 
chosen rather than other available housing opportunities. 15th of May City22 
which is only about 7 km south of HNC, was the second alternative offered 
to Helwan factory workers in the early eighties. It is one of the New Cities 
which started to be built in the late seventies. As many others did, Abu 
Hamid described his regret and frustration at not choosing to buy in 15th of 
May City saying:
"I feel an absolute fool as I had a choice between May and 
here and I chose here. This was in 1981. The first instalment 
in May City was LE900 and the monthly rent LE34. Here the 
deal was to take a plot and a loan to buy my own house. I 
thought that as an American project financed by America it 
would be special. I therefore chose it as I thought then that it 
was a better deal both in terms of money and quality" 
(Interview, 1989).
Describing how he envies his cousin who had the luck to choose to buy in 
May City, Abu Soad said:
"If you look at May City you would know what a bad deal we 
have here. Considering what we ended up paying here, the 
cost of May City which I thought was beyond my means, is 
very reasonable. Not only that, but the apartments are larger, 
they have balconies overlooking beautiful gardens, there are 
large shopping centres, mosques etc" (Interview, 1989).
22 15th of May City is one of the satellite cities, located about 30 Km south of Cairo. 
By 1989, around 13,000 units were built of which 80% were inhabited.
Discussing this point Abu Aly, who has serious health problems23 but has 
two jobs to support a family of seven, said:
"We were trapped into this Project. We found ourselves 
paying more and more. If we had known about the price from 
the beginning it would have been impossible for us to buy 
here. In 1985 we were offered an apartment in May City for 
LE900 first instalment, but we thought it to be too expensive 
then. When two years later I heard of this project and it was 
for LE700, I thought it was O.K since we were living in 
terrible conditions. Then they started asking for more, so we 
started selling our things one by one till we have nothing now 
as you can see" (Interview, 1989).
‘Feeling trapped’ was very much a feeling that most of the flat buyers felt. 
However the feeling was not restricted to the flats. It encompassed a much 
wider awareness and resentment about powerlessness in general and lack of 
control over their lives. This implicit resentment was underlying many of the 
discussions around their lives and especially their relations with others, eg 
their previous landlords, the Agency or Government.
B. COPING WITH INDEBTEDNESS:
86% of the buyers said that they had gone into debt to a number of sources 
to meet the increase in the price of the flats. The rest said that they their 
income and the way they manage it means that they were able to afford the 
new price of the flat without getting into debts.
Consequently, as was often argued, this left buyers with large debts which had 
to be repaid in monthly instalments. Besides borrowing from relatives and 
friends, buyers explained that there were two other sources that were used to 
borrow money. The first of these is the Project Bank, and the second is the 
Building Cooperative to which most factory workers have access.
23 He was taken by a friend to hospital during one of my visits.
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Many of the buyers spoke at great length about the amounts borrowed and the 
implications of the debt repayments on their lives. They spoke about how, 
after the monthly repayments, they had little left for their every day expenses. 
Abu Leila, who is the sole earner in a household of seven with a wife plus 
five children under the age of five, gave a detailed description of the amount 
of debt repayments he had to meet every month.
"I get paid LE106 a month. I have two debts to repay, one to 
the Building Cooperative in the company where I work, and 
this is for LE20 a month. The second is to the bank for LE26.
Then there is the monthly rent of LE42. So if you add LE20,
LE26, and LE42, this amounts to LE86 per month for the 
apartment alone. This leaves us with LE20 for all our other 
expenses. I used to pay LE5 rent" (Interview, 1989).
Others chose to sell some of their belongings, often in addition to borrowing. 
As is often the case with those who are in formal employment and have a 
fixed monthly pay, Egyptians buy electric household appliances and furniture 
through their place of work and pay them in instalments. This system means 
that each month a portion of their income automatically goes towards 
repayment. Having to sell what they have been paying for over months and 
months is obviously very hard. Many of the buyers had to do just that in 
order to get housing in the HNC and expressed a great deal of bitterness . 
Um Aly, one of those who spoke about this issue explained:
"We sold everything for nothing to meet the payments. The 
TV we bought for LE350 and sold for less than half its price, 
the refrigerator was for LE600. We used it only for one year 
and sold it for LE200. Even the furniture we sold. All that 
remains is the bed and a couple of wooden chairs. All this and 
we are still in debt" (Interview, 1989).
Um Salah also said:
"My husband says to you that we managed fine meeting the 
first instalment for the flat. I do not know what he means 
because we had to sell everything we owned for that. The 
coloured TV, the gas stove the fridge, the fan, everything and
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we are still paying the instalments for some of these items” 
(Interview, 1989).
Some of the men who talked about this issue were so furious about having to 
sell so much, that they did no even try to conceal that they had to sell some 
of their wives’ and children’s belongings. This, in regular circumstances, 
would be considered as shameful behaviour and men would not admit to 
having done it. Abu Mahmoud, among others, said bitterly: ”This was an 
absolute disaster for us. We sold everything we owned. I had to sell my 
wife’s and children’s gold” (Interview, HNC, 1989).
Long discussion centred on the often dire situations that the HNC flat buyers 
were faced with as a consequence of indebtedness and loss of goods 
accumulated over the years. Despite long fieldwork experience in low income 
areas, I found the bareness of some of the flats in HNC quite unique. Most 
explained that the situation as it stands could not go on and that measures had 
to be taken in order to get extra income. Many of the men spoke of taking 
on extra jobs, but added that this was no longer easily available with rising 
unemployment. Some women were thinking of finding jobs for the first time 
and again no one was optimistic about the prospects.
The impact of the new economic situation on many of these household meant 
cutting down on expenses which met basic needs. Um Leila, mother of 5, 
was embarrassed and sad when she described how, for the first time, she had 
to cut down on buying essential food for their young children. ”1 cannot even 
afford to buy milk or eggs. I feel absolutely miserable that my children should 
be deprived of such basic food items”.
C. INTRA-HOUSEHOLD TENSIONS:
The frustrations as well as the financial pressures of buying the flats has led 
to difficulties among many relationships within household, some quite
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serious24. As shown above, the decision to buy the flats in the first place 
and then to go ahead with the plan despite increases in price, was taken in a 
number of cases as a result of one member of the couple’s insistence, rather 
than as a result of consensus. Many quarrels occurred about the resulting 
problems and a lot of blame was put on one or the other member of the 
couple. There were cases, such as that of Abu and Um Haguer mentioned 
above (p. 160), where they bought the flat as a result of her insistence because 
she hated being crammed in one room sharing with Abu Haguer’s parents. 
All the financial problems that the household was facing at the time of the 
research are blamed on her. Although she was suffering trying to meet her 
responsibility to make ends meet, she was not allowed to complain.
In other cases, where it was the husband who wanted the move, as in the case 
of Abu and Um Sherif, the situation was reversed. In this instance, she was 
happy living in close proximity to her parents and, as she said, saved money 
through being provided with occasional meals by them.
"I did not want to come here," she explained, "I was happy in 
my house surrounded by my family. We cannot live properly 
here when most of his [her husband’s] pay is spent on debts 
and instalments. We are also so far from civilisation that to do 
my simplest shopping I have to take public transport which is 
an expense we did not have where we were before".
Putting his case forward, Abu Sherif said:
"My in-laws made my life hell. They interfered in everything 
related to our life. I would be sitting in my house and find 
them in the middle of the room. We could not have an 
argument and my wife would let everyone interfere. She was 
completely unmanageable".
He went on to tell the story of their move to the flat. He said that when he 
told his wife about the house in 1984, she made a ‘scene’ as she did not want
24 I was conducting fieldwork in Arab Rashed and HNC, and could feel a significantly 
more tension between household members in the latter.
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to move. She and her family wrote to the agency saying that he already had 
a house. The Agency summoned him. He told them that the flat he was 
living in did not belong to him but to his wife’s parents’. Having proved his 
eligibility, they put him back on the list. He told his wife that he lost the flat 
and started paying for it in secret and tricked her into selling the fridge so he 
could meet the last request of payment. When it was time to move, he 
announced that they were moving the following week. She refused to follow 
him, so he left and stayed in the house for a month until his family and 
friends persuaded her to take the children and go to live with him.
She privately explained that she wanted a divorce, but her brother warned her 
that her husband would take the children. So she went just for her children 
regarding the move as a trial and if things got to be too much, she would 
leave. She said he hated everyone and here he did not mix with anyone, 
although others were trying. In response to her accusations Abu Sherif said 
that the occupants of the flats were "not my kind of people". She said 
"nowhere are people his kind of people".
In the above case there were obviously many problems between the couple. 
The move to the new flats might just have been the last straw. However, one 
cannot ignore the financial pressures and other problems that this move caused 
which helped inflame the whole situation. This is better illustrated in the case 
of another couple, Um and Abu Mohamed.
Abu Mohamed was one of the buyers who was not able to meet the monthly 
instalments of the flats and thus had not paid them since he had moved in. He 
saw his life collapsing and felt overwhelmed with all the financial demands he 
was unable to meet.
Um Mohamed, in order to make some money to help with the increase 
financial demands, found a job as a cleaning lady in a hospital. Her job 
meant long hours away from home. Abu Mohamed complained that the whole
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move to the new flat was her idea and that now they were all having to pay 
the consequences. Serious rows started occurring, and although, as Um 
Mohamed explained, this was not new to their marriage, things deteriorated 
so badly that he started to beat her viciously and accuse her of unfaithfulness 
to him. She eventually left him, and he blamed it all on her ‘newly 
discovered independence’. He said: "She started to make a few piasters and 
believed herself to be a human being. Let her go to hell". He said bitterly: 
"I have not paid them [the Agency] for three months now. Let them come and 
take my belongings, I have nothing left as you can see". And, indeed, he had 
not.
Since household rows are rarely a secret business in cases where living 
arrangement are in such close proximity, discussions about several of these 
cases was one of the favoured topics of conversation. Talking of individual 
cases often led to general discussions about the reason for what was seen by 
many, as a higher incidence of household problems as compared to where they 
came from. Many attributed this tension to difficulties in adapting to a new 
place but mostly to the financial difficulties faced by everyone. The argument 
was, as Abu Saleh, among others put it:
"I think there are lots of rows between couples because of the amount 
of pressure that expenses are causing and because of the many needs 
that the family provider is unable to meet" (Interview, 1989).
D. THE QUESTION OF AFFORDABILITY AND ELIGIBILITY: 
‘HOUSING FOR LOW INCOME PEOPLE?’
If this Project was aimed at meeting the housing needs of the Low Income 
population, how did it come to cause such a financial burden on them? was 
a question asked by many. The big question that was asked by most in 
Neighbourhood 5 was ‘where are the poor? No way can low income people 
afford this’. Like many others, Abu Mohsen asked about the definition of 
‘low income’. His question was about how Government assumed that a
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person with a fixed salary could raise such a large amount of money to meet 
the first instalment.
"I am sincerely interested to find out what they [the Agency] 
mean by low income. They have this large sign at the door 
saying low income. What is their definition of that? We are 
all here on a fixed pay and they do know how much that is" 
(Interview, 1989).
Discussing the monthly instalments, Abu Aly, in his angry manner, asked :
"Where is the low income population in the whole matter?
Why did the agency ask for our pay receipts if they were not 
going to use them to estimate what we could afford to pay for 
rent?" (Interview, 1989).
Abu Ahmed also argued his point along the same lines saying:
"These flats are absolutely beyond our means. I would like 
someone, anyone to explain to me what these people meant by 
low income housing. The monthly payment was supposed to 
be one fourth of our pay. It is in fact 55% of my pay plus 
incentives" (Interview, 1989).
The outrage about the increase in the price of the units raises the question of 
eligibility and affordability. None of those who met the increasing cost felt 
that they could afford it. Project documents and interviews show that 
although there might have been some concern about eligibility and 
affordability, they were dismissed as not really serious. After all, one of the 
major goals set by the Project Paper was to ‘..switch GOE’s emphasis from 
middle to low-income families’ (Gardner, 1990, p. 11). Based on this, the 
HNC Project was targeted to the lowest 60th percentile of the income 
distribution for the Helwan factories (Integrated Development Consultants 
(IDC), 1987, p .l) . This changed over the years to exclude those who were 
below the 30th percentile. There was also a shift from taking basic salary to 
total salary of the head of the household as a measure of income. The 
condition was that housing costs were not to exceed 20% of income (Ibid, 
p.3).
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The major argument held by the Agency employees was that the increase in 
the level of income, and the way in which eligibility criteria re-adapted over 
the years of the Project, matched the increase in the price of the units while 
affordable to the target group. USAID auditors were however unsure about 
this point. They raised the question of affordability in their report of 1989 
and 1990, expressing concern about whether or not buyers would be able to 
meet the required payment. To satisfy their enquiries USAID local office 
contracted a consultant to carry out a study to investigate the issue. The 
conclusion of the study was that more than half of the buyers were paying 
more than 20% of their salaries for housing, with some paying up to 37% 
(IDC, pp. 13-14). This, according to WB estimates, is 12% higher than the 
percentage of income that low income population could afford. It is 20% to 
25 % higher than the estimates of other research in other countries (In Wakely,
1988).
The IDC report goes on to explain that actually the measurement of 
affordability based on head of household salary was not accurate as there is 
the possibility of secondary incomes of wives and sons. In other words there 
is no affordability problem because the income of other members of the 
household would contribute to the payment of the instalments. The argument 
however did not really hold when the survey that was carried out showed that 
only 8% of second generation and 12% of wives had access to income (Ibid, 
p .9). In my research, as shown above, it is even less, at 2% and 8% 
respectively.
In short, although the Consultants’ report suggests more flexibility in the 
system of repayment, such as extending the period for some to 40 rather than 
30 years, it limits the number of those for whom the units are unaffordable to 
only 10% of the buyers. This percentage, the consultant admits might be an 
underestimation. The problem of affordability is avoided by the explanation 
that eligibility is based on total rather than basic salary, the argument that
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other household members are income earners and that the affordability picture 
improves with the passage of time (Oldheim, 1987).
Interviews with Agency senior employees raised further doubts that the 
measures of eligibility and affordability would be revised in the future. The 
Agency staff interviews revealed that most hold the basic view that the whole 
question of affordability was a big fallacy. They believe that factory workers 
make a ‘lot of money’ out of working over-time and by having second jobs- 
that they pretend to be poor in order ‘to get an easy ride’. There were a 
number of comments like "but they make more money than I do", or "don’t 
believe them, they pretend to be poor because they think they can get things 
for free" or "you researchers are so naive you believe everything you are 
told".
In other words, stereotypes about working class people dominated the 
Agency’s views around this issue. Very few of the employees had any 
empathy for what was reported about economic hardship caused by the terms 
of the Project. They not only accused the ‘beneficiaries’, as they call them, 
of deception about their income, but they also accused them of being parasites 
‘who got used to getting everything for nothing’ and that ‘it was time they 
paid their due’. Some also suggested that by getting them to invest money in 
housing, the Project was actually ‘saving them from their vices’. A number 
of the Agency employees went as far as to argue that by committing them to 
pay a fixed proportion of their pay monthly, this meant that the Project was 
‘helping them from using their extra money on bad habits such as drugs or 
taking on a second wife’.
Although affordibility and eligibility were at one point ‘hot issues’ in the 
Project, both the Consultant’s report and the Agency misconception seem to 
have put it to one side.
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E. ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY:
Throughout the discussions with the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5, the issue 
of who was responsible for their predicament kept cropping up. They had 
feelings of bitterness and anger about being at worst cheated and at best let 
down. These feelings were not only directed towards the Agency, but the 
Government in general. Most were less clear about the extent of the role that 
USAID played in the decision around pricing. While most, as will be shown 
in the next sections, blamed USAID with respect to other ‘sides’ of the 
Project, it was exempt of blame for the price.
The blame directed to USAID was mostly indirect. Some said they were 
puzzled by the fact that the Project used an American grant, and that they 
[the buyers] still had to pay so much. Expressing such concern, Abu Mohsen 
asked:
"How can this be an American Project, financed by American 
aid money and yet we have to pay back the full cost of the 
units plus a 4 % interest? If the money is a grant, that means 
it is not returned to the Americans. So why pay all this plus 
interests. Who is going to get this money?" (Interview, 1989).
Abu Salah argued:
"If the Americans were more involved in this Project, none of 
this playing around would have happened. We [Egyptians] 
always say that foreigners have no morals. Well I think they 
have much more conscience then we do" (Interview, 1989).
Other people, like Abu Hamid, saw that the problem resulted from the 
involvement of American money which meant more chance for foul play.
"All the people involved in the project stole from it and the 
Americans know nothing about it. This stealing did not occur 
in May City because it involved Egyptian money which is 
easier to supervise. It was easier to know how it was used and 
where it went. Because this was American money, the playing 
around was easier" (Interview, 1989).
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Most of the anger was directed towards the Agency. The buyers argued that 
the Agency staff intentionally misinformed them about the price. They said 
that although the Agency employees had explained that inflation was the 
reason for the increasing cost over the years, they did not believe this was the 
real reason. They felt that the Agency lied to them in order to get them to 
buy the units.
With the Agency being a Government institution, blame was often also 
generalised to the Government. This led to long discussions, about how the 
buyers felt about the Government as they have been experiencing it, especially 
during the last decades. The discussion generally focused on how 
Government basically ‘does not deliver to the poor’ because personal interests 
always come first. The Project was seen as an illustration of just this 
phenomenon. Accusations that simply everyone is corrupt, dominates most 
conversations among Egyptians. In the case of the HNC inhabitants, finding 
reasons for their hardship which are to do with other peoples’ greed and 
corruption, seemed to be their way of expressing their anger and resentment.
Some repeated a rumour that a group of the old Agency senior staff stole 
LE5M and escaped. The extra amount of money that the buyers have been 
asked to pay, the rumour goes, is to compensate for the loss. Others accused 
the engineers who were seen to be in a conspiracy with the contractors to 
make more money.
Abu Hala, one of the more bitter inhabitants of the neighbourhood said:
"There was no proper supervision on the part of the 
Government and that is why the cost went up. I do not believe 
this business of the prices of construction material. First of all 
the materials are the cheapest possible. Second it is well known 
that when signing a contract there is a clause that says that the 
client will not be responsible for a rise in price, so who are 
they fooling? The thing was done for the mutual gain of
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contractor and the agency, ‘chaiilni wa a chaiilak’”25 
(Interview, 1989).
In their anger about the money they had to pay, the buyers needed to have a 
concrete enemy to blame and they chose the most obvious. USAID, on the 
other hand, not being directly in the picture, was viewed by some in the role 
of the generous provider who was not allowed to give as much as it wanted 
because of those in the middle, whose lack of care or greed resulted in those 
on the receiving end not getting it.
Some of the buyer’s views reflected that everyone had ‘a piece of the cake’ 
and that if Government had a chance it would have had its ‘slice’ as well. 
Abu Salah was one of those who felt that everyone who had a chance made 
a personal profit out of the Project. He described it as a hierarchy of people 
who made money.
"The contractor ate26. The engineer who is supposed to make 
sure the work is done properly also ate, or else the work would 
not have been of the quality you see. The agency also did the 
same. In short there are lots of people who got fat out of this 
project. If it is true what we are told, that some people high 
up do not like this project it must be that they did not have the 
chance to eat as well (Interview, 1989).
Others saw the Government in an exploitative role, wanting to get the most 
out of people even, the poor. Abu Hani, who claimed that he had inside 
information from people he knew at the Agency said:
"I was told by people at the agency that the price went up 
because at first die MOH and the Governorate did not attach 
any value to the land as it was just unused desert. Therefore 
they gave it to the project for free. After the infrastructure was
25 This is an Arabic expression that would literally translate ‘you carry for me, I carry 
for you’, meaning you do me a favour and in return I will do you a favour. The ‘favour’ 
here often has a negative connotation, ie it is often not straight.
26 An expression used for those who embezzled or were bribed.
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installed they became greedy and asked for a price. As a 
result, it is us, the poor, who are paying the price (Interview,
1989).
Greed was one of the words most used. Many made comments such as 
‘These prices show us that the private sector is not more greedy than the 
Government (Interview, 1989).
By asking for interest, many saw the Government as exploitative of people’s 
need for housing in a way to make money instead of providing services to the 
poor. Abu Mostapha argued:
MIn the past Government used to help the poor to survive by 
providing extra services for them. Now they are making a 
profit out of us. I cannot understand how a Government takes 
interest from the poor" (Interview, 1989).
Abu Mervat’s argument, like many others, was about the unfairness of 
Government:
"Why does the Government have to burden me so? I am a 
hard working labourer, I pay my taxes. Why not try to make 
my life less difficult so I can work and produce better? How 
can I be expected to have any loyalty to my country now? This 
is the country of the rich, it does not belong to us (Interview,
1989).
Abu Hamid condemned squatters and questioned the logic of Government in 
dealing with different situations:
"We are punished for doing the legal thing. This is what our 
Government is like. If you look here in front of us you will see 
squatters on the edge of Atlas27. They have no right to the 
land like many others around the country. They are people 
who are willing to take a risk and they often win. It is money 
like that the Government is losing which it is compensating by
27 Atlas is another big Public Housing Project built in the sixties. It is right next to 
neighbourhood 5.
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over-charging people like us who are unwilling to defy the 
law" (Interview, 1989).
IV SPACE, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
While the price of the units took the larger share of discussions that went on 
in Neighbourhood 5, most buyers also had a great deal to say about the 
quality of the units.
A. SPACE:
Compared to other public housing projects, the units in Neighbourhood 5 are 
considerably smaller. As mentioned above, the size ranges from 56, 67 and 
84 sq meters while the minimum size in housing built in the 50’s and the late 
60’s housing was 85 sq meters. In May City, the average size of units in 95 
sq meters.
The reason for the smallness of the flats is that, as discussed in the last 
chapter, they were built on the same plots which were designed for Sites-and- 
Services. The size of the latter were small as more space was to be achieved 
by vertical expansion. Considering this is no option in the case of ready-built 
flats meant that buyers were stuck with tiny rooms and no space for 
expansion. In most five story public housing buildings in Helwan, occupants 
were able to build one or two room extensions to their flats. This involved 
the provision of a five story framed concrete column and/or brick structure 
to any side of the existing building (Tripple and Wilkinson, 1987, p .239). 
This ingenious solution to finding an answer to some of their marrying 
children’s housing problems, was facilitated by the fact that there was enough 
space between blocks to allow such expansion. This option of external 
extension is denied the HNC inhabitants, as space between blocks was
279
intentionally restricted to avoid what the Agency staff see as a ‘potential 
disaster’28.
Having to live in such confined conditions was thus seen by many of the 
buyers as being highly unjust. Inhabitants of models A and B obviously felt 
the most frustrated. As discussed earlier in the chapter, buyers, again were 
not allowed to choose which model they wanted to buy. A complicated, 
computerised system was used to allocate different models to buyers. 
Through trial and error, a system whereby points were given to level of 
income, number of household members and age, among others, was devised. 
The system did not always work, and there were often cases where a 
household of six or seven members were allocated the smallest units. Many 
of the buyers found no sense in the system of allocation and were furious that 
they had to accept things as they were, no matter how unfair they found them. 
In their effort to pacify angry buyers, the Agency staff explained to them that 
there was no question of unfairness since the selection was all done by 
computers. This explanation was, as expected, met with a great deal of 
cynicism. Comments such as ‘show me this Mr.Computer, I would like to 
ring his neck’ were made.
Housing scarcity in Egypt means that there is very little residential mobility. 
Household members often stay in one residence over their life time. 
Increasingly also, even in urban areas, adult male children will marry and stay 
with their parents, as very few can afford to find a place of their own. As a 
result, overcrowding is a very real problem. For the Helwan factory workers 
implied buying a unit in HNC means that most probably, this would be their 
house for the rest of their lives. Therefor, finding that they have to live in 
tiny spaces involved a whole future of uncomfortable housing conditions. It 
also means that marrying children have no option but to leave or stay and live 
in very difficult conditions. Discussing these issues, many of the flat
28 This they saw as the creation o f a squatter style settlement-something they did not 
want to be seen associated with.
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inhabitants again questioned the reason why they were given such bad living 
arrangements. Again questions were raised about the Agency, Government 
in general and USAID.
Abu Ali, among others raised the question of why such small units were built, 
since the usual problem of scarcity of land was not at issue.
"We can’t understand why they were so stingy with space when 
land is so cheap here, it is only desert. They [the Agency] say 
it is the Americans who decided on size, but if this is true why 
did they accept it? Of course all they care about is to save as 
much money from the building expenses to go to their 
pockets" (Interview, 1989).
Um Ali added :
"The apartment is too small. We have five children, two of 
them are teenagers. We arrange our sleeping so as my son 
sleeps in one room and me, my husband and four daughters 
share the second room and the hall way space" (Interview,
1989).
The idea is that the room the son (nineteen years old) is occupying is seen as 
potentially his when he gets married. He will bring his wife to live there and 
then in the future his children will probably also share the room.
Some of the buyers had to leave members of their extended family behind 
because of lack of space. While some members of the household saw this as 
a disadvantage, others were glad to have independence from in-laws. Lack 
of choice was however a source of complaint. Abu Mahmoud who felt 
responsibility towards his mother and kid brothers explained:
"Why are the apartments so small when we are in the desert?
We requested a three room one, they gave us this tiny 
apartment. My mother and my two youngest brothers refuse 
to come now because of lack of space" (Interview, 1989).
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There was some blame also put on USAID. Resentment was very much 
directed against the Americans for basically ‘..wanting us, the Third World, 
to remain in our place and not develop’. Abu Soad was one of those who 
held such views.
"Americans want us to live in bad conditions and never 
improve. They lend us money as long as they can guarantee 
that we will always be reminded of our place as inferior beings 
to them. Yet they want us to be full of gratitude to them.
This is part of their plan to strip us of our pride" (Interview,
1989).
B. THE INTERIOR DESIGN OF THE UNITS:
The smallness of the rooms was also compounded by the absence of balconies 
in model A flats as well as badly located balconies in models B and C. 
Balconies in a hot country like Egypt, are an absolute necessity. They are 
used during the day to hang the washing, provide children a space to play, and 
in the evening they provide a space to sit with the family and enjoy the nice 
cool breeze. In HNC where balconies are available, they are located on the 
inside of the block looking onto the courtyard rather than onto the street. This 
means that balconies of adjacent apartment look onto each other, and are so 
close that the neighbours could literally shake hands from their individual 
balconies. Being so exposed means that balconies cannot be used freely 
especially by the women. Many buyers saw this as a very big disadvantage. 
Abu Soad who lives in a model A flat explained:
"We have no balconies so where is my wife supposed to hang 
the washing? Also there are no spaces for children to play and 
I do not like my daughters to play on the street, especially 
because a road will be built right next to us here. The balcony 
would have provided the children with a breathing space. I 
told the people at the agency that I want to build my own 
balcony, even if this means taking out of the space of the 
room. They refused my request saying ‘this is an American 
project, we have to keep the design as it is’. Even the 
balconies in models B and C are quite useless as they overlook 
each other" (Interview, 1989).
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Many women complained about feeling cooped up in the flats with no 
breathing space. They explained that they have to keep the balconies shut all 
the time as well as the window shutters closed because there is no privacy at 
all because of the way the units are built.
The inhabitants of the HNC saw that the fact that it was an Americans design, 
the only justification for why the units were built in such an unsuitable 
manner. Many said things like ‘this explains it. Westerners have no problem 
with privacy, they do not mind unrelated men and women mixing and being 
exposed to each other’. This they however found as no excuse for the 
execution of the design. Their argument was that they accept that Americans 
do not know better, but what they could not accept was why the Egyptians, 
ie. the Agency, accepted such a design.
Abu Haguer said:
"I can understand that the Americans find no problem sharing 
balconies, and not caring that their wives are seen half naked 
by their neighbours. But we are Muslims. This is completely 
unacceptable to us. I don’t blame the Americans, it is our 
people that I blame. What these designs show is that they [the 
Agency] just do not give a damn"
Abu Hamid, along the same lines argued:
"OK they made the designs in this way but they are not 
Muslim, how would they know how we like to live as 
Muslims. If they had told the agency to put a rattle or a bell 
on our mosques would they have accepted?" (Interview, 1989).
Similarly the courtyard in models A also caused big problems. The adjacent 
apartments of the ground floor share one courtyard which is accessed by a 
balcony door. This meant that there was no separation between the two 
balconies which again have privacy as well as security implications. In
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The first stage o f partitioning and appropriating the courtyard 
in Neighbourhood 5 (1989, aerial photo)
The second stage o f appropriating extra space through the 
construction o f outer walls - Neighbourhood 5 (1990)
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response, the first thing that most of the ground floor inhabitants did was to 
build a wall to separate this space. They found it very strange to share such 
a space which they mostly used for hanging the washing. This was pointed 
out to me frequently with interviewees asking with indignation ‘Did you ever 
see such an arrangement?’.
The Agency objected strongly to the partitions that were built through the 
buyer’s initiative. Their point was that the courtyard belonged to the 
inhabitants of the three floors and did not belong to the ground floor owners 
alone. This space, they explained, was provided to compensate for the 
absence of the balconies and was to be used for hanging the washing. Their 
first reaction was to come round and pull a few partitions down. This 
however caused so much havoc that they resigned themselves to the fact that 
they should leave this matter alone29.
Another major problem in the interior design which also has to do with 
privacy, is the size and especially the location of the toilet in flats model B 
and C. The toilet in these two types of flats opens onto the centre room­
hallway, which is used as a living room. This means that every time someone 
needs to use the toilet they have to go through the living room, which makes 
it quite a public affair. In addition the flimsy doors of the toilets results in the 
person feeling exposed. In the presence of visitors, who will always be 
received in the living room, this becomes an embarrassing exercise, especially 
for the female members of the household. Many complained that they were 
unable to use the toilet when there are male visitors. One or two of the 
women even said that when there were visitors, they would make sure there 
are no men at the neighbours’ and go to use their toilet!
29 These partitioned spaces were subsequently roofed to create a small room, and the 
other floors followed suit. This meant the courtyard was filled in (see photos, p. 285).
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C. THE QUALITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDINGS 
AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE:
In addition to the size and the design, the quality of the construction was 
identified by the buyers as the third major problem with the flats. The way 
the infrastructure connections were installed seemed to be on top of the list of 
construction problems. It only took two months of living in the flats, to show 
that there were serious faults. Sewage and water overflow was already in 
evidence during the time of the fieldwork (see photo, p.287). Subsequent 
visits showed increasing evidence of the problem. When asked about these 
problems, the Agency staff denied they were a result of bad construction but 
blamed it all on inhabitants’ misuse of the facilities. They kept commenting 
that there are problems because ' ..these people are ignorant, and do not care 
about keeping their environment in order’. The inhabitants on the other hand 
complained that toilets get easily blocked, leakages occur and cause high 
levels of damp which result in a high incidence of electrical short circuits. 
Abu Aly explained that the sewage connections served facing blocks which
means that if a pipe is blocked in one of the apartments, not only are all the
units blocked there, but cause blockages in the block facing it.
"There are overflows already occurring. It is unforgivable 
really. Not that we are not used to sewage overflows. Where 
we lived before we suffered a lot from that. But it was an old 
area and the pipes were disintegrating. There is no excuse here 
where everything is supposed to be new. It is basically an 
engineering mistake that is causing the problem. These people 
[the Agency] simply have no conscience’’ (Interview, 1989).
While Abu Aly blamed it on the Egyptian engineers, Abu Mervat directed his 
blame to the Americans.
"The Americans were responsible for the infrastructures and 
they did a poor job. Everything is already falling apart. There
are leaks in the water and sewage connections and the cables
are melting. When they left they probably did not give the 
infrastructure plans to the Egyptian which meant that when the 
latter started the construction, they had to do it through guess 
work" (Interview, 1989).
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Water overflow problems in Neighbourhood 5 (1990)
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The problems faced by the buyers led to some feeling insecure about the 
permanence of the flats. Abu Salah, who was a quiet man who lived in very 
bad housing conditions previously said:
"I feel that the houses will not survive more than three or four 
years. As you can see there are already leaks everywhere. I 
found a serious looking patch of damp on my wall. The 
Agency engineer who came to check it said ‘the neighbours 
upstairs must have left the tap on’. This is nonsense as the 
neighbour was not even here yet and the leak is not in the 
ceiling, it is close to the floor. The ceiling has got holes in it 
and the walls have little cement and mostly sand. My son [2 
years old] was playing with a pen in a small hole in the wall. 
It was so fragile it just crumbled and made a big gap?” 
(Interview, 1989).
There were also many who talked about cheap building material and the bad 
finishing of the units. The Agency staff admitted that in the effort to cut 
down on cost, and attempting to achieve cost recovery, many of the features 
expected in the finishing of the units were left out. The outside of the 
buildings, including the balconies, unlike any other public housing project, 
were left without plastering or painting. The inside walls were plastered but 
not painted. The basins and water faucets were also of bad quality and badly 
installed. The cement tiling on the floors, in addition to its inferior quality 
and the sloppy manner in which it was laid down, was all stained with 
building materials which was found impossible to clean.
Like many others who were disillusioned with the quality of the flats, Um 
Nawal said:
"There is nothing good about these flats except that the floor 
is dry. We lived on the ground floor where it got inundated 
with water every now and then. When I heard of this project 
I thought we were saved. However there are so many 
problems here one cannot believe it" (Interview, 1989).
Abu Aly also said:
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"I always lived in public housing. First, when I was a child, 
in housing built at the time of Nasser in Helwan, the apartment 
was 85 sq meters and my father paid PT 185 a month rent.
Then we left that apartment for my brother and his family and 
moved to May city in a flat of 95 sq meters for LE48. I never 
saw such bad conditions as there are here” (Interview, 1989).
Many of the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 spoke of what they thought was 
the reason for the poor quality of work. They argued that there was a great 
deal of subcontracting that occurred. Abu Salah and Abu Hassan, who live 
in adjacent apartments made it their business to get to the bottom of things. 
They explained that the big contracting firms sub-contracted to smaller ones 
who in turn gave the job to even smaller ones, who to make a profit employed 
cheap labour, children who were paid very little. This" , Abu Hassan added, 
"meant that lots of these contractors made money for nothing and also meant 
that work went from more to less capable hands". They said that they had 
been observing the construction work of the unfinished units in the 
neighbourhood. They pointed out the fact that the construction was actually 
done by children of twelve to sixteen.
The Agency’s lack of proper supervision, or as many saw it, self interest, was 
blamed for the issue of sub-contracting. Abu Aly, among others, accused the 
Agency for "..allowing the contractors to sub-contract to others. Obviously 
they are making a profit out of this too or else why should they accept such 
arrangements?" (Interview, 1989).
Many buyers said they had to re-do the wiring as it was very badly and even 
dangerously done. The evidence of such poor work was obvious even to an 
unexperienced eye. All the mistakes had to be repaired by the buyers which 
was another expense that few could afford. Like many others Um Leila 
voiced her resentment saying: "No repairs are made by them [the Agency], 
although all the problems are a result of their mistakes. All the repairs are 
made by us and we pay and pay and pay" (Interview, 1989).
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A number of buyers complained about the lack of interest among the Agency 
staff in providing the minimum support for at least getting undamaged or 
incomplete units fixed. Abu Samir described it by saying:
"They are absolutely passive. They do not get involved in 
anything. In May City the work was done very well. No 
mistakes were made there because the staff take responsibility 
for maintenance. Here we get an apartment full of problems 
and they refuse to fix anything. The day we were given the 
units we were given no chance to object just had to sign after 
a quick look around the apartment" (Interview, 1989).
As shown above, while the discussion around the price and the quality of the 
construction brings out resentment towards the Egyptian (the Agency and the 
Government), when it comes to the design and the size of the units, USAID 
takes some of the blame. There was a clear division between the inhabitants 
of Neighbourhood 5 around how they felt about the role of USAID or as they 
call them the ‘Americans’. As has already come through in the previous 
section, There were those who saw the Americans in a totally positive light, 
there were those who were sceptical, and then there were those who showed 
quite strong anti-American feelings.
Those who belong to the first category felt that because the ‘Americans’ were 
not involved in the construction, everything went wrong. They believed that 
if the ‘Americans’ had finished the job, this Project would have been what it 
was set out to be. Some, like Abu Ahmed, was convinced that it was the 
Egyptians who asked the Americans to leave30 and that since then the Project 
had gone down hill (Interview, 1989). Abu Hala argued that he felt he had 
been fooled because the Project was advertised in a way that made people 
believe it was an American Project, financed and implemented by them, while 
in fact this turned out to be a lie.
30 He was referring here to the shift from the Sites-and-Services and the ‘Americans’ 
not being involved in the Public Housing.
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"When we first heard this was an American project we 
expected wonders. We saw the health centre they made like a 
glass pyramid31 and we thought these apartments were of the 
same calibre. If they would have done all the work, there 
would not be all these problems we are suffering from. We all 
know how efficient foreigners are. You can see what they did 
with the underground” (Interview, 1989).
The Americans were however blamed for not supervising the work until its
completion.
"Having paid for the Project, the Americans should have 
supervised the work to make sure it was done properly. 
Because they did not, we are the ones paying the price" 
(Interview, 1989).
There were a few buyers who, in general held anti-Western views, and 
thought of the Americans as the real reason for their predicament ‘..because 
they do not care about us in the third world’. Others questioned the real 
motive that Americans have in giving countries like Egypt financial aid, and 
what this means in terms of what the latter are expected to do in return.
One of the stories that a number of buyers kept repeating, was the story of the 
American Congressman who was shown one the apartments during a visit to 
the site. The story, which was confirmed by the person whose flat was 
visited, was that this Congressman was brought to the flat and after looking 
around said: ‘why do you have a poster on your wall showing Japanese 
scenery? Why didn’t you choose one with American scenery? Don’t you 
know that this is an American Project?’. The comment, which was probably 
said in what the Congressman thought was in good humour, was received as 
an example of how the Americans are not doing this for nothing. The 
argument was that Projects of this sort are to get people to be grateful and to 
have loyalty to the Americans and thus become sub-servient to them.
31 This was a building funded by USAID in the early eighties as part of a Ministry of 
Health programme constructing, and upgrading Primary Health Care Centres in Cairo.
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Those with more ambivalent views about the American role, saw them as 
those foreigners who live in strange ways and who know little about the life 
of Egyptians and Muslims in general. If they did make mistakes it was out 
of ignorance and\or lack of care.
V FACILITIES AND SERVICES
"They gathered us together in 1986 and gave us a talk about 
the wonders of the project, showed us a video and gave us 
refreshments. They made fools of us showing us all these 
wonderful things on video of what the housing project will 
develop into. It turns out to be less than any other housing 
project around here” (Interview, 1989).
Abu Mervat among many others explained how beautiful the Housing Project 
looked on video and in the model. There were mosques, schools, parks, 
shops and beautifully paved streets (see sketch in Appendix 8). However 
when they came the only primary school was not ready yet, there were no 
mosques, no shops and definitely no greenery or paved streets. What added 
to the grim atmosphere of the place were the fences all around and the 
checkpoint at the entrance.
A. THE AREA AND SERVICES:
Neighbourhood 5 was surrounded by a fence and there was only one entrance 
controlled by the Agency security guards. The Agency staff explained that 
there were two reasons for such security precautions. The first, they said, was 
because the construction work was not yet finished and therefore there were 
building equipment and material on the site. Having a security check point 
was a guarantee that no theft would occur. The second reason was that it was 
a way to keep a check on what furniture is brought in and out of the 
neighbourhood, a way of controlling speculation. If furniture was brought in,
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the ID32 and proof of ownership had to be shown. In cases where these are 
not on the list of legitimate buyers, then it would mean that someone else had 
bought the flat. Likewise, if furniture leaves the premises then a check could 
be made.
Although most of the buyers knew the reasons for the precautions taken, they 
felt resentful that being the legal owners of the flats they were treated with 
suspicion as if they were all potential wrong doers. The set up as it was, 
added to the non-attractiveness of the area, they explained, which made them 
feel like this was not ‘home’ but more like a prison or a concentration camp.
"We feel like we are Palestinian refugees, put in camps under 
guard. It is a horrible feeling to be surrounded by wires as if 
we were punished or something" Abu Hala exclaimed 
(Interview, 1989).
The question of supervision to prevent speculation was also raised. Some of 
the buyers said this was all a charade. In fact those who did want to sell their 
flats managed to do so as long as they struck a deal with the security guards. 
One of the senior guards, they explained, is making a lot of money by 
threatening people who want to sell their flat that they would be reported 
unless he got paid a commission.
Other than the inconveniences mentioned above, there were also practical 
problems caused by the fencing. It meant that neither street vendors nor 
garbage collectors were allowed in. To buy daily necessities, women had to 
walk long distances and often also use transport, which meant extra 
expenditure of time and money. Garbage also had to be carried out, mostly 
by children of both sexes, and dumped at far distances.
32 All Egyptians above 16 years have to have an Identification Card which they must 
carry on them at all times.
Other than the fence problem, there were also complaints about the lack of 
greenery in the area. The Project area was again compared to May City, 
which had parks and green squares. In order to create a bit of greenery, some 
of the buyers started planting small squares of vegetables and flowers in front 
of their houses. Going through the neighbourhood, this was actually a 
pleasant sight. However a bulldozer came round and dug out the green 
patches. This was seen by many buyers as outrageous and inexplainable. 
Many, who already saw the Agency as an enemy, felt this was the last straw. 
Angry buyers, who for months have been asking the Agency to clear the area 
of rubble and sand and who were told that the Agency did not own the 
equipment to do it, were furious at the fact that suddenly a bulldozer was 
produced to destroy their plants. When asked about it, the Agency 
explanation was:
"We know these people, they play innocent while in fact they 
were planting these patches in order to claim ownership of the 
land. If we leave it, they will eventually use it to build extra 
rooms ".
B. FACILITIES:
Many of the facilities that were promised to the buyers were not ready when 
the inhabitant of Neighbourhood 5 moved in around the months of June, July 
and August 1989. They were promised schools, mosques, health centres, 
nurseries, post offices and food cooperatives. While many of these facilities 
were under construction, some even close to completion, there was very little 
hope they would be functional for another year. The discussion here will only 
focus on the school and the mosque. The fact that these were unfinished in 
the case of the former, and not even started in the case of the latter, caused 
a great deal of controversy.
1. The school:
The buyers were told that by the new academic year, which starts in late 
September, the primary school would be open to accommodate their children.
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Consequently, most parents with young children took them out of their old 
schools at the end of the academic year thinking they would be admitted to the 
new school at the start of the new academic year. As the new academic year 
approached, they made enquiries about the procedures to apply to the new 
school and were told by the Agency that the school was not ready for opening 
and that they would have to look for other schools. In total panic they started 
running around Helwan to find schools for their children. They were told by 
these schools that they did not have places for their children and that, anyhow 
they were not in these schools’ catchment area. This obviously created 
enormous havoc as it meant that the children would lose a whole year staying 
at home for lack of available schools.
Some of the buyers were thus forced to re-instate their children in their old 
schools. Of these, some who were still in the process of moving in and had 
not left their old houses, decided to postpone the move until the new school 
was open. For those who either had already left their old housing or were 
unable to postpone the move, it meant that their children had to travel in some 
cases up to one hour away by public transport. There were a few buyers who 
were able to put pressure on the Helwan schools to accept their children 
through complaining to MP’s or through sheer persistence and spending days 
going back and forth between the Ministry of Education, the Governorate and 
the schools. This left four of the households with the only options of taking 
their children out of school for that year and in two cases the decision was to 
take them out of school for good.
Again all the blame was put on the Agency and their lack of care for peoples’ 
welfare. The prevalent feeling was that this was just another example of this 
‘disastrous’ Project, run by ‘uncaring people’ with lots of broken promises. 
The Agency’s explanation was that the construction of the school was finished 
but the problem was caused by a lawsuit with the contractor.
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There were those who worried about what this meant in terms of money. In 
addition to the difficulty and waste of time taking young children to schools 
by public transport, the cost would be enormous. As, Abu Haguer, parent of 
three young children calculated:
"This will mean that we will have to spend PT30 for the 
children plus PT20 for me or their mother a day. This would 
mean LE12 a month on transport alone. With all the rest of 
debts and monthly instalments where would we get the money 
to live?" (Interview, 1989).
Abu and Um Mahmoud, the parents of seven children, all under fourteen, said 
that their decision was to take them all out of school. To find schooling for 
them all and to meet the expenses was impossible for them.
2. The mosque:
Mosques were also promised and not delivered. For Egyptian Muslim 
men33, even those who do not pray daily, the Friday noon prayer in a 
mosque is sacred. The mosque is not only a place of worship but also often 
becomes a meeting place to discuss issues concerning the neighbourhood or 
wider political matters.
Some of the men deciding they wanted to have their own areas on site for 
Friday prayer, chose an empty piece of land which was clear of rubble and 
sand, collected money and bought straw mats and a microphone. The Agency 
security guards asked them to stop praying on the site, saying it was 
trespassing and that this area was being designated for building a church. 
Having ignored the order, a few Fridays later, as they were gathering for 
prayer, a number of police cars arrived and arrested a couple dozen men. 
While most of them were released on the same day, they detained three of the 
men [those who had organised buying the mats and the microphone] for a few 
days accusing them of Islamic fundamentalism and trying to provoke ethnic
j3 Women generally do not pray in the mosque.
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tension. However, they were released after signing a promise that they would 
not use the area for prayer again. Abu Salem who was one of these three 
men, told the story in a combination of outrage and humour. He said:
"I am no Muslim fundamentalist, I am not even a very good 
Muslim. I just wanted to be of help and so I organised the 
collection of the money. I simply wanted to have good 
relations with everyone and help create a sense of community 
among my new neighbours".
This whole matter, not surprisingly, raised a lot of angry feelings among the 
inhabitants of the neighbourhood. It also caused them to express anti- 
Christian feelings34 which if not provoked in this manner, would not have 
come to the surface on this matter. It also brought out feelings of resentment 
that Christians might be favoured because this was an American Project. Abu 
Soad argument, which echoed what others expressed about the issue saying:
"They made a big issue out of nothing. We chose an empty 
space to pray in and had no intention of building anything. 
Policemen came and said it was not allowed to pray here, that 
a church will be built here. I find this really bizarre. Why 
would the space designated for the church be in the middle of 
the houses here and the area for the mosque on the far side of 
the neighbourhood? Even though Americans favour Christians 
they should realise that we [the Muslims] are the majority here.
In May City there are a number of mosques and not one 
church" (Interview, 1989).
The other view that came out of this discussion was that it was alright to have 
a church on site as long as there were also mosques. For example Abu Aly 
said:
"We meant no harm by setting a place to pray, but it seems 
they do not want us to do anything here. It feels like a jail.
OK we accept that this was the place of a church. So where is 
the mosque?" (Interview, 1989).
34 Anti-Christian feelings can be easily provoked and have been on the rise in Egypt 
since the late seventies.
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There were those among the Muslim inhabitants who favoured the idea of a 
church. Um Haguer, who said that she knows at least two Christian 
households on their block, said that they had the right to a place of worship.
"It is good they intend to build a church. That is a good 
gesture. This is a big Project and I am sure there are a lot of 
Christians. So what is the big fuss about?", she added 
(Interview, 1989).
This view was also held by Um Nawal who said:
"This I think is a good idea. There is in fact no church in Atlas 
so it will serve both areas. A church is like a mosque for 
Muslims. They do have the right to pray just like us" 
(Interview, 1989).
The true motives of the Agency in this matter was questioned. Mainly three 
views were expressed about their role in the matter. One view was that the 
Agency staff was interested in the church because some of the senior 
management were Christians. The other saw the whole business of the 
mosque/church as just an excuse for the Agency to show muscle. The third 
view, related to the last, was that the Agency wanted to be in control and not 
allow the buyers to have a place to get together which might result in a 
general revolt. Expressing such views Abu Hala for example explained:
"They wanted to created problems between Christians and 
Muslims in order to weaken us and keep in control. The 
prayer area was where we met to discuss issues about the 
Project, something they obviously did not want. They used the 
church excuse to prevent us from getting together" (Interview,
1989).
Abu Amr argued:
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"There are here a maximum of 15 or 20 Christians35 so why 
a church? All the security people wanted to show is who is 
boss. The agency did not like the fact that we gathered for 
Friday prayer to complain about the project and make plans to 
find solutions (Interview, 1989).
The Christians with whom this issue was brought up seemed less aware of the 
details of the story and less willing to discuss it. Their argument was that this 
incident was just a manifestation of the trouble that the Agency staff have been 
causing from the start.
Had it not been handled by the Agency in a heavy handed manner, the issue 
of no mosque in the area would probably have not been seen as another 
nuisance relating to lack of facilities. However what actually started as a 
harmless community initiative, caused a great deal of controversy. As shown 
above, not only did the incident raise bad feeling between some Muslims and 
Christians, but it also brought up feeling of animosity against the Agency. 
The latter was seen as constantly wanting to prove it had overall control over 
the Project area and intentionally trying to sabotage any chances for collective 
action, even at the expense of creating ethnic tensions. Hatred for the Police 
and the ‘awful treatment of innocent people’ was also brought up. There were 
strong views expressed about the absolute power of the police which low 
income people have to suffer under. The Agency in bringing in the police, 
was seen as the ultimate example of the powerful being in alliance with each 
other against ‘those who had no backing in this world, the poor’.
VI TENSIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS
Having touched on how the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 felt about each 
other around the issue of religion, it is of importance at this point to go into 
more detail about how they felt towards each other around difference in
35 It is estimated that around 15 % of Egyptians are Christians. According to Government 
census they are only 10%. This figure is denied by Christians who say Government is 
underestimating their numbers, which they estimate to be closer to 18% of the population.
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general. Although they were all working in factories or companies in 
Helwan, they were by no means a homogenous group. This among other 
reasons meant that by living in such close proximity to each other, a great 
deal of tolerance was necessary. They may have had their work place in 
common, but would probably belong to very clear groups in the hierarchy of 
these institutions. This raised many problems whereby those who belonged 
to the higher strata resented having those whom they considered ‘lower’ to 
them as next door neighbours. As described at the beginning of this chapter, 
the inhabitants of HNC also came from a wide variety of backgrounds in 
terms of origin (rural-urban and Upper-Lower Egypt) and place of previous 
residence. Some came from old urban neighbourhoods, semi-rural areas, 
others from squatter areas, old or new, or from other Public Housing flats. 
This meant that they were used to different patterns of interaction and codes 
of behaviour among neighbours. Tensions were also caused by people’s needs 
to establish territorial rights and boundaries. While such difficulties were to 
be expected, it seemed that tempers, as it was often argued by the inhabitants 
of the flats, were inflamed by the financial pressures that the buyers were 
experiencing.
In addition to the many incidents of disagreements and fights between the new 
neighbours that were reported during the fieldwork, it did not take long to be 
around the neighbourhood before such incidents also occurred in my presence.
There was a great deal of discussion around this issue. Abu and Um Soad, 
for example, explained that they had never had problems in their old house 
with owners or neighbours. They described how it was that when they left the 
place, they were waved goodbye by tens of people and they felt like the 
‘President being cheered by the People on the street’. They said that here 
things are ‘a bit trickier’! To develop such warm feelings one had to be much 
more careful. Abu Soad’s argument was put as follows:
"Neighbours here are alright as long as one does not mix too
much with them. Problems usually start with the children and
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therefore we do not ever allow our children to play on the 
street. There are fights all the time here. It seems that instead 
of making the effort to make a good start in a new 
neighbourhood many think they must establish territorial rights 
by bullying their neighbours. Just a show of strength to show 
they are strong and everyone else must be on guard. A guy in 
the next building had a big fight with a woman neighbour 
because she was telling his son not to climb on the mound of 
sand and stones. He shouted at her saying ‘this is Government 
property it is not your business’. All the lady was trying to do 
was to protect his son from injury. All he wanted from day 
one, was to show muscle".
Um Soad added that she makes a very big effort to keep out of trouble.
"Our neighbour downstairs who complained to you about her 
previous landlord having fights with her all the time. Well I 
can see how he was in the right. I make an effort not to tell her 
and her children to treat the apartment more kindly. They 
smash doors, they throw dirty water on the stairs, ....They 
would not accept any criticism from us, so I keep to myself, 
which requires a big effort on my part and I am not sure how 
much more I can take".
Talking about her other neighbours she added:
"The people on the ground floor use their courtyard for raising 
poultry which means absolute filth. The smell is unbearable 
and it is breeding flies and mice. We can see the horrible 
creatures running around. When we complained to the agency 
they said ‘just write a petition and we will come and remove 
the whole thing’. We refused to do this. The last thing we 
want is to make enemies with our new neighbours" (Interview, 
1989).
As shown by the above comments, there was often feelings that neighbours 
who had different standards of cleanliness or use of space, were inferior. Abu 
Salah comment is an example of such feelings:
"There are lots of fights because this project has collected 
people from only God knows what dumps. People should have 
been assigned places according to their social standard. It is 
bad organisation to put a floor supervisor for example with a
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low rank worker in the same apartment building" (Interview,
1989).
Abu Mohsen also said similarly: "Most of the fights are because many of 
those who took flats here come from such places as the Madbah, Imbaba and 
Nasseryia36 (Interview, 1989).
Both Abu Salah and Abu Muhsein however agreed that most of the tension 
between neighbours was a result of the financial pressures that everyone is 
subjected to. "They are also all tense about money and they are therefore 
more easily inclined to take their frustration out through fights" Abu Salah 
said. "Being on edge does not help things either" Abu Mohsen added.
There were other comments about this, for example ‘because of life’s 
pressures people are starting to hate each other’ or ‘people are tense and 
therefore very little is needed to inflame them.
‘Getting inflamed’ was something that the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 saw 
a lot of. The following are three examples of fights which happened in my 
presence and which ended up with people at each others’ throats.
The first of these incidents started when a child got into a fight with a 
neighbour’s child. In a second Um Aly, was out on the street, as was Um 
Mohamed, the other child’s mother. They started screaming at each other for 
having ill behaved children. Abu Aly, who kept out of it for a while suddenly 
decided to join the fight and started screaming insults at Um Mohamed and 
at her husband who was not around. He kept saying that her husband, Abu 
Mohamed, was not a real man because he left his children and his wife loose 
on the streets to attack people. He became totally hysterical, saying how this 
housing Project has gathered together the scum of the earth. The whole fight 
ended up with everyone involved screaming insults about the Project, the 
Agency and the Government.
36 Low income Cairo neighbourhoods that have a reputation for being rough.
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The second fight was about the loss of a keleem37. It is the habit of 
Egyptians to clean their keleem as well as bed covers by shaking them in the 
open air and then hanging them in the sun. When she went out to fetch her 
keleem, Um Ibrahim found it was no longer there. She started screaming and 
using foul language, talking about the Project having allowed a bunch of 
thieves to get housing in what she had hoped was going to be a decent place 
to live. Challenged by a neighbour, she apologised to her and said she only 
meant to accuse Um Ahmed. Hearing her name mentioned, Um Ahmed came 
out of her flat in rage and grabbed Um Ibrahim by the hair and gave her a 
good beating. All the neighbours gathered around and the fight was brought 
to an end, but only after the most foul insults were exchanged and promises 
not to ever forgive each other. This fight was used by many as an example 
of lack of trust between neighbours which was caused by their lack of 
knowledge about each others background.
The third fight started when Nader, a seven year old boy, hurt his finger by 
playing with Abu Salem’s bicycle. Seeing the blood, the neighbour Um 
Hassan said ‘I knew something like this would happen. Didn’t we ask this 
man (referring to Abu Salem) not to park his bike on the staircase?’. Hearing 
all the shouting, Abu Salem came out of his flat showing concern for the 
child. Seeing it was nothing serious, he turned to Um Hassan and said ‘can’t 
you mind your own business. All you are trying to do is to inflame the 
situation. You see that his parents are not complaining. Haven’t you 
anything better to do ?". Then they start to exchange abuse until Abu Salem 
said ‘he was not supposed to play with the bike anyhow, now he has learned 
his lesson’. Up until this point Abu and Um Nader had said nothing. This 
comment however enraged them and this got them all involved in the fight. 
At this point Abu Nader decided to join in. Again the three household 
members ended up directing their insults to the Agency and the Project,
37 Middle Eastern carpet made out of cotton materials cut in strips and woven manually.
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damning the day they had decided to move into this ‘horrid place with its 
horrid people’.
These, and many other fights which occurred during the time of the fieldwork, 
were often used by people to illustrate the difficulties that most are 
experiencing around fitting in and developing a sense of neighbourhood38.
v n  ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE INHABITANTS OF
NEIGHBOURHOOD 5 TO IMPROVE THEIR SITUATION
The inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 took a number of initiatives to try get 
their voice heard. There were many petitions written, and signatures 
collected, mostly about the price of the units. Copies were sent the Ministry 
of Housing, to the Governorate, to Parliament, to MPs and to news papers 
both national and opposition papers as well as to USAID.
Abu Samir explained:
"We complained to the Director of the Agency. He said this is 
not my responsibility. Go to the ‘hay’at el eskan39’. They 
wrote to them but no response. So who is responsible-the 
President? (Interview, 1989).
Abu Hassan, who has resumed a leadership role in an effort ‘to get people to 
listen’, said that he was going to pay a few visits to key places to explain the 
situation. When he spoke about it he was planning a visit to USAID. He 
said:
"I am planning to talk to them about the price of the units. I 
also want to complain about the quality of work. They paid the 
grant, they must have a say", (Interview, 1989).
38 The neighbour is highly valued in Islam.
39 A government institution responsible for housing.
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He said that he took a petition to the Minister of Housing with many 
signatures, and all the latter did was to send it to the Director of the Agency. 
‘ Big joke’, he said.
‘People in this block asked me to do this for them but they are 
relying completely on me and are offering no help. They even 
said they would cover the money lost because of absenteeism 
and money for transportation. I have not seen anything yet’ 
(Interview, 1989).
More positive action was also under discussion. Abu Amr said that :
"We meet in the mosque now in Atlas and decided that maybe 
we should not pay the rent for a few months. Some said: ‘but 
what if it did not work and we had spent the money?’ We 
thought then to have someone entrusted with the rent each 
month so that if anything occurred the money would be ready 
to be paid" (Interview, 1989).
While efforts were made to change things some comments showed pessimism 
and resignation.
"People are writing a lot of complaints asking for reduction in 
the rent. This will not work. Prices are always going up, 
never reduced. Some went to speak to the new Director of 
Agency. He said he can’t do anything as things were already 
decided when he took charge" (Interview, 1989).
"I do not think the price will go down. They will never let go of the interests 
and profits" (Interview, 1989).
Vffl CONCLUSION
Visits, interviews and discussions in Neighbourhood 5 raise the very important 
question: were things really as disastrous as they seemed to be? Had these 
households moved to private housing, would they have faced fewer problems? 
To the objective observer, the answer to both question would probably be: no.
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However, in terms of the reality of the inhabitants themselves, they had been 
promised and were expecting an affordable, real, good and long term solution 
to their housing problem. The project was an ‘American’ project. They were 
shown videos of beautiful green areas with schools and shops. They found 
themselves in flats that cost more, were smaller, and were of poorer qualities 
then they expected. All this at a time when their real wages were going 
down, prices of foods and services going up and options for the future getting 
more limited.
They felt ‘trapped’ in this situation. Of course they could have withdrawn, 
but as the majority explained, they had been expecting the move for over four 
years and often had no other options. What the experience had left them with 
was a strong feeling of powerlessness-a feeling they are familiar with and 
resent. Whether it is about their previous landlords, their place of work, 
police, legislation, Government and now the Agency, they felt helplessness 
and powerlessness. A strong implicit resentment about how people in their 
position had restricted choices and few opportunities to control their lives, 
dominated most discussions. However all this did not succeed in creating a 
sense of unity, of community. Perhaps this would eventually happen in time, 
but what was there at the time of the fieldwork was mostly a sense of 
alienation and of factionalism both in inter and intra household relations.
The Project did not attempt to establish a system of dialogue which would 
have started a democratic system of representation which could have helped 
to form a sense of community. Even in the Sites-and-Service neighbourhoods, 
the idea of block captain was executed in a manner that excluded the 
possibility of leadership and community spirit. The Agency was very keen to 
keep in total control of the HNC- something they could not achieve totally in 
the upgrading areas, and were struggling with in the Sites-and-Service 
neighbourhood which was just starting to develop. The two incidents with the 
digging out of the green patches and bringing in the police to clear the praying
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area, were the two most blatant examples of wanting to demonstrate to the 
population of the new neighbourhood that they were not to be defied.
USAID wanted to be and indeed was very much out of the picture. The 
conditionalities for the HNC of the Project Paper were drastically dismantled. 
However, when it came to issues of eligibility criteria, affordibility and cost 
recovery, the failure to meet any of them is not unique to the Helwan Housing 
project. The Project is similar to a great deal of housing projects 
implemented in the last two or three decades which have aimed but failed to 
reach the poor. The uniqueness that this Project represents is in its reversal 
to conventional housing and the conditions that made this possible.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS
I INTRODUCTION
So who had the power? This thesis demonstrates that to identify who has 
power does not go far enough in understanding power relations. What is 
interesting about power relations is the role they play in shaping processes 
which involve a multitude of actors such as those between donors and 
recipients- or even a process of a project such as the one analysed here. 
Neither the decisionists, the pluralists nor the neo-elitists would be able to 
cope with the multitude of changing relationships and the length of the process 
that was under study. The structuralist-Marxists would be challenged by the 
power of those who should be in fact powerless. Poulantzas has more to say 
considering his ‘relational theory’ of power. His analysis gives a dimension 
to power relations which is less static and deterministic than that other 
structuralists. Foucaults’ understanding of the functioning of power, while 
methodologically less directive, and perhaps for this very reason, allows for 
the fluidity needed to understand a process such as the one under study. 
Power was never dominated by one actor or group of actors through the 
process. It kept changing and shifting. Power was never ‘appropriated’ by 
any of the actors involved-not by USAID, GOE or other American or 
Egyptian institutions, nor by particular groups within the target groups. There 
were points in the process when particular actors had complete power, at other 
points where they totally lost this power, or chose not to use it. Exercising 
power or not, which might on the surface be interpreted as gaining or losing 
power, was often part of a tactical choice that aimed at keeping the 
relationship going. Basically, and no matter what the consequences where, 
the ultimate goal of all concerned was for this relationship to survive. A 
break in the relationship was in no one’s interest. In the light of this, the 
strategy of different actors was often about prioritising which interests were 
worth fighting for and which were not.
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The question of whether power was exercised collectively, as the structuralists 
maintain, or individually, as other schools such as the neo-elitists and 
pluralists propose, is also relevant to the understanding of these relationships. 
In fact the analysis of the Helwan Project demonstrates that while in general 
actors were able to exercise power within the confines of the structures they 
belonged to, some individuals within these structures were able to push the 
boundaries of these structures while others accepted their confines.
This concluding chapter will try, on the one hand, to recapture the changes 
in the power relationships that occurred during the Project and on the other 
to stress the way in which the Project and the way it evolved has impacted on 
the populations it was meant to reach. In other words, to re-address the 
hypothesis1 presented at the beginning of the thesis that the aid relationship 
creates a particular dynamic in political relationships that needs to be 
recognised in order to be better understood. This is illustrated by the 
examination of the Helwan Project which failed to meet its objectives as a 
result of the inherent contradictions between USAID Project formulation and 
the GOE housing policy on the one hand, and the housing needs of the low 
income target population on the other hand. As a result, those who are meant 
to be served by such a Project, were not only left with less than they were 
promised, but in many cases with increased hardship.
n  THE POLITICISATION OF THE HELWAN PROJECT: 
POWER RELATIONS
The Helwan Housing Project started at a time when the US was gaining a new 
ally in the Middle East. It was a time when Sadat had defied Nasser’s foreign 
policies by initiating a peace treaty with Israel which cost him his Arab allies. 
He had also made a full turn towards the West, cutting all ties to the Soviet 
Union. In addition he had implemented an ‘open door policy’ to seal his new 
policy directions. These drastic changes were all presented with a promise for
1 See hypothesis, p. 3.
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prosperity for all. All these policy changes, which occurred over the mid to 
late seventies, were welcomed by a small minority of Egyptians, were 
received with horror by some and left the majority with a mixture of 
apprehension, a feeling of loss of a cherished national and Arab pride at the 
same time as a desperate hope for a more economically comfortable future. 
The U .S.’s major agenda was to prove to the majority of Egyptians that the 
latter was indeed going to occur, because their President has chosen the right 
path. A Project like the one in Helwan was intended to be the kind of 
concrete proof of what opportunities this new direction presented.
While the U.S. and GOE never again had as close a relation as that of the late 
seventies, their mutual interests in keeping their alliance remained largely 
unchanged. Mubarak, while less of a friend to the Americans, still largely 
carried out Sadat’s policies. Egypt has remained the U .S .’s strongest Arab 
friend in the Middle East. The most concrete proof of where Mubarak’s 
loyalties lay, was Egyptian army forces joining the Americans against the 
Iraqis during the Gulf war (1990-91).
Accepting that aid is motivated by ‘political interests abroad and economic 
interests at home’2, it becomes quite clear how this influenced the aid 
relationship of USAID and GOE. Economic interests in this case could be 
satisfied directly through the creation of work for development workers and 
contractors, and the use of American products and transport, eg shipping. 
They are also satisfied indirectly, through the creation of what the U.S. views 
as the conditions most suitable for U.S. markets abroad. However, while 
U.S. economic interests in Egypt are substantial, if tested, political and 
strategic interests take the upper hand. Initially however, whether 
economically or politically motivated, interests vary from one U.S. institution 
to the other.
2 A quotation from Arnold, 1985, p. 161.
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Members of the Congress, for example, see themselves as primarily 
accountable to tax payers, and need to prove that the yearly aid funding that 
goes to Egypt is money well spent. The views of members of Congress, who 
only occasionally visited the Helwan Project, were given a great weight, not 
only by USAID staff in Cairo, but also by the Agency and even the 
inhabitants of the HNC flats. USAID in their eagerness to show results, made 
compromises in the principles of the Project. The Egyptians knew about the 
importance of these visits and often used them to put pressure on USAID to 
make such compromises. The inhabitants of the flats, as well as Rashed 
Cooperative members, also knew that Congress visitors wanted to see proof 
that the Egyptian people were grateful and happy about U.S. support and 
threatened to complain to them- and to my knowledge they never did.
USAID headquarters, while protecting economic interests such as creating jobs 
and promoting industry at home, as well as respecting political interests (they 
are after all accountable to the State Department), also have to deal with 
development goals. They are therefore involved in pushing for economic and 
social programmes which fit into the overall development policies they are 
supporting at a particular point in history. They were promoting self-help- 
housing in the late seventies and early eighties and they wanted to change 
GOE housing policy. While this was their main goal, they were unwilling to 
withdraw or stop funds dedicated to the Helwan Project, let alone to withdraw 
or stop funds to Egypt altogether. They were thus unwilling to put in 
jeopardy economic and political goals.
There is also USAID in-country, which while following all of the above 
mentioned guidelines, is above all the financial manager of these programmes. 
Its main role is to monitor that programmes meet their goals and that the 
money in the pipeline is spent without major obstacles. Unlike USAID 
headquarters, there was no expertise on self-help-housing in the USAID 
Egyptian office, and no real political will to support this approach. There was 
however, the motivation to protect the conditions of the Grant Agreement.
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The latter seemed not to be enough, considering the corner into which the 
Egyptian institutions were able to put them, the pressures from home to start 
showing results and again the unwillingness to cause a political confrontation.
Another set of American actors were the technical consultancy, engineering 
and contracting firms as well as the various industries supplementing material. 
Their important role in the aid relationship cannot be denied. While their 
interests are primarily economic, they rarely want to jeopardise their position 
vis-a-vis the host country, or go against the political interest of their own 
government. This inevitably politicises their interaction with all actors. In 
the case of Helwan, CHF was in no doubt about this position. Although most 
employees had professional integrity, political commitment to self-help- 
housing and various levels of technical expertise in the approach, their 
position in its uniqueness made them both powerful and powerless. They 
were powerful as go-betweens and powerless in influencing the Project 
process to follow more closely the self-help approach. USAID, in-country, 
as mentioned above, had no real knowledge about housing and the Agency 
wanted to revert to the conventional approach. At the same time CHF main 
office in the U.S., was mostly interested in the financial returns. From a 
professional point of view, this left CHF staff members in Egypt without 
allies. However, they had a political role and a certain amount of power, as 
go-betweens. This, while it often facilitated negotiation, did little in terms of 
the Project better meeting the needs of the target groups.
At the time of the signature of the Helwan Grant Agreement, the GOE was 
also eager to prove that Sadat’s policies would pay dividends. The stakes 
were high, as the regime did not have popular support and their legitimacy 
was fragile. The majority of GOE officials at the time felt the GOE had taken 
serious risks in its new U.S. supported policies, and were therefor hopeful to 
get the support needed to deliver to the masses in order to achieve a much 
needed legitimacy. There were also those, among GOE officials who 
disapproved of the new tilt to the right, and these too needed to be pacified.
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Housing as one of the major unfulfilled needs of the great majority of the 
urban population, was on the Government’s priority list. In the case of 
Helwan, USAID was offering a co-funded $180 million Project, with GOE 
paying its share in unused land- in practice nothing. USAID was still a 
relatively unknown entity, and most GOE officials were unsure to what extent 
they had to comply with Project conditions without risking the loss of financial 
support. The fact that the Project had an approach of which GOE was not in 
favour seemed to be irrelevant at this stage. GOE needed the money and it 
needed the housing units. It did not see it fit to openly oppose USAID at this 
stage. In any case, generally, confrontation is the last approach that GOE 
officials would resort to in negotiations. It goes against their usual tactics of 
communication. While the Minister of Housing who signed the agreement, 
might have then been open to persuasion, other senior officials in the Ministry 
wanted to keep the status quo. For some, to let go of public housing meant 
to give up too many vested interests. For others, in their views the present 
policy had worked for Egypt, and they had no intention of changing this just 
because ‘the Americans’ wanted it. Questions of sovereignty were important 
to them. The Minister, who signed the agreement was shortly replaced by 
another, who remained in office throughout the history of the Project. He had 
a very clear agenda, new towns, not upgrading or Sites-and-Service housing.
Other institutions, who were totally marginalised during the early stages of the 
formulation of the Project, such as the Cairo Governorate and the sectoral 
agencies, also had interests in keeping the status quo, and their own position 
of power and control to maintain. While most knew they had to meet the 
needs of the low income populations, they did not see reason to sacrifice their 
own approach or their interests. What made their stand easier was that 
nothing in the legislation or procedures had changed and therefore, by 
opposing Project criteria, they were doing nothing against the rules.
313
These were, to recapture what was discussed in this thesis, some of the 
conditions that existed at the initiation, formulation and implementation of the 
Helwan Project. How did this then allow for the power relationships to 
evolve during the Project process? As mentioned earlier, the Project was 
initiated, formulated and funded by USAID. For the first three to four years 
of the Project, USAID had full power and control over the Project. It had as 
one of its conditions for the Project to create a new agency, the Agency, to 
run the Project. It made sure a number of American Firms were part of the 
Project, that materials were procured from the U.S. and that they were 
shipped on American vessels. It was in fact, at different stages, using 
‘condign’ and ‘conditional’ power3 (Galbraith, 1984, p. 33).
Through subtle acts of defiance, the Agency started demonstrating it was not 
going to accept the patron-client relationship that USAID meant to establish, 
the Agency, as a newly developed organisation would never have had the 
power to defy USAID had it not had the backing of the MOH, which was in 
fact hostile to the Project. There was also the important role of the Egyptian 
sectoral agencies, during the pre-implementation period of the Project which 
when it came to approval of designs and standards, refused to cooperate. The 
fact that there was a Grant Agreement signed approving lowering standards 
had no power over sectoral agencies whose procedures and guidelines have 
been unchanged for decades. The Agency was able to use this again to its 
advantage, as along side the MOH it mostly agreed with the position of those 
institutions. This was the first test put to USAID, the latter’s failure or choice 
not to find another channel to put pressure on the sectoral agencies meant that 
in fact USAID did not have the authority over GOE that it claimed it had. 
This was a time when the Agency and MOH were starting to acquire more 
knowledge of USAID’s limitations.
3 ‘Condign’ power refers to inflicting or threatening to adverse consequences; 
‘conditional’ power is to use persuasion in order to change belief (Galbraith, 1984, p. 33).
314
During the implementation of the upgrading component, as chapters 5 shows, 
USAID mainly relied on CHF and other American and Egyptian firms to 
carry out the work. With its expertise limited mostly to infrastructure, it took 
a back seat in terms of the other components of the Project. The Agency on 
the other hand, while equally uninformed about upgrading, wanted to be part 
of every decision. It felt this was its first real chance to be in control of the 
Project. As chapter 6 demonstrates, most of its need to control was exercised 
in a top-down fashion in its dealing with the communities, giving very little 
leeway for negotiation or sharing in decision making. In addition, the failure 
to implement one of the major components, that of land tenure, was a result 
of Governorate refusal as owner of the land. The position of the Agency on 
this matter was ambiguous. While in general the employees knew of the 
importance of securing land tenure as a pivotal part to the upgrading 
approach, the majority at another level felt the ‘squatters’ had no rights to the 
land and that this could be the beginning of huge demands all over Cairo for 
the same kind of treatment. However, the Agency once again did not have 
to take a stand on this as it was the Governorate that was refusing. USAID 
also did not exercise its power, if indeed it had any in this area, to force the 
matter to be resolved. Had the issue of land tenure come up earlier in the 
process of the Project, it is not clear how the results would have been 
different. There was a level of learning between and among different 
institutions during the process of the Project that meant the limits of exercising 
their own will without causing major confrontation, had been established.
When it came to the HNC, as discussed in chapter 7, the major departure 
there was that of the flagrant defiance to the major goal of the Project- the 
reversal to conventional housing in half of the neighbourhoods. The Minister 
of Housing who had refused to visit the Project for his first three years in 
office, gave the verbal order to build public housing. The majority of the 
Agency employees, because this is what they really wanted from the start, 
presented this decision to USAID and CHF as a fait-accomplis. USAID, 
again put in a corner after delays and various engineering mistakes made by
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American firms, and the pressure of money in the pipeline, let the Egyptians 
go ahead with it.
While different strategies as well as different forms of power were followed 
during the Project, at the end a more stable relationship emerged which took 
on a very particular character. While the Agency was critical of their 
colleagues in the MOH for not being tough negotiators at the time of the 
signature of the Grant Agreement, in fact were not doing any better. There 
was never any open negotiation with USAID nor with CHF about the way the 
Agency really wanted out of the original conception of the Project. Their 
power was that of manipulation4, often through passive resistance, while 
USAID’s power was ‘dormant’ power5 which tilted the power balance 
towards the Egyptians. This was a perfect match for a non-conffontational, 
mistrusting, and subversive relationship which ended up in a most 
unsatisfactory 12 year Project.
Mistrust was rife and accusations about all sorts of misconduct between 
different actors were a common occurrence. Underlying all this was basically 
a lack of understanding and knowledge of each other. USAID and the Agency 
officials accused each other of corruption, nepotism, inefficiency, dishonesty 
and ignorance. They were, in general, not able to talk to each other, they felt 
they spoke totally different languages. What neither the Agency nor USAID 
realised was that they in fact had more in common than they thought they had. 
One very important similarity is their perception of the poor, and the reason 
why they need to be reached through development Projects. It is this 
perception that perhaps was the most influential in the Project’s approach to 
the target groups. The majority of senior staff in both USAID and the 
Agency, saw the main aim of the Project as a means to pacify what are
4 Manipulation is one of many forms of power according to Wrong (1979).
5 ‘Dormant’ power is a term to describe a stage in power relations when those who may 
exercise power decide not to in order to avoid conflict (Galbraith, 1984, p. 33).
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potentially a threatening section of the population. To meet some of their 
needs is to stabilise a potentially dangerous situation. Very little was said in 
interviews and discussions about social equity, or citizenship or human rights.
m  IMPACT OF THE PROJECT ON THE HNC AND RASHED 
POPULATIONS
The contradictions between the policies, approaches and interests of the 
different actors in the Project had produced results that were not necessarily 
in the interest of another set of actors- the target populations. Delays in 
implementation was one of the most damaging effects of the Project. 
Although Egyptian bureaucracy is known for these delays, this was of a 
particular quality, as it was predominantly a deliberate delay. The Agency 
had time on its hands as it was not in its interest to get the Project finished. 
It was created to run the Project and other similar Projects, but there were 
none of the latter in the pipeline. In stalling, it knew that it was putting the 
squeeze on USAID who wanted to see results, reaching a point where they did 
not care what kind of results. Other Egyptian institutions had no reason to 
rush the procedures, they had no interest in this Project, and therefore sat on 
decisions for long periods of time. USAID, especially at the beginning of the 
Project, in following its own bureaucratic procedures also caused long delays. 
CHF did not want to see the Project end fast either. Its contract was tied to 
the completion of the Project and therefore had no fixed deadline.
As chapters 6 and 8 describe, there were some very tangible negative impacts 
on the target population. Perhaps most were unavoidable6. Perhaps had the 
inhabitants not been part of the Project at all, they would have had an even 
worse deal. However they were part of a government Project, funded by the 
‘Americans’- they were part of a Project that promised a great deal. It
6 Most self-help housing schemes of this era faced problems around eligibility criteria, 
affordability, cost recovery and displacement among others. What is however particular to 
the Helwan Project was that it managed to combine the problems of both ‘conventional’ and 
‘non-conventional’ housing.
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promised among other things, land tenure, access to infrastructure and 
affordable good quality housing.
Obviously the impact of the project on the upgrading population was different 
from that of the HNC. The most observable difference is that while the 
Project had a direct impact in the HNC, for the majority, in the upgrading 
community, it had an indirect impact. On the other hand, given that it was 
dealing with an established community, its impact on inter and intra 
community group relations was more potent in the upgrading community.
Land tenure, as mentioned above was not resolved for the upgrading 
communities twelve years into the project. Last inquiries into this matter in 
1996, indicate that a compromise might have been finally reached but it was 
still not certain it was going to be implemented. The impact of the delay in 
implementing land tenure raises ambiguous issues. On the one hand, land 
tenure was the most attractive part of the Project for home-owners, as their 
property was finally going to be made legal. Not getting land tenure not only 
affected this sense of security. Since land ownership was meant to have been 
used as collateral, this resulted in limiting eligibility to loans, mainly to formal 
sector employees. While according to some self-help theorists (eg Burgess), 
land tenure in squatter areas leads to the commodification of housing and puts 
it ‘beyond the pockets of the poor’, in this case the simple promise of land 
tenure achieved this. Also the combination of receiving loans and improving 
housing without legal tenure, was the best conditions possible for home­
owners to get rid of low paying tenants. The latter had few legal rights since 
they, by proxy, were considered illegal tenants. Displacement of the poorest, 
which is perhaps inevitable, seemed to have happened on an especially wide 
scale.
In the HNC, the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 were given only de-jure land 
ownership. Six home owners share the ownership of the land on which their 
block is built. As chapter 7 shows, the initial approach to the HNC also
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offered the possibility for vertical expansion- giving opportunities of extra 
income if owners chose to rent out those extra units or giving possibility for 
housing to younger generations. In that case land would have been owned by 
individual households. Since buyers were not given the right to choose which 
type of housing they received, the opportunity to have land ownership was lost 
to those who bought Neighbourhood 5 flats.
Since the plots were already subdivided and serviced, the decision made by 
the Agency was that the size of the apartments would remain as planned. This 
meant that what was seen as an appropriate size for a ground floor of a house, 
became the size of the flat. This made them by far the smallest flats in the 
area, if compared to neighbouring public housing flats built over the last three 
decades. In addition to this, because of the rush to build them and the 
available budget, there were also many design and construction problems. At 
this stage, the buyers had very little choice in terms of turning down the flats, 
having already waited for on average 5 to 6 years from the time they were 
promised housing. In other words, had the Project from the start been 
‘conventional’ housing, the units would have been bigger, probably better built 
and above all would have been ready much earlier.
Most problematic of all was the increased price of the units and the debts and 
economic pressures the monthly instalments created. This was again the 
direct result of the delays in the Project and the rise in costs of materials, 
labour etc. In comparison to the HNC the financial burden which the project 
created on Rashed inhabitants seems less dramatic. In the latter case, there 
is the direct financial impact of loan repayments, and the price paid for the 
installation of the infrastructure in side streets. Indirectly there is the cost of 
house improvements of those who chose, during the construction boom, to do 
them without taking project loans, and the increase rent for tenants. However, 
the opportunity to improve housing conditions were there and did give some 
positive results. Local contractors as well as builders also benefited a great 
deal from the boom.
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In terms of infrastructure, despite a number of problems, there had been some 
improvement in the physical environment of Rashed. However the sewage 
was non-functional, the garbage collection system worked only for a few 
weeks and water connections were only accessible to those living on the main 
streets and those who could pay for extensions to side streets. In the case of 
the inhabitants of HNC, the infrastructure, though already showing faults, was 
working.
Another level of impacts the Project had was that on intra-and inter­
community group relations. In the Rashed community, the Project has had 
quite a detrimental impact at different levels. The ‘social team’ in the Agency 
and CHF seemed to have had no problem allying itself with the most powerful 
in the community at the expense of the least powerful. It provided the 
conditions by which landlords were given ‘carte blanche’ to advance their 
interests at the expense of the renters; it supported the cooperative leadership 
against that of the Youth Club, and in doing this it in was mostly supporting 
the ‘Arabs’ rather than the ‘newcomers’. It dealt only with men and totally left 
out women. The Project social team, and this includes CHF consultants, 
actually left the community more fractionalised than ever. It played on 
already existing exploitative and competing relationships in order to keep 
control of a complex process it was in fact inexperienced in handling. It 
defined community participation as the participation of leaders, and within this 
limited definition of participation, it even neglected to identify and seek 
legitimate representation. There was never a chance given for real 
negotiation, or space for expressing needs and interest of different groups in 
the community.
In the HNC, again there were no lines of communication established for flat 
buyers to discuss matters with the Agency staff. The latter acted in a 
dictatorial manner, and perceived the occupiers of the flats with suspicion- as 
a potential source of trouble. Perhaps it was too much to expect that 
something different would occur in the Helwan Project in a society where
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democracy is so curtailed at all levels- a society where to challenge authority 
is far from the norm, starting from the level of inter-household relations, in 
schools, to members of parliament and senior government officials. However, 
given that the Helwan Project was meant to be a pilot study, it was a lost 
opportunity for trying something different.
Both target groups experienced the Project as a confirmation about how their 
government treats the poor. Because of the different kind of relationship and 
different experiences that occurred during the Project, the Rashed and the 
HNC populations had slightly different views around this. In Rashed the 
resentment was mostly about what they saw as Government wanting to make 
a profit from the poor through high interest rate loans. This often raised 
discussions about what is seen as Government greed and corruption and how 
it makes its money out of the poor rather than the rich. There was also 
resentment, especially from the tenants, about how the government always 
supports those who have against those who do not. The loans were very 
much seen as an example for this pattern. No one in authority was considered 
to be sympathetic to the plight of tenants who because of the loans, were 
either paying extra rent, being harassed to do so or had lost their housing 
altogether.
The major resentment of the HNC residents was around the price of the units. 
In both communities, the government was accused of always giving promises 
and not delivering. Discussions were triggered about how the situation of the 
poor is always in decline, and that this is because Government does not care. 
Education was most often given as the example of this- of how inaccessible 
education has become and how the present Government was returning to pre­
revolutionary Egypt policies when the poor were ‘to be kept in their place’. 
Discussions about government being scared of mass anger and therefore using 
police brutality, under Emergency Laws (in operation since 1981), to keep 
control of the poor were also brought up in both communities. Both the Iron
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and Steel, and the prayer site incidents, were often brought up by HNC 
inhabitants as examples of Government oppression.
There were different views about the U.S., however none of them very 
passionate. They were mostly accused of wanting to keep the ‘Third World’ 
as it is and seeing its populations as less than human. They were seen as non­
believers who promote loans with interests and do not respect privacy in 
housing design, both basically against Islam. In these cases however, the 
ultimate blame was addressed to the GOE which ‘should know better’ and not 
accept such conditionality. However the latter was accused of being the 
‘American’s servants’, doing everything they are told.
The notion that GOE does everything the US wants it to do- that GOE is 
totally powerless in this relationship, is shared by the great majority of 
Egyptians including those considered to be best informed of Egyptian affairs. 
The generality of this notion, as this thesis has shown, will need to be re­
assessed. What was most interesting in following the way the Project evolved 
was that it shows that all actors, most of all the Egyptians, had potential 
power. Some chose to use it, others did not. This choice was part of an 
overall strategy, perhaps not always conscious, of prioritising interests at a 
particular point in time. It is this fluidity and movement of power, that makes 
Foucaults’ explanation relevant.
IV USAID AND GOE RELATION: WHAT DOES IT TELL US 
ABOUT AID?
Since the late eighties, the U.S. has been threatening to stop its yearly aid 
commitment to Egypt- a threat that, nearly eight years later, still has not 
materialised. In fact the yearly amount has gone from $1 billion annually in 
the seventies and eighties to $1.8 billion in the nineties. The U.S. goal for 
giving this aid to Egypt is still the same as it was in the mid-seventies. This 
aid is still under the umbrella of ‘peace dividend’. While this is rarely 
discussed by the U.S. or GOE, Israel does occasionally make a statement
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referring to this fact. In the last three or four years, relations between Egypt 
and Israel have taken a turn for the worse mostly due to Egypt’s justifiably 
hard line against Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian and other 
neighbouring Arab countries, especially Lebanon. As a result, Israel would 
complain to the U.S. that Egypt is violating the spirit of the peace treaty spirit 
signed between the two countries and therefore ‘aid for peace’ should be 
withdrawn (Quotation from an Israeli Newspaper in A1 Ahram, 1 July, 1996). 
This has not been the only defiance to the U.S. that GOE has been showing 
lately. In fact over the last five years, the U.S. has also been criticised in 
Government controlled national media. This however does not seem enough 
to deter the U.S. from its full economic support to the GOE. There is a 
relatively new threat to the stability of Egypt which would make a withdrawal 
of economic support very hard. Islamic fundamentalism has become a real 
threat in Egypt- a threat that the U.S. cannot afford to take lightly. The 
increased economic hardship of the majority of Egyptians, means increasing 
support for fundamentalism. If the GOE is put under any more economic 
pressure, an Islamic revolution is a real possibility. This is a very clear 
message the GOE have used in its negotiations with the US, with the World 
Bank and with the IMF over the last decade 7. Western countries and 
organisations increasingly see this as a real threat, and do not want another 
Iran in the Middle East. In fact what was the fear of Communism has been 
replaced by a fear of Islamic Fundamentalism- what was the fear of the Soviet 
Union has become the fear of Iran. This fear is not only an external one but 
also an internal one. Acts of terrorism by Muslim Fundamentalists in the 
U.S. and Europe have brought this reality dangerously close to home.
Every incident that confirms this fear, starting with the food riots in 1978, the 
assassination of Sadat in 1981, to more recent outbreaks of violence in Egypt
7 This argument has been the strongest one employed in negotiations over the 
enforcement of structural adjustment measures. Egypt was able to postpone the M l 
implementation of these measures for over eight years and have not till the writing of these 
line taken on all the new policies.
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and in the West in the nineties, are used by Egyptian negotiators. Aid to 
Egypt has therefore remained as politicised as it always has been. The GOE, 
as the Helwan Project has demonstrated, have been using this to its advantage 
and have been far from powerless in the relationship. Their main fight with 
the U.S. over the years - a fight they never won, was that they wanted to be 
treated like Israel, that is to graduate from ‘tied aid’. Aid to Egypt came with 
conditions, and it would be interesting to assess how many of those were in 
fact met. The Helwan Project conditions were not met. The major goal 
behind this Project was to change Egypt’s housing policy. According to the 
last USAID Lessons Learned Report:
1 Almost non of the original project objectives will be achieved.
There has been no material change in GOE housing policy, no 
reduction of subsidies, no re-targeting of beneficiaries, and no 
extension of housing finance to lower-income groups and no 
change in the role of the private sector in Housing" (Gardner,
D. et al, USAID Report, 1990, p. 12).
Not only were the objectives not achieved, but the ‘new’ housing approach 
was stopped from being implemented within the Project itself- a Project 
funded by USAID and with a Grant Agreement signed by the GOE. Another 
approach was then employed by USAID in Egypt and this was labelled ‘Policy 
dialogue’. The purpose of this was to change Egypt’s policies through 
dialogue. Considering what can be learned from the Helwan Project, it is 
interesting to consider whether the conditions for real dialogue are there in a 
relationship such as the one that exists between USAID and GOE. This is a 
highly political relationship, with huge interests at stake and it is totally devoid 
of trust. This is no doubt a key to the whole issue. A good start would be to 
recognise the very nature of this relationship and to bring this to the fore in 
any so-called ‘policy dialogue’.
To reiterate, the question is not about who had the power, but how power 
played a role in shaping the process of one Project, one case in a particular 
context. The analysis of the Helwan Project and what it shows in terms of an
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understanding of a particular aid relationship at a point in the history of 
USAID and GOE relations, is not directly transferable to other contexts. 
There is no doubt that the strategic position of Egypt and its unique aid 
contract with the USAID makes a particular case. Nevertheless, what this 
thesis was trying to illustrate, using a particular methodology, is not only how 
one set of aid relationships can give insight into the functioning of a particular 
context, in this case Egypt, but also elsewhere.
Most, including aid specialists, politicians and the general public, assume that 
recipients of aid are powerless. They also assume that aid is predominantly 
an economic transaction. The impact of aid is often measured against whether 
or not it had achieved its goal- development. Until this approach to the 
analysis of aid is challenged through different case studies such as the one 
presented in this thesis, an important part of understanding aid relations and 
how it affects donor led development will be missed.
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APPENDIX 1
MAPS OF THE HELWAN PROJECT
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APPENDIX 2
OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT COMPONENTS 
OF THE HELWAN PROJECT
The project objectives as they appear in the project paper include a series of 
overall objectives, policy objectives and working objectives. The following 
is a summary of the key objectives:
(1) To enhance the ability of the entire Egyptian housing sector to 
respond to shelter and community needs of the urban population, 
particularly for low income households [overall objective].
(2) To reduce public sector housing subsidies by scaling standards of 
plot size, infrastructure, house construction,and by seeking cost 
recovery from the target group according to their ability to pay [policy 
and working objective].
(3) To mobilise private resources for improving existing housing stock 
by providing home improvement loans; to encourage such investment 
by legalising informal areas through the process of survey, 
subdivision, recordation and sale of titles to residents [policy and 
working objective].
(PCR, CHF, 1988).
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THE PROJECT COMPONENTS AS PLANNED IN 1978
Upgrading
Upgrading of seven existing 
communities with an estimated 
population of 110,000.
Helwan New Community
The development of 
Helwan New community (HNC) 
divided into ten neighbourhoods.
Services provided Services provided
1. Sewage 1. Sewage
2. Water 2. Water
3. Schools 3. Electricity
4. Community centres 4. Schools
5. Home Improvement Loans 5. Community centre
6. Small Enterprise Loans 6. Health Centre
The Project as Implemented After 
its Official Completion Date in 1988
Upgrading
Water and sewage pipes 
installed but sewage 
yet.
All buildings finalised 
except for a number of centres.
Helwan New Community
A. Sites-and-Services
Infrastructure installed
but only two of ten nbs operating
were sold as plots.
B. 'Public Housing’ flats
Five of the remaining eight 
neighbourhoods were constructed 
as three floor flats.
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APPENDIX 3
IDENTIFICATION OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT
A. Policy-implementation level:
The Egyptian side:
Central Government
Ministry of Housing
Egyptian Agency for Joint Projects
Local Government
Cairo Governorate 
Sectoral agencies
Private sector
Construction Contractors
The American side:
Congress
USAID
Consultancy firms
Design and infrastructure contractors
B. Community-Target group level:
The upgrading communities:
Traditional leadership 
‘Young’ leadership
Arabs (bedouins)
Migrants from Upper Egypt 
Migrants from lower Egypt 
Cairenes
Home owners 
Renters
The inhabitants of the public housing flats 
The inhabitants of Sites-and-Services
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APPENDIX 4 
STUDY POPULATIONS\METHODS
STUDY POPULATIONS METHODS
A. POLICY/IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL:
1. THE EGYPTIAN SIDE
Ministry of Housing (Women & Men)
Egyptian Agency for Joint Projects (Women 
& Men)
Semi-structured
interviews
Observation & semi­
structured interviews
2. THE AMERICAN SIDE
USAID (Women & Men) Structured & Semi- 
structured interviews
CHF (Consultants- Women & Men) Semi-structured
interviews
B. COMMUNITY/TARGET GROUP LEVEL:
1. The Upgrading community (Rashed)
The leaders:
-Community Development 
Cooperative (Men)
Observation, discussions 
& semi-structured 
interviews
-The Youth Club (Men) Semi-structured
interviews
Members of the Community (Women & 
Men):
-The ‘Arabs’ 
-Upper Egyptians 
-Lower Egyptians 
-The Cairenes
Discussions, in-depth and 
structured interviews
2. The public housing residents (Women & men) Discussions, in-depth and 
structured interviews
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APPENDIX 5 
PLANS OF THE HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY
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APPENDIX 6
HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY - HOUSING TYPES
337
Source: 
U
rbanisation 
Plan 
1985
U)LO
00
u o  ,  i  «o .  U . _  .  '*<  .  1*>. •»>
•a(9
>KJ
U1X
K)U1
3
*
U1X
KJU1
*
ao
X
KJW1
3
TTT
*
M i
' H g j
€ 1 4-
n *  ! ’ «» , • ? «  , J  r »  - n ______j A
8
B
c o
7 ~ r ' «2 A I!
H
ousing 
Types
04
2
( I ) e
*
J» . '*£ jii. iJ ,»L. j l  JS j5> * .
; V '  r  —a>i £-1*3 j ^ l l
Type A
Source: Urbanisation Plan 1985 
339
I
( ^ )  £ 4 * “
r^)lr><a -
( u i )  £ j > * j
T n v . o  =  ajK3I
-  ^  JS
j 'j* r  J - * ’ g& JX
Type B 
340
- > )
(-?•)
%  A £ , VV© =  AjISII
Type C
341
APPENDIX 7
THE IMPACT THE HELWAN PROJECT HAD 
ON THE HNC RESIDENTS: FOUR CASES
By moving into their new flats, the inhabitants of HNC had to meet additional 
financial obligations which put them in a particularly difficult situation. They 
did not just have to cope with the on-going impact of general economic 
conditions, but also had to meet the sudden additional expenses of moving into 
units. The latter seems to have put them in a more vulnerable position to 
cope with the former. Moreover, they were little prepared or warned about 
the negative impact of either.
The inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 could be subdivided into four broad 
categories around they were able to cope with the move to the Project 
housing. Four case studies have been selected to represent each of these four 
household categories1.
1. The first category is very much in the minority (around 1%  of the sample). 
These are household where the main income earner (generally the husband) 
is doing well and the wife (with two exceptions) is not economically active. 
Most have a smaller number of children than average and they are all in 
education. The flat of these households are well furnished, with sturdy and 
sometimes fancy furniture, electrical equipment which included a washing 
machine, refrigerator, television and perhaps a video machine.
ABU AND UM AMR:
This was a household composed of husband, wife and three children. Abu 
Amr and Um Amr were both 30 years old (average ages), Amr (the son) was 
7 and Nada and Marwa (the daughters) are six and five. Abu Amr came from
1 Around 90% of households in the sample at the time of the fieldwork were composed 
of nuclear families.
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a small town in upper Egypt and Um Amr came from the city of Helwan. 
They had been married for eight years, during which time they lived in the 
city of Helwan in two room, sharing a bathroom with other tenants, with no 
running water. They paid LE25 a month in rent.
When the research was carried out Abu Amr, who is a university graduate, 
worked in the Cement factory as an accountant. He was paid around LE250 
to LE300 per month depending on incentives (120% to 170% of the pay).
Um Amr who described herself as a housewife, had never been to school. 
Amr was in primary school, Nada and Marwa were to join him the following 
year. High education achievement for all three children was seen by both 
parents as one of their major goals in life.
The flat, although type ‘A’ 2, was comfortable and pleasant. The furniture 
was of good quality. All desirable electrical equipment were available: 
coloured T.V, washing machine, stove and refrigerator. Having this 
equipments in their possession, ie not having had to sell any of it, put them 
in the minority of the sample. Food, like the wide majority of the HNC 
population comes on the top of their list of expenses. They said they spent 
LE120 a month ie around 50% of their income, on food. The next was 
medical expenses, on which they spent around LE45. Then the third was the 
flat instalment of LE35.
The reason they gave for choosing to get a flat in the HNC was that they lived 
in crammed conditions without proper infrastructure far from Abu Amr’s 
place of work. The flat however was costing much more than they had 
anticipated. Its poor condition, they explained, meant that they had to spend 
around LE600 to fix it. However compared to their previous living 
conditions, they said this was a better place to live.
2 Type A is the smallest unit of 56.25 Sq meters, containing two bedrooms, a bathroom 
and a standing space for a kitchen.
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Abu and Um Amr were however not uncritical of the Project. They accused 
the Agency for not being straightforward about the price of the units which 
caused them and everyone else financial problems. Um Amr said "At one 
point we had to borrow money and become part of a game’va3. two things 
which we always avoided doing. I feel very uncomfortable about it".
They were both resentful at having to pay 50% in addition to the amount they 
were told they would pay in instalment. They said they understood that the 
price of building materials went up and thus had contributed to the rise in the 
price. However, they felt that the increase was mostly as a result of mistakes, 
like money lost on the Model Housing Estate, which they were now having 
to pay for. Abu Amr explained that he sympathised with those who are 
suffering, mostly due to this price increase:
"There are many who were desperate enough to accept to pay 
much more for these flats than they could afford. The reason 
is that they lived in inhuman conditions before. They often 
have low pay and a large number of children. They are really 
cornered".
Abu Amr said that he and his family were doing quite well in comparison to 
others. He explained that he and his wife have an advantage over others who 
might have the same income, because they manage their money well and are 
clear about their priorities. He said that they never loose money on useless 
things, that he had to give up smoking in order to save the money for better 
use. The government was criticised for lack of planning and that "although 
the economic recession is caused by the world economic recession, things are 
so bad in Egypt mainly due to the debt crisis which is a result of 
mismanagement" Abu Amr commented.
3 A cooperative, which is a traditional form of saving through a rotating fund among a 
group of people.
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2. The second category of households were those who were able to keep a 
certain level of control over their lives but were feeling the pressure from 
economic problems. It is estimated that this group could represented about 
20% of the population of HNC. They generally had quite good incomes and 
had been quite comfortable financially before because they lived in low rent 
houses. However they felt overstretched after the move because of the present 
housing situation and the increase in living expenses.
ABU AND UM MOHSEN:
This was another nuclear household, composed of the husband, wife and again 
three children. 27 % of the HNC had three children at the time the research 
was carried out and some had the intention of having more. Abu and Um 
Mohsen had been married for ten years. He was 37 and she was 30, Mohsen 
(the oldest son) was 9, Heba (the daughter) 7 and the baby boy Mohamed 8 
months old. Um Mohsen was born in a lower Egyptian city (30%) and Abu 
Mohsen in Cairo (24%). They had lived in Cairo in a three room flat which 
contained a private bathroom but no kitchen and no water or sewage 
connections and had paid LE30 rent. Abu Mohsen had always been the sole 
income earner, working as a mechanic in the maintenance garage of the 
Cement factory making about LE230 to LE270 per month. He left school at 
the age of 15. Um Mohsen, had a middle level diploma and describes herself 
as a housewife. They lived in type ‘C’4 flat, and therefore had to pay 
LE2,391 as first instalment and LE42 in monthly instalments. The flat was 
well furnished, though scarce by Egyptian standards5. They owned a T.V a 
fridge and a stove. Their largest expenditure was on food (LE150) and their 
second on the instalments and repayment of debts which Um Mohsen said 
amounted to LE70 a month. They explained that in order to raise the money 
for the first instalment they had had to sell Abu Mohsen’s share in his father’s 
house, borrow from work and sell Um Mohsen’s jewellery. They also spent
4 These are 84,375 Sq meter flats, with three bedrooms, a bathroom and kitchen.
5 The majority of Egyptians like to furnish their houses with heavy, plentiful furniture.
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LE2000 fixing the flat: painting, repairing the electric connections and the 
water connections in the kitchen.
Although, after being repaired, they really liked the flat, they thought that had 
they known it would be so expensive, they would have looked in the private 
sector. However they felt trapped and they felt it was impossible to go back. 
The Agency was blamed for the rise in price,
w..they are making a lot of profit out of us. The so-called low 
income population. Tell me, how can a low income family 
have LE5000 in savings? Non of us can afford to save" Abu 
Mohsen argued.
Um Mohsen explained that before this move to the flat they were able to live 
without debts. "It is true that the old flat was small and we had no water, but 
at least we could sleep at night without worrying about debts", she said. Abu 
Mohsen added that he has had to borrow to cover his monthly expenses which 
means he was getting even more in debt. He added:
"I am seriously considering finding work in the Golf to get us 
out of this vicious circle. This option will be painful for all of 
us, but I might still have to do it".
When asked about the option of Um Mohsen working, she argued that her 
children were still too young to be left on their own and that anyhow she did 
not think there were good paying jobs for women. She also did not see what 
she could produce at home to bring in an income. She explained that in each 
building there was dressmaker already. To the possibility of his wife 
working, Abu Mohsen added that idea of his wife working was out of the 
question. He said he would not be ‘a real man’ if he allowed it.
Discussing the wider economic situation they both agreed that things were 
getting more and more expensive and that the majority of people were unable 
to survive. The reason for this, they explained, was the ‘population
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explosion’. Abu Mohsen said that there are too many mouths to feed. He 
added:
"You can see this very clearly in the factory I work in. The 
more children a man has the more in-debt he is and the more 
harassed he looks. Single men are the ones who can afford to 
lend money to these desperate people".
No serious sacrifices seemed to have been made yet, but the threat of 
migration for Abu Mohsen was seen as a serious possibility. On the other 
hand there was no mention of having to resort to desperate measures such as 
to cut down on food, or take children out of school. Worrying about debt was 
seen to be upsetting to them, though not devastatingly so.
3. The third category which represent the majority of the HNC population 
(around 60%), are those who were really suffering hardship because of the 
unexpected rise in the price of housing. This category, who were having 
already struggling because the wider economic conditions, were made even 
more vulnerable by having acquired the HNC flats. This category of 
household were among those who had already had to review their priorities 
and made choices that might have entailed making real sacrifices.
ABU AND UM MERVAT
This household was composed of Abu Mervat, Um Mervat and four 
daughters. He was 35, she was 27 and the daughters were 12, 8, 5 and 2 
years old. The couple had been married for thirteen years and both came 
from rural upper Egypt. They had been living with Um Mervat’s parents in 
Cairo. Abu Mervat was sole income earner in the household. He made about 
LE175 as semi-skilled worker, and an additional LE100 driving a friend’s taxi 
on Fridays. Both Abu and Um Mervat had never been to school. The two 
older girls went to primary school.
The flat was very simple, with basic furniture: beds, couches and tables. 
They also owned a black and white T.V and a stove.
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Food was again on the top of their expenditure list on which they said they 
spent LE100, followed by the rent and the debts which amounted to LE92 per 
month. Abu and Um Mervat explained that they were desperate to leave his 
wife’s family home as they were all squashed into one room, and although 
they had paid their share towards the rent (LE10), they were made to feel a 
burden. Um Mervat who was very distraught about the way they had been 
mistreated by her family, explained that she would not have minded selling all 
she had and borrowing from everyone to escape this daily humiliation. Indeed 
they did sell a newly stove for half the price they had bought. They also sold 
a coloured T.V and her wedding jewellery. They had also borrowed from 
Abu Mervat’s place of work, a sum that he had to repay in LE50 monthly 
instalments.
Inflation was also getting to them. Um Mervat spoke at great length about the 
effort it took her to make ends meet. She was terribly stressed and felt guilty 
and inadequate because she had to drop a number of nutritious items from her 
children’s diet. She said that it was perhaps alright to do without meat, but 
to stop giving her children eggs or milk was too much. She said her 
daughters were used to having their glass of milk daily. Now this was gone 
and she could only afford to give a smaller amount to the two year old. 
"When we are in the market, my daughter of five asks me about the names 
of fruits. They used to be at our table before. It breaks my heart", she said.
Other than sacrifices in terms of cutting down on food items, there were fears 
expressed by both adults about whether they would be able to keep their 
children in school. They said that this possibility would have never crossed 
their minds before as they did not want their children to suffer like they did 
for not having been educated.
These discussion inevitably raised the issue about the government and its role. 
Abu Mervat’s opinion was that the rise in prices was not a reflection of 
scarcity of food in Egypt, but bad planning and corruption.
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4. The fourth category, although in the minority (around 15%), are an 
important category as they personify the extreme end of how detrimental the 
Project was for some. These were households who were already in hardship 
and could barely make ends meet before the Project. The Project had then 
come along, they had taken part in it and were badly shaken by the 
consequences. They had sold all they had owned to meet part of the first 
instalment. They borrowed had from work, relatives and friends and the 
strain was so bad that inter-household relations were suffering seriously.
ABU AND UM MAHMOUD:
This was one of the few extended households among the population of the 
HNC It was composed of Abu Mahmoud, Um Mahmoud and seven children. 
In addition, his widowed mother and two younger brothers stayed with him 
for part of the year. All of them live in a type ‘A’ flat. Abu Mahmoud was 
35, Um Mahmoud was 30, their children were five girls between the ages of 
14 and 8 years and the two sons are 3 years, and 9 months. Abu Mahmoud’s 
mother (Um Mohamed) was 50, her two sons were 10 and 8 years. Abu 
Mahmoud and Um Mahmoud were first cousins and were born in an upper 
Egyptian village. They had been married for 16 years during which Um 
Mahmoud had nine births (lost two children). They used to live in two rooms 
and shared a bathroom and cooking area with other households. They paid 
LE20 in rent.
None of them had gone to school, with the exception of one of the daughters, 
the youngest, who went to school for two years but was taken out when they 
came to the HNC. Abu Mahmoud worked as a semi-skilled labourer in a 
factory. He said he was paid around LE150 to LE200 per month. Um 
Mahmoud set up a little stall in front of the house selling biscuits and soft 
drinks. She said she made about LEI00 a month.
Their flat had the minimum amount of furniture. Two beds, a couch and a 
few mattresses. Um Mahmoud said their two major expenses were LEI00 per
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month on food, around LE62 on the instalment for the flat and repayment of 
debts. LE40 was spent on medicine. She explained that they had to 
drastically cut down on food, and were eating just enough to survive. They 
said they had come to HNC because they thought they would pay only LE23 
on instalments per month. In order to raise the money, they had sold their 
T.V, Abu Mahmoud had borrowed money from work and they got involved 
in a ‘game’va’ and they had even sold the girls’ golden earrings. Talking 
about this issue Abu Mahmoud said:
"This flat was an absolute disaster for us. We sold everything 
we owned and I am indebted to the factory for LE350. This 
means I pay LE17 a months towards this plus LE10 for the 
game’ya. All this in addition to the LE35 of the monthly 
instalments".
The small size of the flat also meant that Abu Mahmoud’s mother and his 
brother could not live there permanently. This perhaps was considered a 
blessing to Um Mahmoud and even to Abu Mahmoud. However as the eldest 
son, his sense of responsibility and pride meant he had to take care of his 
mother and his young brothers.
Discussions with this household often centred around an unsympathetic 
government and the poor who had no hope to improve their lives. Abu 
Mahmoud said that he had hopes to educate his children and was still trying, 
but it seemed to him it was a loosing battle.
Um Mahmoud’s selling in front of the house, despite the teasing and loss of 
face for her husband, in addition to the financial pressures, caused enormous 
tension in the household. However without her contribution, the household 
would have gone under, and could still do so.
A number of households, like this in fact had to leave the flats shortly after 
having moved in. They were unable to cope with the additional financial 
pressures. I was unable to get exact figures about this. However during the 
fieldwork, I came across at least four households who had chosen this option.
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APPENDIX 8
SKETCH FROM PROJECT PUBLICITY BROCHURE 
OF HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY
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